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F.O.
371

1947

PALESTINE

FILE No. 46

pp. 1672 – 1780

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UNTIL

1978

61768

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142

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PALESTINE

E 1672
25 FEB
2

Registry Number } E 1672/62/31

FROM

Kelcourt

No.

Dated

Received in Registry } 23 Feb 1921
25 Feb 1921

Memo on file fire outbreak

Various

Last Paper.

1668

References.

(Print.)

61768

(How disposed of.)

(3). Ack. Mar 12.

(6). Ack. Mar 19

(Minutes.)

2). H. Kaye
3). Mrs. W. Foxhound
4) E. Gates
5) Leopold Glazer
6) Mr. G.K. (Isabel) Hinchliffe
7) W. Stanley Shaw.
8) Chas. F. Bennett.
9) B.M. England.
10 Lyle Fanning.

1-5) Plain acknowledge no. 3

H.T.B. 4/3

6-10) Plain acknowledge no. 6

N. American Dept. (no. 10)

H.T.B. 14/3

(Action completed.)

6 Mar 21

(Indexed)

24 Mar 21

Next Paper.

1673

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E 3

J. ROBART
BOSCHWEG 12
APELDOORN

TEL. 3651

E 1672
25 FEB

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J. ROBART
BOSCHWEG 12
APELDOORN

TEL. 3651

4

Yours sincerely,

J. Robart


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Friday Feb 21st please Ack 16 Halton Village
Nr Aylesbury
Bucks

To Mr Bevin

FO 1672/46/91

Dear Sir.

I am writing you on behalf of quite a number of mothers + wives of men in Palestine.

These men are enduring terrible hardships in Palestine to say nothing of the humiliation at the treatment the Jews are handing out to them.

They hate our men + tell them that they couldn't catch a cold + just laugh at them.

Quite a number of these men are on conscription service.

Will you please get our youth out of Palestine before they are all get blown to smithereens. The terrorists seem to be getting busy again

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& They say that they intend 2
to carry on until the last
British soldier has left.

I certainly think that the garrisoning of the place should be shared by the other nations.

We must get these terrorists under control or get our youth away from there.

I think America should send a few thousand men out there. After all a lot of the terrorist funds are coming from America.

Perhaps if their own soldiers were involved they would think twice about sending subscriptions.

Will you please get our youths on conscription service out of Palestine.

Yours faithfully
Mrs W Tabhouse

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Her youth could be doing more useful work here in England than fighting terrorists in Palestine.

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13th Feb 1947.

'Kenaway'
Rochester Drive
Westcliff-on-Sea
Essex.

Dear Mr Bevin,

You dont have to be told by me that our country is short of manpower. Nor that the Arabs and the Jews resent our boys in palestine. British people protecting a race of people that dub us their enemies. It doesn't make sense to me and the more we read the reports on these things the more puzzled we become. Lets have our boys back in England where they will probably be able to do some good. they are the fathers of the next generation. Too many have already been killed. In a few years time some one will be saying that England is a country of old men I believe it has been said already. We want thinking men and women now you have the welfare of our country at heart. Lets have our boys back in England, why not have a vote on the question of withdrawing from

P.T.O

CONTINUATION SHEET
ATTACHED
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13th Feb 1947. "Kenaway"
Rochester Drive
Westcliff-on-Sea
Essex.

ACKNOWLEDGED
1 Ack
2 Dept
M.E.I.S. FILE 1672 46 R1
10

Dear Mr Bevin,

You dont have to be told by me that our country is short of manpower. Nor that the Arabs and the Jews resent our boys in palestine. British people protecting a race of people that dub us their enemies. It does'nt make sense to me and the more We read the reports on these things the more puzzled we become. Lets have our boys back in England where they will probably be able to do some good. they are the fathers of the next generation. Too many have already been killed. In a few years time some one will be saying that England is a country of old men I believe it has been said already. Most thinking men and women know you have the welfare of our country at heart. Lets have our boys back in England, why not have a vote on the question of withdrawing from

P.T.O.

M.E.I.S. CONTINUATION SHEET

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palestine? and let those that are fighting so much about it get on with the job a vote from the people would show their minds about the question just as it did when they put you in power. I wish you good luck always.

yours faithfully Elsie Gosta.

P.S. Our Boys must not be used to fight fore of Arabs in Palestine.

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"Ramleh" P.W.
Ack. 107 Shirland Rd. 12

ACKNOWLEDGED
12 FEB 1947

16/2 46 4/9.

Eastern Dept 9.2.47.

Dear Mr Beoan,

I am thankful to see you have supported the proposal I submitted by Special Messenger in respect to the Palestine problem. Many thanks for seeing the Necessity of taking only this Stand.

However as arranged I am sending to you the full statement as I had formerly submitted it to Mr Stanley Baldwin when Prime Minister in 1933, and

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to the late Mr David Lloyd George, apart from sending it to others, including yourself indirectly, as brought to your notice.

I take it your Secretary obtained from Lord Jialoutal the full report sent to him on Special Safeguards for India in forming a new Constitution for India some months ago. The present arrangement seems to indicate it met with your approbation.

If the agreement can be reached between Arab & Jews regarding Palestine and between Hindus & Muslims regarding India's transition towards Dominion Status and between the Egyptians and ourselves over the Soudanese country then the only alternative will be for the United Nations to hold Mandates for the controlling

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& these Countries with a United Nations Defensive forces to preserve Law and order therein until they are effectively managed and then transfer the torch to the Nations themselves to continue where UNO left off. Like this no one can say that one Nation wants a monopoly over their respective interests.

Wishing You all Success in Your Great work for Peace in Our Time.

Yours ever
Fraternally Yours
always
Leopold Kaiser.

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The OPENING OF PALESTINE FOR THE JEWS.

by Leopold Glazer., F.T.S.

All are agreed that the future safetyof the Near East lies in the co-operation of all people in Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Transjordania, Arabia and Mesopotamia. The oldsystem of an Empire is recognised to be a thing of the past. We can, with some hope of success, based on the joint will of the people of these Countries. (build up another unificatory system) *

A Federation seems to us to be the best plan for the continuation of the culture of the Near Eastern people. In order to secure this end, we must must also secure the freedom of the various peoples who are now subjected to the domination of the European Powers. The securing of the freedom of these Countries is the primary objective.

Palestine forms the centre piece of the future reconstruction, owing to its historic importance for three religions of the World.

WE believe that future progress of humanity lies in the co-operation of all peoples, based on mutual tolerance and goodwill. Let us see whether we can bring these factors to bear on Palestinian Affairs. The Jews and the Muslims have been brought together under perculiar circumstances. THE JEWS came back into Palestine relying fully on the promises of the Western Allies to build up a real National Home for their people. The interests of the Muslims had assumed a second rate importance when Turkey had to yield along with Germany. It was only the fortitude of the local population that Palestinian Arabs were not completely driven out. They were helped by their co-religionists from India, but the aid they did receive was moral backing and political check was given, thereby, to the British, by also a counter move in India, backed again by the Hindus, under Mahatma Gandhi.

The recognition of the rights of the Arabs to live under the Palestinians soon followed. The Arabs, in the new circumstances, secured their rights not by the might of power but by the strength of their moral claim to enjoy the possession of the ordinary human rights of occupation extending over several CENTURIES.

As to the future, the JEWS, it looks to us, are not far from being reconciled to the circumstances of today. We believe that the Arab mentality is beginning to recognise the need of realising the inevitability of the situation. The Jews are there and many of the German Jews that are being turned out of Germany under the Hitler Regime and anxious too, to enter into Palestine and to all reasonable minds as being considered a forgone conclusion, of the Jews going there for some time to come.. The Arabs should have, by this time, come to recognise the legality of this fact. If they have, then, what is being proposed now, will not be so unpalatable to them or to other Powers who base their policies on tolerance and goodwill.

We consider, the future co-operation of the two peoples is feasible if both Arabs and Jews are prepared to live together in harmony. The following are the proposals I submit towards securing this harmony:-

1. Palestine should be under a unitary form of self-government.
2. The Arabs and the Jews should have equal opportunities of evolving their own lives.
3. Palestine ought to reach the same level of independent political existence as is enjoyed by other Nationalities and Countries.
4. The freedom of Palestine in its turn, depends upon the Arabs and the Jews to develope according to their respective ideals.
5. In order to secure this end, a plan should be formed under which both communities would be free to develope along their own lines and yet be co-operating.
6. Both the Jews and the Arabs should look at thisquestion from this point of view in order to arrive at a proper solution.
7. If the Jews have a selected territory that they can call their own in which they can evolve the newly awakened idealism, then THEIR sentiments will be reconciled and they will not come in the way of the evolution of the Arab community.
8. If the Arabs are assured that the ideal of a National Home for the Jews can be developed without disturbing the unity of Palestine, the Arabs may then be prepared to consider such a proposition, which is to be hoped for at this stage.
9. Local autonomy for both communities to evolve of their own lines and loyal co-operation in the building up of Palestine as an independent State should prove to be a sound basis for future development.
10. This thes is being accepted, then the solution of the Palestinian question is solved if Jewish and Arabs Leaders come together.

* [Amendment telephoned by Mr Glazer. P.A. 11/2]

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I do feel that the above views which I put forward in 1933 to Mr Baldwin and to the late Mr David Lloyd George, is the correct policy to adopt and which should satisfy both the Jewish people and the Arab people alike.

We must be very conciliatory towards the Arabs, for more than one reason because of the position in which Eygpt at present stands, for she is a bulwark in the future defence of the British Empireand the other reason, is the Jews are NOT a WARRIOR RACE and when it comes to defending the Country of Palestine from a foreign invasion they will not be powerful enough to do so without ARABIAN support. Moreover the Jews, stand to gain much more in increasing their markets, in not opposing the Arabs, and this stands for England too, for if England shows more interests in the Jewish aspect than the Arabs', the Arabs who have a strong political footing with Germans in Africa and in India and the rest of Europe as well as amongst our own Conservatives, also in Italy and Spain, therefore, in the Defence of Peace we cannot afford to favour any Religious denomination more than another, however valuable that Race may be, at the cost of losing the friendship of Egypt, etc.

Of this you may be sure, the Arabs would negotiate with the Jewish people on the lines proposed, if immigration were to cease during such negotiations, for otherwise it does not prove that the Jewish people really are concerned in the Arabs interests. The Arabs would co-operate with the Jews because they come from the same stock more readily that with Powers outside their domain. But if they see that the Jews and the British Government are not conciliatory, then force of circumstances will induce them to support a foreign invasion, if such is not already contemplated. Who knows if it be not Russia or the Muslim World or even Europe as a whole. These elements have got to be watched just the same, for where there is no respect for God there is no faith or loyalty towards human rights.

Leopold Glazer.

NOTE:- If no agreement can be reached between the Arabs and the Jews, then UNO should hold the mandate for the government of these areas. The problem of Soudan and India would have to be the same arrangement.

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INDEXED

10 Stanley Av. E
Birkdale
Southport-17
Feb. 23rd 1947.

To the Foreign Minister
Whitehall 1672 46 31
London.

Dear Sir, I enclose an airletter from my son which may interest you, as it comes from the most untrained mind.

I have marked the bits which I feel will interest you and so save wading through personal matters.

Wishing you the best in all your big endeavours.

Yours very sincerely
(Mrs. C. K.) Isabel Stretch

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Bishop Gobat School,
Jerusalem
15th Feb. 1947

My dear Mummy and Daddy

I got your airletter of Feb 6th today. Not too quick considering how anxious I was to hear how the weather was treating you. You sounded remarkably cheerful. But of course these terrible cuts only started on Monday. I do hope things are not too grim. And here we are sweltering in most unseasonable warmth. I have not even put on my pullover this evening and am more than comfortable. I am sorry I did not write last week-end but things are quite hectic again and I seem to have had much more than any one person should get to do. I am now hoping for a bit of relief if Mr Sergeant comes to live here and gives us some help with English and Scripture. He is anxious to if he can get someone to look after the Newman school buildings. As the circular you had said, his wife had been sent home, but is now in Egypt I believe. Well, although my last letter was so short and indefinite, I am afraid this will not seem much more satisfactory. I have been hoping to hear from Francis. I had a cable to say he was leaving Southampton on the seventh and I replied that I would meet him at any place and time he appointed in the canal zone. But his answer has not yet come though I reckon he must now be coming half way along the Mediterranean. I hope he wont leave me too little time, as our frontier is closed to British subjects and I may have trouble getting a permit. But I am hoping to see him this week-end even if only for a few hours, and then with exams and so on I can probably postpone corrections and find time to write. Mr MacInnes says or said he would look after the school while I was away but now I hear he is busy this week-end and wont be available. We have been preparing for the mid-year exams and also getting passes for our Junior school children to enter the cantonment area. But there seems to be no intention of interfering with my liberties at all. I applied today for a pass for all areas and have had no instructions about moving. The school has not been affected at all, and the only result in my case is this piling on a little extra work that I have already grumbled about. Now that the government has not been able to obtain approval from either side for its truly reasonable and sensible proposals I suppose we are in for another few months of "no policy" until the U.N. can consider the case. It must make all these removals seem utterly senseless. They could only have been justified as clearing the decks for action. Now there will be no action save of a "police" and security nature, which of course we are well accustomed to. They might as well have let them all stay. You have no idea of the lurid accounts arriving here of the conditions in the transit camps. But it compelled the Chief Secretary to visit Egypt and try to improve the position. We are still more sorry for those unfortunates being planked down in wintry England. Really it is cruel. I have had to get my exam papers set in case I am called away suddenly. They are ready on the stencil now so I only have to duplicate them, the work of an hour or so.

The magazine has gone off to press. Mostly Arabic this time, so I am afraid you wont be much interested. Thanks for sending me Uncle Ernest's address: useful for reference. Miss Kern seems to be having difficulty getting her visa for England, and her return to Palestine. She says she does not feel she is likely to make the visit this summer. Mrs Semple and Mrs Weippert are staying on. The former is not fit to travel alone, and the latter was exempted to enable the school to carry on. Of course as usual they see they have been quite absurd and slowly give way

to requests for permission to remain. It is a pity if the government do not have the courage to carry through their ideas without weakly looking to people here to "back" them. Of course they cant expect to get any backing but if they resolve on a fair policy and also determine to carry it through, the inhabitants will very soon respond. For different reasons. But the majority are still prone to admire the strong hand, and even miss it - since the Turks went. And they would easily be led to see the advantages of cooperation. As long as the fear of a Jewish majority and state is removed - as it is in Bevin's scheme. But this (apparent) retreat from a policy is exactly whatever the one has foretold and expected and feared. It always happens. The main failing of the Arab population is an inferiority complex. Some of them were telling me only tonight that of course they know they have none of the organising skill or qualities of the Jews and they seem unwilling to make any effort to see if by any chance they have more gifts than they claim. It is a real problem but our inability to help them is partly the price we pay for the past. They instinctively suspect anything that comes from the British. Yet they keep on blaming the Government for not doing more for them: accuse it of claiming to be a "trustee" and doing nothing for the people. How can you help anyone who does not want to be helped? I must not let myself run on about this. I am sure it is just the effect of the past week's events. But again it is our fault very largely for showing ourselves so panicky: in the eyes of the Palestinians the evacuation is nothing less. Heaps of love to you both. I do hope they dont cut off your power at night. Tonight the news said the weather was a little better. And a lot of ships had reached London with coal. It is I suppose really no use blaming the Govt. there either for we never expected them to control the weather. Only another 5 months now before we shall I hope meet. How shall I be off for clothing coupons. I need to buy a lot if possible. Yr as ever

Knowles. (2)

BY AIR MAIL

AIR LETTER

IF ANYTHING IS ENCLOSED THIS LETTER WILL BE SENT BY ORDINARY MAIL

Mrs Stretch

10, Stanley Avenue,

Birkdale

SOUTHPORT

England

WHEN FOLDED THE LETTER MUST CONFORM IN SIZE AND SHAPE WITH THE BLUE BORDER WITHIN WHICH THE ADDRESS ONLY MAY BE WRITTEN

SENDER'S NAME AND ADDRESS:—

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The London Police Court Mission.

E 20

Chairman of Committee—
D. L. Bateson, Esq.

President—
The Rt. Hon. Lord Hailsham, P.C.

Cheques should be crossed Westminster Bank (Tavistock Square Branch), and addressed to Captain Stanley Shaw,

INDEXED

Boys' Home—Padcroft, Yiewsley
Girls' Hostel—Bethnal Green, E

1672 46 11

Hostel for Unmarried Mothers—Hatch End.
Hostel for Boys—Whetstone, N.

Telephone—Sloane 7538

From **Capt. W. STANLEY SHAW**

2, HOBART PLACE,
EATON SQUARE, S.W.1.
26th. February 19 47

Dear Sir,

Palestine

As I was instrumental in giving the Zion Movement a very great impetus, I take an interest in Palestine.
In 1901, I founded The British Brothers' League, of which I was first President, and organised the Alien agitation in East London, which led to a Royal Commission on Alien Immigration, and, subsequently, to an Aliens Act.
At that time, Polish and Roumanian Jews were pouring into this country, and literally swamping East London, and the poorer districts of Glasgow, Manchester and Leeds.
The result of my campaign in East London in 1901 & 1902 was that tens of thousands of Polish & Roumanian Jews were diverted from Great Britain to Palestine.
The records of the Zion Movement will prove this.
For five hundred years, the Arabs did nothing with Palestine, but allowed it to become a dust-heap. Then, when the Jews began turning it into a garden, certain men, with ulterior motives, sprang up and began making trouble.
Their agitation was a bogus one, and infuriated the Jews.
Peace must be brought to Jerusalem, but it can be done only by a man in whom both Jews and Arabs have confidence.
The ordinary official will never do it.
Peace must be brought to Jerusalem.

Yours very truly,

W. Stanley Shaw

Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P.
Foreign Secretary,
S.W.1.

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25/2/47

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INDEXED

From Chas.F.Bennett
29 Fairfield Grove
London S.E.7

F 1672/46/31

27 FEB 1947

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Confirmatory

Reference: Dr Arthur Ruppin, Jewish Professor of Sociology in the University of Jerusalem, in his book " JEWS AND THE MODERN WORLD" (Macmillan 15/-) Pages 164-5:-

" The Soviet Government proposed to direct Jewish agricultural settlers mainly in Biro-Bidjan on the Amur River .....During the years 1928-32, the total number of Jews transplanted by the Government amounted only to 18,000 of whom 11,000 re-emigrated....." etc. etc.

What is the matter with Biro-Bidjan?

Where and what is Biro-Bidjan?

A tremendous stretch of territory: an area of 20,000 square miles, about 19½ million acres, equal to both Holland and Belgium combined.

It is situated in the Soviet Union, in the Far East part of Siberia, near Khabarovsk on the Eastern frontier. The Trans-Siberian railway traverses it.

On May 17, 1934, this vast territory was " proclaimed a Jewish, autonomous territory (also called Autonomous Republic) and is the first and only Jewish autonomous territory in the world " forming " an additional chapter in the glorious book of the Soviet national policy."

According to Soviet Ambassador Troyanovsky, guest of the American Committee for the settlement of Jews in Biro-Bidjan, March 11, 1936 : " With the creation of a Jewish Autonomous Province which in the future will become a **Jewish Autonomous Republic,** the Jewish people have acquired their own state organization as a basis for national culture. But the formation of a Jewish Autonomous Province does not in any way impair full equality, including national development for the Jews in the rest of the U.S.S.R., nor will it isolate the Jews. It will encourage the cultural aspirations of Jewish nationality in the Soviet Union."

In addition to this, the Council of Commissars of the Soviet Union voted a budget of 76,000,000 roubles for Biro-Bidjan for the year of 1936.

Apart from this the Incor, or Association for Jewish Colonization in the Soviet Union, collects enormous sums from the Jewish people in America for that new Paradise.

NO ANTI-SEMITISM

With such a unique opportu one wonders why the whol Jewish immigration is diverted to Biro-Bidjan where come instead of objection w meet it. In the words Troyanovsky " in the S Union, anti-Semitism is par larly resented. Many form anti-Semitism are consid not only as perversions, bu crimes, and are prosecuted in courts as such. But we are h that anti-Semitism has al completely disappeared in country, and our young gener especially is completely free any trace of the anti-Se spirit."

Why should both the U States and Great Britain be ried about Palestine when in Bidjan there is no need of a datory power, no Arab or objection?

PALESTINE UNNECESSAR

All the nations should en the easy solution given to Jewish Question by the S Union and the INCOR of American Jewish Committee.

Apart from all the natura sources of the territory, its situation provides for the co of trade between Siberia, C and Japan. Moreover, should war occur in the Far East, w harvest there is to be made o the passing armies! Such a nificent opening. One wo why the Zionists are wasti much of their breath a Geneva parleys all about tine when Biro-Bidjan is al proclaimed a free autono Jewish Republic.

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Invisible Government

Part II.—ZIONISM

For an accurate definition of the word Zionism one must go to recognised Jewish sources. A Gentile if asked for it would blandly answer that it is the policy of securing the return of all the Jews to Palestine. Even the late Arthur Balfour, reputed author of the British declaration which bears his name, did give such an explanation.

From Jewish sources, which range from the Jewish Encyclopædia to the "History of Zionism," by Nahum Sokolow; "Guide to Zionism," by Jesse Sampter; "Zionism," by Richard Gottheil; and a host of others, Zionism must be described as the National Jewish movement based on the Messianic ideal of Jewish World Domination.

For the purpose of an exposé, which must necessarily be brief, Zionism must be viewed:—

1. In its conception and composition.
2. From an internal viewpoint in relation to the Jewish people.
3. In its relation to Great Britain and other nations.
4. From the standpoint of its political world power.

I.—ESSENCE AND ORGANISATION OF ZIONISM.

The essence of Zionism is twofold (a) Prophetic Universalism, and (b) Jewish Nationalism.

(a) **Prophetic Universalism.**—"The prophets, indeed, are politicians and statesmen, concerning themselves with both domestic and foreign problems, and using 'the word of the Lord' as authority for their political doctrine and social policy. . . . The prophets were nothing if not 'real-politiker,' with a passion for the preservation of Israel for Zion and of Zion for Israel, and they grew to realise that the only device by which this could be secured was an international order and a single law. After the manner of the ancients, they attributed to this law a divine origin and sanction and described its rule as the rule of God. But the substance of their vision is not other than the vision of all internationalists who regard the realities of the relations between nations and States and hope for their improvement.

"Prophetic 'universalism' did not abolish the nations, it harmonised the nations; and it was nationalistic to the point of giving to Israel a dominant tone in the international harmony and to Zion the foremost place."—(From "Zionism and World Politics," by Horace Meyer Kallen, pp. 11 and 12.)

The late Israel Friedlander, a noted Zionist, writes in "Past and Present":—

"The social ideal of righteousness (1) as formulated by the prophets received and unalterably retains a political form. They rightly believed that the social ideal depends for its realisation as much on the State as does the State for its reason for existence on the social ideal. Hence the social ideas as realised in the body politic and the body politic as necessitated and uplifted by the social ideal constitutes the point of gravity in the message of the prophets.—(p. 5.)

"With the moment when the establishment of peace on earth and goodwill to men, but the universal recognition of the Jew and his God."—(From "Studies in Jewish Nationalism," by Leon Simon (2) —(p. 14.)

(b) **Jewish Nationalism.** From "The Case of Anti-Zionists," by Leon Simon

"What, then, is Zionism? What is its underlying idea?

"The underlying idea of Zionism is that of Jewish nationality."—(p. 20.)

"Ahad Ha-Am never loses sight of the fact that the universal ideal which the Prophets preached was an ideal for their own people, an ideal for which their own people, as a people, must live and work, and that therefore the prophetic teaching involves not the merging of Israel in the nations, but the persistence of Israel as a nation and as a pattern to the other nations right up to the very end of days. Their vision was of a day when the nations should come up to the mount of the Lord to learn the way of truth. Once let the Jews give up their sense of separate identity and their possibility of reaching the prophetic ideal(3) is gone for ever.

What we call Jewish nationalism is therefore a direct outcome of the prophetic teaching. And if we see it in that light we shall see how immeasurably it stands above the *bastard nationalism* which regards the mere possession of a territory and political self-government as the essential thing."—("Studies in Jewish Nationalism," by Leon Simon, page 92.)

Bastard Nationalism—such is, from a Zionist point of view, the definition of patriotism, that high feeling so deeply cherished by every Englishman.

The organisation of Zionism is governmental—it calls itself democratic and has a representative Parliament. Mr. Ettinger, Ll.B., a Zionist, in May, 1929, submitted a report to the Zionist Conference at Sydney, Australia, from which the following is extracted:—

"The Zionist Organisation is a body unique in character, with practically all the functions and duties of a government, but deriving its strength and resources not from one territory, but from some seventy-two different countries.

"The supreme government is in the hands of the Zionist Congress, composed of over 200 delegates, representing shekel-payers of all countries. Congress meets once every two years. Its powers between sessions are delegated to the General Council, generally known as the Actions Committee, which meets three or four times a year, or more frequently if necessary. It counts about ten members.

"Both bodies are strictly democratic, since they are elected in accordance with the principles of the Mizrahi section (orthodox) and the Revisionists section (holding extreme political views). And these sections form part and parcel of the Zionist Organisation, and join in all branches of Zionist work.

"This world-wide machinery finds its repetition in each country in federations, such as the Australian Zionist Federation the English Zionist Federation (of which Lord Melchett is President), etc. . . . Political relations between the Zionist Organisation, in its present capacity of Jewish Agency, and Great Britain, as the Mandatory Government, are gradually assuming a fixed and regular course. Constant touch is maintained with the Colonial Office in London, and permanent negotiations are conducted in Jerusalem. The Zionist representative with the League of Nations has an officially recognised standing. Through him we have a certain influence with the Mandates Commission. Pro-Palestine Committees, composed of the leading statesmen of each country, have been formed in France, Germany, Italy, and South Africa, and are in the process of formation in other countries. In London the British Palestine Mandate Society performs the same task of gaining non-Jewish sympathy for our movement."

The seat of the Zionist Government is in England at 77, Great Russell-street, London.

The present president is Dr. Chaim Weizmann, who was elected at the last Zionist Congress, replacing Mr. Nahum Sokolow (September, 1935, at Zurich.(4).

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The last number of the "Free Press," Oct., 1935, made a study of Fabianism to be followed by that of Zionism, as the combination of those two forces makes the present power ruling England and the British Empire.

Lord Eustace Percy on Zionism

"The Russian revolution is no passing freak of Jewish fury. The great problem of the future is the Jewish.

"In a world of completely organised territorial sovereignties the Jew has only two possible outlets of refuge; he must either pull down the pillars of the whole national state system (as he has done in Russia) or he must create a territorial sovereignty of his own. In this perhaps lies the explanation both of Jewish Bolshevism and of Zionism, for at this moment (1919) Eastern Jewry seems to hover uncertainly between the two.

"In Eastern Europe, Bolshevism and Zionism often seem to grow side by side, just as Jewish influence has moulded Republican and Socialist thought throughout the nineteenth century."—(From "Responsibilities of the League," by Lord Eustace Percy.)

Does not Lord Eustace Percy perceive now that Mr. I. M. Sieff's Zionism is moulding the Socialist thoughts of the P.E.P. and of the present National Government?

". . . The Keren Hayesod makes its call for support on the immemorial tradition of Ma'aser.

"Ma'aser is the tenth part or tithe of his capital and income which every Jew is obligated to give for the benefit of all Israel.

". . . The Keren Hayesod has revived the demand for Ma'aser to provide for the National interests of the Jewish people.

". . . The tithe principle has been accepted in its most stringent form. The Congress declared it as the absolute duty of every Zionist to pay tithes to the Keren Hayesod. It added that those Zionists who failed to do so, should be deprived of their offices and honorary positions.

"In connection with this, power has been given to the Board of Directors of the Keren Hayesod, to fix minimum salaries free from tithes payments.

"The Congress has issued a call to the whole of the Jewish people to pay tithes on all fortunes and incomes and to lay the foundation of the Jewish National Home by making the Keren Hayesod the general fund of the entire Jewish people."

To this Jabotinsky, the prominent Zionist added:—

"The Keren Hayesod *is* a State tax and can be described in no other way.

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It is well known that the collection of any tax by another Government is not allowed in any country. It would be considered an infringement of its sovereign rights. Yet the taxation of Jews by their own State and communities (Kehillahs) is allowed to go on unchecked.

One wonders in what manner monies thus collected are taxed by the Sovereign State, in this country: the British Government.

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Ever since its official formation in 1897, Great Britain has had dealings with the Zionist Government. Unable to obtain Palestine from Turkey for their benefit, in 1904, England proposed to give the Zionists Uganda territory to found their national home. They refused.

They turned their hope towards Germany. When the war broke out the seat of the Zionist organisation was in Berlin; their hope centred on Germany and its promise to obtain Palestine from the Sultan for them.

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According to Mr. Ettinger, already quoted, the Zionist Government derives its strength and resources from seventy-two countries. Logically interpreted this means that it is an "imperium in imperio" in seventy-two States.

IV.—ZIONISM AS A WORLD POWER, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC.

The world power of Zionism is centred in the League of Nations. It is easy to understand that being a State within seventy-two nations which, with but very few exceptions, are represented on the League of Nations in Geneva, Zionism has a lion's share of influence.

"The League of Nations is an old Jewish ideal.

"The solution of self-determination and the recognition of the necessity for a League of Nations to protect these small people from future aggression have grown in a large measure out of the claims of the Zionists."—(Jessie Sampter in "Guide to Zionism," pp. 14 and 87.)

"The League of Nations is a Jewish idea, and Jerusalem some day will become the capital of the world's peace.

"We Jews will make the League's struggle our own and will not rest until there is ultimate victory.

"The League of Nations is interested in the success of our cause not merely for juristic reasons, because it has granted the mandate, but because our cause transcends the boundaries of the national affairs of a single people, because it is something in which the peace and progress of the entire world are involved."—(Nahum Sokolow, chairman, Zionist Executive Committee, August 27, 1922, at Carlsbad Conference.)

"The Zionist representative with the League of Nations has an officially recognised standing. Through him we have a certain influence with the Mandates Commission."—(From M. Ettinger's report already quoted.)

Zionist political power in the U.S. was centred in the person of Justice Louis D. Brandeis, whose influence over the late President Woodrow Wilson has so frequently been referred to by historians of the Great War. He headed the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs created on August 30, 1914, in New York. Among his colleagues were Rabbi Stephen Wise, Jacob de Haas, Nathan Straus, Felix Frankfurter, Julian Mack, Eugene Meyer. Of these, Brandeis, F. Frankfurter, and Eugene Meyer, at the present time, exercise a political influence on Mr. Roosevelt not inferior to that exercised over here on Messrs. MacDonald and Baldwin by the Fabian-Zionist P.E.P. in which Mr. Sieff and Lord Melchett, both ardent Zion-

bluntly answer that it is the policy of securing the return of all the Jews to Palestine. Even the late Arthur Balfour, reputed author of the British declaration which bears his name, did give such an explanation.

From Jewish sources, which range from the Jewish Encyclopædia to the "History of Zionism," by Nahum Sokolow; "Guide to Zionism," by Jesse Sampter; "Zionism," by Richard Gottheil; and a host of others, Zionism must be described as the National Jewish movement based on the Messianic ideal of Jewish World Domination.

For the purpose of an exposé, which must necessarily be brief, Zionism must be viewed:—

1. In its conception and composition.
2. From an internal viewpoint in relation to the Jewish people.
3. In its relation to Great Britain and other nations.
4. From the standpoint of its political world power.

I.—ESSENCE AND ORGANISATION OF ZIONISM.

The essence of Zionism is twofold (a) Prophetic Universalism, and (b) Jewish Nationalism.

(a) **Prophetic Universalism.**—"The prophets, indeed, are politicians and statesmen, concerning themselves with both domestic and foreign problems, and using 'the word of the Lord' as authority for their political doctrine and social policy. . . . The prophets were nothing if not 'real-politiker,' with a passion for the preservation of Israel for Zion and of Zion for Israel, and they grew to realise that the only device by which this could be secured was an international order and a single law. After the manner of the ancients, they attributed to this law a divine origin and sanction and described its rule as the rule of God. But the substance of their vision is not other than the vision of all internationalists who regard the realities of the relations between nations and States and hope for their improvement.

"Prophetic 'universalism' did not abolish the nations, it harmonised the nations; and it was nationalistic to the point of giving to Israel a dominant tone in the international harmony and to Zion the foremost place."—(From "Zionism and World Politics," by Horace Meyer Kallen, pp. 11 and 12.)

The late Israel Friedlander, a noted Zionist, writes in "Past and Present":—

"The social ideal of righteousness (1) as formulated by the prophets received and unalterably retains a political form. They rightly believed that the social ideal depends for its realisation as much on the State as does the State for its reason for existence on the social ideal. Hence the social ideas as realised in the body politic and the body politic as necessitated and uplifted by the social ideal constitutes the point of gravity in the message of the prophets.—(p. 5.)

"With the moment when the God of the Universe was identified with the *national* God of Israel, Israel's distinction reached an unapproachable height and became undisputed supremacy."—(p. 7.)

"The problem of Israel among the nations, the existence of the Jews in the Golus, in the Dispersion, scattered all over the countries of the globe, and having no country of their own, settled among all the nations of the earth and at the same time forming a nation of their own, has ever been a mystery which has puzzled and terrified the whole world.

"This solution is usually called 'Messianism,' but, in view of its ultimate objective, it may more properly be termed 'Zionism,' though the name is only of recent date.

"Modern Zionism is a continuation of the Messianic doctrine without its theological egg-shells."—(p. 372.)

"And the Messianic age means for the Jew not merely the establishment of peace on earth and goodwill to men, but the universal recognition of the Jew and his God."—(From "Studies in Jewish Nationalism," by Leon Simon (2)—(p. 14.)

(b) **Jewish Nationalism.** From "The Case of Anti-Zionists," by Leon Simon

"What, then, is Zionism? What is its underlying idea?

"The underlying idea of Zionism is that of Jewish nationality."—(p. 20.)

"Ahad Ha-Am never loses sight of the fact that the universal ideal which the Prophets preached was an ideal for their own people, an ideal for which their own people, as a people, must live and work, and that therefore the prophetic teaching involves not the merging of Israel in the nations, but the persistence of Israel as a nation and as a pattern to the other nations right up to the very end of days. Their vision was of a day when the nations should come up to the mount of the Lord to learn the way of truth. Once let the Jews give up their sense of separate identity and their possibility of reaching the prophetic ideal (3) is gone for ever.

What we call Jewish nationalism is therefore a direct outcome of the prophetic teaching. And if we see it in that light we shall see how immeasurably it stands above the *bastard nationalism* which regards the mere possession of a territory and political self-government as the essential thing."—("Studies in Jewish Nationalism," by Leon Simon, page 92.)

Bastard Nationalism—such is, from a Zionist point of view, the definition of patriotism, that high feeling so deeply cherished by every Englishman.

The organisation of Zionism is governmental—it calls itself democratic and has a representative Parliament. Mr. Ettinger, Ll.B., a Zionist, in May, 1929, submitted a report to the Zionist Conference at Sydney, Australia, from which the following is extracted:—

"The Zionist Organisation is a body unique in character, with practically all the functions and duties of a government, but deriving its strength and resources not from one territory, but from some seventy-two different countries.

"The supreme government is in the hands of the Zionist Congress, composed of over 200 delegates, representing shekel-payers of all countries. Congress meets once every two years. Its powers between sessions are delegated to the General Council, generally known as the Actions Committee, which meets three or four times a year, or more frequently if necessary. It counts about ten members.

"Both bodies are strictly democratic, since they are elected in accordance with the principles of proportional representation. Every Jew accepting the Zionist programme and paying the shekel (1s. to 5s.) per year, has the right to vote.

"The Zionist Executive is our Cabinet, and is composed of two sections—P.Z.E. (Palestine Zionist Executive), and the London Zionist Executive. Each member of the executive is responsible for a definite department. At the present moment Prof. Brodetzky is in charge of political work in London; Dr. Rosenblueth is in charge of organisation (he is our Home Secretary); Col. F. Kish, political affairs in Palestine; Mr. Sacher, settlement in Palestine; Miss H. Szold, public health and education; Mr. Vanvriesland is the Chancellor of our Exchequer.

"Dr. Weizmann is our President and Mr. Sokolow our Prime Minister.

"Our organisation contains sections based on certain political differences, such as the Labour section, the Mizrahi section (orthodox) and the Revisionists section (holding extreme political views). And these sections form part and parcel of the Zionist Organisation, and join in all branches of Zionist work.

"This world-wide machinery finds its repetition in each country in federations, such as the Australian Zionist Federation, the English Zionist Federation (of which Lord Melchett is President), etc. . . . Political relations between the Zionist Organisation, in its present capacity of Jewish Agency, and Great Britain, as the Mandatory Government, are gradually assuming a fixed and regular course. Constant touch is maintained with the Colonial Office in London, and permanent negotiations are conducted in Jerusalem. The Zionist representative with the League of Nations has an officially recognised standing. Through him we have a certain influence with the Mandates Commission. Pro-Palestine Committees, composed of the leading statesmen of each country, have been formed in France, Germany, Italy, and South Africa, and are in the process of formation in other countries. In London the British Palestine Mandate Society performs the same task of gaining non-Jewish sympathy for our movement."

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3. To strengthen and augment Jewish self-consciousness in the individual and in the community.
4. To take the proper preliminary steps towards securing the concurrence of the Powers, insofar as their assent may be necessary for the attainment of the Zionist goal.

The resources of the Zionist Government come from taxes and contributions, not voluntary, but levied upon the Jewish people already heavily taxed by their own Kehillahs, and who must also pay the regular taxes of the countries that harbour them. To this effect, two tax-gathering funds have been created, one the Jewish National Fund (Keren Hayemeth) founded in 1901 at the fifth Zionist Congress, the other the Keren Hayesod founded in 1921.

The tax imposed upon the people by the Zionists and collected for the Keren Hayesod fund is called Ma'aser.

The official definition of both terms is:—

"The Keren Hayesod is the public treasury to build Jewish Palestine.

". . . Its functions are governmental functions such as would under normal conditions be met out of compulsory taxation.

". . . The Keren Hayesod makes its call for support on the immemorial tradition of Ma'aser.

"Ma'aser is the tenth part or tithe of his capital and income which every Jew is obligated to give for the benefit of all Israel.

". . . The Keren Hayesod has revived the demand for Ma'aser to provide for the National interests of the Jewish people.

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But in 1916 a change occurred. Zionist allegiance was suddenly transferred to the Allies—the inside story of this episode makes weird reading—it drove Albert Ballin to commit suicide.

Zionists settled in London. Then came the Balfour declaration, by which the British Government promised Palestine to the Zionists. This was, as is known, in violation of a former agreement signed with the Arab Sheriff Hussein. The Declaration itself had been written out by American and Russian Zionists, the latter living in London throughout the war.

Last came the British Mandate over Palestine and all it has cost the Government and the taxpayers.

Enormous sums of British capital are constantly being diverted from England and British industries and poured into Palestine.

Zionists have secured concessions refused to British industrials by the Government, and in Britain they enjoy all the prerogatives of Englishmen, although their statesmen show in every way that their allegiance is first and foremost due to their own Zionist State, which is a fully organised "Imperium in Imperio"—a State within the State.

Instances of cajolery or coercive action to obtain favours from the British and other Governments are numerous, and are mentioned by the Zionists themselves in their various Press organs.

In this perhaps lies the explanation both of Jewish Bolshevism and of Zionism, for at this moment (1919) Eastern Sieff's Zionism is moulding the Socialist thoughts of the P.E.P. and of the present National Government?

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The restriction of space allows but of a short conclusion. Let the reader for one short moment reflect upon the combination of political power, such as is briefly sketched above, with the economic power wielded by an organisation, such as Zionism, whose members control the Imperial Chemical Industries, with Lord Melchett, hon. vice-president of the Zionist organisation, Lord Bearsted and his control of oil, Mr. I. M. Sieff, his chain store and vast financial interests in Palestine, and, to cap it all, the financial House of Rothschild, whose members, both in England and France, are the real heads of Zionism.

If such men manipulate, as is known, the leaders of all political parties here, then the British Government is led, not from Downing Street and Westminster, but from 16, Queen Anne's Gate, the dwelling of Fabian P.E.P., and 77, Great Russell Street, seat of the Zionist Organisation.

"The world is, indeed, governed by very different personages from what is imagined by those who are not behind the scenes." Disraeli was right. Conservatives yearly bedeck him with modest primroses; he deserves a sunflower.

(1) the word righteousness is frequently used in Jewish writing to mean Israel—it is so in this case.

(2) Leon Simon, Director of Telegraphs and Telephones, General Post Office (Government Key Position). A renowned Zionist, he was the foremost disciple of Asher Ginzberg "Ahad Ha-Am," and translator of his works.

(3) World domination in reason of their sense of supremacy.

(4) At this last congress, the Revisionists seceded from the main Zionist body and led by Wladimir Jabotinsky, they have formed the New Zionist Organisation.

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The Editor's Word

A Red League

Let us be frank about the League of Nations, its sanctions and our obligations.

The British public, whose sense of honour can ever be relied upon to react to the word given or an engagement entered into, has been saturated by the necessity of standing by the Covenant of the League of Nations. The League of Nations Union has done its subtle work.

In reality Fear has been the dominant factor at Geneva. Fear of seeing the monster of Communism totter down to its fall.

For it is Communism which the League of Nations protects.

And England is made its catspaw.

The League of Nations is the instrument of Moscow, the real seat of the Third International, headed by Litvinoff-Finkelstein.

Nothing can excuse Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia. However, where he is concerned, he seems to have fallen into a trap laid for Fascism by Communism.

There are sanctions and sanctions.

A political observer cannot fail to remark that the invasion of Abyssinia was benevolently sanctioned by all the powers at Geneva. How otherwise could Italy have prepared and sent over countless troops and all her war material without so much as a word being said or a gesture being made to prevent her?

All the hullabaloo of righteous indignation began only after Italy had transported men and ammunition and was irremediably committed.

Will Bolshevism now be able to claim that it has dealt Fascism a terrible blow? It seems so.

Would not this Communist tactic explain the alacrity with which several elements of the Social-Labourite-Communist parties over here voted to support war in spite of their pacifist creed?

When one reflects upon the origin of the League of Nations one cannot overlook the fact that Fabianism and Zionism presided at its birth.

Noel Brailsford in his book "A League of Nations" reveals the fact that the framework of the famous League was worked by the Fabian Society, notably by Leonard S. Woolf, author of "International Government."

From American sources one knows that President Wilson's views on a League of Nations were the inspiration of the Zionist Louis D. Brandeis.

The support which Fabian-Zionism gives to Communism through the League of Nations, using Great Britain and the sense of honour of her people as a cover, should be fearlessly exposed.

Economic interests of both England and Italy and the welfare of Abyssinia could all have been peaceably worked out.

It stands to reason that had the League been all that it claims to be, it might have long since used some reasonable civilising influence with Abyssinia to help it develop the country for the welfare of its people and the good of other nations.

Mussolini's mad idea that he can civilise the Abyssinians by a wholesale slaughter revolts the whole world. But his madness is of slight account in the deliberations of the League. The main theme has been, although the Press has not reported it, how to prevent Germany, Poland and Japan from dealing Russia and Bolshevism a mortal blow. That is the governing fear of all at Geneva.

All means have been resorted to to deal Fascism a severe blow. Mussolini was allowed to believe that he would meet with no opposition, and in fact his war preparations were viewed with perfect equanimity for weeks and weeks. Now, when Moscow has him in the trap, a sudden disapproval is expressed by the League, and sanctions against him are to be applied.

Litvinoff triumphs. He did not secure the Eastern Pact—he has gone one better and staged the war which the Bolshevists prophesied would lead to World Revolution. The result is that England may at any moment be drawn into war which the servile League of Nations Union has knowingly prepared for the greater benefit of Communism.

Should Britons allow their individual and national sense of honour to be misused to the extent of bringing tears and ruin to their homes and country? Or should they react against being led by the gang of arch-criminals and murderers plotting in Moscow?

Call to Christians

THAT was the title of the Presidential Address given by the Bishop of Winchester at the Church Congress at Bournemouth, on October 8, 1935.

A fair analysis of the address has left us somewhat dismayed. No one wants to doubt the good faith and purity of intention of the Bishop, but we are struck by some of the advice he gives to Christians, viz., to support the League of Nations because "it is a practical attempt to realise the Christian ideal of a fellowship of nations."

No Christian ideal is compatible with Bolshevism embodied in the present President of the League of Nations, Litvinoff-Finkelstein, and we do not think that his appointment can have been made by men moved by Christian ideals.

We are also painfully impressed by the insistent approval of group movements, which, in particular, seems to apply to Buchmanism. The evils arising out of the occult practices of this "group," its shameless exhibitionism, and morally unhealthy public vivisection of sin have been shown by the Bishop of Durham. It seems as if there could be no two opinions in the matter.

Further, we note that the Bishop encourages also internationalism when he says:

"The Christian, truly patriotic—for no man who does not love his own country is ever likely to be a good citizen of humanity—will recognise that national patriotism by itself is not sufficient, and will keep before his mind the ideal of a commonwealth of nations . . ."

To be a "citizen of the world" or of humanity as the Bishop has it, has been the motto of such illuminati as Adam Weishaupt and our present-day revolutionists.

We do not know what is meant by "national patriotism," but we do know that there is no such thing as "inter-patriotism."

All the genius of the world internationalists has been powerless to create that word.

Patriotism is a term complete in itself; it contains and expresses one of the finest of human feelings, love for one's own country and devotion to its ideals. It generates heroism, and, blended with Christianity, gives to the humblest of men a sublime superiority.

The Sky is the Limit

BRITONS should not harbour such foolish ideas as a desire to protect themselves against anything falling from the heavens, rain excepted. Against that they may still use umbrellas.

Bombs and gas from air attacks must be looked upon as manna from heaven and a manifestation of divine dispensation.

So the Fabian Committee of the National Peace Council would have us believe.

Why not go one step further and bomb and gas the whole of our population ourselves? Such a kind thought towards those who might have the desire to dispense death from the air to all Great Britain, would undoubtedly spare them cold-blooded murder and bring peace everlasting to all.

The organisation of precautions against air attacks for their hapless population may be the foolish idea of the contemptible French and Germans, but how could we foster such an anti-pacifist spirit?

"Cet animal est très méchant! Quand on l'attaque, il se défend." (Such a ferocious animal! it defends itself when attacked.)

That applies to the French and Germans, for they have already systematised all measures to be taken against air attacks. They are very "méchants." We do not want to be. We are pacifists.

The statement of the National Peace Council enumerating the reasons why precautions should not be taken has the following priceless argument:—

". . . it would be an intolerable burden on the population and destroy all the possibilities for a better life. . . ."

The reverse is true. The dispensation of bombs and poisonous gas is the surest way to the "better life" we so frequently read of in prayer books or on tombstones.

What is "Laissez-faire"?

By R. BELL

The writer of this article is a well-known engineer and authority on economics.

His treatment of the Capitalism v. Labour problem is masterly.

SOCIALISM and High Finance both advocate an increase of "State" management of the business of the community. The P.E.P. group writes:—

"In many cases the economic life of the world has become too complex, the scale too large . . . to allow of any return to nineteenth-century methods. . . With the advent of the twentieth century and particularly after the war, government intervention began rapidly to operate in increasingly wider spheres. . . ."

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So, while the economic system is evolving, and we are engaged in its continual perfection and adapting obstacle to the return to pure laissez-faire. Modern finance may be said to have destroyed laissez-faire. It has made wages so low that the creditor classes have had to be forced to disgorge some of their gains to the unemployed.

Any Government which could decide what was or was not "anti-Social" would itself have unlimited licence. Its members would look after themselves and their class; after a few original idealists had been swept away the relations of the Ministers would get all the contracts. The councillors of Saintes-Maries-de-la-Mer may be quoted as a pictur-

Nor can Ministers perfect an economic system; they can make good simple laws preventing chicanery and corruption, and compelling fair competition everywhere. Clever men will then come to the front and make industry grow, and themselves find the best system of exchange. If they fail, it is not likely that an elected Government will succeed.

A "Red" League

Let us be frank about the League of Nations, its sanctions and our obligations.

The British public, whose sense of honour can ever be relied upon to react to the word given or an engagement entered into, has been saturated by the necessity of standing by the Covenant of the League of Nations. The League of Nations Union has done its subtle work.

In reality Fear has been the dominant factor at Geneva. Fear of seeing the monster of Communism totter down to its fall.

For it is Communism which the League of Nations protects.

And England is made its catspaw.

The League of Nations is the instrument of Moscow, the real seat of the Third International, headed by Litvinoff-Finkelstein.

Nothing can excuse Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia. However, where he is concerned, he seems to have fallen into a trap laid for Fascism by Communism.

There are sanctions and sanctions.

A political observer cannot fail to remark that the invasion of Abyssinia was benevolently sanctioned by all the powers at Geneva. How otherwise could Italy have prepared and sent over countless troops and all her war material without so much as a word being said or munist parties over here voted to support war in spite of their pacifist creed?

When one reflects upon the origin of the League of Nations one cannot overlook the fact that Fabianism and Zionism presided at its birth.

Noel Brailsford in his book "A League of Nations" reveals the fact that the framework of the famous League was worked by the Fabian Society, notably by Leonard S. Woolf, author of "International Government."

From American sources one knows that President Wilson's views on a League of Nations were the inspiration of the Zionist Louis D. Brandeis.

The support which Fabian-Zionism gives to Communism through the League of Nations, using Great Britain and the sense of honour of her people as a cover, should be fearlessly exposed.

Economic interests of both England and Italy and the welfare of Abyssinia could all have been peaceably worked out.

It stands to reason that had the League been all that it claims to be, it might have long since used some reasonable civilising influence with Abyssinia to help it develop the country for the welfare of its people and the good of other nations.

Mussolini's mad idea that he can civilise the Abyssinians by a wholesale slaughter revolts the whole world. But his with no opposition, and in fact his war preparations were viewed with perfect equanimity for weeks and weeks. Now, when Moscow has him in the trap, a sudden disapproval is expressed by the League, and sanctions against him are to be applied.

Litvinoff triumphs. He did not secure the Eastern Pact—he has gone one better and staged the war which the Bolshevists prophesied would lead to World Revolution. The result is that England may at any moment be drawn into war which the servile League of Nations Union has knowingly prepared for the greater benefit of Communism.

Should Britons allow their individual and national sense of honour to be misused to the extent of bringing tears and ruin to their homes and country? Or should they react against being led by the gang of arch-criminals and murderers plotting in Moscow?

Call to Christians

THAT was the title of the Presidential Address given by the Bishop of Winchester at the Church Congress at Bournemouth, on October 8, 1935.

A fair analysis of the address has left us somewhat dismayed. No one wants to doubt the good faith and purity of intention of the Bishop, but we are struck by some of the advice he gives to Christians, viz., to support proval of group movements, which, in particular, seems to apply to Buchmanism. The evils arising out of the occult practices of this "group," its shameless exhibitionism, and morally unhealthy public vivisection of sin have been shown by the Bishop of Durham. It seems as if there could be no two opinions in the matter.

Further, we note that the Bishop encourages also internationalism when he says:

"The Christian, truly patriotic—for no man who does not love his own country is ever likely to be a good citizen of humanity—will recognise that national patriotism by itself is not sufficient, and will keep before his mind the ideal of a commonwealth of nations . . ."

To be a "citizen of the world" or of humanity as the Bishop has it, has been the motto of such illuminati as Adam Weishaupt and our present-day revolutionists.

We do not know what is meant by "national patriotism," but we do know that there is no such thing as "inter-patriotism."

All the genius of the world internationalists has been powerless to create that word.

Patriotism is a term complete in itself; it contains and expresses one of the finest of human feelings, love for one's own country and devotion to its ideals. It generates heroism, and, blended with Christianity, gives to the humblest of men a sublime superiority.

the National Peace Council would have us believe.

Why not go one step further and bomb and gas the whole of our population ourselves? Such a kind thought towards those who might have the desire to dispense death from the air to all Great Britain, would undoubtedly spare them cold-blooded murder and bring peace everlasting to all.

The organisation of precautions against air attacks for their hapless population may be the foolish idea of the contemptible French and Germans, but how could we foster such an anti-pacifist spirit?

"Cet animal est très méchant! Quand on l'attaque, il se défend." (Such a ferocious animal! it defends itself when attacked.)

That applies to the French and Germans, for they have already systematised all measures to be taken against air attacks. They are very "méchants." We do not want to be. We are pacifists.

The statement of the National Peace Council enumerating the reasons why precautions should not be taken has the following priceless argument:—

". . . it would be an intolerable burden on the population and destroy all the possibilities for a better life. . . ."

The reverse is true. The dispensation of bombs and poisonous gas is the surest way to the "better life" we so frequently read of in prayer books or on tombstones.

What is "Laissez-faire"?

By R. BELL

The writer of this article is a well-known engineer and authority on economics.

His treatment of the Capitalism *v.* Labour problem is masterly.

SOCIALISM and High Finance both advocate an increase of "State" management of the business of the community. The P.E.P. group writes:—

"In many cases the economic life of the world has become too complex, the scale too large . . . to allow of any return to nineteenth-century methods. . . With the advent of the twentieth century and particularly after the war, government intervention began rapidly to operate in increasingly wider spheres. . . ."

The rank-and-file Socialist is often misguided enough to be satisfied with such statements as, "You are very badly off now; you can see that there are plenty of good things about; if things were only planned better you would be better off!" High finance, then, does the planning and makes a good profit out of it.

Laissez-faire suggests that it is the business of a Government to govern; that it should not attempt to manage a country as a business unit. It must not be confused with individualism, for it does not encourage or discourage the formation of companies, and it admits that some public services are necessary. In the words of John Stuart Mill:

"Letting alone, in short, should be the general practice: every departure from it, unless required by some great good, is a certain evil."

NO INTERFERENCE.

One object of laissez-faire is to secure the maximum development of the individual, which will take place when he is both subjected to a minimum of interference and given a maximum of opportunity. Another is to reduce the power of the rich financier or moneylender, and to reduce inequality of wealth. It is argued that the freer the competition the more closely will the wealth of the individual tend to correspond with his brain power. The subjection of the rich financier-monopolist to free competition may aptly be likened to the turning of bloodhounds on to escaped convicts. Small efficient businesses would absorb the wealth of the big, inefficient "planners."

P.E.P. quotes "the growth of a code of law and of custom for motorists" as an example which proves the necessity for more Government interference. In doing so they show a complete confusion of thought. They write:—

"Self-discipline and collective action enable the motorist to enjoy a large measure of freedom. Without the help of the code, and without the intervention of authority to help him to enforce it, the will of the motorist would be everywhere frustrated, and he would enjoy far less freedom than is now secured for him."

P.E.P.'s ABSURDITY.

In other words, the obvious necessity for some form of Government proves the necessity for Government interference in business matters—which is absurd. One might infer "because the Government has to make laws under which business ought to be carried on, therefore it ought to interfere with business," or, to put it in P.E.P.'s words:—

". . . so long as we worship at the altar of laissez-faire as the guiding principle of our economic life, we are trying to conduct our industry and commerce in exactly that spirit which we have wisely rejected in the field of motoring."

Now very few people do "worship at the altar of laissez-faire." Nearly all modern writers would be aghast at the suggestion that a system of laissez-faire might be the means of overcoming most of our political difficulties. For example, Mr. Porteous, in "The New Unionism," writes:—

". . . the attitude of the reactionary Capitalist of the laissez-faire school is an anarchist attitude, which has much in common with that of the Bolshevist. Each claims an unlimited licence in pursuing the interests of a single class, even at the cost of the happiness of mankind in general . . . private rights should be interfered with and restricted only in so far as they may be anti-social."

So, while the economic system is evolving, and we are engaged in its continual perfection and adaption, let us remember that meantime we are all dependent on the prosperity of the industries and commerce whose conditions we are studying to modify and improve."

G. D. H. and M. I. Cole write:—

"The two outstanding obstacles to the return to pure laissez-faire are the creditor classes and the working classes. . . The creditor classes are, however, an exceedingly influential element in practically every State, and above all in France and Great Britain. . . The second obstacle lies in the working classes, who would strongly resist both any drastic reduction in wage-rates and any attempt to go back on a large scale upon the social services developed since 1914. The resistance of the working classes to lower wages might perhaps be overcome . . ."

It is probable that the majority of the public do, like Mr. Porteous, advocate a mild form of Socialism; and that they do, like Mr. and Mrs. Cole, think that wages would drop if laissez-faire were adopted as a political creed.

ROLE OF FINANCE.

There is one word of truth in these extracts: that is, that the creditor classes are an outstanding obstacle to the return to pure laissez-faire. Modern finance may be said to have destroyed laissez-faire. It has made wages so low that the creditor classes have had to be forced to disgorge some of their gains to the unemployed.

Any Government which could decide what was or was not "anti-Social" would itself have unlimited licence. Its members would look after themselves and their class; after a few original idealists had been swept away the relations of the Ministers would get all the contracts. The councillors of Saintes-Maries-de-la-Mer may be quoted as a picturesque example:—

"M. Pioch" (Communist Mayor of Saintes-Maries) "to-day admitted most of the 'administrative irregularities' for which he has been blamed. 'But I did not take a penny for myself,' he said. 'It is the honour of my career to have introduced a spirit of enterprise in my commune.'

"In the light of these words it is difficult not to take a sympathetic view of the Roubine, a diminutive canal which was for ever being dredged and otherwise cared for.

"Every operation, whether fictitious or not, represented an augmentation of income for one or other of M. Pioch's friends. Thus a M. Fabre, who was bedridden during the three years which preceded his demise, was paid for weeding the Roubine.

"M. Dijol, secretary of the town hall, specialised in planting trees. Anyone who read the municipal records would be tempted to conclude that Saintes-Maries possessed more trees than any other place in France, but the president of the court observed that when he went there recently he could not see one anywhere. 'They are all too young,' whispered M. Dijol. . . .

—The "Daily Telegraph."
March 14, 1934.

Nor can Ministers perfect an economic system; they can make good simple laws preventing chicanery and corruption, and compelling fair competition everywhere. Clever men will then come to the front and make industry grow, and themselves find the best system of exchange. If they fail, it is not likely that an elected Government will succeed.

FREEDOM TO THE RICH

As laissez-faire has been interpreted as the giving of freedom to the rich so that they can enslave the poor, the word has become deceptive. Moreover, it does not suggest the necessity, a vital one, for the prevention of a few men from being able to make use of the unwieldiness of the mass for their own profit. Thus "anti-Collectivism" is preferred; while it agrees with true laissez-faire, it nevertheless insists on the protection of the small man; also it agrees with the formation and growth of companies, but only in fair competition with the individual.

It differs profoundly from the independence recommended by Sir Ernest Benn. Sir Ernest would have laissez-faire plus all the worst features of modern finance, of what many Socialists mean when they talk about Capitalism. In his "Confessions of a Capitalist," he writes:—

". . . the only revolution of a constructive kind, the only revolution which will strengthen the ability of industry to serve mankind, the fundamental, permanent, big

(*Continued on page 8.*)

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customers.

A Home for the D. P.s

General McNarney is embarrassed by the presence of 125,000 Jewish "displaced persons" in the United States zone of Germany. These homeless wanderers, fortunate enough to escape Hitler's brutal extermination of European Jews, have come mainly from eastern Europe, and particularly Poland. Although the Polish government makes anti-Semitism a crime, it has been unable to prevent pogroms by a population whose prejudices are deep-rooted, fanatical and violent. Ironically, the Jews flee Poland to find asylum in Germany. But they do not wish to remain there either. They can have no real life in the camps scattered throughout southern Germany, but merely an existence.

Since these D. P.s are in the United States zone, they are now an American responsibility. General McNarney would like to ship them off to Palestine, where they would become a British responsibility. This is fairly typical of the American tendency to offer the British plenty of criticism but little constructive help with the very intricate Palestine problem. We believe it is time the United States took the lead in dealing with the entire problem not only of the Jews but of all the D. P.s unhappily stranded in Germany and Austria, where they constitute one more headache for the harassed occupation authorities.

The problem might be referred to the United Nations. But before that is done, the United States should give some concrete evidence of its willingness to do its share. Fourteen months ago President Truman directed that this country should receive 100,000 D. P.s on unused immigration quotas, at the rate of approximately 3,900 monthly. In the following five months the number admitted was 0. In the next nine months the number was 7,123, or 13 per cent of the total that might have come in fourteen months at the rate foreseen.

The excuses offered are lack of shipping and shortage of consular staffs. The former is no longer valid; the latter is something

Minutes.

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Editorial 7/8/47

YORK HERALD TRIBUNE.

that should be remedied, as should the negative attitude of the State Department and most of the consulates, which are unhelpful, to put it mildly, to people who are considered undesirable on the basis of their race or country of origin. Quota immigration should be facilitated, not obstructed. If necessary, our immigration laws, or at least the way in which they are interpreted and administered, should be liberalized. Only thus can the United States set an example to other countries, like the dominions and our Latin-American neighbors. All these nations together would have no real difficulty and would suffer no great hardship in absorbing the relatively small existing number of displaced persons, whose plight demands urgent attention.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS MARGIN.

enclosed

Food Econ. Dept

80 Woodland Ave
New Rochelle, New York

13 MAR 1947

E 16/2/46/F

Mr Bevin

INDEXED

Your should get a Nick
out of the enclosed.

Your patience & perseverance
have won the respect of both
the British & Americans.
more power to your
Hope Gordon

P.S. please don't take time
to acknowledge. I know how
busy you are trying to keep warm!

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Mr B. H. England
40 Whittington Oval
Lea Hall
Birmingham 26

27

26/2/44 1672 46 31

INDEXED

To Mr E. Bevin M.P.
Foreign Secretary -
Dear Sir.
I read this morning in the Birmingham Gazette on the Front Page where it says BEVAN: I AM STILL OPEN, and you say you are still open to settle the Palestine Problem without recoarse to the ~~League of~~ United Nations. Mr Bevin let me assist you for it has been given unto me by the Lord God almighty to solve the problem for you. I am

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I have wrote to him real
god inspired messages of
the Plan to win the war.
Now Mr Bevin I have the
Plan which no one has hinted
at yet, you have slightly hinted
saying ~~let us solve this~~ using a
Humanitarian way, God
Bless you for that, but
God has shewn me that only
by the Bible, the Word of
God can the Problem
be solved, and I have every
detail of the solving, and
the End of how the Jews,
and how the Arabs are to
dwell in the Holy Land.
to both of their satisfactions

& converted Jew converted
to the Faith in the Lord
Jesus Christ, which many of
your Labour Ministers believe
in. I used to preach the
Gospel in the Ball Ring years
ago, but give it up on
account of having to get
my living. Then I was used
by God to re-arm this
Country against Hitler, &
the Balham C.L.D. ~~or~~
~~and demonstrated by~~
Banner and meetings and
then by writing to the
Prime Minister and
ask Mr Churchill if I

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4 will you let me solve it
I will have an interview with
you, speak in the House of
Commons about it or get me
permission to speak over
the wireless about it.
and I'll tell you every
word I am going to say
before I say it it will
satisfy everybody because
it is the Truth and
nothing but the Truth of
the Lord Jesus Christ.
so now I am waiting for
you it is up to you to
tell me. I Remain yours
Sincerely
Mr B. H. Eagland

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E 1673

25 FEB

MAURICE BERNHARDT.

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NEW YORK, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1947.

Palestine—Britain's Alternatives

The British are privileged, by virtue of their arms, to act as conquerors in Palestine. They may, for rifles give them permission, force thousands to abandon their homes in Jerusalem. They can sweep through settlements—searching, smashing, even looting the magnificent achievements wrested by blood and sweat from a harsh earth.

They may, as happened at Sarona the night of January 2, force Jews to run a gauntlet of gun butts and truncheons until some fall bloody and unconscious. They are able to order non-essential Britishers to evacuate Palestine as they prepare an all-out drive on terrorists.

But they cannot prevail through such tactics.

Of course, there can be "no surrender to terrorists." But hanging Dov Gruner and turning Palestine into an active theatre of war IS surrender to the terrorists.

For nothing could suit the strategy of the extremist groups more than the imposition of martial law, now almost a certainty. It means closing down factories and farms, forcing thousands into unemployment. And in the atmosphere of hopelessness and resentment thus engendered, the conviction that nothing is to be gained through moderation will spread and men, in desperation, will turn to guns.

Idealists to Machiavellians?

Unless idealists have overnight turned into Machiavellians, that is not what British Labor wants. It is certainly not what the vast mass of Palestinians desire.

Yet it is coming. True, Britain has offered the Jewish Agency 7 days in which to conduct its own purge of terrorists.

But no institution faintly representative of the Jewish people could accept that ultimatum. The British have flouted their mandate, converted their Balfour pledge into a scrap of paper, turned unfortunate immigrants back from their only hope of life. Do they now expect the Agency to wage civil war in order that such illegalities and indignities be facilitated in the future?

Deprived of the elementary attributes of sovereignty—the right to control immigration, land purchases—is the official spokesman of Palestinian Jewry to assume an artificial sovereignty momentarily proffered it by the British, so that it may better proceed to the shedding of brothers' blood?

Yet the Agency wants desperately to stop the terror. The economy of Palestine built by the bitter toil of pioneers is imperiled by extremist activities. Citrus crops often rot, for the highways to shipping points are unsafe. Merchants are forced, at gunpoint, to subsidize the underground.

But the Agency cannot turn quisling.

Hope Is the Answer

The answer then, lies not in ultimatums and flourishes of arms. If Britain desires an end to terrorism, she must offer the Jewish people of Palestine some hope for the future. She must, at the very least, propose a plan that will set up a free Jewish state large enough to sustain its present population, plus those who dream of migrating to their homeland.

If and when that happens, no ultimatums will be required to end the excesses. For widespread terror can exist only by sufferance of the community. And given hope and reason the Jews will themselves take care of their extremist fringe.

The alternative is more British troops and ultimatums. But that will solve nothing. A gun will be turned up here and there, arrests will mount. But for every man jailed a hundred, grown embittered and disillusioned, will spring to take his place. The ancient, continuing battle for human

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And the end of that battle will not be a British triumph. Of that, Mr. Bevin, Gen. Barker and like-minded Britishers may be sure.

As His Majesty's Government prepares to free Burma and India, it should ponder what a harsh imperialist policy—using guns instead of reason, denying elementary human rights to subject peoples—has already cost the Empire.

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34

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

14th February, 1947

1673/46/11

My dear John,

I enclose for whatever action may be considered appropriate a copy of a telegram from some Jews in Manila.

I am also sending a copy to Edmonds at the Colonial Office. I have not, of course, sent any acknowledgment.

Yours ever,

John Addis

J.P.L.C. Henniker, Esq., M.C.,
Foreign Office.

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NLT HIS EXCELLENCY PRIMEMINISTER CLEMENT

ATTLEE LONDON=

JEWISH COMMUNITY PHILIPPINES IN PRESENCE OF HIGH REPRESENTATIVES PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC AND ALLIED NATIONS UNVEILED SUNDAY MONUMENT DEDICATED JEWISH WAR VICTIMS STOP FOLLOWING DEDICATION JEWISH WHEREAS JEWISH BRETHREN FOUGHT AS ALLIED OF GREAT BRITISH EMPIRE FOR DISPOSAL COMMON

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ENEMY OF MANKIND DISPROPORTIONATELY SUFFERING LARGEST CAUSALTIES FOR CAUSE OF FREEDOM DEMOCRACY STOP WHEREAS DOV GRUNER FOUGHT WITH HIS MAJESTIES FORCES AGAINST ENEMY HOPING TO DESTROY BRITISH EMPIRE STOP RESOLVED JEWISH COMMUNITY PHILIPPINES JOIN PEOPLE OF JEWISH FAITH ALL OVER THE WORLD PLEADING FOR COMMUTATION OF DEATH SENTENCE DOV GRUNER.

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
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E

41

1673 46 P1

January 10, 1944

Rec 11-2-44

Dear Sir -

Enclosed you will find a clipping from the Chicago Sunday Sun. It tells an unbelievably horrible story.

I would appreciate it very much if you would send me the British report on this incident.

Thank you,

Louis Liberman
3908 Gladys
Chicago 24, Illinois

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

42

British 'Get Even'

Soldiers in Palestine Force 60 Jews to Run Gantlet After Raid

By Homer Bigart.

TEL AVIV.

TWO obvious facts—a growing anti-Semitism among British troops and a rising anti-British feeling among Palestine Jews—dominate all other considerations in the Palestine crisis.

The anti-Semitism has been the inevitable product of terrorist acts, just as terrorism appears to be the inevitable recourse of a people who feel that all legal pressure for achieving security and freedom has failed.

The British troops now in Palestine are certainly no worse than American troops now in Germany. Both forces are composed largely of young recruits who, under strain, are liable to lose their heads. No one could deny that troops here have suffered nagging provocations. But the Sarona police compound incident in Tel Aviv the other night was a particularly nasty display of anti-Semitism.

* * *

SHORTLY after a terrorist attack on the district military headquarters in a citrus house in the heart of Tel Aviv, soldiers and police entered the Montefiore district, rounded up the male population and marched them into Sarona police compound.

Some 60 to 70 men were forced to run the gantlet between rows of soldiers and police, who struck them with rifle butts and batons. Twenty-nine were injured.

A brigade commander of the 6th Air-Borne Division, whose troops were involved, said that a closed inquiry was under way.

* * *

ABRAHAM KLAJMAN, owner of a textile mill, said that police entered the factory, ordered him and 12 men out into the yard.

"I asked them whether I should halt the machines and they replied, 'You'd better—you won't be back very soon.'

"I told the girl employees they'd better stay inside the factory. We were lined up in the yard. Some of the workers started smoking, but the cigarettes were struck from their hands by the police.

* * *

"SUDDENLY a policeman fired in the air and I heard a command 'Run.' We ran to the main road, where we mixed with a crowd of men whom the police and soldiers had removed from a bus. We stood there a few minutes and then the command 'Run' came again.

"At Sarona the main gate was open. Soldiers and police were lined up on both sides of a lane leading to the center of the compound—a distance of one sixth of a mile.

"I heard the cries of men being beaten in the darkness ahead and then I realized that the shots fired by the police had been a signal to the soldiers to prepare the gantlet.

* * *

"I WAS a prisoner of the Germans at Radon, in Poland, and I have learned a few things. I kept in the center of the mass of running men and suffered fewer blows than those on the outside.

"I was clipped once on the head and twice on the arm, but did not fall. Some of the older men fell. I saw a man clubbed with the butt of a rifle as he lay on the ground.

"In the center of the compound we were ordered to sit in a circle on the ground. The soldiers continued to beat those they could reach at the edge of the perimeter. Some of the men became nause-

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"In the center of the compound we were ordered to sit in a circle on the ground. The soldiers continued to beat those they could reach at the edge of the perimeter. Some of the men became nauseated, others fainted. I heard one soldier cry, 'Give me a machine gun and I'll kill the whole bloody lot.'

* * *

"THEN we were put into trucks and taken to the British counter-intelligence at Jaffa. There was a stretcher case unconscious in my truck and another man with a broken leg and one with a badly injured arm.

"At Jaffa they simply took our names and ordered us to go home. I overheard an officer saying: 'Who gave orders to arrest these people? Take them back.'"

Similar stories were obtained from Benjamin Brabda, who had fought with the Jewish Brigade in Belgium and Holland; Joram Danieli, a textile worker, and Joseph Dula, a laborer whose right arm was still in a sling.

* * *

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Jerusalem, 20th January, 1947.

43

Mr. E. Bevin,
Foreign Secretary,
Foreign Office,
LONDON

No Jews

F 673 46 51

Sir,

I herewith beg to submit to you the pamphlet in which I draw attention to the main claims of the Jews, and a Digest of their decisive rights for a solution of the Palestine problem now discussed in the Palestine Conference in London.

My statement is based on historical foundations and on the world-politics as well as on the development of affairs and the changes of the conditions and the relations betweet the three peoples in wuestion from the day of the Balfour Declaration until today,

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant.

M M Porush

Rabbi M.M. Porush
Shaare-Hessed Quarter,
Jerusalem.

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44

הרב מנחם מנדל פרוש

זכויותנו הברורות והמכריעות

בקשר

להועידה הארצי־ישראלית בלונדון

ולאסיפת ארגון אומ"א

טבת תש"ז

ירושלים

OUR CLEAR AND DECISIVE RIGHTS IN CONNECTION

WITH THE PALESTINE CONFERENCE IN LONDON
and The Uno Meetings

By Rabbi M. M. PORUSH

January 1947
JERUSALEM

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45.

בעזהי"ת

א

המושב ישראל בארץ — חיי היהודים בגלות — צפייתם לגאולה —

מלבד ארץ ישראל אין שום ארץ ומדינה בעולם שהיהודים נמצאו וישבו שמה מלפני שאר האזרחים בני האומה השולטת, בכל ארצות ומדינות שהגרו שמה היהודים היו עמי הארץ לפניהם, והיהודים ידעו שהם גרים שמה בחסד, נכנעו וסבלו סברו וקבלו כל מיני הגבלות וגזירות המלכות.

הסתייגו בינם לבין עצמם דרכי חייהם היו כפולים כלפי חוץ וכלפי פנים, הסתגלו לדרכי ותכונות הגוים שנמצאו בהם, וכלפי פנים חיו חיי עצמאיים כממשלה בתוך ממשלה כל עניניהם הפנימיים, הדתיים התרבותיים, וגם הסוציליים נחתכו והתנהלו על פי הרבנים ראשי הקהל ופרנסי הדור.

למרות ההכנעה תחת עול הגלות ושעבוד המלכות, נשארו בני חורין ברוחם, בהכרת כבוד עצמם בגיאותם הלאומי בדתם, בתורתם במוסרם ובחיי־משפחתם הצנועים, קשורים בעברם המזהיר, ולארץ מולדתם ובצפייתם לגאולה.

רק בארץ ישראל נמצאנו היהודים בארץ לפני האזרחים הערבים, בה כוננו ממלכתם מלכות יהודה וישראל, בה נבנו בית מקדש תפארתם בה קמו נביאיהם שהתנבאו על קורות העתידים לבוא, ועל כל ממלכות תבל ומלואה.

ב

— ישוב יהודים בארץ לא נפסק לעולם — הקשר בין יהודי הגולה ובין היהודים בארץ — תקנות הגולה לתמוך ביהודי הארץ —

לעולם לא נפסק ישוב היהודים בארץ מזמן שנכבשה מידם על ידי הרומאיים ובזמן שלטון הפרסיים והביצנצים וכאשר כבשיו הערבים את הארץ מצאו בה תושבים יהודים ואף שעיקר מרכז היהודים נמשך להתקיים בבבל, בכל זאת תפסה ארץ ישראל והיהודים שישבו בה מקום גדול וחשוב אצל כל אחיהם שבגולה, וקשר תמידי היה קיים ביניהם ע"י התמיכה הקבועה שתיקנו ראשי הגולה שבבבל לתמוך ביהודי א"י, שנחשבו לחלוצי העם המחזיקים את הישוב בקודש, ושלוחים היו יוצאים מהכא להתם ומהתם להכא תקנה זו נמשכה ונתקבלה למסורת לדורות ונתחדשה בכל התקופות בזמן הרמב"ן ובזמן תלמידי הגר"א והבעש"ט ז"ל.

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ג

— תקופות קצרות של שלטון עמים שונים בארץ — אי־חשיבות
הארץ עצמה אצל העמים — ממשלת הערבים בארץ — כבוש
התורקים — לא נשאר שום שלטון לערבים בארץ — יחס התורקים
להערבים ולהיהודים — תקופה שא"י היתה מרכז רוחני לכל
עם היהודי —

אחת מסגולת הארץ ומנפלאות ההשגחה היא שלעולם לא נמצאה תקופת רבות תחת שום ממשלה של עמים אחרים ולא שמשה אצל כל העמים שנמצאה תחת ידם למקום מרכזי דתי או לאומי, ולא כבשוה מפני חשיבותה העצמי, אלא רק לשם מעבר למצרים, שתמיד נשאו הממלכות עיניהם אליה מפני חשיבותה האסטרטיגי, גם הערבים העבירו מטעם זה את הכליפות למצרים, ומשם הלכו והתפשטו בכל ארצות צפון אפריקה עד מערבה למפרץ גיברלטר שמשם עברו לספרד.

אף ממשלת הערבים בארץ לא נמשכה תקופה רבה, מלבד שבינתיים נכבשה ע"י המונגלים והצלבנים נכבשה אח"כ ע"י התורקים יחד עם כל ארצות ערב והכניעו ושיעבדו את הערבים ביד חזקה ודכאו את רוחם עד שנאבד ונאפס מהם כחם התרבותי וכח היצירה הספרותי והפיליסופי שהיה להם בתקופתם המזהירה, ולא נשאר בידם שום כח של שלטון וממשלה, לבד כקידים נמוכים ששרתו את הנציבים והמושלים שנמנו מאת השער העליון בעיר סטמבול הבירה.

לעומת זה התיחסו התורקים להיהודים בכבוד רב, את שערי ארצם פתחו לפני גולי ספרד, הכירו באופן רשמי את כח הרבנות ע"י הרב הראשי בעיר הבירה שהיה יוצא ונכנס בשער העליון והופיע בכל החגיגיות הרשמיות, וכן בכל שאר הערים הגדולות נמנו הרבנים ע"י מאמר המלך, כל דיני ומשפטי היהודים בינם לבין עצמם דיני אישות וגם דיני ממנות נחתכו ע"י בתי דינים של היהודים, בתקופה של אחרי גלות ספרד במאה השש עשרה נעשתה ארץ ישראל למרכז רוחני לכל עם היהדי בגולה בזמן רבנו יוסף קרא בעל השולחן ערוך והאר"י הקדוש ותלמידיו שהאירו עיני כל ישראל בעולם.

ד

— אין לערבי א"י אופי לאומי מיוחד — גם לא תכונות מיוחדות
משאר ערבי ארצות השכינות — לא היה להם שום פעם שלטון
וממשלה מיוחדת —

בין בזמן שלטון הערבים בארץ, ובין בזמן שלטון התורקים, לא הוו הערבים תושבי הארץ שום אופי ותכונה לאומית מיוחדת, לעצמם, ולא היה שום הבדל ושנוי

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בכל דרכי חייהם מיתר הערבים של הארצות השכינות, אף לא במבטא השפה הערבית כמו שיש הבדל ניכר גם אצל ערבי מצרים, ועוד יותר ניכר אצל המוררבים תושבי ארצות צפון אפריקה המערבית.

וכש"כ שלא היה להם שום פעם שלטון וממשלה לבדם, תמיד היו נחשבים לחלק של הערבים תושבי הערים הגדולות הסמוכות, גם בימי ממשלת תורכיה היו הפחה של ירושלם נכנע תחת פקודת הוואלי של דמשק או בירות.

ומדוע איפה? ובאיזה זכות? תובעים להם ערבי ארץ ישראל זכות של עצמאות מיוחדה?

ה

— הבדל נפשי יסודי בין היהודים ובין הערבים ביחסם להארץ —
תאות ראשי המשפחות לשלטון — אין היהודים דוחקים מקום
הערבים ולא רוצים לשלוט בהם —

יש הבדל נפשי יסודי בין היחס של הערבים להארץ ובין היחס של היהודים להארץ, הקשר שבין הערבים להארץ הוא רק קשר אינדיבנדלי, כי מלבד ראשי המשפחות והמנהיגים שלהם ששסו אותם בנו וגירו את יצרם לתאוות שלטון אמביצית לשבת על כסאות ממשלה, — הקשר של שאר הערבים אזרחי ותושבי הארץ הוא רק קשר טבעי הבא מתוך הרגש הרגיל שיש אצל כל אדם שחביב עליו יותר המקום שנולד בו, ולכן יחסם להארץ הוא רק יחס פסיבי, ועל רגשות כאלה לא קשה לוותר, ובנקל אפשר לכובשם, שכן אנו רואים שאדם עוזב את מקום מולדתו להגר למדינה אהרת, ועאכו"כ שלא יבצא עצמו עלוב כאלו הוא הגלה ממקומו וכאלו שמגרשים אותו אם הוא עובר לגור במקום אחר בין בני עמו דתו ולשונו, בעוד שבאמת אין כוונת היהודים לדחוק אותם ממקומם, ואינם חפציב לשלוט עליהם, ורק ראשי המשפחות וראשי הדת שנשאו עיניהם לשלטון התחילו להסית את ההמון להלהיב את רגשותיהם ודתיים לאיים עליהם בסכנת מקומותיהם הקדושים, ולהפחיד אותם מפני שלטון של היהודים עליהם.

ו

— הארץ קשורה להיהודים — קשר חיובי — קשר ישר בלתי
אמצעי — אהבה בלתי תלויה — ההכרה הלאומית — תורשת
האמונה — איננה שאלה מקומית — שאלת קיום עם ישראל —

לא כן הוא הקשר וחיחס של היהודים להארץ, לא שהם נקשרו להארץ, אלא שהארץ קשורה בנפשם ובנשמתם, כל יהודי ויהודי מבין כל היהודים הפזורים בכל

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קצוי תבל אם רק לא נשבה נפשו ולא נתפס ברוח ההתבוללות וכל עוד נשאר חי בקרבו זיק האמונה והתקוה של דורות לשיבת ציון, בין מתוך האמונה, ובין מצד התקוה הלאומית אז הקשר שבינו לבין הארץ איננו קשר פסיבי, קשר אמצעי, מטעם איזו סיבה שהיא גם לא מתוך הרגשה טבעית רגילה, אלא קשר ישר בלתי־אמצעית — קשר חיובי — להארץ עצמה, אהבה בלתי־תלויה, אהבה פלאטנית, אהבה קדושה, תחושה מופשטה, הקיימת גם מתחת לסף ההכרה הגלויה גם ההכרה הלאומית החילונית שנתעוררה אצל אלה המכריזים על עצמם שהם בלתי דתיים באה אצלם מתוך תורשת האמונה של דורות, שהתקיימה אצל היהודים מעולם האמונה בתקומת עם ישראל ובשובם לארצם ארץ מולדתם ארץ אבותם, תביעתנו שארץ ישראל כולה תהיה למדינת היהודים איננה רק שלילית שאחרים לא ישלטו בנו, ואף איננה רק שאלה מקומית בלבד, אלא שאלת קיום עם היהודים בכל העולם.

ז

— מדוע התקיים עם ישראל בגולה — שלטון הדת על המדינה, כח התורה והדת אצל היהודים — פירוד המדינה מהדת — ההכרה הלאומית אצל כל העמים — התחיה הלאומית אצל היהודים — חיבתם לשפתם ולארצם — הציונית המדינית — ד"ר הרצל — המלחמה הקודמת — הצהרת בלפור —


כל זמן שממלכות העולם והמדינות היו מבוססים על יסודי הדת ששלטה על המושלים ועל המדינות, וכל סבוכי המדיניות ותגרי הממלכות, ותאוות כיבוש ארצות להרחיב גבול ממלכתם באו מתוך קנאת הדת לאלוף את אמונתם ודתם על אחרים או להגן על דתם.

אז היו היהודים יכולים להתקיים בגולה בכל משך זמן הגלות הארוך באלפיים שנה, מפני שהרגישו בעצמם שכח אמונתם תורתם ודתם חזק כ"כ אצלם כמו כח של ממלכה אדירה, אף בלי ארץ ומלוכה וכח הגבורה הרוחנית שלהם היה כמו כח צבאי צי נשק וזיון, את כח לשד חייהם ינקו ושאבו ממקור אמונתם ותורתם, בה הגו ולמדו, ובה מצאו משיבת נפשם ושמחת לבם, האמונה התורה וקיום מצוותיה אחד וקשר את כל היהודים לעם אחד מפוזר ומפורד בין העמים בכל קצוי תבל.

אבל אחרי שהמדינה נפרדה מהדת, והנהגת המדינות ושפטיהם הועמדו על יסודות הלאומיות של תולדות העמים, אז גם אצל היהודים התחילו יסודי הדת להתרופף היו כאלה שע"י זכות שוויון האזרחי שהעניקו להם חשבו לקבל את

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ד

— מליאה מרבית בתחילת — הכנסה ביטחונית לא־מוגדרת
מרבית — רוב מרבית לחסרות בקנה — ועידה משלח —
— מליאה מוחלטת — מליאה אזורית מרבית — המשכיות ביטחונית
לעניין לחיזוק בית המלוכה --

מרבית מחמד אליו שלטון מוסדי הוא מנהיגי עם מנהיגות ביטחונית
של כסף ועידות, עם שינוי מאזניים ועם מליאה לעם מלוכנית, מלחמת ביטחונית
מנהיגות לעם את מנהיגים מחוז ועידה לעניין מנהיגות, לא מינוי ולא
מלוכה את בלעם מיד מאזניים בקנה, עם מוסדות מנהיגים המנהיג לא מאזנים מוח
ביטחונית לעניין ומ״ב מלא המשכי ולא מבלי את אל מנה מוסדות
מנהיגות.

ומינויים לעניין ומ״ב מלא המשכי ולא מבלי את אל מנה מוסדות
מנהיגות.

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והגישו את עצמת תביעת היהודים להכיר בזכותנו בארץ ישראל, ואת שווין זכות האזרחי להיהודים בגולה.

ובסן רימו כשנוסד חבר הלאומים ובחלוקת המנדטים, בו בזמן שהכירו בשחרורם של הערבים וארצות הערביות נתחלקו לממשלות נפרדות תחת שני מנדטים, הכירו והסכימו אז גם על הצהרת בלפור שארץ ישראל תהיה לבית לאומי לעם היהודים, תחת מנדט של ממשלת בריטניה שתעזור להיהודים בהתפתחות הארץ ע"י עלית היהודים ובבנינה עד שתהא ראויה לקבל עצמאותה, ועפ"י הרוח של הצהרת בלפור שנתנה על יסוד של ההסתדרות הציונית המדינית וממשלת המנדט הכירה בסוכנות היהודית של ההסתדרות ציונית לשתף אותה ולהתיעץ אתה בהגשמת בית הלאומי, אין שום ספק שהמטרה הסופית היא שארץ ישראל תהיה למדינת היהודים.

ט

— חוק יסודי במשפט — המתחיל בריב — אנו והאנגלים — יחס של ידידות — התקוה מהצהרת בלפור — האכזבה — ההתמקות — אלמלי רצתה — עמדה חזקה — עוררה שאלה ערבית — לפייס את הערבים — המעטת זכות היהודים —

חוק יסודי הוא במשפט כל העמים כי יהיה ריב בין אנשים והיכו זה לזה והוגשו למשפט, אז על השופט לברר מי משניהם היה המתחיל, ואז נמצא שהוא הנאשם והחייב והשני זכאי.

אנו והאנגלים נמצאים כהיום במצב של יריבים, וכלום יש צורך לבירור רב כדי לברר מי מאתנו היה המתחיל בריב ?

עם היהודים היו מתמיד רוחשים ידידות לעם האנגלים יותר מלכל העמים אחרים, והביטו עליהם כמגינה על היהודים, וכשניתנה לנו ע"י ממשלת בריטניה את הצהרת בלפור חשבנו שנתקיימה תקוותנו שתלינו בעם האנגלי.

אולם תקוותנו נתאכזבה ואכזבה גדולה באה תחת האימון שנתנו בעם האנגלי שזכאית וראויה היא להיות שליח ההשגחה ולמלאך מושיע לעם ישראל.

לא עבר זמן רב אחרי שנכנסה הארץ תחת ממשלת בריטניה, לא הספקנו עוד להשיב רוחנו, ולרפא משובתנו מהשבר והתלאה שעבר על היהודים באירופה, ולבצר עמדתנו בארץ, הרגשנו תיכף שממשלת בריטניה מתחמקת מלמלאות התחייבותה החגיגית נגד כל עמי העולם.

אלמלי רצתה הממשלה באמת לקיים הבטחתה לעזור להיהודים להקים את הבית הלאומי והיתה נוקטת עמדה חזקה וגלויה בלי הסוסים, לא היתה נוצרה כלל

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שום שאלה ערבית, כי אם היו יודעים הערבים שאין שום מקום לערעור ולעורר טענות ותביעות, היו מקבלים ברצון את ההשיגים הגדולים שהשיגו עם הערבים בכלל ותושבי הארץ בפרט, שיצאו משעבוד ועבדות נשתחררו מתגרת יד ממשלת תורקיה שהכבידה עולה עליהם במסים כבדים ובחובת הצבא ופדיונה, מבלי לתת להם שום עזרה לפתוחם, הערבים היו נהנים בשוה מהתפתחות הארץ מהרמת התרבות, והרמת החיים הכלכליים, וגם מהרמת כבודם הלאומי בזמן שאחיהם הערבים הקימו להם ממשלות והוכתרו להם מלכים ונשיאים שבכל אופן היו עומדים עמהם בקשר תרבותי ולאומי.

אבל הממשלה דעת אחרת היתה אתה, תמיד הראה פנים כאלו היא דואגת בעד הגנת זכות הערבים שלא יקופח כביכול, היא העירה והחמירה יותר, והלהיבה יותר את שאלת הערבים ותמיד חיפשה דרכים איך לפייס את הערבים על חשבון הפחתת והמעטת זכות היהודים.

ל

— פקידי הממשלה — הפרעות והרציחות — קריעת עבר הירדן —
נתחדשו הפרעות — ועידת חקירה — הצעת חלוקה — פגיעה בלב
היהודי — חלק קטן — ערך מדינה או בית לאומי — אחרי חורבן
היהודים — אין לשלול — חלק הראוי להתישבות — דחיית
ההצעה — מעלים את זכרה —

פקידי הממשלה התחילו להראות פנים זועפות להיהודים ולהערבים פנים שוחקות הערבים קבלו בכל חלקי הממשלה יותר משרות וגבהות יותר מהיהודים, הממשלה עודדה את רוחם להרים ראש עד שהרהיבו להתחיל בפרעות ורציחות וכדי לפייסם קרעו את עבר הירדן מארץ ישראל ויוצרה ממשלה חדשה מבלי להשאיר זכות להיהודים אף לשבת שמה בתור אזרחים, וגבול עבר הירדן סגור בפני היהודים, לא עברו שנים רבות והשיגה את עצמאותה, והעמיר הוכתר למלך ונושא את עיניו מערבה.

נתחדשו הפרעות ביתר אכזריות ודמי נקיים וקדושים נשפכו על אדמת קודש, ולמרות מה שהיהודים הבליגו והתנחמו בהמשכת הרחבת הישוב ובנינו נשלחה ועידת הקירה כאלו שהיה מה לחקור מי הם הפורעים או המתחיל בפרעות, והתוצאות היו עוד הפעם פיוס להערבים וקיפוח להיהודים העלו הצעת החלוקה הזעומה עם חלק מחנק להיהודים.

אף עצם החלוקה כשהיא לעצמה חלוקת הארץ אף בגבול הטבעי שלה ובקדושתה המלאה שלה, היא כמו פגיעה ודקירה בלב היהודי כי הארץ בשביל

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היהודים אינה רק כמו רכוש ששני בעלי דברים חולקים עליו, שאפשר לפשר ביניהם ולחלקו לחצאים.

אף אין שאלת ארץ ישראל בשביל היהודים רק כדי למצוא מקום להצלת היחידים, אלא גם שאלת קיום היהודים בכל העולם, להשיב להם את כבודם ואת ארץ מולדתם אשר גזלו ממנו.

ואי אפשר להיהודים להסכים שחלק מהארץ הנמצאת עכשיו רק תחת ממשלת מנדט תמסר לחלוטין לממשלה ומלוכה אחרת ולשלול מהיהודים לתמיד את זכותם עליה.

וכש"כ, שהחלק הקטן והמדולדל שהואילה הועידה בטובה להציע להיהודים, אין בו כדי לתפוס איזה מקום חשוב של ערך מדינה או בית לאומי.

ועל אחת כמה וכמה עכשיו אחרי חורבן היהודים באירופה שכמה רבבות יהודים נטולי אזרחיות מתגוללים בהסגרים באין מקום מפלט להם זולת בארצנו שעיניהם נשואות אליה, אין לשלול שום חלק מהארץ הראויה להתישבות היהודים.

גם היהודים וגם הערבים דחו את הצעת החלוקה, ונשארת גנוזה בארכיו של מניסטריום המושבות, אך לפעמים נמצאים בעלי עצות טובות שמעלים את זכרה.

יא

— השעה המוכשרת לפרעות — שלטון הרשע — חולשת ממשלת בריטניה — צורה של מרידה — הבלגת היהודים — מצב המדוכא — קצרה יד הממשלה להשקיט — ספר הלבן — זיוף הצהרת בלפור — היהודים דחו את הסה"ל — הגינוי של ועדת המנדטים — נתפרצה המלחמה — מלחמת בזק — כיבוש אירופה — זעמו שפך על היהודים — הנס הגלוי — קרוב לשערי ארצנו — התחלת מפלתו — סופם של הרשעים —

שעה מוכשרת יותר לפרעות מצאו הערבים בזמן שעלה שלטון הרשע בגרמניה ונשא עיניו להכניע ולשעבד את כל העולם תחת רגליו וראשית מלחמתו הכריז על עם היהודים, ושכנינו ראו את חולשת ממשלת בריטניה שהתרפסה בתחילה לפניו, התחילו אז בפרעות נוראות עד שקבלו צורה של מרידה גלויה, היהודים שנמצאו במצב של דכאון רוח בהרגישם את הרעה הצפויה להם הראו התאפקות והבלגה בהשענם על כחות הממשלה לדכא את המרידה שהיתה מכוונת אז גם נגדה.

אולם ממשלת בריטניה עשתה את עצמה כאלו קצרה ידה להשקיט את מרידת הערבים וכדי לפייסם פרסמה את ספר הלבן המשחיר והמזיק את הצהרת בלפור שלא רק שהוציאו את הרוח מלבה, אלא גם מגוף ההצהרה כמעט שלא נשאר כלום.

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היהודים דחו את הספר הלבן ע"י מחאות והפגנות, גם וועידת המנדטים שע"י חבר הלאומים גינתה את הספר הלבן והיוותה דעתה שזה נגד הצהרת בלפור ונגד התחייבותה של ממשלת המנדט לעם היהודים.

בין כך נתפרצה המלחמה האיומה בכל זוועותיה, ובמלחמת בזק כבש האויב השטני את אירופה ובכל מדרך כף רגלו זרס והחריב בלי המלה, את כל זעמו שפך על היהודים שעבדם לעבודת כפיה רכושם החריב, והתחיל להפיק זממו הרע להשמיד חלילה את היהודים מגוי.

דרך איטליה שרודה האכזרי חבירו לרעה הצטרף אליו, עברו לאפריקה הצפונית, והגיעו קרוב לשערי ארצנו, וכאן ראו נס גלוי בעליל, שמשם מאל עלמין התחילה מפלתו ונסיגתו לאחור, צבאות הברית הלכו מחיל אל חיל עד שהגיעו לשערי ברלין, סופם של הרשע וחברו היה כמו סופם של כל הרשעים, שעמדו על ישראל להשמידם להשיב גמולם בראשם.

יב

— התקוה המלאה — סבלות היהודים — חלק הישוב במאמצי המלחמה — התגייסות בחורים ובחורות — לחזור על בגידתה — סדר עולם חדש — שלום קיים — שלום עם היהודי — אין שלום בלי ארץ מולדתם — הכרזת בווין — ההפתעה והרעם — זיק תקוה — שיתוף ממשלת ארה"ב — ועדת חקירה — ביקורה בההסגרים — תרו את הארץ — קבלו עדות — תקוותנו לא נתקיימה — התנחמנו בהחלטתה של מאה האלף — ובאניות המעפילים —

היינו מלאי תקוה ובטחון גמור שאחרי השואה והשבר שעבר על עם היהודי שאבד ששה מליונים מבניו שנהרגו ונשרפו, נחנקו ונקברו חיים, ואחרי חלקו הגדול של הישוב במאמצי המלחמה, רבבות בחורים ובחורות עזבו את עבודת הבנין והישוב, הקריבו נפשם והתגייסו לחזית המלחמה, לא תחזור עוד ממשלת המנדט על בגידתה, וכן ממשלות הברית כשיתוועדו לקבוע סדר עולם חדש, ואת תנאי־שלום קיים בין העמים יזכרו גם עם היהודים לטובה, שאי אפשר עוד לבניו להתקיים על מקום מזבח משפחותיהם ועל אדמת הדמים שרוותה דמי מליוני אחיהם, ואי אפשר להיות שלום־אמת קיים בעולם בלי שלום עם היהודים, עם השלום, ואין שלום אמת להיהודים בלי ארץ מולדתם ארץ אבותם.

והנה באה עלינו כהפתעה וכרעם ההכרזה המחפירה של מר בווין מיניסטר

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החוץ של מפלגת הפועלים שעלתה על כסא הממשלה ושהכריזה מקודם על תכניתה לקיים את הצהרת בלפור.

בהכרזה זו שהרעישה את לבב כל יהודי הישוב וכל העם היהודי וגם כל ידידינו הישרים בכל עמי העולם מצאנו גם זיק תקוה ונחם בזה שממשלת מנדט משתפת ומצרפת גם את ממשלת ארה"ב בפתרון שאלת ארץ ישראל, שגם היא הסכימה ואישרה את הצהרת בלפור אחרי המלחמה הקודמת בזמן שלקחה גם אז חלק גדול בנצחון של ממשלות הברית על גרמניה ותורקיה, בעלת בריתה אז.

נבחרה ועידה משותפת, קבלה עדות שונות מכל הצדדים, חברי הועידה בקרו באירופה וראו את שרידי עמנו השבורים ורצוצים, בקרו בהסגרים מקום שמתגלגלים רבבות אחינו שכולים ממשפחתם ילדים יתומים ואלמנות, באו לארץ עברו בה וראו את מקומות השוממים, ראו גם את עבודת הבנין והישוב שהקימו היהודים בידים חרוצות ובזיעת אפם, שמעו וקבלו עדות מכל העדות ומאישים ידועים, ומפקידי הממשלה.

ואף שלא נתקיימה גם תקוותנו זו שתלינו מהועידה המשותפת, אולם התנחמנו עכ"פ בהצלה לפי שעה מההחלטה שיצאה ממנה למלאות קודם כל דרישת הנשיא מר טרומן להכניס את המאה אלף.

אף הבלגתנו והתאפקותנו לעצור את סערת רוחנו שהסתער בלב כל בני הישוב מהכרזת בווין ונשכנו את בשרנו בשנינו, היה ג"כ מפני זה, שעכ"פ הצליחו במשך הזמן לעלות להארץ מעפילים שהשליכו נפשם מנגד להמלט מהגולה והפליגו באניות קטנות ורעועות צפופים בתנאים קשים ומסוכנים וזכו עכ"פ לדרוך בכף רגליהם על אדמת קודש משאת נפשם, אף כי נתנו במסגורים, לפני שחרורם.

יג

— שיא ההתעללות — דחתה החלטת הועדה של מאה האלף — ציוד על אניות המעפילים — אי קפריסין — חרדה וזעזוע — קצה גבול ההבלגה — מזימת הממשלה — להכניע את רוחנו — לידי יאוש ואפס תקוה — לקבל מה שתושיט לנו — התאוששות והתקוממות — אין לשון משותפת — אין ללמוד להבין את הגויים — עליהם להבין גם אותנו — שפה חדשה — נקודות חדשות — מפנה ושינוי יסודי — נקו המדיניות שלנו — עמדה חזקה וגלויה —

אולם לידי שיא ההתעללות וההתכחשות בנו, הגיעה ממשלת המנדט בשתיים רעות אלו מצד אחד דחתה בהתקחשות לב :את החלטת הועידה להכניס את המאה

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אלף, וגם לא נרתעה לפרוש ציוד ימי מאניות משחית לתפוס את אניות המעפילים שהגיעו לחוף ארצנו לסחוף את העולים שעיניהם כבר ראו מרחוק את הרי ישראל, להעבירם על האניות המשחית ולהחזירם, לשלחם על אי נדח ולהחזיקם שוב בהסגירים.

פעולות אלו של הממשלה החרידו וזיעזעו את לב הישוב עד קצה גבול היכולת של הבלגה, נתגלה לפנינו מזימת הממשלה להכניע את רוחנו לשבור את לבנו ולהרוס את תקוותינו ולהפיל אותנו לידי יאוש ואפס תקוה ובאין אונים נתן את עצמנו למדרס ולהיות מוכנים לקבל כל מה שתושיט לנו יד הממשלה בחסדה הגדול.

אבל כל זה הביאה לידי פעולה נגדית, הישוב התאושש והתקומם מבלי להכנע מהפכה גמורה עד כדי מרידה ברוח באה במהלך המחשבה של היהודים, הכירו לדעת, שאין עוד לשון משותפת בינינו ובין האנגלים, ואין לנו עוד ללמוד להבין את הגויים, הגיע הזמן שעליהם להבין גם אותנו ולהקשיב לקול יעקב.

שפה חדשה וברורה קבלו גם העתונים העברים, לא תלונות ובקורת בשפה רכה ונעימה, אלא דברים כמתלהמים דברים חריפים ועזים, לגלות פני הלוט ולחשוף מזימות הממשלה לעודד ולעורר את רוח העם להחזיק מעמד ולא ליפול לידי יאוש, להמשיך בפעולות הבנין והתעשיה, נקודות חדשות נוצרו במקומות שוממים וצעירים גבורי כח ברוח, עלו והעמידו אוהלים והתחילו לשדד אדמה חרבה

גם בקו המדיניות של מנהיגינו באה מפנה ושינוי יסודי עזבו את הטכסיסים הדפלומטיים, את ההתרפסות והשתדלנות, יאחזו עמדה חזקה וגלויה.

יד

— מה שמפריע אותנו — ושטן על דרכנו — פורשים בלתי אחראים — חבלות ורציחות — הישוב מוחה ומגנה — אין בלתי ליגליות — נגד ספר הלבן — הבלתי חוקי — היינו מכבדים את הגבורה — רק גבורי רוח — קול יעקב ולא ידי עשו — הטירור הוא פרוביקציה בידי הממשלה — להתיר דמינו ורכושנו — חיילים פורעים ומשתוללים — מהרסים ומחבלים — גרמתם לכמה קרבנות משלנו — חילול מבצר כבודנו — וכבוד מנהיגינו — אחים יקרים חדלו ממעשיכם — שמעו לקול מורינו ומנהיגינו — שובו מדרככם —

אולם מה שמטריד את הישוב ביותר וגוזל את מנוחתו, מפריע אותנו ועומד לשטן על דרכנו, בא דוקא לצערנו ולבשתנו מתוכנו אנו, נתפרצו פורשים בלתי אחראים שהנהגת הממשלה הממשיכה ביד חזקה את המדיניות של הספר הלבן

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הפעמים, הפרטים על רשמו ואין רשם כזה, על כרך מיוחד הרשם, המתאים ביותר
לרשימות ומעניינו הם רבים, כי ישנה הפרשה בדעתם מעשה ואינה ואינה את
עצמו, בדרגה הם מעניינים ומעניינים את השתתפות על מעשיהם ביותר הפרטים
את שאלות אלמנט הרי רק בדוגמאות ואינה הוא כוח ואחר, ואינה לא הרי כך
מעשיות, ישנו מעניינים את על רשם ואינה ואינה ומעניינים ביותר מעשיהם ביותר
את מי בשנים ואינה ואינה ואינה, ואינה ישנו ביותר ואינה ואינה ואינה
ואינה ואינה ואינה ואינה ואינה ואינה ואינה ואינה

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טו

— ארצות הערביות התחילו להתערב בשאלת א"י — ממשלת בריטניה כרתה בריתות והסכמים עמהם — הבטחות טריטריים להם — גמול שקבלה מהם זכויות — הליגה הערבית — הם אינם צד ובעלי דברים שלנו — החלטת הקונגרס — לא להשתתף בתנאים הנוכחים — לבעלי הבקורת — תכנית מעשית — התאבקות בלי תכנית — ד"ר הרצל — תכנית חזון — מטרה סופית — מדינת היהודים —

אם כי מכבר ידענו שארצות הערביות ומושליהן מתחילים להתערב בשאלת ארץ ישראל, אף כי מקודם לא הראו התנגדות, ידענו ג"כ שממשלת בריטניה כורתת בריתות והסכמים עם הממשלות האלו בזמן שקבלו את עצמאותם, ובודאי לא חסרו בתנאי ההסכמים הבטחות טריטוריים וזכויות פוליטיים להערבים על חשבון זכות היהודים בגמול הזכויות בסיסים אסטרטגיים והכלכליים שבריטניה קבלה מהם, צמחה ליגה ערבית ונוצר כח גדול כביכול, שמוכרחים כבר להתחשב עמהם.

אבל עכ"פ זה לא שערנו שהדברים יגיעו עד כדי שיכירו אותם באופן גלוי ובאופן חוקי לצד ובעלי דברים, שעל היהודים לעמוד בדין עמהם ולשבת עמהם סביב לשולחן עגול אחד ולבוא עמהם בטענות ודין ודברים על פי הזמנת ממשלת בריטניה שכרתה עמהם בריתות והסכמים, בזמן שבריתה והבטחתה להיהודים כבר הפרה ובטלה ע"י הספר הלבן.

ובצדק החליט הקונגרס הכ"ב שבתנאים הנוכחים ועל יסודות ההצעות והתכניות שבאו ג"כ על יסוד של ספר הלבן, אין ליהודים להשתתף בהועידה הארץ ישראלית בלונדון.

דברים אחדים להמתחכמים והפקחים שלנו בעלי הבקורת המתקיפים את החלטות של הקונגרס שלא יצא ולא עובד שום תכנית מעשית, שנוכל לבוא עמה לפני הממשלה.

רבותי! התכנית הכי בטוח היא להתקיים ולהמשיך בהתאבקותנו בלי תכנית, מעשית.

גם כשהופיע ד"ר הרצל לא היה בידו תכניות מעשיות, אלא תכנית של חזון התכנית של המטרה והיא מדינת היהודים.

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קטעים מהעדות שהגשתי לועדת החקירה האנגלית אמריקנית

כל חוק ומשפט של העמים, נחקק ביסודו לא בשביל יחיד פרטי או יחידים פרטיים אלא באופן כללי, ולפי רוח השולט בבני אדם בכלל, ועל אחת כמה וכמה במשפט זה המסור בידכם שאינו דיון בין אישים פרטיים, אלא משפט בין עם לעם, ובין לאום ללאום, אין ספק שצריכים לדון בזה רק לפי רוח הכלל; ולפי מה שנוגע הדבר לעם או ללאום שבין שני הצדדים, ולא רק זה שאין קיום העם והלאום הערבי תלוי בנידון זה, אלא גם שאין עיקר הנידון חשוב ואין לו כ״כ ערך לכח הכללי של העם הערבי, נמצא: שאין הממשלות הערביות נחשבים לצד שלישי שיטענו מצד עצמם, לא כן הוא בנוגע ליהודים, כל יהודי ויהודי הנאמן לעמו ודתו הנמצא בכל העולם, הוא הבעל הדבר והצד עצמו וכל העם היהודי נהשב לצד הנידונים עצמם, ועל השופטים להתחשב עם כלל עם היהודים, והכלל הוא תמיד מכריע נגד פרטים יהיה מספרם כמה שיהיה.

האם לא מספיק בשביל בריטניה מה שמשתמשת בא״י ובנמליה להחזיק את צבאותיה וציה שבמזרח הקרוב? אף אם א״י תהיה למדינת היהודים לא ידרשו היהודים לעולם מבריטניה כל זמן שלא תרצה זאת בעצמה שתוציא את צבאה מהארץ, ותמורת זה שממשלת בריטניה תמשיך להחזיק צבאה בארצנו, בבסיסים ובמקומות מוגבלים, תגן עלינו רק בפני המדינות שסביבינו אף שבטוחים אנו שגם הם יבינו אח״כ שאין להם במה לפחד מפני היהודים, ואם רק ישכון שלום בינינו, תהיה השפעת גומלין שכולנו נרויח ונהנה, בין בשטח המסחר והכלכלה ובין בשטח התרבותי, והערבים המקומיים יהיו בודאי בטוחים בכל הזכויות האזרחיות והלאומיות, אף בלי הגנה ושמירה כביכול מכמה אלפים שוטרים וקצינים וגם כמה פקידים גבוהים ונמוכים אנגלים, המחזיקים אותם במדרגה ובמשכורות יותר גבוהה מאזרחים בארץ העולים לסכומים ענקיים על חשבון תושבי הארץ והחלק היותר גדול נופל על היהודים, שבסכומים כאלה היינו יכולים להכניס עוד כמה מאות אלפים יהודים לארץ. אנו די מבוגרים להגן על בטחון הסדר והמשטר בארץ בינינו לבין עצמנו וגם מה שבינינו לבין הערבים ולנהל עמהם יחד את כל מחלקות הממשלה באופן שכל האזרחים יהנו משיוי זכויות אזרחיות דתיות ולאומיות

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ולפתח את הארץ שתהיה לתפארת עולם, ויכולים אנו לשאול: כמה פושעים אזרחיים יהודים ישנם ביחס לעמים אחרים? ואלמלי היה שקט בארץ, ואלמלי היתה מנהלת ממשלת המנדט את ממשלתה בכיוון הראוי עד כמה היתה מונעת את הבלבולים את הפרעות ואת הטירור הגורמים לכמה קרבנות נפש והוצאות ענקיות שהיו יכולים להשתמש בהן לטובת הארץ ולהתפתחותה.

היהודים הם מעולם מכירי תודה, ולמרות מה שעבר עלינו בא"י ולמרות היחס המוזר והמסולף של ממשלת המנדט אל הבטחתה, אנו בכ"ז רוחשים כבוד לעם האנגלי, הליברלי, שארצם היתה הראשונה ששם חיו היהודים חיים אזרחיים אמתיים.

אבל בכ"ז יש לנו הרשות לשאול מממשלת אנגליה: במה זכתה להחזיק את א"י ולמשול עליה הכל כרצונה ורק לפי האינטרסים שלה? אמנם היא כבשה את א"י בכח צבאותיה, אבל, כלום מתחשבים גם עכשיו רק עם הכח בלבד? וגם אז לא עמדה לבדה במלחמה נגד טורקיה, אלא בהשתתפות ממשלות הברית, אף בריטניה בעצמה גילתה דעתה אז שאין בכוונתה לספח עוד טריטוריה בשבילה אלא הבטיחה לערבים לשחרר אותם מיד טורקיה ועם זה פרסמה אז את הצהרת בלפור להכיר בזכות היהודים לא"י שתהי' לבית לאומי ליהודים.

הכתובת
הרב מנחם מנדל פרוש
שערי חסד
י ר ו ש ל י ם

Address
Rabbi M. M. PORUSH
Shaare Chesed
Jerusalem

דפוס העברי י. ורקר טלפון 3693 ירושלים.
שע"י הסתדרות המזרחי בא"י — ברית החשמונאים

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F. 60

Feb 10-1947.

A. D. Lindsay
1226 Brighton Rd
Pittsburgh 12 Pa

Prime Minister Atlee
10 Downing St.
London England.

INDEXED

Secretary. Please pass this letter.

1673 46 31

Prime Minister Atlee. Greetings:

Dear Sir. There is a matter which I desire to discuss with you. It is a matter of great importance to Britain and to The United States as well. First of all, I am not a Jew. I am Presbyterian and a decendant of your British Lindsays. I do Please understand me.

I want to call your attention to the 12th Genesis 12-3. God made a covenant with the Jew and promised to protect them forever. Of course quoted above, in it God says that He will give blessing for blessing, and cursing for cursing, according as one bless or curse the Jew. Recal what happened to Hitler and all the leaders of the Jew haters as well as the Jew hating German nation? Recal what happened to the Czar of Russia after the awful persecution of the Jews there in the early years of this century?

I beg of you to consider that God said that He would take the Holy Land back for the Jew and do it without bloodshed? ? Yes. Recal General Allenby and his troops. I think how God used Britain and her people. What an honor. Are you willing for God to use you more? (Great Britain) All the nations that have gone against the Jew fell over it. Isa. 54-15.

God will fight the battles of the Jews in the last days. Joel 3rd ch. God will fly in that day over airplanes. Isa 31-5. So will the enemy. Hab. 1-8.

God gave to the Jews "all of the land of all Canaan," as an "everlasting possession." Everlasting? It is still possessions of the Jews. How large a territory? Exodus 23-31. next page.

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"And I will set thy bounds from the Red sea even to the sea of the Philistines, and from the desert unto the River: for I will deliver the inhabitants of the land into your hand; and thou shalt drive them out before thee" "Thou shalt make no covenant with them," Ex 23-31,32. 61

What river? The 'Euphrates'. Gen 15-18.

What about 'now'. God will gather them back to their possessions from every nation Ezek 36-24. God is doing that now. No nation, nor group of nations, (nay, all nations combined) can withstand the hand of the Lord when and since He has decided to bring them back to their own possessions.

I beg of you as the head of the British government - His Majesty's Prime Minister - to not do this foolish thing. Britain has been on the side of the Lord in all of his struggles of these days. God will fly in that day, Hab 1-8. so stay there. God is on the side of the Jew in all of the time is coming at the end of the world - when the whole world will again be in war. At that time "All nations shall be gathered in the planes of the holy land in attack on the Jews. All nations against one small people? Yes. And God will fly as He defends the Jew against all nations. Hence here can see, Zech 14-2, Is 31-4,5 nations & now fighting the Jew - When the Jew will be fighting for His rights. God and the Jew on one side and United Nations on the other.


I plead with you to allow all Jews to return to the homeland. You need not shout down publicly, nor make such an announcement just cease to interfere. Then the Arab will not be so resentful.

I plead that the whole English speaking peoples of all continents be found on the side of the Jew. The Lord will be on that side. Let us be on the Lord's side.

I have been sick my nerves are in bad shape and my writing and language is poor but please excuse all. And remember God says that He will restore the land to the Jew - so why resist God. God Bless you and the whole British people.

A. C. Lindsay.

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WILLIAM E. RIKER
Founder of
Perfect System of Government

The World's Perfect Government

HEADQUARTERS FOR

Economic, Racial and Spiritual Solutions

Holy City, California Feb. 14, 1947

Honorable Clement Attlee,

London, England.

Dear Mr. Attlee:

The true solution to the Palestine Jewish problem is to arrange an equal and proportunate distribution of all Jewish people into every white race people's country on earth as they belong together, as doesthe old and new testaments.

W. E. Riker.

Air

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Letter to file F 63

A. Kirshenbaum,

INDEXED

The Neat Knit Sweater Mill

440 RALPH AVENUE

BROOKLYN, N. Y.

167346/31

4/0 20/2

Date Feb 12 1947

R15/2

Dear Mr atlee:-

Cant you realize that Maybe this is Gods punishment to the English people for resulting such treatures action to the most suffered Jewish Nation!?

Yours and Bevins Government brought in a hate between the noble English democratic people and the Jewish people creators of Demoeracy. This will not pass by unpunished. Distrust between your people and your Government will grow more and more.

The Hitler appeasment brought destruction in Europe, and the appeasment in middle East can do it again.

you can still avoid it: before it is to late.

with deep concern

I remain

A. Kirshenbaum

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes. 64

PM Daily
FIVE CENTS
(Copyright, 1947, by The Newspaper PM, Inc.)
VOL. VII — No. 204
Tuesday, February 11, 1947
Partly Cloudy
COMPLETE EDITION

T
B
F

Lord R. O'Dwyer to put views on air tomorrow night.

Stories and Pictures on Pages 9-13

British Policy for Palestine



British Ultimatum Expires; Showdown Due in Palestine

British authorities order virtual martial law for Jerusalem starting Thursday and condemn three more underground members to death as Jewish Agency rejects ultimatum asking Jews to help suppress underground activity of extremists. Officials believe these events bring British and the Jewish underground to the brink of a showdown. Story on Page 5

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Hickory, N. C., Feb. 12, 1947.

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1673 46 3

Hon. Ernest Bevin,
Foreign Secretary,
London, England,

Dear Sir:

It may be of interest to you to know how a small-town Southerner of the United States feels in regard to your Palestinian policy. I have heard and read quantities of your Colonial Office propaganda, paid or otherwise, and I have heard and read news stories, broadcasts and other items that are too contradictory not to have some basis in fact. The enclosed clipping is just one of many of a similar nature. Many of the democratic people of this country feel as I do,- that so much shilly-shally indicates an ulterior motive not only toward the Jews but also toward all nationalities.

Your Nineteenth Century double dealings that imposed the British Empire upon helpless peoples is very distasteful to fairminded people of the Twentieth Century, who expect and demand a socalled better world. It would seem that your office could see the hand writing on the wall,- in your own India, in French Indo-China, in Egypt. People are tired of being pushed around. Tired of being promised the world when the British Empire needs help, and then being given the old XX when that need has been satisfied.

Many Americans, as well as myself, have always admired the British people, their ruggedness under pressure and their down to earth common sense. However, many, as well as myself cannot say the same thing in regard to the British government. Your government's inclination to take an unfair advantage is well-known here in America and is quite a counter-balance to the natural good-will of our people. A growning disallusionment and definite anti-British feeling is the result.

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6b

American wants to be your friend but not merely a friend in need . We want to feel that the little nations in your power get a fair deal. We want to feel that the British WORD is more than an expedient.

We want you and your Colonial Office to go through with your promises for Palestine. You always manage to go through with policies and measures that suit you regardless of whose feelings are hurt. Your considerations for the "poor" Arab have in recent years bordered upon the ludicrous. Nothing you have done has been directed toward creating harmony between the Jews and Arabs. In fact, it seems that the opposite has been the rule. It is time for you to clean house,- do away with your Nineteenth Century methods and modernize your policy.

You promised to let 100,000 Jews into Palestine,- let them in. The Arabs won't do anything about it unless some of your career diplomats stir them up to doing it. The Jews can and will be the best friends the British Empire ever had,- they showed that during the war.

Americans like clean cut policies and deals. We will work with you if you show us something to hang on to,- something more than trick promises never kept. I had to get good and mad before I could write this letter. It is not just the opinion of one American woman. Millions of other American men and women feel the same way and they can in the end have a direct effect upon American policy of the future. Thank you for your attention.

Very truly yours,

Mrs. A. L. Harrison

Mrs. A. L. Harrison,
1036 16½ Ave., Hickory, N. C.

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Work Ctm Dept / 10 Dec

158 Carroll St
Brooklyn N.Y.
Feb 6 1947

Foreign Secretary Mr Bevin
London
England

My Dear Mr Bevin:

The recent events in Palestine move myself and millions of other thinking people in America and thru out the world to look with horror at the astounding exhibition of uncivil force by your troops.

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1678 46/21
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completion of say a five (3)
year period after local
self government rules, to come
into free independence, or
as an alternative, present the
entire question of Palestine
Mandate with its powers for
final determination as to form
of government to the Assembly
of the United Nations.

Basically shall we put
it this way - Great Britain
acts as the supervisor for
various vast areas apparently
incapable of self rule, if so
does it not seem correct that

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To term such repressive
acts by a mandate power
as necessary due to the
behavior of some of the pop-
ulation is preposterous.
It has been said "Whom
the Gods would destroy they
first make mad."
Here has been and
is the opportunity for your
government to save face,
declare Palestine a dominion
of temporary status or, Con

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your troops withdraw if and when the population of the particular area under consideration, are capable of self determination.

Certainly you can not claim that the Jewish people in Palestine - are not sufficiently progressive to bring prosperity to both Jew and Arab alike. Surely the past performances in their transformation of a poor, retarded, desert area to vibrant verdant and busy garden spot is commendable. You have two armies of action, one for continued repression and ruin to your people and Palestinians, and one for Humanity, justice and liberty of peoples.

Very truly yours,

Ralph D. Estreich

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The Hickory Daily Record

L. C. GIFFORD, Publisher
Published Every Afternoon Except Sunday
OFFICE—Record Building
Telephone 112

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The Record is glad to publish letters, not too long, on matters of general interest. But such communications must be accompanied by the real name of the writer.

"The South Will Come Into Its Own When Its Fields Are Green In Winter."

PALESTINE PROPOSALS

The situation in Jerusalem continues tense, as this is written. British authorities frankly acknowledge that they expect violent reaction from Jewish underground, following the sentencing of three suspected members of a secret resistance organization to death, by a military court, Monday.

In London, both Arabs and Jews have rejected new proposals for the future of Palestine, although it is significant that the way is being kept open for further negotiations.

The new plan which is being discussed, has not been made public, but it is understood that under its provisions semi-autonomous Jewish and Arab areas in Palestine would be set up, with eventual independence as the goal.

Most Americans are quite confused over the situation in the Holy Land. Much light, however, is thrown on the controversy by a young English soldier, Lt. Kenneth Alexander Gourlay, in an article published in an Army newspaper. Inasmuch as the writer was forced to stand trial on charges of "defamatory libel" but was acquitted after the case received widespread publicity, the opinions expressed are of more than passing interest.

Lt. Gourlay is convinced that the British Administration, despite pre-election promises of the Labor regime, has not changed the policy which has prevailed in Palestine for the past quarter of a century. In fact, he indicates that the Jewish section has been deliberately provoked into open insurrection, for the specific purpose of calling off the mandatory experiment and allowing Palestine to become a semi-colonial Arab country with a minority of oppressed Jews, and ripe for continued exploitation by British capitalists. The English soldier, who seems to have made a careful study of what he saw, has come to this conclusion through the conviction that "in no other way is it possible to explain what is happening in Palestine."

Furthermore, he argues that Palestine should be permitted to acquire its independence as a Jewish State. To those who argue that it was never intended to do more than form a Home for the Jews, Lt. Gourlay inquires pertinently: "How can there be a home without a State?" To which he adds the challenging reminder that if an Englishman's home is his castle, "Must the key to the Jewish prefabricated residence remain forever in Mr. Bevin's pocket?"

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1947.

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PALESTINE

E 1674
25 FEB
72

Registry Number E1674/44/31

FROM C.O.

No. Cornwd.

Dated

Received in Registry 25/Feb 1947

Terrorist activities

Palestine tel 372 of 19/2 giving Terrorist activities as at 18 Feb 1947.

Last Paper.

1673

References.

(Minutes.)

2a P.P. P'stine tel 379 of 20/2.

— . — 381 of 20/2.

H3.1/3

(Print.)

2a P.P. P'stine tel 444 28/2

— — " — 446 —

— " — 448 1/3

— " — 451 1/3

— " — 453 1/3

— " — 454 1/3

— " — 458 2/3

— " — 460 2/3

— " — 464 2/3

— C.O. — 433 2/3

— P'stine — 462 2/3

(How disposed of.)

H3.6/3

2a P.P. P'stine tel 473 4/3

— — — 484 2/3

H3 14/3

(Action completed.) 2 GP 15/3

(Index.) 24/6/48

Next Paper.

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32003 F.O.P

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INWARD TELEGRAM

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En Clair

FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 19th February, 1947.
R. 19th " " 13.35 hrs.

E 1674
25 FEB

No. 372

Addressed to S. of S.
Repeated to B.M.E.O. Cairo, No. 11 (please pass copy to Ambassador and C. in C.).
" " Washington No. 24.
" " Baghdad No. 11.
" " Beirut No. 184.
" " Jedda No. 13.
" " Amman No. 185.

Terrorist incidents at 20.41 hours on 18th February in Jerusalem.

A M.D. truck was blown up by a remote control road mine. Following military personnel were injured - 2 British other ranks seriously and 3 British other ranks slightly. Following the incident, a number of persons were seen to run in direction Talbieh Quarter.

At 21.20 hours on 18th February at Kilo 89-90 on Haifa-Jaffa Road opposite Gan Hayim Colony, a M.D. vehicle was blown up by a remote control mine. The driver a British other rank was slightly injured. Two Jews observed in the vicinity have been detained.

At 07.30 hours on 19th February on the main Gaza Rehovoth Road just south of Rehovoth two mines disguised as kilos stones were found and disposed of. The mines were attached to electric detonating sets in a near-by orange grove.

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Ministry of Defence — Chief of Air Staff.
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E 1674/46/31

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En Clair

FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 20th February, 1947.
R. 20th " " 19.35 hrs.

No. 379

Addressed to S. of S.
Repeated " B.M.E.O. Cairo No. 12 (please pass copy to Ambassador and C.-in-C.).
" " Washington, No. 25.
" " Baghdad, No. 12.
" " Beirut, No. 190.
" " Jedda, No. 14.
" " Amman, No. 191.

Terrorist incidents.

(i) At 22.00 hours on 19th February in Haifa, two electrically detonated mines exploded at the road side as two W.D. trucks were passing. No, repeat no, casualties, one vehicle was slightly damaged.

(ii) At 22.45 hours, mortar and small arms fire was directed at the R.A.F. airfield at Aincheinar. Some 10.12 mortar shells were fired, no, repeat no, casualties or damage. Three small mortars have been found abandoned in vicinity, as well as sabotage material and a stolen truck.

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25 FEB 1947

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FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 20th February, 1947.
R. 20th " " 15.20 hrs.

No. 381

Addressed to the S. of S.
Repeated to Memin No. 12 (please pass copy to Ambassador and C.-in-C.
" to Washington, No. 26.
" " Baghdad, No. 13.
" " Beirut, No.194.
" " Jedda, No. 15.
" " Amman, No.195.

My telegram No. 379.

Terrorist incidents.

At 0300 hours on 20th February the I.P.C. pipeline in vicinity of village of Indur was cut by an explosion caused by two mines. One unexploded mine was found in the vicinity.

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FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 28th February, 1947.
R. 1st March, " 07.00 hrs.

No. 444

Addressed to S. of S.
Repeated " Washington No. 29.
" " B.M.E.O. No. 16 (please pass to C. in C. and Ambassador).
" " Baghdad, No. 16.
" " Beirut, No. 250.
" " Jedda, No. 18.
" " Amman, No. 251.

At 14.50 hours today 28th February an explosion occurred in the offices of the Haifa Shipping Agency situated on third floor of Barclays Bank building in Kingsway, Haifa. The entire third floor suffered considerable damage. Preliminary reports indicate that 3 (repeat 3) employees of the Haifa Shipping Agency were seriously injured. The Bank premises suffered little damage and the Bank staff were safely evacuated after the explosion.

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En Clair

INDEXED

FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 2nd March, 1947.
R. 3rd " " 13.15 hrs.

No. 462

Addressed to the S. of S.
Repeated to Washington, No. 34.
" " B.M.E.O., Cairo, No. 20.
" " Jedda, No. 22.
" " Baghdad, No. 20.
" " Beirut, No. 264.
" " Amman, No. 265.

Terrorist incidents.

Following is summary of terrorist incidents on 1st March.

A. Haifa District.

(1) At 18.45 six armed Jews held up T.A.C. guard on naval car park in Haifa. Explosives were laid and fourteen vehicles were damaged by three explosions. No (repeat no) casualties.

(2) At 19.00 hours a W.D. truck was damaged by a land mine at Kiriat Haim on the Haifa-Acre Road. One British soldier was slightly injured.

(3) At 20.00 hours a land mine disguised as a kilo stone was detonated in Haifa as a military jeep was passing. Two N.C.O.'s were killed and two were injured.

/(4)

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(4) At 20.00 hours a mortar shell was fired at a military camp at Madera. No (repeat no) casualties.

B. Samaria District.

(5) At 18.47 hours near Khirbet Beit Lid a road mine exploded as two military vehicles were passing. Two British soldiers were injured. Vehicles were not (repeat not) damaged.

(6) At 19.10 hours eight mortar shells were fired into a military camp near Khirbet Beit Lid. One British soldier was killed and three were injured.

C. Jerusalem District.

(7) The attack on the Officers Club has been reported in my telegram No. 453. Following is list of casualties.

(a) Military personnel.

Two British officers and one British soldier killed. Five British officers slightly injured. One British N.C.O. slightly injured. One British soldier slightly injured.

(b) Police.

One British Inspector slightly injured.
One British Constable slightly injured.
One Arab S.P. Corporal seriously injured,
one Arab S.P. Constable Seriously injured.

(c) British civilians.

One dead. One slightly injured.

(d) Non British civilians.

Eight Arabs killed. One Pole killed.
One Arab slightly injured. One other slightly injured.

/D.

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D. Lydda District.

(8) At 19.45 hours a land mine was detonated on the Haifa-Jaffa Road near Petah Tikva. No (repeat no) casualties or damage.

(9) at 20.00 hours two bombs were thrown at Rehovoth Police Stations. No (repeat no) casualties or damage to the Stations.

(10) At 20.35 hours a W.D. vehicle was blown up on the main road between Rehovoth and Rishon Lezion. One British officer and two British other ranks were slightly injured.

(11) At 23.15 hours an army vehicle was blown up by a land mine on the Haifa-Jaffa Road. One British N.C.O and one British soldier were killed.

(12) At 23.45 hours a military vehicle was blown up by a land mine on the Rehovoth Gaza Road. No (repeat no) casualties but considerable damage to vehicle.

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" "		- Mr. C.W. Baxter.
" "		- Sir R.G. Howe.
" "		- Dominions Intelligence Dept.
" "	(Research Dept.)	- Air Commodore K.C. Buss.
" "	(Middle East Secretariat	- Mr. D.A. Greenhill.
" "	" "	- Maj. Gen. A.J.C. Pollock.
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" "		- Mr. E.A. Armstrong.
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" "	(M.I.3)	- Lt. Col. W. Gore.
" "	(M.I.3a)	- Major Telfer Smollett.
" "	(M.O.4)	- Lt. Col. J.G. Atkinson.
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J.A.R. Pimlott, Esq., Private Secretary to the Lord President of the Council.

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INWARD TELEGRAM

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1674 4621

En Clair

INDEXED

FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 28th February, 1947.
R. 1st March, " 07.00 hrs.

No. 446

Addressed to S. of S.
Repeated to Washington No. 30.
(?Repeated to B.M.E.O. omitted) No. 17 (please pass copy to C. in C. and Ambassador).
" to Baghdad, No. 17.
" to Jedda, No. 19.
" to Beirut, No.252.
" to Amman, No.253.

My telegram No. 444 addressed S. of S.

Terrorist incidents.

Latest figure of casualties in Haifa bomb explosion are as follows

(a) Seriously injured 2 Jews.

(b) Fairly seriously injured 4, comprising 1 British civilian Naval employee, 1 British soldier and 2 Arabs, of whom 1 a Private in Arab Legion.

(c) Treated and discharged from hospital 2 Jews and 1 Arab Private in T.J.F.F.

2. The above is subject to confirmation.

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War Office		- Chief of Naval Staff.
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"	" (M.I.3a)	- Lt. Col. W. Gore.
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INWARD TELEGRAM

E 1674/46/31

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En Clair

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FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 1st March, 1947.
R. 1st " " 17.30 hrs.

No. 448

Addressed to Secretary of State.
Repeated to Washington 31.
" " Memin 18. (please pass copy to Ambassador and C-in-C).
" " Baghdad 18.
" " Beirut 257.
" " Jedda 20.
" " Amman 258.

My telegram 446.

Terrorist incidents.

The two Jews who were seriously injured in the Haifa bomb outrage of 28th February have since died.

2. In addition to casualties previously notified, a chief petty officer of the Royal Navy was seriously injured.

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"	" (Middle East Secretariat)	- Mr. D.A. Greenhill.
"	"	- Major Gen. A.J.C.Pollock.
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"	" (M.I.3a)	- Major Telfer Smollett.
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INWARD TELEGRAM

1674 46 71 88

In Clair

FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

INDEXED

D. 1st March, 1947.
R. 1st " " 20.00 hrs.

No. 451

Addressed to the S. of S
Repeated to Washington, No. 32.
" " B.M.E.O. Cairo, No. 19.
" " Jedda, No. 21.
" " Beirut, No. 50.
" " Bagdad, No. 19.
" " Amman, No. 51.

Terrorist incidents.

At 15.25 hours today in Jerusalem, a vehicle drove into the wire defences of the Officers Club and blew up. Considerable damage was caused to the building. Six dead bodies so far recovered. Casualties believed to be considerable. One dead Jew has been found in the vicinity.

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" " - Sir S.G. Howe.
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" " (Research Dept.) - Air Commodore T.C. Pike.
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INWARD TELEGRAM

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1674 46 21

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunninghem) RECEIVED

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 1st March, 1947.
R. 1st " " 19.35 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 453 Top Secret.

Further to my telegram No. 451.

Jerusalem Officers Club.

At approximately 3.20 p.m. on 1st March, 1947, truck No.M740R drove into King George Avenue, Jerusalem, from Keren Kayemeth Street through the barbed wire surrounding Goldschmidt House Officers Club in King George Avenue. One person dismounted and placed a package in the building. At the same time, automatic fire was opened upon the sentries at Goldschmidt House from the vicinity of the houses adjacent to the Synagogue in King George Avenue. The sentries replied. A small explosion occurred at this time at the rear of the East side of Goldschmidt House which set a tent on fire. During exchange of shots, a number of persons dressed in Khaki as British O.R.'s jumped from the truck and ran away. A heavy explosion then occurred causing extensive damage to Goldschmidt House.

Shortly before the explosion, a police vehicle proceeding along King George Avenue in the direction of Goldschmidt House, was caught in cross-fire. Mr. Beynon, British Clerical Officer of Police H.Q., was killed and Inspector Price, British Cons'dle Church and Mr Cleary, British Clerical Officer of Police H.Q., were wounded. Casualties as known at present are twelve dead, including Jewish female Telephone Operator, fifteen injured.

At least three more of [illegible] believed to be under the rubble.

[illegible]

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INWARD TELEGRAM

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En Clair

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FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 1st March, 1947. INDEXED
R. 1st " 21.20 hrs.

No. 454

My telegram No. 451.

Terrorist incidents.

At 18.45 hours approximately on 1st March, car park in Haifa was attacked by six armed men, believed to be Jews. Guard was held up and explosives were deposited. Explosion wrecked number of vehicles. No (repeat no) casualties.

2. Above is preliminary report, subject to confirmation. Terrorist incidents are also reported to have occurred in other parts of the country. Details are not yet available.

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INWARD TELEGRAM

1674 46 31

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 2nd March, 1947.
R. 2nd " " 12.20 hrs.

IMMEDIATE
No. 458

Addressed S. of S.
Repeated Washington No. 33.

Following on yesterdays extensive outrages, I have decided to apply statutory martial law to an area of Jerusalem occupied by Jews and long suspected of harbouring terrorists.

2. Necessary empowering Defence (Emergency) Regulations were made at 23.00 hours on 1st March, and were simultaneously applied to the area mentioned in paragraph 1 with effect from 08.00 hours today.

3. Effect is to withdraw usual Government facilities from the area to which regulations are applied; to close Civil Courts; to empower Military Commander to close banks and to control movement of persons and vehicles; to prescribe that all criminal offences committed in the area shall be tried by Military Courts.

/4.

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4. Question of applying regulations to other areas is under consideration.

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"	"	= Dominions Intelligence Dept.
"	(Research Dept.)	= Air Commodore K.C. Buss.
"	(Middle East Secretariat)	= Mr. D.A. Greenhill.
"	"	= Major Gen. A.J.C. Pollock.
M.I.5		= Mr. J.C. Robertson.
Cabinet Offices		= Gen. Sir J. Hollis.
"		= Grp. Capt. Stapleton.
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Admiralty		= Chief of Naval Staff.
War Office		= C.I.G.S.
"	(M.I.3)	= Lt. Col. W. Gore.
"	(M.I.3a)	= Major Telfer Smollett.
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Air Ministry		= Chief of Air Staff.
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INWARD TELEGRAM

Enter 94

1674 46 31

Code

INDEXED

FROM PALESTINE (Gen Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S. COLONIES.

D. 2nd March. 1947.
R. 2nd " " 16.00 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 460.

My telegram No. 458.

Statutory Martial Law.

Following communique is being released here at 11.15 a.m. G.M.T. today, 2nd March. Begins.

A month ago the Government invited the Jewish Agency and Vaad Leumi to call upon Yishuv to cooperate in bringing to justice members of the terrorist groups. These Institutions refused their cooperation. Renewed warnings were, therefore, given of the serious consequences which any further outbreaks of terrorism would entail. The severer measures now necessary are the result of the lack of cooperation against bloodshed and terrorism which these institutions have themselves condemned.

Since the invitation to cooperate was issued, 48 outrages have occurred, in which 20 people have lost their lives and 34 people have been injured, including 18 killed and 25 injured in yesterday's incidents. Included in these casualties are 13 civilians.

There is distinct evidence to link the attacks carried out on the 1st March with Tel Aviv area, from which it is well known that operations by dissident groups are conducted. For instance, the vehicles used in the attacks in Jerusalem and Haifa were stolen yesterday in Tel Aviv.

/The

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The Regulations providing for the imposition of Statutory Martial Law are therefore being applied with effect from 01.15 p.m. today, 2nd March, to an area including Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, Bnei Brag and Petah Tikva. Ends.

Copies sent to:-

Foreign Office		= Private Secretary.
"	"	= Mr. C.W. Baxter.
"	"	= Sir R.G. Howe.
"	"	= Dominions Intelligence Department.
"	(Research Dept.)	= Air Commodore K.C. Buss.
"	(Middle East Secretariat)	= Mr. D.A. Greenhill.
"	"	= Major Gen. A.J.C. Pollock.
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Cabinet Offices		= Gen. Sir L. Hollis.
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Air Ministry		= Chief of Air Staff.
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INWARD TELEGRAM

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1674 46 71

Cypher (O.T.P.)

INDEXED

FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 2nd March, 1947.
R. 2nd " " 20.10 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 464

Addressed to H.M. Ambassador, Washington, No. 35.

Repeated to S. of S.

In consequence of terrorist outrages on 1st March, details of which are contained in my telegram No. 34, I have made Regulations under Article 6 of Palestine (Defence) Order in Council 1937 providing for the application of "statutory martial law" to areas specified by me. These Regulations provide for the withdrawal of the normal facilities for civil Government (including Courts of Law) from the areas to which they are applied, for closure of banks and control of entry into and departure from specified areas of persons and vehicles by order of a Military Commander, and for the trial of all criminal offences committed in specified areas by Military Courts.

2. The Regulations were applied to a restricted Jewish area of Jerusalem with effect from 08.00 hours local time today (2nd March) and to an area including Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, Bnei Braq and Petah Tikvah with effect from 13.15 hours.

3.

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3. Communique announcing the imposition of statutory martial law on Tel Aviv area stressed that the measures now taken were necessary as a result of the failure of Yishuv to co-operate with the Government in anti-terrorist measures, referred to (?refusal) of Jewish Agency and Vaad Leumi to respond to invitation to co-operate in bringing terrorists to justice, contained in the Chief Secretary's letter of 3rd February, drew attention to the fact that 48 outrages involving 20 deaths (of whom 13 were civilians), 3 injuries since the date of letter, and stressed that yesterday's outrages were linked with Tel Aviv area, whence vehicles used in the attacks in Jerusalem and Haifa had been stolen.

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

1674 46 71 98

Cypher O.T.P.

INDEXED

TO PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham).

FROM S. OF S., COLONIES.

Sent on 2nd March, 1947, 15.30 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 433.

Addressed to the High Commissioner, Palestine, from S. of S., Colonies.

Repeated Washington.

Begins.

Your telegram No. 458.

1. I approve action you have taken.

2. I should be glad to know as quickly as possible of your decision should you decide at any time to extend statutory martial law to other areas. Ends.

(Copies to Foreign Office Cypher Room for repetition to Washington).

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"	" (Middle East Secretariat)	- Mr. D.A.Greenhill.
"	" " "	- Maj. Gen.A.J.C.Pollock.
M.I.5.		- Mr. J.C. Robertson.
Cabinet Offices		- Gen. Sir L. Hollis.
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"	" (M.I.3)	- Lt.Col. W. Gore.
"	" (M.I.3a).	- Major Telfer Smollett.
"	" (M.O.5)	- Lt. Col. J.G.Atkinson.
Air Ministry		- Chief of Air Staff.
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INWARD TELEGRAM

Entire
100

1674 46 P1

Clair

FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 4th March, 1947.
R. 4th " " 15.20 hrs.

No. 473

Addressed to S. of S.
Repeated " Washington No. 37.
" " B.M.E.O. Cairo No. 21 (please pass copy to C. in C. and Ambassador).
" " Baghdad, No. 21.
" " Beirut, No. 268.
" " Jedda, No. 23.
" " Amman, No. 269.

Terrorist incidents.

At 2115 hours on 3rd March five grenades thrown into a military camp in Haifa from a passing vehicle. No (repeat no) casualties.

2. At 2215 hours on 3rd March automatic and small arms fire was directed at a military camp near Hadera. Two persons were injured.

3. At 0805 hours on 4th March on the Ramle Aqir Road, a R.A.F. vehicle carrying Arab labourers was blown up by a mine. Five Arabs were injured, two believed seriously.

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"	" (Middle East Secretariat)	- Mr. D.A. Greenhill.
"	" " "	- Major Gen. A.J.C. Pollock.
M.I.5		- Mr. J.C. Robertson.
Cabinet Offices		- Gen. Sir L. Hollis.
"	"	- Group Capt. Stapleton.
"	"	- Mr. E.A. Armstrong.
Admiralty		- Chief of Naval Staff.
War Office		- C.I.G.S.
"	" (M.I.3)	- Lt. Col. W. Gore.
"	" (M.I.3a)	- Major Telfer Smollett.
"	" (M.O.4)	- Lt. Col. J.G. Atkinson.
Air Ministry		- Chief of Air Staff.
Min. of Defence		- Private Secretary.
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Private Secretary, No. 10 Downing Street.
J.A.R. Pimlott, Esq., Private Secretary to the Lord President of the Council.

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INWARD TELEGRAM

Keep with pp
WM 76/3

1674 46 11

Mr Clair

102

FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 5th March, 1947.
R. 5th " " 19.50 hrs.

No. 484

Addressed to S. of S.
Repeated " Washington No. 39.
" " B.M.E.O. Cairo No. 23 (please pass copy to Ambassador and C. in C.)
" " Baghdad, No. 22.
" " Beirut, No. 278.
" " Jedda, No. 24.
" " Amman, No. 279.

Terrorist incidents.

In addition to incidents reported in my telegram No. 473, following terrorist incident occurred on the morning of 4th March. A M.D. vehicle was blown up by a road mine on the Gaza Road near Rishon Lezion. Three soldiers were slightly injured.

2. At approximately 0905 hours this morning, a party of armed Jews raided the booking office of the Orion Cinema in Jerusalem and succeeded in escaping with a sum of about £(P)200.

/Copies

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Copies sent to:-

Foreign Office — Private Secretary.
" " — Mr. C.W. Baxter.
" " — Sir R.G. Howe.
" " — Dominions Intelligence Dept.
" " (Research Dept.) — Air Commodore K.C. Buss.
" " (Middle East Secretariat) — Mr. D.A. Greenhill.
" " " " — Major Gen. A.J.C. Pollock.
M.I.5 — Mr. J.C. Robertson.
Cabinet Offices — Gen. Sir I. Hollis.
" " — Group Capt. Stapleton.
" " — Mr. E.A. Armstrong.
Admiralty — Chief of Naval Staff.
War Office — C.I.G.S.
" " (M.I.3) — Lt. Col. W. Gore.
" " (M.I.3a) — Major Telfer Smollett.
" " (M.O.4) — Lt. Col. J.G. Atkinson.
Air Ministry — Chief of Air Staff.
Ministry of Defence — Private Secretary.
" " " — Sir Henry Wilson Smith.
Private Secretary, No. 10 Downing Street.
J.A.R. Pimlott, Esq., Private Secretary to the Lord President of the Council.

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E

1947

PALESTINE

E 1675 104

25 FEB

Registry Number } E 1675/46/31.

FROM Lt Hartley Hawkrow

No.

To M Beeley

Dated 21 Feb 1947

Received in Registry } 25 Feb 1947

The Jewish Struggle.

Refers previous letter (E 516/46/31) of Jan 7. Indicating decision to prosecute four concerned in publication of paper called "The Jewish Struggle" containing incitements to violence in Palestine. It was now decided that a prosecution would not be in the public interest & on publication was stopped but cautions following & Police warning. Will ascertain should publication be resumed.

Last Paper (516) 1674

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

1/3

(Action completed.) 26/2/47

(Index.) 26/2/48

Next Paper.

E 1676

32003 F.O.P

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F 1675
16 FEB

105

21st February 1947.

New Year:

I wrote to you on the 7th January indicating that I had decided to authorise the Director of Public Prosecutions to commence criminal proceedings for seditious libel against those who were concerned in the publication of a paper called "The Jewish Struggle", which had contained incitements to violence in Palestine.

Since that decision the result of further enquiries by the Police have been considered by Prosecuting Counsel. It seems that publication of "The Jewish Struggle" was stopped following a warning given by the Police in the autumn of last year, and as far as the Police can ascertain there is no intention of recuming publication. The most serious incitement contained in the paper was made as long ago as September, although my attention was not drawn to it until January. It is possible, therefore, that although the defendants were convicted, the Trial Judge might take a lenient view on the ground that the case was stale and that the defendants had all stopped publication owing to the warnings which were given to them. I consider that the infliction of a light punishment would be something of an anti-climax, and in the circumstances as they now appear I have therefore decided that a prosecution would not be in the public interest. If, however, publication of "The Jewish Struggle" is renewed I shall re-consider the whole position.

I have explained the circumstances to Sir Stanley Reed, who asked me a Parliamentary Question about the matter, and I do not think that he will pursue it.

Stanley Shaw

The Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, MP,
Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs.

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PALESTINE

E1676

25 F

Registry Number } E1676/46/31.

TELEGRAM FROM New York.

No. 608.

Dated

Received in Registry } 24 Feb 1947
25 Feb 1947

Settlement of Palestine.

Ref our 70 & 573 (E1481/46/G)
agrees that special meeting of Assembly
would be best method, and gives
views as regards restriction of agenda
to Palestine.

Last Paper.

E 1675

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Please send white

See now E 1786

H.13. 1/3

(Action completed.)

F 26/2/47


(Index.)

24/6/48

Next Paper.

E1677

28888 F.O.P.



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Reference: FO 371/61768

E R

107

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations)

No. 608.
February 24th, 1947.

D. 5.30 p.m. February 24th, 1947.
R. 9. 0 p.m. February 24th, 1947.

Repeated to Washington
Moscow

JJJ

IMMEDIATE
GIANT
LIGHT
SECRET

E 1678/6
25 FEB

Your telegram No. 573.

PALESTINE

I agree with considerations contained in first 3 paragraphs of your telegram under reference and am inclined also to agree that special meeting of Assembly would be best method of dealing with problem.

2. As regards restriction of Agenda to Palestine, however, this would presumably be subject to Rule 17 of Assembly rules of procedure which empowers Assembly to include by a two thirds majority vote items other than those for which special Session is called. If Egyptians did take opportunity to press for hearing of their case it is, I consider, quite likely that they would obtain necessary majority.

3. I agree also with suggestions in your paragraph 5 as regards composition of proposed Committee. However I do not see how Special Assembly could be prevented from entering on substantive discussion before appointing Committee.

4./.....

FEB 25 1947

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4. Any proposal on part of Secretary General or others that question should be remitted to Special Committee on Information from non-self-governing territories could I think be forestalled on grounds that Palestine is a special case requiring concrete action and that Committee in question is not scheduled to meet until shortly before second regular session of Assembly which would cause unnecessary delay.

5. If you should decide to adopt course described in paragraph 5 of your telegram I would propose to speak to Secretary General on the whole question with particular reference to points raised in your paragraph 6. Pending your instructions however I do not propose to discuss this matter with Mr. Lie or anyone else.

6. You have presumably considered and rejected the alternative of bringing matter before Security Council either (A) under Article 34 of the Charter as a "situation.... likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security", or (B) possibly with a view to the working out of a special statute for Palestine as in the case of Trieste.

7. Theoretically an advantage of reference to Security Council is that that body is in permanent session and could deal with the matter without delay. On the other hand Security Council is by its terms of reference less qualified than the Assembly to deal with general and humanitarian aspects of Palestine problem and His Majesty's Government may think it preferable even at cost of delay to obtain the broadest possible sanction for their plans by referring matter to the

Assembly./...

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Assembly. Reference to the Security Council would moreover be unlikely to produce early agreement upon a permanent régime for Palestine, in discussion of which the veto would of course apply. A possible outcome of discussion in the Security Council might be a decision that the five permanent members should under Article 106 of the Charter take joint military measures to maintain security pending reference to the General Assembly and it may well be that His Majesty's Government would recoil from the prospect of installing Soviet troops on the banks of the Jordan.

See also my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office please pass to Moscow as my telegram No. 78.

[Repeated to Moscow.]

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710

E1677 /G

BY

MARSHINE

RU FEB 1947

Registry Number E1677/46/31.

TELEGRAM FROM

No. New York. 609.

Dated

Received in Registry 24 Feb 1947 / 25 Feb 1947

Settlement of Palestine, Soviet attitude.

Refer New York 608 (E1677/46/31).

Requests U.S. views and those of H.M. Ambassador at Moscow on probable attitude of Soviet Govt to Palestine Problem.

Last Paper.

E1677

References.

3319/48/31.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft) Sir A. Cadogan, New York. no 128 March 29

enc

(9) Washington no. 677
U.K. Del. Moscow no. 38

April 1

Copies of Provisional record of 21st and session of League of Nations

P.T.O.

(Minutes.)

Please enter minute and b.v. again

H.B. 27/2

This did not re-appear until to-day. Meanwhile Washington have provided (Ex E2231) the information asked for in para. 2 (D)(i).

I should be grateful if U.N. Department would minute on 2 (B) and (C). Should they also supply copies of the minutes of the final League Assembly?

H Beeley 14/3

U.N. Dept.

(& Legal Adviser)

Views of Colonial Office will also be necessary on points 2 (b) and (c), but meanwhile the following are UN Department's views:-

(a) States directly concerned. The procedure for identifying and consulting "States directly concerned" will largely depend upon what arrangements are made for trusteeship in Palestine. In the General Assembly the Soviet representative maintained the view that the Charter only allowed for independence, or for trusteeship, there was no middle way. It is possible that they will maintain th=t Palestine

(Action completed.) F.E.M. 17/3

(Index) 24/3/48

Next Paper.

1728

E1677

28888 F.O.P.

should/

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should be independent, since Palestine is an "A" class Mandate, which means that the intention was early achievement of political independence rather than continued international supervision. Likewise the Russians maintained inthe General Assembly that the Mandates provided only for advice and assistance "in legislative, administrative and judicial spheres", which presumably would exclude political and military supervision. Assuming however that some form of trusteeship for Palestine was possible the multiplicity of claims might be made. In particular the neighbouring Arab countries will claim to be directly concerned, the United States might similarly advance a claim, and so also would the Soviet Union. To try to establish any definite criterion would be quite impossible. In the United Nations the Russians have made no direct claim that the Soviet Govt. are directly interested in any territory, and the only grounds on which they could advance such a claim in respect of Palestine are those of general interest, and their position as a member of the Big Five. This claim has been partly recognised by the special position of the Big Five under Article 23 in the Security Council, but we are not prepared to admit it in respect of mandated territories and we did not admit it in respect of the African mandates which we have placed under truesteeship. In practice the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee of the General Assembly found it impossible to agree on an interpretation of the phrase "States directly concerned" and the whole question was, on U.S. initiative, put into cold storage. No claims to be "States directly concerned" were actually admitted, and no claims were actually waived. The precedent adopted by the U.S. in respect of their strategic area trusteeship agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands may also be quoted. Here again the U.S. Government admitted no claims , but sent their draft text to a certain number of countries which might be deemed to have an interest in the Japanese Mandated Islands. I suggest therefore that in the event of a trusteeship for Palestine, the draft terms should be communicated to any state which might be considered to have an interest in Palestine, and such State should be free to make any comments they wished. No State should however be allowed to exercise a veto by refusing to accept any terms agreed upon, except, in accordance with Article 79 of the Charter, the Mandatory Power.

(b) Legal Position as regards Mandates. The resolutions on Mandates adopted on 18th April 1946 by the League of Nations at its final meeting (see text in U.K. Delegation Geneva telegram No.15 of 12th April, 1946) definitely recognised that "on the termination of the League's existence, its functions with regard to Mandated terrorities will come to an end, etc." and goes on to say "Take note of the expressed intention of members of the League now administering territories under mandate to continue to administer them.....in accordance with the obligations contained in respective mandates until other

arrangements/

8) Mr. Matthews G.D.
cc April

8) Mr. Baldwin, Private Office, Admty.
April. 15

2 Copies sent to Mr. Higham, C.O.
April 15

8) D.O. (Room 0018)
April 16

Copy to Sir Orme Sargent.
April 16

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arrangements have been agreed between the United Nations and respective mandatory powers". As I see it therefore all obligations under the League are legally ended. But morally there is an obligation to continue in the spirit of these obligations, and to agree to some new arrangement with the United Nations. The words "agreed upon" do however imply that the mandatory power has a veto on the arrangements made and they could therefore refuse to accept any solution suggested by the United Nations unless they had previously categorically stated that they would be prepared to accept any United Nations decision.

2. As regards documents relating to final League Assembly, I attach copies of the League ~~General~~ Assembly minutes, and also of the First Committee minutes. Eastern Department may like to send these on to New York.
(As regards mandates main document is A/VR/7/1946)

C B B Heathcote-Smith

(C.B.B.Heathcote-Smith)
18th March, 1947.

Draft despatch to New York with enclosures. I have sent copies of the enclosures to C.O. for comment, explaining that they have yet to be submitted to U.N. Dept. and the Legal Adviser.

H B Beeley 25/3

U.N. Dept. 26/3

Legal Adviser

26/3

The last sentence but one of the memorandum entitled "The Legal Position with regard to Mandates" should I think be omitted. In my opinion no such implication can be drawn from the word "agreed". The position is simply as stated in the previous sentence.

Otherwise I agree with the draft letter and memoranda

W.V.J. Evans
2nd April (24) 1s

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See, however, Mr. Burkell's minute opposite, and the attached comments by the Colonial Office. I submit drafts revised in accordance with these.

H. Beeley 29/3

b.v. again a.a.

The despatch to New York has gone. But we have not yet answered the question in para. 1 of their telegram no. 609, about the probable attitude of the Soviet Govt. Nor have Moscow commented on this.

H Beeley 1/4

Northern Dept. for any obs.

A recent letter from Mr. Roberts at Moscow to Mr. A. C. Lambert (at present under submission) enclosed an account of a conversation with a Party member who has given fairly accurate reports on the Party line in the past. She admitted that the Palestine question was difficult and said the Soviet Govt. would be embarrassed to vote for either the Arabs or the Jews. Hitherto Soviet propaganda has taken the line that the conflict has been deliberately fanned by the British in pursuit

1/4

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Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

114

of their policy of "Divide and Rule," and that if only we would withdraw, the Jews & Arabs would find a modus vivendi. I see no good reason why the Russians should abandon this line, which creates trouble for us and gives them a chance of carping from the side lines.

Thomas Brimelow

3.4.47.

Moscow have now answered this question. See their telegram no. 929

H.13. 16/4

Dft P.P. & Tel 1213 25/2.

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115

Dr Bechell,

The attached memoranda (B) & (C) appear to me to be accurate except for the last sentence but one in (C) and I think you should see.

Trevor Evans
22/3

I have the following comments on notes (B) and (C).

The last sentence of (B) is perhaps correct in stating a position which perhaps H.M.G. would like to establish, but it is not consistent with the Charter, which does give a veto on all the states directly concerned. As no one, however, can agree upon who the "states directly concerned" are,

there/

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there is therefore no agreement about what states are entitled to exercise the veto.

Note (C), last paragraph. While I do not share Mr. Evans's doubt about the penultimate sentence of this paragraph, I am not so happy with the wording of the first sentence of this paragraph, and I think I should substitute the following:-

> "By assenting to this resolution, H.M.G. have undertaken to continue to administer Palestine in accordance with the Mandate for Palestine until some new arrangements can be made by agreement between H.M.G. and the United Nations."

W.G. Bennett

27th March, 1947.

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Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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Eastern Department.

I have noticed that, on one or two occasions recently, you have just taken to marking papers "Legal Adviser". I am not clear whether in doing this you have had in mind Office Circular No. 6, of which the last paragraph reads as follows:-

> "There is no "Legal Department", and no papers should be so marked. Papers marked simply "Legal Adviser" will all be brought to Mr. Beckett and should not be so marked unless it is intended that they should go to him. Papers for Mr. Fitzmaurice can be marked in his name or marked "Second Legal Adviser". The papers for Assistant Legal Advisers must be marked with the name of the person intended."

Another paragraph reads as follows:-

> "The Head of any Department is entitled to ask for the opinion of Mr. Beckett on any question (or in his absence of Mr. Fitzmaurice) even if in the ordinary way the work of his Department is allocated to another Legal Adviser."

If this particular paper was one on which the Head of Eastern Department wished for my opinion specially instead of Mr. Evans, he is entitled to obtain it. I am not clear, however, that this was really intended. In any case, I suggest in this case that Mr. Evans should see the paper and it should then come to me, and the course of marking papers to us both is always open to you.

W. G. Beckett

27th March, 1947.

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Cypher/OTP WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations).

No. 609 D: 4.55 p.m. 24th February, 1947

24th February, 1947 R: 10.25 p.m. 24th February, 1947

Repeated to Washington,
Moscow.

&&&&&&&&

IMMEDIATE.
GIANT
LIGHT
SECRET.

E 1677
25 FEB

My immediately preceding telegram.

Palestine.

It would be helpful also to have your views and those of His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow on probable attitude of Soviet Government towards Palestine problem were it raised in Security Council or Assembly. Moscow telegram No. 3150 of last year suggested that they may try to sidestep issue of Arabs versus Jews and turn the debate into an onslaught on presence of British troops in Palestine on lines of their campaign in recent Assembly against troops abroad. This would be consistent both with their recent championship of Arab States and with their encouragement of illegal Jewish immigration referred to in your telegram to Washington No. 9367 of last year, but it would not be very difficult to resist.

2.

25 FEB

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2. I presume you will be sending me shortly full factual background on Palestine and I should in particular welcome information on:

(A) present state of affairs regarding illegal immigration and evidence of complicity of Soviet or other Governments therein;

(B) Your views regarding procedure for identifying and consulting "States directly concerned" in any draft trusteeship agreement that may be contemplated under Article 79 of the Charter.

(C) Exact legal position as regards Mandate in view of winding up of League of Nations (I do not appear to have record of proceedings of final League assembly); and

(D) Importance and political complexion of the various Jewish organisations which are active in this field and which may seek contact with this delegation. (Perhaps His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington could supply this information).

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COLONIAL OFFICE

120

Downing Street,
S.W.1.

26th March, 1947.

Dear Harold,

With reference to our telephone conversation this morning about your two notes (on states directly concerned and on the position with regard to the Mandate) I have had a shot at redrafting the last paragraph of your note 'B' on the lines we discussed.

Apart from this I have no comments on the two notes other than the suggested addition of France as a probable claimant to be a state directly concerned, as I mentioned to you.

I haven't seen the New York telegram asking for this information but if it is something which you are sending them soon you might suggest that they discuss with Poynton since he is now over there and is, as you know, the great pundit on all these matters.

Yours ever
John Bennett

H. BEELEY, ESQ.

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An Aide Memoire dated 9th October, 1946, handed to the State Department by H.M. Ambassador, Washington, dealing with the general question of states directly concerned in connection with the draft Trusteeship Agreements for African territories which were then shortly due to be submitted to the General Assembly, contained in paragraph 4 the following words:

Washington printed letter No.2414 of 10.10.46 to Foreign Office

> "H.M.G. in the U.K. have, however, never contemplated the conclusion of a formal Treaty among "states directly concerned" and do not interpret Article 79 of the Charter as meaning that any "state directly concerned" can indefinitely hold up the submission of draft terms of trusteeship to the General Assembly should it unfortunately prove impossible to reach agreement in any particular case".

This passage was inserted with the possible case of Palestine, inter alia, in mind.

It appears that the procedure to be adopted in submitting draft terms of trusteeship for Palestine would depend considerably on the nature and conclusions of the debate about Palestine in the Assembly next September. It may be presumed that H.M.G. would only accept an Assembly Resolution in favour of trusteeship if the discussion in the Assembly had already indicated at least in broad outline what the contents of the Trusteeship Agreement were to be. H.M.G. could hardly be in a position to decide whether or not to accept the Assembly Resolution without this information. It is also possible (though not certain) that the Assembly discussion would have indicated that broad international agreement could be obtained on a Trusteeship Agreement framed in such and such terms. On this assumption, there would seem to be two alternative courses open to H.M.G.:

(a) To circulate their draft Trusteeship Agreement to all states which might be considered to have an interest in Palestine. The Governments receiving the text would be free to make comments or proposals for revision of the text. H.M.G. might then revise their draft in the light of these comments and in presenting it to the General Assembly would explain that the interested states had been consulted. In following this procedure the passage from the Aide Memoire to the State Department quoted above would be relevant.

(b) Alternatively, H.M.G. might decide that, in view of the discussion which had already taken place at the General Assembly and in view of the exceptional difficulty in the case of Palestine of determining who are the states directly concerned, they would be justified in presenting a draft Trusteeship Agreement direct to the General Assembly, leaving it to the Assembly to decide whether any further individual discussion with interested states was desirable or not.

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COLONIAL OFFICE

27-3-47

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Dear Beeley,

Have made one small amendment, but otherwise agree. I believe Bennett has sent you parts B+C separately.

Yours sincerely

John D Hilson

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Reference: FO 371/61768

A. Note on present state of affairs regarding Jewish illegal immigration and evidence of complicity of Soviet or other Governments therein.

During the four and a half months from mid-October onwards approximately 11,000 Jewish illegal immigrants have been intercepted in Palestine waters and diverted to the camps at Cyprus. Of the nine shiploads involved, four left from French ports, three from Adriatic ports (two of these from the Yugoslav port of Bakar), and one each from Sweden and Italy. In the last six weeks, the principal flow has been from French Mediterranean ports.

Renewed representations have recently been made to all the European Governments concerned to prevent the departure of Jewish illegal immigrant vessels. In view of the fact that the headquarters of this traffic would now appear to be in the south of France, H.M. Ambassador at Paris has been instructed to make particularly strong representations to the French Government and to request them to agree to discuss with H.M. Government at an early date measures for controlling the departure of Jewish illegal immigrants from France. In these discussions it is proposed that the British representatives should lay particular stress on the necessity for abolishing the present transit quota of 8,000 Jews whom the French Government permit to enter France without visas of ultimate destination. This is a revolving quota and invites a regular flow of Jewish illegal immigration through France from Central Europe.

The present concentration of potential Jewish illegal immigrants in maritime countries can be tabulated as follows:-

Greece	-	Believed small.
Yugoslavia	-	Believed small.
Italy	-	The official UNRRA figure for Jewish D.P.s receiving UNRRA assistance in Italy on January 31st is 22,227.
France	-	At least 8,000. This is the legal quota referred to above, but there are also no doubt a number of Jews who have entered France illegally.
Belgium	-	Up to 4,000. The Belgians have a similar transit quota to the French of between 3,000 and 4,000 Jews. 800 - 1,000 are known to be in the Antwerp area awaiting shipment, but the last illegal immigrant ship from Belgium left about nine months ago.
Sweden	-	A few hundred.

There/

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There are no recent reports of encouragement given by the Soviet authorities to Jewish illegal immigration and H.M. Ambassador at Belgrade reports that the Yugoslavs are not at present facilitating this traffic. The most dangerous sources are at present France and Italy and the strongest representations have therefore been made to the Governments of those two countries.

25th March, 1947.

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Registry
No. E1677/46/31 H.B.

~~Top Secret.~~
Secret.
~~Confidential~~
~~Restricted~~
~~Open~~

Draft. Despatch

Sir A. Cadogan,

NEW YORK.

no 129

OUT FILE + 2C 12529

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

29 March, 1947.

Sir,

With reference to your telegram No.609 of the 24th February, in which you asked for information on various aspects of the Palestine problem, I now enclose three short memoranda dealing with the questions raised in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of your second paragraph.

2. You ~~will see from~~ should know in connection with the first of these memoranda, that the Defence Committee, at a recent meeting, decided upon various measures designed to check the rate of illegal Jewish immigration into Palestine. As part of this programme, it was decided that you should be asked to write to the Secretary General of the United Nations ~~asking~~ requesting him to appeal to all member States to take the strictest precautions to prevent the transit through their territory and the departure from their ports of Jews attempting to enter Palestine illegally. In this ~~matter~~ letter you should point out that, the Palestine problem having been submitted to the United Nations, and being therefore sub judice, it is incumbent upon all member States to avoid giving encouragement to any illegal activity which is likely to increase the difficulty of finding a solution to the problem.

3. A communication on these lines would be more effective after than before our formal submission of the Palestine question to the United Nations. On the assumption that you will be able before long to make ~~the~~ a communication to the Secretary General on the lines suggested in my telegram to you No.682, I should therefore ~~like~~ prefer you to wait until this

/has

Copy to Washington
Moscow
(U.K. Delegation)

3
U.N. Sec. Dept. 26/3

Legal Advisers. See minute W.E. 27/3
Dr. Evans
Mr. Beckett
(See note on attached slip
H.B. 25/3
26/3

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has been done before addressing the Secretary General on the lines of my paragraph 2 above.

4. If however there should be a prolonged delay, it may be necessary to ask you by telegram to approach the Secretary-General on the subject of illegal immigration in advance of your formal communication to him on the Palestine problem as a whole.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to HM Ambassador at Washington and to the U.K. Delegation at Moscow.

RVL
28/3

I am, etc.,
(for Mr. Attlee)
(Sgd.) C.W. Baxter.

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

29th March, 1947.

No.128.

(E.1677/46/31).

SECRET

Sir,

With reference to Your Excellency's telegram No.609 of the 24th February, in which you asked for information on various aspects of the Palestine problem, I now enclose three short memoranda dealing with the questions raised in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of your second paragraph.

2. You should know, in connexion with the first of these memoranda, that the Defence Committee, at a recent meeting, decided upon various measures designed to check the rate of illegal Jewish immigration into Palestine. As part of this programme, it was decided that you should be asked to write to the Secretary-General of the United Nations requesting him to appeal to all member States to take the strictest precautions to prevent the transit through their territory and the departure from their ports of Jews attempting to enter Palestine illegally. In this letter you should point out that, the Palestine problem having been submitted to the United Nations, and being therefore sub judice, it is incumbent upon all member States to avoid giving encouragement to any illegal activity which is likely to increase the difficulty or finding a solution to the problem.

3. A communication on these lines would be more effective after than before our formal submission of the Palestine question to the United Nations. On the assumption that you will be able before long to make a communication to the Secretary-General on the lines suggested in my telegram to you No.682, I should therefore prefer you to wait until this has been done before addressing the Secretary-General on the lines of my paragraph 2 above.

4. If however there should be a prolonged delay, it may be necessary to ask you by telegram to approach the Secretary-General on the subject of illegal immigration in advance of your formal communication to him on the Palestine problem as a whole.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and to the United Kingdom Delegation at Moscow.

I am, with great truth and respect,
Sir,
Your Excellency's obedient Servant,
(For Mr. Attlee).

(Sgd) C. W. Baxter.

His Excellency
The Right Honourable
Sir Alexander Cagodan, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.,
etc., etc., etc.,
NEW YORK.

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A. Note on present state of affairs regarding Jewish illegal immigration and evidence of complicity of Soviet or other Governments therein.

During the four and a half months from mid-October onwards approximately 11,000 Jewish illegal immigrants have been intercepted in Palestine waters and diverted to the camps at Cyprus. Of the nine shiploads involved, four left from French ports, three from Adriatic ports (two of these from the Yugoslav port of Bakar), and one each from Sweden and Italy. In the last six weeks, the principal flow has been from French Mediterranean ports.

Renewed representations have recently been made to all the European Governments concerned to prevent the departure of Jewish illegal immigrant vessels. In view of the fact that the headquarters of this traffic would now appear to be in the south of France, H.M. Ambassador at Paris has been instructed to make particularly strong representations to the French Government and to request them to agree to discuss with H.M. Government at an early date measures for controlling the departure of Jewish illegal immigrants from France. In these discussions it is proposed that the British representatives should lay particular stress on the necessity for abolishing the present transit quota of 8,000 Jews whom the French Government permit to enter France without visas of ultimate destination. This is a revolving quota and invites a regular flow of Jewish illegal immigration through France from Central Europe.

The present concentration of potential Jewish illegal immigrants in maritime countries can be tabulated as follows:-

Greece	-	Believed small.
Yugoslavia	-	Believed small.
Italy	-	The official UNRRA figure for Jewish D.P.s receiving UNRRA assistance in Italy on January 31st is 22,227.
France	-	At least 8,000. This is the legal quota referred to above, but there are also no doubt a number of Jews who have entered France illegally.
Belgium	-	Up to 4,000. The Belgians have a similar transit quota to the French of between 3,000 and 4,000 Jews. 800 - 1,000 are known to be in the Antwerp area awaiting shipment, but the last illegal immigrant ship from Belgium left about nine months ago.
Sweden	-	A few hundred.

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There are no recent reports of encouragement given by the Soviet authorities to Jewish illegal immigration and H.M. Ambassador at Belgrade reports that the Yugoslavs are not at present facilitating this traffic. The most dangerous sources are at present France and Italy and the strongest representations have therefore been made to the Governments of those two countries.

25th March, 1947.

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B. "STATES DIRECTLY CONCERNED."

The problem of defining states directly concerned will not arise until and unless a decision is taken to place Palestine under trusteeship.

The phrase "States directly concerned" in article 79 of the United Nations Charter has never been authoritatively defined. Attempts have been made, in the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee of the General Assembly, to reach agreement on an interpretation. These attempts did not succeed, and finally the whole question was, on the initiative of the United States Delegation, put into cold storage. The present position, so far as territories hitherto placed under trusteeship are concerned, is that no claims to the states directly concerned have been either recognised or withdrawn.

In the case of Palestine, there can be no doubt that the five Arab states who are members of the United Nations will all claim to be states directly concerned. It is also probable that the United States will advance a similar claim, and the U.S.S.R. may do so on historical grounds apart altogether from their position as one of the Big Five.

If His Majesty's Government were to submit a trusteeship agreement for Palestine to the United Nations, they would probably adopt the procedure of circulating their draft text to all states which might be considered to have an interest in Palestine. The governments receiving the text would be free to make comments or proposals for the revision of the text. His Majesty's Government might then revise their draft in the light of these comments, and would explain in presenting it to the General Assembly that the interested states had been consulted. They would maintain, however, that no state (other than the mandatory power in accordance with article 79) should be allowed to exercise a veto and so prevent the conclusion of the trusteeship agreement.

FOREIGN OFFICE,
~~25th~~ March, 1947.

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Continuation of BJ & C 131

An Aide Memoire dated 9th October, 1946, handed to the State Department by H.M. Ambassador, Washington, dealing with the general question of states directly concerned in connection with the draft Trusteeship Agreements for African territories which were then shortly due to be submitted to the General Assembly, contained in paragraph 4 the following words:

Washington printed letter No.2414 of 10.10.46 to Foreign Office

"H.M.G. in the U.K. have, however, never contemplated the conclusion of a formal Treaty among "states directly concerned" and do not interpret Article 79 of the Charter as meaning that any "state directly concerned" can indefinitely hold up the submission of draft terms of trusteeship to the General Assembly should it unfortunately prove impossible to reach agreement in any particular case".

This passage was inserted with the possible case of Palestine, inter alia, in mind.

It appears that the procedure to be adopted in submitting draft terms of trusteeship for Palestine would depend considerably on the nature and conclusions of the debate about Palestine in the Assembly next September. It may be presumed that H.M.G. would only accept an Assembly Resolution in favour of trusteeship if the discussion in the Assembly had already indicated at least in broad outline what the contents of the Trusteeship Agreement were to be. H.M.G. could hardly be in a position to decide whether or not to accept the Assembly Resolution without this information. It is also possible (though not certain) that the Assembly discussion would have indicated that broad international agreement could be obtained on a Trusteeship Agreement framed in such and such terms. On this assumption, there would seem to be two alternative courses open to H.M.G.:

(a) To circulate their draft Trusteeship Agreement to all states which might be considered to have an interest in Palestine. The Governments receiving the text would be free to make comments or proposals for revision of the text. H.M.G. might then revise their draft in the light of these comments and in presenting it to the General Assembly would explain that the interested states had been consulted. In following this procedure the passage from the Aide Memoire to the State Department quoted above would be relevant.

(b) Alternatively, H.M.G. might decide that, in view of the discussion which had already taken place at the General Assembly and in view of the exceptional difficulty in the case of Palestine of determining who are the states directly concerned, they would be justified in presenting a draft Trusteeship Agreement direct to the General Assembly, leaving it to the Assembly to decide whether any further individual discussion with interested states was desirable or not.

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(c) THE LEGAL POSITION WITH REGARD TO MANDATE.

The minutes of the final session of the League of Nations Assembly, and of the First Committee of the Assembly, are attached for reference. The resolution on mandates adopted by the Assembly on the 18th April, 1946, will be found on page 7 of the minutes of the Assembly's 7th meeting (A/VR/7/1946).

This resolution "recognises that, on the termination of the League's existence, its functions with respect to the mandated territories will come to an end."

The resolution draws attention, however, to the fact that the principles of the United Nations Trusteeship system correspond to those of the Mandates system of the League of Nations. It takes note of the intention of mandatory powers to continue to administer mandated territories "in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective mandates, until other arrangements have been agreed between the United Nations and the respective mandatory powers."

~~The meaning of this appears to be that, whereas all legal obligations under Article 22 of the Government of the League of Nations are terminated, there is a moral obligation to administer Palestine in general accordance with the existing mandate until some new arrangements can be made by agreement between His Majesty's Government and the United Nations.~~ Covenant
The word "agreed" implies that His Majesty's Government are not in a position to substitute other arrangements for the existing Mandate without the consent of the United Nations. It also implies, however, that His Majesty's Government have a veto on any new arrangement that may be proposed, and could refuse to accept any solution proposed by the United Nations which did not meet with their approval.

FOREIGN OFFICE,
~~25th~~ March, 1947.

By assenting to this resolution, H.M.G. have undertaken to continue to administer Palestine in accordance with the Mandate until some new arrangements can be made by agreement between H.M.G. and the United Nations.

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5 FEB 1947

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DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Lord Inverchapel.
No. 1213.

25th February 1947.

D. 11.45 p.m. 25th February 1947.
R. 5.40 a.m. 26th February 1947.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

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E/6

United Kingdom Delegation telegram No. 609 paragraph 2 (D).
Palestine and the United Nations.

Brief is being put together urgently and will be forwarded to New York very shortly.

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Dated: Debate

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26 Feb 1947

Palestine Government Policy.

Transmits text of speech made by Mr. Bevin concerning the Palestine Problem and the handing over of same to United Nations. In the House of Commons on Feb. 25.

Last Paper.

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E 1728/46/31

PALESTINE (GOVERNMENT POLICY)

Extract from House of Commons Debates, 25th February, 1947

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ernest Bevin): The course of events has led His Majesty's Government to decide that the problem of Palestine must be referred to the United Nations, as outlined in the announcement which I made to the House last week. The problem of Palestine is a very vexed and complex one. There is no denying the fact that the mandate contained contradictory promises. In the first place it promised the Jews a National Home and, in the second place, it declared that the rights and position of the Arabs must be protected. Therefore, it provided for what was virtually an invasion of the country by thousands of immigrants, and at the same time said that this was not to disturb the people in possession. The question therefore arose whether this could be accomplished without a conflict, and events in the last twenty-five years have proved that it could not.

The Jews set about colonising and there is no doubt that, in the sphere they have developed, they have carried out some very great experiments. Many of the Arabs, as I shall explain later, are involved in those developments, such as citrus growing, which is vital to the economy of Palestine. As far as Jewish development is concerned, everybody in this country who has been associated with the affair, certainly up to 1931, assumed that it was a National Home for the Jews about which we were talking. I want to remind the House, however, that this is not the issue now. All that is over. The issue which the United Nations must consider and decide is, first, shall the claims of the Jews that Palestine is to be a Jewish State be admitted; second, shall the claim of the Arabs that it is to be an Arab State, with safeguards for the Jews under the decision for a National Home be admitted; or, third, shall it be a Palestinian State, in which the interests of both communities are as carefully balanced and protected as possible? I have put it in that form because in all negotiations I have had to conduct, and whatever proposals we have adopted to-day, I come back every time to these three provisions. I cannot escape them and I do not think anyone who has been Colonial Secretary, as who has handled this problem hitherto, however much the question has been argued, has, in fact, escaped them.

That, therefore, raises the issue which has got to be decided and we, as Mandatory Power, cannot solve that problem until the United Nations have recommended which of these three alternatives is to form the basis of the future organisation of Palestine. We, as Mandatory Power, have no power to make that decision. Nothing that I can find in any of the documents, either at the League of Nations, or in the discussions between the Great Powers at Versailles and after, indicate that we have that power. The mandate certainly does not give it, and the Anglo-American Committee, faced with the problem that we have been faced with, came to the view not to recommend a Jewish State, and everybody who has touched the Palestine question is forced back to that every time. I really want the House to face up to this problem which His Majesty's Government have to face up to now. In our recent negotiations the Colonel Secretary and I, over and over again, came up against this fundamental problem. All the proposals we have made for the gradual evolution of Palestine towards independence have been judged by the Arabs and the Jews according to the effect they might have on the final decision as to the kind of State Palestine is to be when it becomes independent, and independent it must become. The Mandatory Power cannot go on for ever.

Let me trace the history of this business since we came into office. We gave early consideration to the problem and discussed the matter very fully. I do not escape the fact—I do not desire to escape it—that when I was a member of the Coalition Government with right hon. gentlemen opposite I took my corner in trying to see what solution we could find for Palestine. I have a perfectly open mind about it. All I want is a settlement, and I want a settlement because this is one of those sore spots in the Middle East that may, if not

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settled, lead to much wider trouble—[hon. members: "Hear, hear"]. Various schemes have been evolved in the past, including partition, but all of them which have come before me, whether in the Coalition Government or in this Government, would have to be put into operation by force. That is to say, everybody came to the conclusion that we should not get agreement, but that we would have to come to a decision and then apply force to put it into operation.

His Majesty's Government, after reviewing the situation, came to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, that after all the force we had seen throughout the world in the last twenty-five years, force applied to this problem would not produce a final solution, and that it might create wider difficulties in the Middle East, and might, indeed, start us on a road leading in another quarter of a century to another war. That we have had to face, having regard to the importance to the world economy of the raw materials and the whole position of the Middle East. We therefore proceeded, not too hopefully, but with the conviction that it was our duty, to make the effort to try to get a negotiated settlement. To begin with, and I want to make this very clear, we agreed that we could not enforce the White Paper of 1939 as a basis for our policy. It has been suggested that all that was needed was to tear up the White Paper. This raises a very serious question in international affairs, one that cannot be approached lightly. Statements have often been made in this House and outside, that when Labour was in Opposition, they stated that they would not be bound by that decision of the Government of the day. But there are many precedents. It has always been accepted, in international affairs at least, that the party coming into office after making such a declaration does not just tear up existing undertakings, but seeks to change them by proper negotiation and by substituting another policy. I have to emphasise this because this House of Commons did vote for the White Paper. It is true that the Mandates Commission did not endorse it——

Mr. Clement Davies (Montgomery): Not this House—a predecessor.

Mr. Bevin: I always regard this House as continuing from eternity to eternity, and I meant it in that sense. I think I am right—[hon. members: "Hear, hear"]. I did not mean the actual members of this House. What I meant was that the House in 1939 did, in fact, vote—and the Arabs took that as a decision of the British Parliament—[*Interruption*]. I must say that I should be reluctant to remain Foreign Secretary for five minutes, if I thought that I might go to an international conference with a vote of a majority of this House and give undertakings, and that those undertakings were going to be torn up without proper negotiations at the end——

Mr. Sydney Silverman (Nelson and Colne): Would my right hon. friend say that the White Paper of 1939 represents any kind of agreement or undertaking with any other Power with whom we were in international relations? Was it not merely a declaration of policy by the Mandatory Power.

Mr. Bevin: It was regarded by the Arab States at that conference as an undertaking by the British Parliament and one which would be carried out. May I suggest—[*Interruption*]. Please do not interrupt. We are dealing with one of the most serious problems. I suggest to my hon. friend that if the vote had been the reverse way, and an undertaking of an inverse character had been given to the Jews, the hon. member would have been on his feet and said that this was a vote from the House, and that we could not tear it up. Really, I must stand for this as a point of principle, because all my negotiations of any kind with Foreign Powers depend on the integrity of a vote of this House of Commons——

Mr. Turner-Samuels (Gloucester): If that is right, how can the Foreign Secretary reconcile that with the statement of the Prime Minister on 1st July last year in which he said:—

> "The Government have never stood by the White Paper policy . . . . It is quite wrong to say that we are carrying on the White Paper policy."—[Official Report, 1st July, 1946; Vol. 424, c. 1907].

Mr. Bevin: That is quite right, and if the hon. and learned member will wait a moment, I will show him why. The point I am making is this—and really I must ask the House, whether it is my party, or any party, to support me in this because it is fundamental—I am going away next week to Moscow, and when I go to Moscow I shall be asked to give undertakings. When I arrive at conclusions, I shall have to say that it is subject to the ratification of the House of Commons, and when that ratification of the House takes place—whatever the vote is—and

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that undertaking is given, I assume that whatever party succeeds us, whatever its political colour may be, will honour that undertaking until it negotiates a change. I must ask my hon. friends to accept that; otherwise they ought never to send me to an international conference at all for any purpose. Really I have to state this, because it is fundamental to the carrying on of the business of the country. This is not a question of continuity of policy, but a question of keeping one's word, and, indeed, if there is one thing I have grown up in, not merely as a politician but as a trade union leader, it is that I have kept my word, whatever the opposition may have been.

Therefore, I told the Arabs quite straight that my party declared that they could not be bound by this, and that a change must be negotiated, and I have proceeded on that policy with my right hon. friend the Colonial Secretary ever since. I think that is a perfectly legitimate action to take. Thereupon, the present question arose; what should the approach be? The position had become accentuated by the European situation and I thought, with the then Colonial Secretary, that the first step which should be taken—and I agree with the right hon. gentleman who corrected me the other night about the date—was to decide about immigration. The question was, should immigration come to an end at 31st December, 1945? I communicated with the Arabs and told them that I thought it should not. My right hon. friend the Colonial Secretary in his Department, took it up with the Arabs in Palestine—I dealt with the Arab States—and we agreed that it should continue at 1,500 a month. I will not say, and it would be wrong of me to say, that there was an agreement by the Arabs to do that, but there was at least acquiescence, and on that acquiescence in a friendly way, we proceeded to issue certificates at 1,500 a month.

Since we took that decision in December of 1945, 21,000 Jewish immigrants have entered Palestine over and above the 75,000 for whom the White Paper provided, and immigration now is proceeding at the rate of 18,000 a year. There seems to be an impression everywhere that this is an abnormally low rate of entry, but the fact is that it has only been exceeded five times in the whole history of the Mandate—in 1925, and in the first four years of the Nazi rule in Germany. In other words, 18,000 a year is above the average for the whole mandatory period and I must say that I felt, having moved up to that as the first step in the opening of negotiations, it was not a bad rate of entry. But I think we might have been able to do more for the Jews, and have increased this rate at that time, if the bitterness of feeling which surrounds this problem of immigration had not been increased by American pressure for the immediate admission of 100,000. I do not desire to create any ill feeling with the United States; in fact, I have done all I can to promote the best possible relations with them, as with other countries, but I should have been happier if they had had regard to the fact that we were the mandatory Power, and that we were carrying the responsibility—[hon. members: "Hear, hear"].—and if they had only waited to ask us what we were doing. Then we could have informed them. But, instead of that, a person named Earl Harrison went out to their zone in Germany collecting certain information, and a report was issued. I must say it really destroyed the basis of good feeling that we—the Colonial Secretary and I—were endeavouring to produce in the Arab States, and it set the whole thing back.

However we realised that we had to take American interest in this problem into account. Accordingly, having regard to what they had said, we invited them to join us in forming the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Now I must point out that I have been very severely criticised by people in the United States for not accepting the committee's report. I was reminded of this when I was over there recently almost every day. But none of the report was accepted by the United States except one point, namely, the admission of 100,000 immigrants. I was perfectly willing to stand up to the problem of the report as a whole, which included ten points. I have never gone back on that, but even if I had, as events have turned out, it would not have settled the Palestine problem, as I shall show before I sit down. We could not undertake this, except as a part of the general settlement, and we had to continue our efforts to work out policy.

Our first attempt resulted in the plan for provincial autonomy. I must remind the House that the Anglo-American Committee reported against a Jewish State. Therefore, taking the report as a basis, we put forward this provincial autonomy plan as a basis for negotiation. We did not lay it down but, if I may say so, if other

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countries with different races and different religions, can work on the cantonal principle, I really cannot see why it cannot work in Palestine as elsewhere. We then tried to convene a conference of both Arabs and Jews. We tried very hard to get the Jews into conference. I interviewed their representatives in Paris, in London, and I tried to persuade them, to the best of my ability to come in and face the issue with us.

I profoundly regret they did not. [hon. members: "Hear, hear."] I know—and I do not want to set one section of Jews against another—that those who have been trained in England and grown up under English customs and practice, wanted to come in, but the Jewish Agency, very largely dominated by New York, would not really come in, and it was with gentlemen from there that I had to deal so much. They would not join the conference unless, as a prerequisite, we would more or less commit ourselves to a Jewish State in advance, either partition or as a whole. How could I? I had to consult Arabs, I had to discuss the whole problem, and how could any representative of His Majesty's Government give an advance declaration one way or the other? However, we did agree to put any plan which the Jewish Agency cared to submit on the agenda, and to examine it on its merits whatever it involved.

The proposal I put to them was, "Here is the British plan. There is the Arab plan"—by then had been drawn up—"You have your plan. Let us take these three plans, and see if, out of them, we can produce a solution." I knew from experience that I could not get them in the same room. That, too, I think is regrettable when you have a problem of this character to solve. And in this case it was the Arabs who were the greatest difficulty. I want to make a balanced statement on this, quite fairly. They argued that experience of the past was not helpful, but the Jews were willing if I would accept the Jewish State, in some form, in advance. I could not do that, so they did not come into the conference. Neither could I get them into one room.

I did reach a stage, however, in meeting the Jews separately, in which I advanced the idea of an interim arrangement, leading ultimately to self-government. I indicated that I did not mind whether this interim arrangement was for five years, or 10 years, or three years, or whatever it was. I said to them, "If you will work together for three, five, or 10 years, it might well be that you will not want to separate. Let us try to make up the difference." At that stage things looked more hopeful. There was a feeling—I do not think I overestimated it—when they left me in the Foreign Office that day, that I had the right approach at last. But what happened? I went back to the Paris Peace Conference, and next day—I believe it was the Day of Atonement, or a special day of the Jewish religion—my right hon. friend the Prime Minister telephoned me at midnight, and told me that the President of the United States was going to issue another statement on the 100,000. I think the country and the world ought to know about this.

I went next morning to the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, and told him how far I had got the day before. I believed we were on the road, if only they would leave us alone. I begged that the statement be not issued, but I was told that if it was not issued by Mr. Truman, a competitive statement would be issued by Mr. Dewey. In international affairs I cannot settle things if my problem is made the subject of local elections. I hope I am not saying anything to cause bad feeling with the United States, but I feel so intensely about this. A vexed problem like this, with a thousand years of religious differences, has to be handled with the greatest detail and care. No one knows that more than I do. I have seen these tense religious struggles in parts of this country, in Ireland, and elsewhere. I know what it involves. It can lead to civil war before you know where you are. However, the statement was issued. I was dealing with Jewish representatives at the time, and I had to call it off because the whole thing was spoilt.

One thing is clear. I had to open the conference with the Arabs alone, and they put the point to me that they wanted finality. They wanted to determine what the future of Palestine is to be. The Jews also want finality, provided it takes the form of a Jewish State. But they would be prepared to see British rule continued as a protecting Power, provided it was clearly aiming at a Jewish Sovereign State. The conference was suspended at that time. The United Nations was meeting in New York. I thought that by going to New York, I could talk to a lot of people, and try to help the thing along by meeting people, and so on. While there I discussed the matter with the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, and at the end, he made a public statement saying

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that the basis upon which Great Britain was proposing to hold the conference, in his view merited the attendance of the Jews as well as the Arabs. Even that, from America, produced no results.

Then came the second session of the conference with the Arabs. In view of the difficulty, we agreed to have informal talks with the Jewish Agency. We did not press them to come into the conference. I have been too long a negotiator to stand on form. I thought it was better, if they could not see their way clear to come into the conference, that I should meet them informally, and see whether, with my colleagues, I could get over this difficulty. When we met, the Arabs adhered to their plan for a unitary independent State in Palestine. They have reiterated at every meeting that they have never accepted the Palestine Mandate, nor recognised the legality of the Balfour Declaration. Nevertheless, they told us they were willing to recognise the results of this policy so far as the present residents in Palestine were concerned. These included about 600,000 Jews, now nearer 700,000 I am told, already living in Palestine with 1,200,000 Arabs.

I say this in all seriousness. If it were only a question of relieving Europe of 100,000 Jews, I believe a settlement could be found. I believe a settlement can now be found if it is purely the humanitarian problem I have to solve. Unfortunately, that is not the position. From the Zionist point of view the 100,000 is only a beginning, and the Jewish Agency talk in terms of millions. I think the Arabs could be persuaded to agree to 100,000 new immigrants, in an orderly way, on humanitarian grounds, having regard to the European situation if—and I emphasise this—immigration after that, was to be determined by the elected representatives of the people of Palestine.

The claim made by the Arabs is a very difficult one to answer. We here in Great Britain as a House of Commons determine whether people shall be admitted into this country or not. No one else is doing that. Why should an external agency, largely financed from America, determine how many people should come into Palestine, and interfere with the economy of the Arabs, who have been there for 2,000 years? This is what I have to face. There may be an answer to it, if it is on the merits of how long the respective parties have owned the country. But, the Arabs say they are not going to be pushed out, by an external agency, from a country which they regard as their own—I am using their words—and in which they have been living for just about as long as England has been a Christian country. That is what the House has to face, and it is a difficult thing to answer. I do not know what would happen if a lot of Welshmen tried to drive the Englishmen out. There would have to be a buffer State. The difficulty would be no doubt intense. Under the Arab plan the Jewish National Home—and they now accept the National Home—although they did not accept the Balfour Declaration or the mandate, they will accept the National Home——

Mr. Kenneth Lindsay (Combined English Universities): Does that also mean partition?

Mr. Bevin: No. I will deal with partition in a moment. But they accept the Home within a unitary State. That gives an Arab majority. I have argued with both Jews and Arabs. What is it we have got to solve? Are the Jews a State or are they a religion? I have got to face the question of Catholics, Mahommedans and everybody else, and really, this is a difficult thing to decide. I cannot believe that if there is a unitary State in Palestine every Arab will vote for an Arab candidate—he may in the first instance—or that every Jew will vote for a Jewish candidate. About the only constituency in this country which returned a Communist candidate was Mile End and they have a perfect right to do so. No one is elected to this House either as a Jew or a Christian. One is elected as a man, as a representative. Therefore, one will have Communists, one will have Socialists, and it depends on the intelligence of the people whether there will be Conservatives. It may be that there will be some liberalism, even in Palestine. There is no doubt that people will form views which will crystallise. Therefore, the Arabs argue, "Leave it to the intelligence of the people who live in the State."

Mr. S. Silverman: Will my right hon. friend explain to the House exactly what he understands by the word "National" in the phrase "Jewish National Home"?

Mr. Bevin: I am sorry that I cannot give an accurate definition, and Balfour is dead. I do not say that unkindly, but whether anyone can explain what people

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meant at the time, I do not know. When I used it, there was an understanding on the part of the Arabs that in Palestine, in view of certain historical associations, those Jews who had migrated there should have their liberty and freedom—no pogroms, no persecution—and be equal citizens of the State. That makes it a national home—[*interruption*]. My national home is in England, with the same conditions.

Mr. Turner-Samuels (Gloucester): My right hon. friend says that the Arabs are prepared to accept the National Home. If he does not know what that is, and cannot give a definition of it, what is the good of telling the House that the Arabs are prepared to accept it?

Mr. Bevin: Because they agreed in their plan—hon. members have it before them—that "You can have your own language, your own university, your own religion, everything"—[*interruption*]. My hon. friend says, "Very kind of them," but if other countries that persecuted Jews had only given them that, there would never have been a problem.

Mr. Lipsom (Cheltenham): It is the people who matter.

Mr. Bevin: It is human rights which are the basis of the United Nations, and in the proposals, which I thought were perhaps too limited—I did not accept them—they were fundamental principles which I thought gave effect to what I understood to be the basis of the claim originally made by Nathan Rothschild and other people—I have read all the papers—in the original discussions.

I want to put the other side. The Jews say that if that is done they will be tolerated as a minority. I cannot alter the balance of people in a State—that is impossible—any more than one can alter it between Nehru and Jinnah to-day in India. The numbers are there, and one cannot alter it in any country. Then we tried our hand at another plan. Members will have seen it in the White Paper. The plan had certain features common to the Anglo-American report and the provincial Autonomy Plan. From the Arab point of view, those proposals had the advantage that they placed in Arab hands the maintenance of existing safeguards against the dispossession of Arab cultivators, and at the end of two years they would have given the Arabs a voice in determining the rate of immigration. We propose to set up a Governor's Council, and in two years—and this was not based on anything but humanitarian principles—96,000 people would have been allowed in from Europe, without any question of economic absorptive capacity. That was the proposal. Afterwards, the High Commissioner was to consult a council of both Jews and Arabs, and after consulting them he was to decide, on the basis of economic absorptive capacity, incorporating the words of the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill), which he included in the 1922 White Paper.

Mr. Janner (Leicester, West): Will my right hon. friend permit me to ask one question, a rather important one. What is the proposal with regard to the fulfilment of the provisions in the Mandate about the Jewish Agency, which is recognised as an international body?

Mr. Bevin: I will come to that, but my hon. friend is delaying my statement, and I hope that I shall be allowed to proceed. We proposed that if the High Commissioner's decision was not accepted by either party, the Secretary-General of the United Nations would appoint an arbitration tribunal, and we, as the Mandatory Power, would abide by the result. Was that not reasonable? What was the answer? It was that that proposal was rejected because we proposed that the Arabs should be consulted at all. Really, His Majesty's Government could not accept a position in which one was going to admit people into a country, and representatives of the people living in it must not be consulted. That was really too tall an order, and I could not, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, accept that. I am saying this because I am leading up to the point where I shall say, at the end, that there is a chance of a settlement yet, without going to the United Nations, if people will come off their arbitrary positions. I am still open to try.

Then the other difficulty was that the present Government has no roots in the people at all. It is an alien Government imposed on the top by a Mandatory Government. I do not know what previous people who held the office of Colonial Secretary had in their minds, but I am perfectly sure in the discussion of this problem during the five years when I was in the Coalition Government it was never intended that we should be a Mandatory Power for ever. It was intended to lead to something and that the regulation of our relationship with Palestine should, in

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the end, be on a treaty basis and not a mandatory basis. That is as I understood it, and I believe that there is agreement on that. Therefore, I thought it would be a good thing. Suggestions have been put to me over and over again by hon. members of this House and by members of another place, "Why not try to establish a British dominion to try to solve the problem?" But really it is too late for that.

The Trusteeship Council has been established and there is no other road but independence from a mandatory position, unless we get agreement between the parties, and there was no chance of agreement. Therefore, we proposed a trusteeship for five years—for two years with 96,000 immigrants, and arbitration after that on the question of the economic absorptive capacity—and that we should begin at once by creating municipal areas in certain parts of Palestine which would have Jewish majorities and others which would have Arab majorities. In order to achieve that, we designed our plans to give the Jews the benefit of Tel Aviv. It is not realised that 78 per cent. of the Jews live in Tel Aviv and the balance are on the land. It is sometimes assumed that they are all on the land. That is not true. They are an urban population.

Mr. Oliver Stanley (Bristol, West): The right hon. gentleman said that 78 per cent. live in Tel Aviv. I do not think he meant that. I think he meant that they live in urban districts.

Mr. Bevin: I beg pardon. They live in urban areas. Taking the Tel Aviv population with that of other urban areas we have this majority of 78 per cent. It is quite clear that the police for the maintenance of order have no roots in the place. We suggested devising a police system like our own which would be partly central and partly municipal in the respective areas. It would be recruited in a way similar to that adopted in Birmingham, or any other local government area in this country. This was suggested so as to begin building up a Government with roots in the people, ready to hand over. After four years, we suggested a constituent assembly which should endeavour to work out a Constitution. If they could not succeed—this is not British territory; we hold it under trust—we would return to the United Nations and ask for their help and advice. We felt that if we could begin self-government, begin getting people to work together, it would help to solve the problem. I am convinced that if the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine—I emphasise in Palestine—are given a chance to work together, they will work together and solve this problem, but if it is to be settled in accordance with the Jewish Agency's dictates, it will never be settled. I am speaking, I hope, impartially.

Mr. Janner: With the greatest respect——

Hon Members: Order.

Mr. Bevin: I have given way many times. In the Citrus Board, in the trade boards and the various boards of commerce, they do work together. If they can work together in trade and commerce in that way, personally I am convinced that if given the chance and removed from political difficulty, then the Jews and Arabs will develop a State of which they can well be proud. That is my view, and I am entitled to my view after all these negotiations. We have been compelled to maintain a Government with which the people, as I say, have not been sufficiently associated. We, therefore, tried a new method. It was rejected.

In the other States of the Middle East where we also had a mandate, it has led to self-government—in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and all the rest. I want to suggest that the cultural development of the Arabs and Jews in Palestine is of as high a standard as the cultural development and aptitude for government to be found in any other Arab States. That being so, we rather pinned our faith on developing independence in that way. If this policy was expressed in connexion with any other place in the world, I believe this House, the United Nations, and everybody else, would say that our policy was right in that we were aiming for independence, getting rid of the mandate and developing self-government and self-determination with proper protection for the rights of any minorities. That has been our policy and I think if this was not Palestine it would have been successful.

I was asked a question about defining the National Home. This has been a great puzzle to me. When the Balfour Declaration and the subsequent mandate were made, nobody indicated, as far as I can discover, when the National Home would be established. I cannot find it anywhere. Was it millions of Jews; was it a majority; was it a Jewish State, or what was it? The only expression that I can find is this vague expression of a "Jewish National Home." I know the reason for this declaration. I know why it was made,

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but I do not believe it would help the discussion now. It was thought by most people prior to 1939, that the steps that had been taken up to date, did really fulfil the Balfour Declaration. Between the Labour Party and the party then in office a great dispute was carried on in this House. But, frankly, the more one reads the documents, the more difficult it is to find any guide as to when a Jewish National Home has been completed or established. It was for that reason that we thought if we developed these municipal areas, if we transferred the land regulations, the laws and the police, and all this kind of thing, to majorities in that area, we should have established in fact the National Home. We should have established the National Home within a unitary State, with a free chance to the Jews for their own development, which would have allowed them in the joint Parliament of Arabs and Jews, to have had their say in the affairs of the world.

That leads me to another point, which is a very difficult one. It is said that, if we have a unitary State, the Jews, as Jews, will not be in the United Nations. Really, this is raising a very big question. Are we in the United Nations as a religion, are we in the United Nations as a people geographically situated, or how are we in it? If the United Nations is to arrive at a position in which it will have five or six great religions as dominant factors, then that will be a very disturbing situation, and, as far as I am concerned, at any rate——

Mr. Turner-Samuels (Gloucester) *rose*——

Mr. Bevin: I have given way very often already, and the hon. and learned Gentleman will have his turn. I must raise this issue, because really it is fundamental. I have to deal with the points put to me by the Jewish Agency, and the Jewish Agency says that, "as nationals, but not as Jews, we shall be in the United Nations." I never knew, and I never thought, that we had promised or done anything to establish a situation of that character, but, if that is the case, let us do it with our eyes open. This is one of the difficulties which I see, and I say this because I want both the Jews and the Arabs to reconsider their position. We are united in the United Nations to-day as States, and, within every State of the United Nations, there are any number of religions. It may be different, but that is the situation that is put to me, and I hope it will be debated and brought out, because it does raise a very serious question, especially for a Commonwealth like this, which represents every possible phase of people in the world. We cannot divide ourselves like that.

Therefore, I have asked, over and over again, if it will not be possible to have a Palestinian State, and with the ability that is there—the business ability, and it is exceptional and has done remarkably well, the statesmanship and the aptitude for government—cannot we find a place through a Palestinian State to deal with these problems in the United Nations from a State point of view? That is the question which I should like debated in the course of this debate, because it is the issue upon which the whole crux of this settlement really depends. I hope it will not be dealt with in any spirit of prejudice, because we have to face these issues, and because, when we go to the United Nations next September, these are the issues which I suggest are going to come before us. Take the position of Russia. I do not know how many races there are in that great territory, covering one-seventh of the globe, but it is colossal, and I have never heard that this particular theory has been advanced there. Therefore, I ask for consideration of this problem.

May I now just turn to the question of partition? A good many people have said that the way out of the difficulty is to have partition. I am sure that, if we have agreed to partition, we would have had a tremendous row as to where the frontier should be. We have drawn frontiers in the Provincial Autonomy Plan; I have seen the Jewish idea of partition in an American paper, but we really cannot make two viable States of Palestine, however we may try. We can make one viable State, and, so far as I can see, or as far as any student of the map could see, the only thing we could do would be to transfer the rest to one of the Arab States, but I ask what trouble is that going to cause in the whole of the Arab world? That will set going a conflict which will be worse than the conflict we have tried to settle. It has been suggested that we could do it by knitting in Transjordan, and it is argued that we carried out partition when we created Transjordan. That may be, but, if we try now, with Palestine as we know it to-day, to make it into two viable States, I say that we cannot do it. If we try to take away the taxable capacity of the best areas of Palestine for productive purposes, and that taxation goes entirely to the Jewish portion, you cannot expect the others to accept it. You cannot expect to make

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the one State dependent upon somebody else. The best partition scheme, and the most favourable one that I have seen up to now, has the effect that it would leave, at the present moment, 450,000 Jews and 360,000 Arabs in that Jewish State. I put that to the Arabs quite frankly, and what was their answer? The Arabs say: "If it is wrong for the Jews to be in a minority of 33⅓ or 40 per cent. in the whole country, what justification is there for putting 360,000 Arabs under the Jews? What is your answer to that?" I have no answer to that.

Therefore, you transfer one large issue in solving your problem by partition, and there are only two possible consequences. Either the Arabs in the partitioned State must always be an Arab minority, or else they must be driven out—the one thing or the other—and, on that basis, I am afraid that I should be led, and the Government would be led, to a worse position. I have been asked: "Why go to the United Nations?" Any remedy that has been put up to the Government in the form of creating a Jewish State, will lead to one result—the Arab States will take you to the United Nations. Supposing we partitioned the country now, and the question then went to the United Nations. Syria, or some other country, would take us to the United Nations, where we should have our conduct discussed on the basis of our legal action in carving up a State that was not ours, and I venture to suggest, after my experiences in New York last year, that Britain would be placed in a very funny position. It is indefensible. We can discuss all these things, I know quite easily, but really, we cannot do that.

Therefore, the Government tried to get the best they could within the Mandate, and, in the end, we came to the conclusion that this Mandate is really unworkable. I think we could establish a case that we have carried out what the Mandate originally intended, provided that the problem had not been accentuated by the Hitler régime. If we take the ratio of immigration and development unaccentuated by the Hitler régime, I think that the original basis of the Mandate, as visualised in 1922, has, in fact, been carried out. What we have not been able to do, is to meet with this Mandate the accentuated position created by the Hitler régime and the persecution in Germany. That is my view. I believe that throughout British Governments have done their best all the way through.

The Palestine Administration has had one of the most difficult tasks of any administration in the world. Sometimes, when reading the reports and documents, I wonder how they managed to carry through. They have had no support from the people, and they have been criticised by both sides. I believe that they have honestly tried to do their best, and that if there has been a failure in dealing with the problem of these displaced persons due to persecution of the Jews, it has not been the Palestine Mandate, as administered on the original basis, which has been the cause of failure; it has been the failure of the moral consciousness of international organisations to grapple with this problem as a whole which has left the problem as it is at the present time.

Take the position now. There are a million displaced persons on the Continent. I have said to Governments, week after week, what is a million people out of 4,000 million in the world? I have made the offer—and I make it from this Box to-day—that, to get over this problem, we will take a proportion, together with all the other countries of the world, of that million, and add them to our population in order to get rid of this miserable state of affairs. The thing ought to be taken up and grappled with. I pleaded with the United States to take in thousands—I do not mean Jews; I do not single out Jews, and I do not think they ought to be singled out. But all States ought to do it. It is really absurd to think that, with all the organisation built up for this business, one million people could not be thus absorbed. That ought to be done, but, everywhere I go, and everywhere I turn, nobody wants them. It is a tragedy. They are doing something in South America, and in some other parts of the world, but it is relatively very little.

I will not mention the name of one great statesman in the British Commonwealth who came and gave me a half hour's lecture on the Zionist problem. When he had finished, I said to him, "How many will you take? I will get a ship and send them to you tomorrow." Not one. That is really sympathy without relief. We really ought to get rid of this problem, and if I could get back to the contribution on purely humanitarian grounds of 100,000—that is, 60,000 more than we are now taking in over two years—into Palestine, and if this political fight for a Jewish State could be put on one side, and we could develop self-government by the people resident in Palestine, without any other political issue, I would be willing to try again. I honestly believe that it could be accomplished. But, if the attack is made

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that this is merely the advance proportion coming out of Europe, in order that more millions can be poured in, so as to get a complete Jewish State, which we have never undertaken to create, I am afraid—and I say this with great sincerity—that will provoke a conflict in the Middle East which I do not desire to see. There is enough conflict in the world already. I am convinced that if, as I have said to-day, we can bring the matter back to this contribution to the relief of European suffering, which was where His Majesty's Government originally started to deal with it, then there is a chance of solution.

Finally, there is the question of time. I have been asked whether we can do something before September. It is very difficult, and I cannot give an answer. I am studying the matter to see whether there is any process by which we can get it considered earlier, under the Charter. But I must ask for more time on that. I am in consultation with Sir Alexander Cadogan, who knows the Charter inside out, to see whether anything can be done. Even now, rather than that it should go to the United Nations, I would prefer that Great Britain, with all her traditions, should be allowed to deal with the problem on a humanitarian basis. Let us remove the political conflict and get back to relieving Europe of these 100,000 people as we are asked to do, and let us be allowed to deal with any further immigrants on the basis I have suggested. If there is a dispute, let there be arbitration, and, in the quickest possible time we can create an independent State in Palestine where Jew and Arab, who have such traditions and have contributed so much to the religious and cultural thought of the world, can work together and end these century-old conflicts.

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PALESTINE (GOVERNMENT POLICY)

Extract from House of Commons Debates, 25th February, 1947

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ernest Bevin): The course of events has led His Majesty's Government to decide that the problem of Palestine must be referred to the United Nations, as outlined in the announcement which I made to the House last week. The problem of Palestine is a very vexed and complex one. There is no denying the fact that the mandate contained contradictory promises. In the first place it promised the Jews a National Home and, in the second place, it declared that the rights and position of the Arabs must be protected. Therefore, it provided for what was virtually an invasion of the country by thousands of immigrants, and at the same time said that this was not to disturb the people in possession. The question therefore arose whether this could be accomplished without a conflict, and events in the last twenty-five years have proved that it could not.

The Jews set about colonising and there is no doubt that, in the sphere they have developed, they have carried out some very great experiments. Many of the Arabs, as I shall explain later, are involved in those developments, such as citrus growing, which is vital to the economy of Palestine. As far as Jewish development is concerned, everybody in this country who has been associated with the affair, certainly up to 1931, assumed that it was a National Home for the Jews about which we were talking. I want to remind the House, however, that this is not the issue now. All that is over. The issue which the United Nations must consider and decide is, first, shall the claims of the Jews that Palestine is to be a Jewish State be admitted; second, shall the claim of the Arabs that it is to be an Arab State, with safeguards for the Jews under the decision for a National Home be admitted; or, third, shall it be a Palestinian State, in which the interests of both communities are as carefully balanced and protected as possible? I have put it in that form because in all negotiations I have had to conduct, and whatever proposals we have adopted to-day, I come back every time to these three provisions. I cannot escape them and I do not think anyone who has been Colonial Secretary who has handled this problem hitherto, however much it has been argued, has escaped them.

That, therefore, raises the issue which has got to be decided and we, as Mandatory Power, cannot solve that problem until the United Nations have recommended which of these three alternatives is to form the basis of the future organisation of Palestine. We, as Mandatory Power, have no power to make that decision. Nothing that I can find in any of the documents, either at the League of Nations, or in the discussions between the Great Powers at Versailles and after, indicate that we have that power. The mandate certainly does not give it, and the Anglo-American Committee, faced with the problem that we have been faced with, came to the view not to recommend a Jewish State, and everybody who has touched the Palestine question is forced back to that every time. I really want the House to face up to this problem which His Majesty's Government have to face up to now. In our recent negotiations the Colonel Secretary and I, over and over again, came up against this fundamental problem. All the proposals we have made for the gradual evolution of Palestine towards independence have been judged by the Arabs and the Jews according to the effect they might have on the final decision as to the kind of State Palestine is to be when it becomes independent, and independent it must become. The Mandatory Power cannot go on for ever.

Let me trace the history of this business since we came into office. We gave early consideration to the problem and discussed the matter very fully. I do not escape the fact—I do not desire to escape it—that when I was a member of the Coalition Government with right hon. gentlemen opposite I took my corner in trying to see what solution we could find for Palestine. I have a perfectly open mind about it. All I want is a settlement, and I want a settlement because it is one of those sore spots in the Middle East that may, if not settled, lead to much wider trouble—[hon.

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members: "Hear, hear"]. Various schemes have been evolved in the past, including partition, but all of them which have come before me, whether in the Coalition Government or in this Government, would have to be put into operation by force. That is to say, everybody came to the conclusion that we should not get agreement, but that we would have to come to a decision and then apply force to put it into operation.

His Majesty's Government, after reviewing the situation, came to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, that after all the force we had seen throughout the world in the last twenty-five years, force applied to this problem would not produce a final solution, and might create wider difficulties in the Middle East, and might, indeed, start us on a road leading in another quarter of a century to another war. That we have had to face, having regard to the importance to the world economy of the raw materials and the whole position of the Middle East. We therefore proceeded, not too hopefully, but with the conviction that it was our duty, to make the effort to try to get a negotiated settlement. To begin with, and I want to make this very clear, we agreed that we could not enforce the White Paper of 1939 as a basis for our policy. It has been suggested that all that was needed was to tear up the White Paper. This raises a very serious question in international affairs, one that cannot be approached lightly. Statements have often been made in this House and outside, when Labour was in Opposition, that they would not be bound by that decision of the Government of the day. But there are many precedents. It has always been accepted, in international affairs at least, that the party coming into office after making such a declaration does not just tear up existing undertakings, but seeks to change them by proper negotiation and by substituting another policy. I have to emphasise this because this House of Commons did vote for the White Paper. It is true that the Mandates Commission did not endorse it——

Mr. Clement Davies (Montgomery): Not this House—a predecessor.

Mr. Bevin: I always regard this House as continuing from eternity to eternity, and I meant it in that sense. I think I am right—[hon. members: "Hear, hear"]. I did not mean the actual members of this House. What I meant was that the House in 1939 did, in fact, vote —and the Arabs took that as a decision of the British Parliament—[*Interruption*]. I must say that I should be reluctant to remain Foreign Secretary for five minutes, if I thought that I might go to an international conference with a vote of a majority of this House and give undertakings, and that those undertakings were going to be torn up without proper negotiations at the end——

Mr. Sydney Silverman (Nelson and Colne): Would my right hon. friend say that the White Paper of 1939 represents any kind of agreement or undertaking with any other Power with whom we were in international relations? Was it not merely a declaration of policy by the Mandatory Power.

Mr. Bevin: It was regarded by the Arab States at that conference as an undertaking by the British Parliament and one which would be carried out. May I suggest—[*Interruption*]. Please do not interrupt. We are dealing with one of the most serious problems. I suggest to my hon. friend that if the vote had been the reverse way, and an undertaking of an inverse character had been given to the Jews, the hon. member would have been on his feet and said that this was a vote from the House, and that we could not tear it up. Really, I must stand for this as a point of principle, because all my negotiations of any kind with Foreign Powers depend on the integrity of a vote of this House of Commons——

Mr. Turner-Samuels (Gloucester): If that is right, how can the Foreign Secretary reconcile that with the statement of the Prime Minister on 1st July last year in which he said:—

> "The Government have never stood by the White Paper policy . . . . It is quite wrong to say that we are carrying on the White Paper policy."—[Official Report, 1st July, 1946; Vol. 424, c. 1907].

Mr. Bevin: That is quite right, and if the hon. and learned member will wait a moment, I will show him why. The point I am making is this—and really I must ask the House, whether it is my party or any party, to support me in this because it is fundamental—I am going away next week to Moscow, and when I go to Moscow I shall be asked to give undertakings. When I arrive at conclusions, I shall have to say they are subject to the ratification of the House of Commons, and when that ratification of the House takes place—whatever the vote is—and an undertaking is given, I assume that

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whatever party succeeds us, whatever its political colour may be, it will honour that undertaking until it negotiates a change. I must ask my hon. friends to accept that; otherwise they ought never to send me to an international conference at all for any purpose. Really I have to state this, because it is fundamental to the carrying on of the business of the country. This is not a question of continuity of policy, but a question of keeping one's word, and, indeed, if there is one thing I have grown up in, not merely as a politician but as a trade union leader, it is that I have kept my word, whatever the opposition may have been.

Therefore, I told the Arabs quite straight that my party had declared that they could not be bound by this, and that a change must be negotiated, and I have proceeded on that policy with my right hon. friend the Colonial Secretary ever since. I think that is a perfectly legitimate action to take. Thereupon, the present question arose; what should the approach be? The position had become accentuated by the European situation and I thought, with the then Colonial Secretary, that the first step which should be taken should be—and I agree with the right hon. gentleman who corrected me the other night about the date—was to decide about immigration. The question was, should immigration come to an end at 31st December, 1945? I communicated with the Arabs and told them that I thought it should not. My right hon. friend the Colonial Secretary in his Department, took it up with the Arabs in Palestine—I dealt with the Arab States—and we agreed that it should continue at 1,500 a month. I will not say, and it would be wrong of me to say, that there was an agreement by the Arabs to do that, but there was at least acquiescence, and on that acquiescence in a friendly way we proceeded to issue certificates at 1,500 a month.

Since we took that decision in December of 1945, 21,000 Jewish immigrants have entered Palestine over and above the 75,000 for whom the White Paper provided and immigration now is proceeding at the rate of 18,000 a year. There seems to be an impression everywhere that this is an abnormally low rate of entry, but the fact is that it has only been exceeded five times in the whole history of the Mandate—in 1925, and in the first four years of the Nazi rule in Germany. In other words, 18,000 a year is above the average for the whole mandatory period and I must say that I felt, having moved up to that as the first step in the opening of negotiations, it was not a bad rate of entry. But I think we might have been able to do more for the Jews, and have increased this rate at that time, if the bitterness of feeling which surrounds this problem of immigration had not been increased by American pressure for the immediate admission of 100,000. I do not desire to create any ill feeling with the United States; in fact, I have done all I can to promote the best possible relations with them, as with other countries, but I should have been happier if they had had regard to the fact that we were the mandatory Power, and that we were carrying the responsibility—[hon. members: "Hear, hear"].—and if they had only waited to ask us what we were doing. Then we could have informed them. But, instead of that, a person named Earl Harrison went out to their zone in Germany collecting certain information, and a report was issued. I must say it really destroyed the basis of good feeling that we—the Colonial Secretary and I—were endeavouring to produce in the Arab States, and it set the whole thing back.

However we realised that we had to take American interest in this problem into account. Accordingly, having regard to what they had said, we invited them to join us in forming the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Now I must point out that I have been very severely criticised by people in the United States for not accepting the committee's report. I was reminded of this when I was over there recently almost every day. But none of the report was accepted by the United States except one point, namely, the admission of 100,000 immigrants. I was perfectly willing to stand up to the problem of the report as a whole, which included ten points. I have never gone back on that, but even if I had, as events have turned out, it would not have settled the Palestine problem, as I shall show before I sit down. We could not undertake this, except as a part of the general settlement, and we had to continue our efforts to work out policy.

Our first attempt resulted in the plan for provincial autonomy. I must remind the House that the Anglo-American Committee reported against a Jewish State. Therefore, taking the report as a basis, we put forward this provincial autonomy plan as a basis for negotiation. We did not lay it down but, if I may say so, if other countries with different races and different

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religions, can work on the cantonal principle, I really cannot see why it cannot work in Palestine as elsewhere. We then tried to convene a conference of both Arabs and Jews. We tried very hard to get the Jews into the conference. I interviewed their representatives in Paris, in London, and I tried to persuade them, to the best of my ability to come in and face the issue with us.

I profoundly regret they did not. [hon. members: "Hear, hear."] I know—and I do not want to set one section of Jews against another—that those who have been trained in England and grown up under English customs and practice, wanted to come in, but the Jewish Agency, very largely dominated by New York, would not really come in, and it was with gentlemen from there that I had to deal so much. They would not join the conference unless, as a prerequisite, we would more or less commit ourselves to a Jewish State in advance, either partition or as a whole. How could I? I had to consult Arabs, I had to discuss the whole problem, and how could any representative of His Majesty's Government give an advance declaration one way or the other? However, we did agree to put any plan which the Jewish Agency cared to submit on the agenda, and to examine it on its merits whatever it involved.

The proposal I put to them was, "Here is the British plan. There is the Arab plan"—which by then had been drawn up—"You have your plan. Let us take these three plans, and see if, out of them, we can produce a solution." I knew from experience that I could not get them in the same room. That, too, I think is regrettable when you have a problem of this character to solve. And in this case it was the Arabs who were the greatest difficulty. I want to make a balanced statement on this, quite fairly. They argued that experience of the past was not helpful, but the Jews were willing if I would accept the Jewish State, in some form, in advance. I could not do that, so they did not come into the conference. Neither could I get them into one room.

I did reach a stage, however, in meeting the Jews separately, in which I advanced the idea of an interim arrangement, leading ultimately to self-government. I indicated that I did not mind whether this interim arrangement was for five years, or 10 years, or three years, or whatever it was, I said to them, "If you will work together for three, five, or 10 years, it might well be that you will not want to separate. Let us try to make up the difference." At that stage things looked more hopeful. There was a feeling—I do not think I over-estimated it—when they left me in the Foreign Office that day, that I had the right approach at last. But what happened? I went back to the Paris Peace Conference, and next day—I believe it was the Day of Atonement, or a special day of the Jewish religion, I forget which—my right hon. friend the Prime Minister telephoned me at midnight, and told me that the President of the United States was going to issue another statement on the 100,000. I think the country and the world ought to know about this.

I went next morning to the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, and told him how far I had got the day before. I believed we were on the road, if only they would leave us alone. I begged that the statement be not issued, but I was told that if it was not issued by Mr. Truman, a competitive statement would be issued by Mr. Dewey. In international affairs I cannot settle things if my problem is made the subject of local elections. I hope I am not saying anything to cause bad feeling with the United States, but I feel so intensely about this. A vexed problem like this, with a thousand years of religious differences, has to be handled with the greatest detail and care. No one knows that more than I do. I have seen these tense religious struggles in parts of this country, in Ireland, and elsewhere. I know what it involves. It can lead to civil war before you know where you are. However, the statement was issued. I was dealing with Jewish representatives at the time, and I had to call it off because the whole thing was spoilt.

One thing is clear. I had to open the conference with the Arabs alone, and they put the point to me that they wanted finality. They wanted to determine what the future of Palestine is to be. The Jews also want finality, provided it takes the form of a Jewish State. But they would be prepared to see British rule continued as a protecting Power, provided it was clearly aiming at a Jewish Sovereign State. The conference was suspended at that time. The United Nations was meeting in New York. I thought that by going to New York, I could talk to a lot of people, and try to help the thing along by meeting people, and so on. While there I discussed the matter with the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, and at the end, he made a public statement saying that the basis upon which Great Britain

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was proposing to hold the conference, in his view merited the attendance of the Jews as well as the Arabs. Even that, from America, produced no results.

Then came the second session of the conference with the Arabs. In view of the difficulty, we agreed to have informal talks with the Jewish Agency. We did not press them to come into the conference. I have been too long a negotiator to stand on form. I thought it was better, if they could not see their way clear to come into the conference, that I should meet them informally, and see whether, with my colleagues, I could get over this difficulty. When we met, the Arabs adhered to their plan for a unitary independent State in Palestine. They have reiterated at every meeting that they have never accepted the Palestine Mandate, nor recognised the legality of the Balfour Declaration. Nevertheless, they told us they were willing to recognise the results of this policy so far as the present residents in Palestine are concerned. These included about 600,000 Jews, now nearer 700,000 I am told, already living in Palestine with 1,200,000 Arabs.

I say this in all seriousness. If it were only a question of relieving Europe of 100,000 Jews, I believe a settlement could be found. I believe a settlement can now be found if it is purely the humanitarian problem I have to solve. Unfortunately, that is not the position. From the Zionist point of view the 100,000 is only a beginning, and the Jewish Agency talk in terms of millions. I think the Arabs could be persuaded to agree to 100,000 new immigrants, in an orderly way, on humanitarian grounds, having regard to the European situation if—and I emphasise this—immigration after that, was to be determined by the elected representatives of the people of Palestine.

The claim made by the Arabs is a very difficult one to answer. Here, we in Great Britain as a House of Commons determine whether the people shall be admitted into this country or not. No one else is doing that. Why should an external agency, largely financed from America, determine how many people should come into Palestine, and interfere with the economy of the Arabs, who have been there for 2,000 years? This is what I have to face. There may be an answer to it, if it is on the merits of how long the respective parties have owned the country. But, the Arabs say they are not going to be pushed out, by an external agency, from a country which they regard as their own—I am using their words—and in which they have been living for just about as long as England has been a Christian country. That is what the House has to face, and it is a difficult thing to answer. I do not know what would happen if there were a lot of Welshmen in America and they tried to drive the Englishmen out. There would have to be a buffer State. The difficulty would be no doubt intense. Under the Arab plan the Jewish National Home—and they now accept the National Home—although they did not accept the Balfour Declaration or the mandate, they will accept the National Home——

Mr. Kenneth Lindsay (Combined English Universities): Does that also mean partition?

Mr. Bevin: No. I will deal with partition in a moment. But they accept the Home within a unitary State. That gives an Arab majority. I have argued with both Jews and Arabs. What is it we have got to solve? Are the Jews a State or are they a religion? I have got to face the question of Catholics, Mahommedans and everybody else, and really, this is a difficult thing to decide. I cannot believe that if there is a unitary State in Palestine every Arab will vote for an Arab candidate—he may in the first instance—or that every Jew will vote for a Jewish candidate. Almost the only constituency in this country which returned a Communist candidate was Mile End and their member is not exactly a Zionist, and they have a perfect right to do so. No one is elected to this House either as a Jew or a Christian. One is elected as a man, as a representative. Therefore, one will have Communists, one will have Socialists, and it depends on the intelligence of the people whether there will be Conservatives. It may be that there will be some liberalism, even in Palestine. There is no doubt that people will form views which will crystallise. Therefore, the Arabs argue, "Leave it to the intelligence of the people who live in the State."

Mr. S. Silverman: Will my right hon. friend explain to the House exactly what he understands by the word "National" in the phrase "Jewish National Home"?

Mr. Bevin: I am sorry that I cannot give an accurate definition, and Balfour is dead. I do not say that unkindly, but

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whether anyone can explain what people meant at the time, I do not know. When I used it, there was an understanding on the part of the Arabs that in Palestine, in view of certain historical associations, those Jews who had migrated there should have their liberty and freedom—no pogroms, no persecution—and be equal citizens of the State. That makes it a national home—[*interruption*]. My national home is in England, with the same conditions.

Mr. Turner-Samuels (Gloucester): My right hon. friend says that the Arabs are prepared to accept the National Home. If he does not know what that is, and cannot give a definition of it, what is the good of telling the House that the Arabs are prepared to accept it?

Mr. Bevin: Because they agreed in their plan—hon. members have it before them—that "You can have your own language, your own university, your own religion, everything"—[*interruption*]. My hon. friend says, "Very kind of them," but if other countries that persecuted Jews had only given them that, there would never have been a problem.

Mr. Lipsom (Cheltenham): It is the people who matter.

Mr. Bevin: It is human rights which are the basis of the United Nations, and in the proposals, which I thought were perhaps too limited—I did not accept them—they were fundamental principles which I thought gave effect to what I understood to be the basis of the claim originally made by Nathan Rothschild and other people—I have read all the papers—in the original discussions.

I want to put the other side. The Jews say that if that is done they will be tolerated as a minority. I cannot alter the balance of people in a State—that is impossible—any more than one can alter it between Nehru and Jinnah to-day in India. The numbers are there, and one cannot alter it in any country. Then we tried our hand at another plan. Members will have seen it in the White Paper. The plan had certain features common to the Anglo-American report and the provincial Autonomy Plan. From the Arab point of view, those proposals had the advantage that they placed in Arab hands the maintenance of existing safeguards against the dispossession of Arab cultivators, and at the end of two years they would have given the Arabs a voice in determining the rate of immigration. We propose to set up a Governor's Council, and in two years—and this was not based on anything but humanitarian principles—96,000 people would have been allowed from Europe, without any question of economic absorptive capacity. That was the proposal. Afterwards, the High Commissioner was to consult a council of both Jews and Arabs, and after consulting them he was to decide, on the basis of economic absorptive capacity, incorporating the words of the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill), which he included in the 1922 White Paper.

Mr. Janner (Leicester, West): Will my right hon. friend permit me to ask one question, a rather important one. What is the proposal with regard to the fulfilment of the provisions in the Mandate about the Jewish Agency, which is recognised as an international body?

Mr. Bevin: I will come to that, but my hon. friend is delaying my statement, and I hope that I shall be allowed to proceed. We proposed that if the High Commissioner's decision was not accepted by either party, the Secretary-General of the United Nations would appoint an arbitration tribunal, and we, as the Mandatory Power, would abide by the result. Was that not reasonable? What was the answer? It was that that proposal was rejected because we proposed that the Arabs should be consulted at all. Really, His Majesty's Government could not accept a position in which one was going to admit people into a country, and representatives of the people living in it must not be consulted. That was really too tall an order, and I could not, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, accept that. I am saying this because I am leading up to the point where I shall say, at the end, that there is a chance of a settlement yet, without going to the United Nations, if people will come off their arbitrary positions. I am still open to try.

Then the other difficulty was that the present Government has no roots in the people at all. It is an alien Government imposed on the top by a Mandatory Government. I do not know what previous people who held the office of Colonial Secretary had in their minds, but I am perfectly sure in the discussion of this problem during the five years when I was in the Coalition Government it was never intended that we should be a Mandatory Power for ever. It was intended to lead to something and that the regulation of

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our relationship with Palestine should, in the end, be on a treaty basis and not a mandatory basis. That is as I understood it, and I believe that there is agreement on that. Therefore, I thought it would be a good thing. Suggestions have been put to me over and over again by hon. members of this House and by members of another place, "Why not try to establish a British dominion to try to solve the problem?" But really it is too late for that.

The Trusteeship Council has been established and there is no other road but the establishment of a trusteeship leading to independence from a mandatory position, unless we get agreement between the parties, and there was no chance of agreement. Therefore, we proposed a trusteeship for five years—for two years with 96,000 immigrants, and arbitration after that on the question of the economic absorptive capacity—and that we should begin at once by creating municipal areas in certain parts of Palestine which would have Jewish majorities and others which would have Arab majorities. In order to achieve that, we designed our plans to give the Jews the benefit of Tel Aviv. It is not realised that 78 per cent. of the Jews live in Tel Aviv and the balance are on the land. It is sometimes assumed that they are all on the land. That is not true. They are an urban population.

Mr. Oliver Stanley (Bristol, West): The right hon. gentleman said that 78 per cent. live in Tel Aviv. I do not think he meant that. I think he meant that they live in urban districts.

Mr. Bevin: I beg pardon. They live in urban areas. Taking the Tel Aviv population with that of other urban areas we have this majority of 78 per cent. It is quite clear that the police for the maintenance of order have no roots in the place. We suggested devising a police system like our own which would be partly central and partly municipal in the respective areas. It would be recruited in a way similar to that of Birmingham, or any other local government area in this country. This was suggested so as to begin building up a Government with roots in the people, ready to hand over. After four years, we suggested a constituent assembly which should endeavour to work out a Constitution. If they could not succeed—this is not British territory; we hold it under trust—we would return to the United Nations and ask for their help and advice. We felt that if we could begin self-government, begin getting people to work together, it would help to solve the problem. I am convinced that if the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine—I emphasise in Palestine—are given a chance to work together, they will work together and solve this problem, but if it is to be settled in accordance with the Jewish Agency's dictates, it will never be settled. I am speaking, I hope, impartially.

Mr. Janner: With the greatest respect——

Hon Members: Order.

Mr. Bevin: I have given way many times. In the Citrus Board, in the trade boards and the various boards of commerce, they do work together. If they can work together in trade and commerce in that way, personally I am convinced that if given the chance and removed from political difficulty, then the Jews and Arabs will develop a State of which they can well be proud. That is my view, and I am entitled to my view after all these negotiations. We have been compelled to maintain a Government with which the people, as I say, have not been sufficiently associated. We, therefore, tried a new method. It was rejected.

In the other States of the Middle East where we also had a mandate, it has led to self-government—in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and all the rest. I want to suggest that the cultural development of the Arabs and Jews in Palestine is of as high a standard as the cultural development and aptitude for government to be found in any other Arab States. That being so, we rather pinned our faith on developing independence in that way. If this policy was expressed in connexion with any other place in the world, I believe this House, the United Nations, and everybody else, would say that our policy was right in that we were aiming for independence, getting rid of the mandate and developing self-government and self-determination with proper protection for the rights of any minorities. That has been our policy and I think if this was not Palestine it would have been successful.

I was asked a question about defining the National Home. This has been a great puzzle to me. When the Balfour Declaration and the subsequent mandate were made, nobody indicated, as far as I can discover, when the National Home would be established. I cannot find it anywhere. Was it millions of Jews; was it a majority; was it a Jewish State, or what was it? The only expression that I can find is this vague expression of a "Jewish National

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Home." I know the reason for this declaration. I know why it was made, but I do not believe it would help the discussion now. It was thought by most people prior to 1939, that the steps that had been taken up to date, did really fulfil the Balfour Declaration. Between the Labour Party and the party then in office a great dispute was carried on in this House. But, frankly, the more one reads the documents, the more difficult it is to find any guide as to when a Jewish National Home has been completed or established. It was for that reason that we thought if we developed these municipal areas, if we transferred the land regulations, the laws and the police, and all this kind of thing, to majorities in that area, we should have established in fact the National Home. We should have established the National Home within a unitary State, with a free chance to the Jews for their own development, which would have allowed them in the joint Parliament of Arabs and Jews, to have had their say in the affairs of the world.

That leads me to another point, which is another very difficult one. It is said that, if we have a unitary State, the Jews, as Jews, will not be in the United Nations. Really, this is raising a very big question. Are we in the United Nations as a religion, are we in the United Nations as a people geographically situated, or how are we in it? If the United Nations is to arrive at a position in which it will have five or six great religions as dominant factors, then that will be a very disturbing situation, and, as far as I am concerned, at any rate——

Mr. Turner-Samuels (Gloucester) *rose—*

Mr. Bevin: I have given way very often already, and the hon. and learned Gentleman will have his turn. I must raise this issue, because really it is fundamental. I have to deal with the points put to me by the Jewish Agency, and the Jewish Agency says that, "as nationals, but not as Jews, we shall be in the United Nations." I never knew, and I never thought, that we had promised or done anything to establish a situation of that character, but, if that is the case, let us do it with our eyes open. This is one of the difficulties which I see, and I say this because I want both the Jews and the Arabs to reconsider their position. We are united in the United Nations to-day as States, and, within every State of the United Nations, there are any number of religions. It may be different, but that is the situation that is put to me, and I hope it will be debated and brought out, because it does raise a very serious question, especially for a Commonwealth like this, which represents every possible phase of people in the world. We cannot divide ourselves like that.

Therefore, I have asked, over and over again, if it will not be possible to have a Palestinian State, and with the ability that is there—the business ability, and it is exceptional and has done remarkably well, the statesmanship and the aptitude for government—cannot we find a place through a Palestinian State to deal with these problems in the United Nations from a State point of view? That is the question which I should like debated in the course of this debate, because it is the issue upon which the whole crux of this settlement really depends. I hope it will not be dealt with in any spirit of prejudice, because we have to face these issues, and because, when we go to the United Nations next September, these are the issues which I suggest are going to come before us. Take the position of Russia. I do not know how many races there are in that great territory, covering one-seventh of the globe, but it is colossal, and I have never heard that this particular theory has been advanced there. Therefore, I ask for consideration of this problem.

May I now just turn to the question of partition? A good many people have said that the way out of the difficulty is to have partition. I am sure that, if we have agreed to partition, we would have had a tremendous row as to where the frontier should be. We have drawn frontiers in the Provincial Autonomy Plan; I have seen the Jewish idea of partition in an American paper, but we really cannot make two viable States of Palestine, however we may try we cannot do it. We can make one viable State, and, so far as I can see, or as far as any student of the map could see, the only thing we could do would be to transfer the rest nearer to one of the Arab States, but I ask what trouble is that going to cause in the whole of the Arab world? That will set going a conflict which will be worse than the conflict we have tried to settle. It has been suggested that we could do it by knitting in Transjordan, and it is argued that we carried out partition when we created Transjordan. That may be, but, if we try now, with Palestine as we know it to-day, to make it into two viable States, I say that we cannot do it. If we try to take away the taxable capacity of the best areas of Palestine for productive purposes, and that taxation goes entirely to the

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Jewish portion, you cannot expect the others to accept it. You cannot expect to make the one State dependent upon somebody else. The best partition scheme, and the most favourable one that I have seen up to now, has the effect that it would leave, at the present moment, 450,000 Jews and 360,000 Arabs in that Jewish State. I put that to the Arabs quite frankly, and what was their answer? The Arabs say: "If it is wrong for the Jews to be in a minority of 33⅓ or 40 per cent. in the whole country, what justification is there for putting 360,000 Arabs under the Jews? What is your answer to that?" I have no answer to that.

You transfer one large issue in solving your problem by partition, and there are only two possible consequences. Either the Arabs in the partitioned State must always be an Arab minority, or else they must be driven out—the one thing or the other—and, on that basis, I am afraid that I should be led, and the Government would be led, to a worse position. I have been asked: "Why go to the United Nations?" Any remedy that has been put up to the Government in the form of creating a Jewish State, will lead to one result—the Arab States will take you to the United Nations. Supposing we partitioned the country now, and the question then went to the United Nations. Syria, or some other country, would take us to the United Nations, where we should have our conduct discussed on the basis of our legal action in carving up a State that was not ours, and I venture to suggest, after my experiences in New York last year, that Britain would be placed in a very funny position. It is indefensible. We can discuss all these things, I know quite easily, but really, we cannot do that.

Therefore, the Government tried to get the best they could within the Mandate, and, in the end, we came to the conclusion that this Mandate is really unworkable. I think we could establish a case that we have carried out what the Mandate originally intended, provided that the problem had not been accentuated by the Hitler régime. If we take the ratio of immigration and development unaccentuated by the Hitler régime, I think that the original basis of the Mandate, as visualised in 1922, has, in fact, been carried out. What we have not been able to do, is to meet with this Mandate the accentuated position created by the Hitler régime and the persecution in Germany. That is my view. I believe that throughout British Governments have done their best all the way through.

The Palestine Administration has had one of the most difficult tasks of any administration in the world. Sometimes, when reading the reports and documents, I wonder how they managed to carry through. They have had no support from the people, and they have been criticised by both sides. I believe that they have honestly tried to do their best, and that if there has been a failure in dealing with the problem of these displaced persons due to persecution of the Jews, it has not been the Palestine Mandate, as administered on the original basis, which has been the cause of failure; it has been the failure of the moral consciousness of international organisations to grapple with this problem as a whole which has left the problem as it is at the present time.

Take the position now. There are a million displaced persons on the Continent. I have said to Governments, week after week, what is a million people out of 4,000 million in the world? I have made the offer—and I make it from this Box to-day—that, to get over this problem, we will take a proportion, together with all the other countries of the world, of that million, and add them to our population in order to get rid of this miserable state of affairs. The thing ought to be taken up and grappled with. I pleaded with the United States to take in thousands—I do not mean Jews; I do not single out Jews, and I do not think they ought to be singled out. But all States ought to do it. It is really absurd to think that, with all the organisation built up for this business, one million people could not be thus absorbed. That ought to be done, but, everywhere I go, and everywhere I turn, nobody wants them. It is a tragedy. They are doing something in South America, and in some other parts of the world, but it is relatively very little.

I will not mention the name of one great statesman in the British Commonwealth who came and gave me a half hour's lecture on the Zionist problem. When he had finished, I said to him, "How many will you take? I will get a ship and send them to you tomorrow." Not one. That is really sympathy without relief. We really ought to get rid of this problem, and if I could get back to the contribution on purely humanitarian grounds of 100,000—that is, 60,000 more than we are now taking in over two years—into Palestine, and if this political fight for a Jewish State could be put on one side, and we could develop self-government by the people resident in Palestine, without any other political issue, I would be willing to try

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again. I honestly believe that it could be accomplished. But, if the attack is made that this is merely the advance proportion coming out of Europe, in order that more millions can be poured in, so as to get a complete Jewish State, which we have never undertaken to create, I am afraid—and I say this with great sincerity—that that will provoke a conflict in the Middle East which I do not desire to see. There is enough conflict in the world already. I am convinced that if, as I have said to-day, we can bring the matter back to this contribution to the relief of European suffering, which was where His Majesty's Government originally started to deal with it, then there is a chance of solution.

Finally, there is the question of time. I have been asked whether we can do something before September. It is very difficult, and I cannot give an answer. I am studying the matter to see whether there is any process by which we can get it considered earlier, under the Charter. But I must ask for more time on that. I am in consultation with Sir Alexander Cadogan, who knows the Charter inside out, to see whether anything can be done. Even now, rather than that it should go to the United Nations, I would prefer that Great Britain, with all her traditions, should be allowed to deal with the problem on a humanitarian basis. Let us remove the political conflict and get back to relieving Europe of these 100,000 people as we are asked to do, and let us be allowed to deal with any further immigrants on the basis I have suggested. If there is a dispute, let there be arbitration, and, in the quickest possible time we can create an independent State in Palestine where Jew and Arab, who have such traditions and have contributed so much to the religious and cultural thought of the world, can work together and end these century-old conflicts.

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(HANSARD)

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and defence. May I ask him whether that includes land for experiments on new weapons, or is that on a different footing?

The Prime Minister: This includes training and defence. I cannot give specific details as to whether the weapons are new or old, but the training must go on.

Miss Jennie Lee: While we cannot expect a reply from the Prime Minister now, may I ask him to keep in mind when reducing the amount of land used in England, Wales and elsewhere that it would be a good idea to exclude areas like Cannock Chase, which is in the heart of an industrial area. I mention that because I heard a rumour that the Chase was going to be closed, which would be contrary to the policy of making the mining areas more attractive.

The Prime Minister: I will bear that in mind. I had not heard that rumour.

Mr. H. Strauss: Can the Prime Minister say anything about the public inquiry, which Department will hold it and will those who advocate that these territories should be taken over submit themselves to cross-examination?

The Prime Minister: The Ministry of Town and Country Planning will hold the inquiry. I could not give an answer specifically without notice in regard to the exact way in which it will be conducted.

Mr. David Grenfell: Having regard to the sites that are being taken in Scotland, Wales and other districts, will the Prime Minister undertake that the views of the people in the immediate district shall be fully heard?

The Prime Minister: I can assure my hon. Friend that we are having a public inquiry for precisely the purpose of obtaining the local views.

Mr. Grenfell: I could not hear what the Prime Minister said. Could he give us that assurance?

Mr. Charles Williams: How long does the right hon. Gentleman expect the Dartmoor Inquiry to take, and can he assure us that real consideration will be given to local feeling on the matter?

The Prime Minister: Certainly. I think the House will realise that there are conflicting interests and that the Army, the Navy and the Air Force have got to be trained. Therefore, we have to consider these areas with regard to amenities, defence and agriculture. An endeavour will be made to hold a fair balance between these considerations, but if I were to say that one should be absolutely overwhelming obviously it would not get us anywhere.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: In view of the fact that it was under the wartime regulations that these large training areas were taken over and are held by the War Department, will the right hon. Gentleman state how soon we might expect the White Paper and a decision on these matters?

The Prime Minister: I cannot give a date, but as soon as possible.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: We have got a very important Debate coming on and I think we should get on.

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PALESTINE
(GOVERNMENT POLICY)

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[*Mr. William Whiteley.*]

3.44 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ernest Bevin): The course of events has led His Majesty's Government to decide that the problem of Palestine must be referred to the United Nations, as outlined in the announcement which I made to the House last week. The problem of Palestine is a very vexed and complex one. There is no denying the fact that the Mandate contained contradictory promises. In the first place it promised the Jews a National Home, and, in the second place it declared that the rights and position of the Arabs must be protected. Therefore, it provided for what was virtually an invasion of the country by thousands of immigrants, and at the same time said that this was not to disturb the people in possession. The question therefore arose whether this could be accomplished without a conflict, and events in the last 25 years have proved that it could not.

The Jews set about colonising and there is no doubt that in the sphere they have developed, they have carried out some very great experiments. Many of the Arabs, as I shall explain later, are involved in those developments, such as citrus growing which is vital to the economy of Palestine. As far as Jewish development is concerned, everybody in this country, who has been associated with the affair, certainly up to 1931, assumed that it was a National Home for the Jews about which we were talking. I want to remind the House, however that that is not the issue now. All that is over. The issue which the United Nations must consider and decide is, first, shall the claims of the Jews that Palestine is to be a Jewish State be admitted; second, shall the claim of the Arabs that it is to be an Arab State, with safeguards for the Jews under the decision for a National Home be admitted; or, third, shall it be a Palestinian State, in which the interests of both communities are as carefully balanced and protected as possible? I have put it in that form, because in all negotiations I have had to conduct, and whatever proposals we have adopted today, I come back every time to these three provisions. I cannot escape them and I do not think anyone who has been Colonial Secretary, or who has handled this problem hitherto, however much the question has been argued, has in fact, escaped them.

That, therefore, raises the issue which has got to be decided and we, as Mandatory Power, cannot solve that problem until the United Nations have recommended which of these three alternatives is to form the basis of the future organisation of Palestine. We as Mandatory Power have no power to make that decision. Nothing that I can find in any of the documents, either at the League of Nations, or in the discussions between the great Powers at Versailles and after, indicate that we have that power. The Mandate certainly does not give it, and the Anglo-American Committee, faced with the problem that we have been faced with, came to the view not to recommend a Jewish State, and everybody who has touched the Palestine question is forced back to that every time. I really want the House to face up to this problem which His Majesty's Government have to face up to now. In our recent negotiations the Colonial Secretary and I, over and over again, came up against this fundamental problem. All the proposals we have made for the gradual evolution of Palestine towards independence have been judged by the Arabs and the Jews according to the effect they might have on the final decision of the kind of State Palestine is to be when it becomes independent, and independent it must become. The Mandatory Power cannot go on for ever.

Let me trace the history of this business since we came into office. We gave early consideration to the problem, and discussed the matter very fully. I do not escape the fact—I do not desire to escape it—that when I was a member of the Coalition Government with right hon. Gentlemen opposite I took my corner in trying to see what solution we could find for Palestine. I have a perfectly open mind about it. All I want is a settlement, and I want a settlement because this is one of those sore spots in the Middle East that may, if not settled, lead to much wider trouble—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Various schemes have been evolved in the past, including partition, but all which have come before me, whether in the Coalition Government or

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in this Government, would have to be put into operation by force. That is to say, everybody came to the conclusion that we should not get agreement, but that we would have to come to a decision and then apply force to put it into operation.

His Majesty's Government, after reviewing the situation, came to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, that after all the force we had seen throughout the world in the last 25 years, force applied to this problem would not produce a final solution, that it might create wider difficulties in the Middle East, and might, indeed, start us on a road leading in another quarter of a century to another war. That we have had to face, having regard to the importance to the world economy of the raw materials and the whole position of the Middle East. We, therefore, proceeded, not too hopefully, but with the conviction that it was our duty, to make the effort to try to get a negotiated settlement. To begin with, and I want to make this very clear, we agreed that we could not enforce the White Paper of 1939 as a basis for our policy. It has been suggested that all that was needed was to tear up the White Paper. This raises a very serious question in international affairs, one that cannot be approached lightly. Statements have often been made in this House and outside that when Labour was in Opposition, they stated that they would not be bound by that decision of the Government of the day. But there are many precedents. It has always been accepted, in international affairs at least, that the party coming into office after making such a declaration, does not just tear up existing undertakings, but seeks to change them by proper negotiation and by substituting another policy. I have to emphasise this because this House of Commons did vote for the White Paper. It is true that the Mandates Commission did not endorse it——

Mr. Clement Davies (Montgomery): Not this House—a predecessor.

Mr. Bevin: I always regard this House as continuing from eternity to eternity, and I meant it in that sense. I think I am right—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I did not mean the actual Members of this House. What I meant was that the House in 1939 did, in fact, vote—and the Arabs took that as a decision of the British Parliament—[*Interruption.*] I must say that I should be reluctant to remain Foreign Secretary for five minutes, if I thought that I went to an international conference with a vote of a majority of this House and gave undertakings, and that those undertakings were to be torn up without proper negotiations at the end——

Mr. Sydney Silverman (Nelson and Colne): Would my right hon. Friend say that the White Paper of 1939 represents any kind of agreement or undertaking with any other Power with whom we were in international relations? Was it not merely a declaration of policy by the Mandatory Power.

Mr. Bevin: It was regarded by the Arab States at that conference as an undertaking by the British Parliament and one which would be carried out. May I suggest—[*Interruption.*] Please do not interrupt. We are dealing with one of the most serious problems. I suggest to my hon. Friend that if the vote had been the reverse way, and an undertaking of an inverse character had been given to the Jews, the hon. Member would have been on his feet and said that this was a vote from the House, and that we could not tear it up. Really, I must stand for this as a point of principle, because all my negotiations of any kind with Foreign Powers depend on the integrity of a vote of this House of Commons——

Mr. Turner-Samuels (Gloucester): If that is right, how can the Foreign Secretary reconcile that with the statement of the Prime Minister on 1st July last year in which he said:—

"The Government have never stood by the White Paper policy. . . . It is quite wrong to say that we are carrying on the White Paper policy."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st July, 1946; Vol. 424, c. 1907.]

Mr. Bevin: That is quite right, and if the hon. and learned Member will wait a moment, I will show him why. The point I am making is this—and really I must ask the House, whether it is my party or any party, to support me in this because it is fundamental—I am going away next week to Moscow, and when I go to Moscow I shall be asked to give undertakings. When I arrive at conclusions, I shall have to say that it is subject to the ratification of the House of Commons, and when that ratification of the House takes place—whatever the vote is—and that undertaking is given, I assume that

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[Mr. Bevin.]

whatever party succeeds us, whatever its political colour may be, will honour that undertaking until it negotiates a change. I must ask my hon. Friends to accept that; otherwise they ought never to send me to an international conference at all for any purpose. Really I have to state this, because it is fundamental to the carrying on of the business of the country. This is not a question of continuity of policy, but a question of keeping one's word, and, indeed, if there is one thing I have grown up in, not merely as a politician but as a trade union leader, it is that I have kept my word, whatever the opposition may have been.

Therefore, I told the Arabs quite straight that my party declared that they could not be bound by this, and that a change must be negotiated, and I have proceeded on that policy with my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary ever since. I think that is a perfectly legitimate action to take. Thereupon, the present question arose; what should the approach be? The position had become accentuated by the European situation and I thought, with the then Colonial Secretary, that the first step which should be taken—and I agree with the right hon. Gentleman who corrected me the other night about the date—was to decide about immigration. The question was, should immigration come to an end at 31st December, 1945? I communicated with the Arabs and told them that I thought it should not. My right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary in his Department, took it up with the Arabs in Palestine—I dealt with the Arab States—and we agreed that it should continue at 1,500 a month. I will not say, and it would be wrong of me to say, that there was an agreement by the Arabs to do that, but there was at least acquiescence, and on that acquiescence in a friendly way, we proceeded to issue certificates at 1,500 a month.

Since we took that decision in December of 1945, 21,000 Jewish immigrants have entered Palestine over and above the 75,000 for whom the White Paper provides, and immigration now is proceeding at the rate of 18,000 a year. There seems to be an impression everywhere that this is an abnormally low rate of entry, but the fact is that it has only been exceeded five times in the whole history of the Mandate—in 1925, and in the first four years of the Nazi rule in Germany. In other words, 18,000 a year is above the average for the whole Mandatory period and I must say that I felt, having moved up to that as the first step in the opening of negotiations, it was not a bad rate of entry. But I think we might have been able to do more for the Jews, and have increased this rate at that time, if the bitterness of feeling which surrounds this problem of immigration had not been increased by American pressure for the immediate admission of 100,000. I do not desire to create any ill feeling with the United States; in fact, I have done all I can to promote the best possible relations with them, as with other countries, but I should have been happier if they had had regard to the fact that we were the Mandatory Power, and that we were carrying the responsibility—[Hon. Members: "Hear, hear."]—and if they had only waited to ask us what we were doing. Then we could have informed them. But, instead of that, a person named Earl Harrison went out to their zone in Germany collecting certain information, and a report was issued. I must say it really destroyed the basis of good feeling that we—the Colonial Secretary and I—were endeavouring to produce in the Arab States, and it set the whole thing back.

However we realised that we had to take American interest in this problem into account. Accordingly, having regard to what they had said, we invited them to join us in forming the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Now I must point out that I have been very severely criticised by people in the United States for not accepting the Committee's Report. I was reminded of this when I was over there recently almost every day. But none of the Report was accepted by the United States except one point, namely, the admission of 100,000 immigrants. I was perfectly willing to stand up to the problem of the Report as a whole, which included 10 points. I have never gone back on that, but even if I had, as events have turned out, it would not have settled the Palestine problem, as I shall show before I sit down. We could not undertake this, except as a part of the general settlement, and we had to continue our efforts to work out policy.

Our first attempt resulted in the plan for provisional autonomy. I must remind the House that the Anglo-American Committee reported against a Jewish State. Therefore, taking the Report as a basis,

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we put forward this provisional autonomy plan as a basis for negotiation. We did not lay it down but, if I may say so, if other countries with different races and different religions, can work on the cantonal principle, I really cannot see why it cannot work in Palestine as elsewhere. We then tried to convene a conference of both Arabs and Jews. We tried very hard to get the Jews into conference. I interviewed their representatives in Paris, in London, and I tried to persuade them, to the best of my ability to come in and face the issue with us.

I profoundly regret they did not. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I know—and I do not want to set one section of Jews against another—that those who have been trained in England and grown up under English customs and practice, wanted to come in, but the Jewish Agency, very largely dominated by New York, would not really come in, and it was with gentlemen from there that I had to deal so much. They would not join the conference unless, as a prerequisite, we would more or less commit ourselves to a Jewish State in advance, either partition or as a whole. How could I? I had to consult Arabs, I had to discuss the whole problem, and how could any representative of His Majesty's Government give an advance declaration one way or the other? However, we did agree to put any plan which the Jewish Agency cared to submit on the agenda, and to examine it on its merits whatever it involved.

The proposal I put to them was, "Here is the British plan. There is the Arab plan"—it by then had been drawn up—"You have your plan. Let us take these three plans, and see if, out of them, we can produce a solution." I knew from experience that I could not get them in the same room. That, too, I think is regrettable when you have a problem of this character to solve. And in this case it was the Arabs who were the greatest difficulty. I want to make a balanced statement on this, quite fairly. They argued that experience of the past was not helpful, but the Jews were willing if I would accept the Jewish State, in some form, in advance. I could not do that, so they did not come into the conference. Neither could I get them into one room.

I did reach a stage, however, in meeting the Jews separately, in which I advanced the idea of an interim arrangement, leading ultimately to self-government. I indicated that I did not mind whether it was five years, or 10 years, or three years, or whatever it was. I said to them, "If you will work together for three, five, or 10 years, it might well be that you will not want to separate. Let us try to make up the difference." At that stage things looked more hopeful. There was a feeling—I do not think I overestimated it—when they left me in the Foreign Office that day, that I had the right approach at last. But what happened? I went back to the Paris Peace Conference, and next day—I believe it was the Day of Atonement, or a special day of the Jewish religion—my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister telephoned me at midnight, and told me that the President of the United States was going to issue another statement on the 100,000. I think the country and the world ought to know about this.

I went next morning to the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, and told him how far I had got the day before. I believed we were on the road, if only they would leave us alone. I begged that the statement be not issued, but I was told that if it was not issued by Mr. Truman, a competitive statement would be issued by Mr. Dewey. In international affairs I cannot settle things if my problem is made the subject of local elections. I hope I am not saying anything to cause bad feeling with the United States, but I feel so intensely about this. A vexed problem like this, with a thousand years of religious differences, has to be handled with the greatest detail and care. No one knows that more than I do. I have seen these tense religious struggles in parts of this country, in Ireland, and elsewhere. I know what it involves. It can lead to civil war before you know where you are. However, the statement was issued. I was dealing with Jewish representatives at the time, and I had to call it off because the whole thing was spoilt.

One thing is clear. I had to open the conference with the Arabs alone, and they put the point to me that they wanted finality. They wanted to determine what the future of Palestine was to be. The Jews also want finality, provided it takes the form of a Jewish State. But they would be prepared to see British rule continued as a protecting Power, provided it was clearly aiming at a Jewish Sovereign

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[Mr. Bevin.]

State. The conference was suspended at that time. The United Nations was meeting in New York. I thought that by going to New York, I could talk to a lot of people, and try to help the thing along by meeting people, and so on. While there I discussed the matter with the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, and at the end, he made a public statement saying that the basis upon which Great Britain was proposing to hold the conference, in his view merited the attendance of the Jews as well as the Arabs. Even that, from America, produced no results.

Then came the second session of the conference with the Arabs. In view of the difficulty, we agreed to have informal talks with the Jewish Agency. We did not press them to come into conference. I have been too long a negotiator to stand on form. I thought it was better, if they could not see their way clear to come into the conference, that I should meet them informally, and see whether, with my colleagues, I could get over this difficulty. When we met, the Arabs adhered to their plan for a unitary independent State in Palestine. They have reiterated at every meeting that they have never accepted the Palestine Mandate, nor recognised the legality of the Balfour Declaration. Nevertheless, they told us they were willing to recognise the results of this policy so far as the present residents in Palestine were concerned. These included about 600,000 Jews, now nearer 700,000 I am told, already living in Palestine with 1,200,000 Arabs.

I say this in all seriousness. If it were only a question of relieving Europe of 100,000 Jews, I believe a settlement could be found. I believe a settlement can now be found if it is purely the humanitarian problem I have to solve. Unfortunately, that is not the position. From the Zionist point of view the 100,000 is only a beginning, and the Jewish Agency talk in terms of millions. I think the Arabs could be persuaded to agree to 100,000 new immigrants, in an orderly way, on humanitarian grounds, having regard to the European situation if—and I emphasise this—immigration after that, was to be determined by the elected representatives of the people of Palestine.

The claim made by the Arabs is a very difficult one to answer. We here in Great Britain as a House of Commons determine whether people shall be admitted into this country or not. No one else is doing that. Why should an external agency, largely financed from America, determine how many people should come into Palestine, and interfere with the economy of the Arabs, who have been there for 2,000 years? This is what I have to face. There may be an answer to it, if it is on the merits of how long the respective parties have owned the country. But, the Arabs say they are not going to be pushed out, by an external agency, from a country which they regard as their own—I am using their words—and in which they have been living for just about as long as England has been a Christian country. That is what the House has to face, and it is a difficult thing to answer. I do not know what would happen if a lot of Welshmen tried to drive the Englishmen out. There would have to be a buffer state. The difficulty would be no doubt intense. Under the Arab plan the Jewish National Home—and they now accept the National Home—although they did not accept the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate, they will accept the National Home——

Mr. Kenneth Lindsay (Combined English Universities): Does that also mean partition?

Mr. Bevin: No. I will deal with partition in a moment. But they accept the Home within a unitary State. That gives an Arab majority. I have argued with both Jews and Arabs. What is it we have got to solve? Are the Jews a State or are they a religion. I have got to face the question of Catholics, Mahommedans and everybody else, and really, this is a difficult thing to decide. I cannot believe that if there is a unitary State in Palestine every Arab will vote for an Arab candidate—he may in the first instance—or that every Jew will vote for a Jewish candidate. About the only constituency in this country which returned a Communist candidate was Mile End and they have a perfect right to do so. No one is elected to this House either as a Jew or a Christian. One is elected as a man, as a representative. Therefore, one will have Communists, one will have Socialists, and it depends on the intelligence of the people whether there will be Conservatives. It may be that there will be some liberalism, even in Palestine. There is no doubt that people will form views

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which will crystallise. Therefore, the Arabs argue, "Leave it to the intelligence of the people who live in the State."

Mr. S. Silverman: Will my right hon. Friend explain to the House exactly what he understands by the word "National" in the phrase "Jewish National Home"?

Mr. Bevin: I am sorry that I cannot give an accurate definition, and Balfour is dead. I do not say that unkindly, but whether anyone can explain what people meant at the time, I do not know. When I used it, there was an understanding on the part of the Arabs that in Palestine, in view of certain historical associations, those Jews who had migrated there should have their liberty and freedom—no pogroms, no persecution—and be equal citizens of the State. That makes it a national home—[*Interruption.*] My national home is in England, with the same conditions.

Mr. Turner-Samuels: My right hon. Friend says that the Arabs are prepared to accept the National Home. If he does not know what that is, and cannot give a definition of it, what is the good of telling the House that the Arabs are prepared to accept it?

Mr. Bevin: Because they agreed in their plan—hon. Members have it before them—that "You can have your own language, your own university, your own religion, everything"—[*Interruption.*] My hon. Friend says, "Very kind of them," but if other countries that persecuted Jews had only given them that, there would never have been a problem.

Mr. Lipson (Cheltenham): It is the people who matter.

Mr. Bevin: It is human rights which are the basis of the United Nations, and in the proposals, which I thought were perhaps too limited—I did not accept them—they were fundamental principles which I thought gave effect to what I understood to be the basis of the claim originally made by Nathan Rothschild and other people—I have read all the papers—in the original discussions.

I want to put the other side. The Jews say that if that is done they will be tolerated as a minority. I cannot alter the balance of people in a State—that is impossible—any more than one can alter it between Nehru and Jinnah today in India. The numbers are there, and one cannot alter it in any country. Then we tried our hand at another plan. Members will have seen it in the White Paper. The plan had certain features common to the Anglo-American Report and the Provincial Autonomy Plan. From the Arab point of view, those proposals had the advantage that they placed in Arab hands the maintenance of existing safeguards against the dispossession of Arab cultivators, and at the end of two years they would have given the Arabs a voice in determining the rate of immigration. We proposed to set up a Governor's Council, and in two years—and this was not based on anything but humanitarian principles—96,000 people would have been allowed from Europe, without any question of economic absorptive capacity. That was the proposal. Afterwards, the High Commissioner was to consult a council of both Jews and Arabs, and after consulting them he was to decide, on the basis of economic absorptive capacity, incorporating the words of the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill), which he included in the 1922 White Paper.

Mr. Janner (Leicester, West): Will my right hon. Friend permit me to ask one question, a rather important one. What is the proposal with regard to the fulfilment of the provisions in the Mandate about the Jewish Agency, which is recognised as an international body?

Mr. Bevin: I will come to that, but my hon. Friend is delaying my statement, and I hope that I shall be allowed to proceed. We proposed that if the High Commissioner's decision was not accepted by either party, the Secretary-General of the United Nations would appoint an arbitration tribunal, and we, as the Mandatory Power, would abide by the result. Was that not reasonable? What was the answer? It was that that proposal was rejected because we proposed that the Arabs should be consulted at all. Really, His Majesty's Government could not accept a position in which one was going to admit people into a country, and representatives of the people living in it must not be consulted. That was really too tall an order, and I could not, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, accept that. I am saying this because I am leading up to the point where I shall

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[Mr. Bevin.]

say, at the end, that there is a chance of a settlement yet, without going to the United Nations, if people will come off their arbitrary positions. I am still open to try.

Then the other difficulty was that the present Government have no roots in the people at all. It is an alien Government imposed on the top by a mandatory government. I do not know what previous people who held the office of Colonial Secretary had in their minds, but I am perfectly sure in the discussion of this problem during the five years when I was in the Coalition Government it was never intended that we should be a Mandatory Power for ever. It was intended to lead to something and that the regulation of our relationship with Palestine should, in the end, be on a treaty basis and not a mandatory basis. That is as I understood it, and I believe that there is agreement on that. Therefore, I thought it would be a good thing. Suggestions have been put to me over and over again by hon. Members of this House and by Members of another place, " Why not try to establish a British Dominion to try to solve the problem?" But really it is too late for that.

The Trusteeship Council has been established and there is no other road but the establishment of a trusteeship leading to independence from a mandatory position, unless we get agreement between the parties, and there was no chance of agreement. Therefore, we proposed a trusteeship for five years—for two years with 96,000 immigrants, and arbitration after that on the question of the economic absorptive capacity—and that we should begin at once by creating municipal areas in certain parts of Palestine which would have Jewish majorities, and others which would have Arab majorities. In order to achieve that, we designed our plans to give the Jews the benefit of Tel Aviv. It is not realised that 78 per cent. of the Jews live in Tel Aviv and the balance are on the land. It is sometimes assumed that they are all on the land. That is not true. They are an urban population.

Mr. Oliver Stanley (Bristol, West): The right hon. Gentleman said that 78 per cent. live in Tel Aviv. I do not think he meant that. I think he meant that they live in urban districts.

Mr. Bevin: I beg pardon. They live in urban areas. Taking the Tel Aviv population with that of other urban areas, we have this majority of 78 per cent. It is quite clear that the police for the maintenance of order have no roots in the place. We suggested devising a police system like our own which would be partly central and partly municipal in the respective areas. It would be recruited in a way similar to that adopted in Birmingham, or any other local government area in this country. This was suggested so as to begin building up a government with roots in the people, ready to hand over. After four years, we suggested a constituent assembly which should endeavour to work out a Constitution. If they could not succeed—this is not British territory; we hold it under trust—we would return to the United Nations and ask for their help and advice. We felt that if we could begin self-government, begin getting people to work together, it would help to solve the problem. I am convinced that if the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine—I emphasise in Palestine—are given a chance to work together, they will work together and solve this problem, but if it is to be settled in accordance with the Jewish Agency's dictates, it will never be settled. I am speaking, I hope, impartially.

Mr. Janner: With the greatest respect——

Hon. Members: Order.

Mr. Bevin: I have given way many times. In the Citrus Board, in the trade boards and the various boards of commerce, they do work together. If they can work together in trade and commerce in that way, personally I am convinced that if given the chance and removed from political difficulty, then the Jews and Arabs will develop a State of which they can well be proud. That is my view, and I am entitled to my view after all these negotiations. We have been compelled to maintain a Government with which the people, as I say, have not been sufficiently associated. We, therefore, tried a new method. It was rejected.

In the other States of the Middle East where we also had a Mandate, it has led to self-government—in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and all the rest. I want to suggest that the cultural development of the Arabs and Jews in Palestine is of as high a standard

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as the cultural development and aptitude for government to be found in any other Arab State. That being so, we rather pinned our faith on developing independence in that way. If this policy was expressed in connection with any other place in the world, I believe this House, the United Nations, and everybody else, would say that our policy was right in that we were aiming for independence, getting rid of the Mandate and developing self-government and self-determination with proper protection for the rights of any minorities. That has been our policy and I think if this was not Palestine, it would have been successful.

I was asked a question about defining the National Home. This has been a great puzzle to me. When the Balfour Declaration and the subsequent Mandate were made, nobody indicated, as far as I can discover, when the National Home would be established. I cannot find it anywhere. Was it millions of Jews; was it a majority; was it a Jewish State, or what was it? The only expression that I can find is this vague expression of a " Jewish National Home." I know the reason for this Declaration. I konw why it was made, but I do not believe it would help the discussion now. It was thought by most people prior to 1939, that the steps that had been taken up to date, did really fulfil the Balfour Declaration. Between the Labour Party and the party then in office a great dispute was carried on in this House. But, frankly, the more one reads the documents, the more difficult it is to find any guide as to when a Jewish National Home has been completed or established. It was for that reason that we thought if we developed these municipal areas, if we transferred the land regulations, the laws and the police, and all this kind of thing, to majorities in that area, we should have established in fact the National Home. We should have established the National Home within a unitary State, with a free chance to the Jews for their own development, which would have allowed them in the joint Parliament of Arabs and Jews, to have had their say in the affairs of the world.

That leads me to another point, which is also a very difficult one. It is said that, if we have a unitary State, the Jews, as Jews, will not be in the United Nations. Really, this is raising a very big question. Are we in the United Nations as a religion, are we in the United Nations as a people geographically situated, or how are we in it? If the United Nations is to arrive at a position in which it will have five or six great religions as dominant factors, then that will be a very disturbing situation, and, as far as I am concerned, at any rate——

Mr. Turner-Samuels *rose*——

Mr. Bevin: I have given way very often already, and the hon. and learned Gentleman will have his turn. I must raise this issue, because really it is fundamental. I have to deal with the points put to me by the Jewish Agency, and the Jewish Agency says that, " as nationals, but not as Jews, we shall be in the United Nations." I never knew, and I never thought, that we had promised or done anything to establish a situation of that character, but, if that is the case, let us do it with our eyes open. This is one of the difficulties which I see, and I say this because I want both the Jews and the Arabs to reconsider their position. We are united in the United Nations today as States, and, within every State of the United Nations, there are any number of religions. It may be different, but that is the situation that is put to me, and I hope it will be debated and brought out, because it does raise a very serious position, especially for a Commonwealth like this, which represents every possible phase of people in the world. We cannot divide ourselves like that.

Therefore, I have asked, over and over again, if it will not be possible to have a Palestinian State, and with the ability that is there—the business ability, and it is exceptional and has done remarkably well, the statesmanship and the aptitude for government—cannot we find a place through a Palestinian State to deal with these problems in the United Nations from a State point of view? That is the question which I should like debated in the course of this Debate, because it is the issue upon which the whole crux of this settlement really depends. I hope it will not be dealt with in any spirit of prejudice, because we have to face these issues, and because, when we go to the United Nations next September, these are the issues which I suggest are going to come before us. Take the position of Russia. I do not know how many races there are in that great territory, covering one-seventh of the globe, but it is colossal,

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[Mr. Bevin.]

and I have never heard that this particular theory has been advanced there. Therefore, I ask for consideration of this problem.

May I now turn to the question of partition? A good many people have said that the way out of the difficulty is to have partition. I am sure that, if we have agreed to partition, we would have had a tremendous row as to where the frontier should be. We have drawn frontiers in the Provincial Automony Plan; I have seen the Jewish idea of partition in an American paper, but we really cannot make two viable States of Palestine, however we may try. We can make one viable State, and, so far as I can see, or as far as any student of the map could see, the only thing we could do would be to transfer the rest to one of the Arab States, but I ask what trouble is that going to cause in the whole of the Arab world? That will set going a conflict which will be worse than the conflict we have tried to settle. It has been suggested that we could do it by knitting in Transjordan, and it is argued that we carried out partition when we created Transjordan. That may be, but, if we try now, with Palestine as we know it today, to make it into two viable States, I say that we cannot do it. If we try to take away the taxable capacity of the best areas of Palestine for productive purposes, and that taxation goes entirely to the Jewish portion, you cannot expect the others to accept it. You cannot expect to make the one State dependent upon somebody else. The best partition scheme, and the most favourable one that I have seen up to now, has the effect that it would leave, at the present moment, 450,000 Jews and 360,000 Arabs in that Jewish State. I put that to the Arabs quite frankly, and what was their answer? The Arabs say: " If it is wrong for the Jews to be in a minority of $33\frac{1}{3}$ or 40 per cent. in the whole country, what justification is there for putting 360,000 Arabs under the Jews? What is your answer to that? " I have no answer to that.

Therefore, you transfer one large issue in solving your problem by partition, and there are only two possible consequences. Either the Arabs in the partitioned State must always be an Arab minority, or else they must be driven out—the one thing or the other—and, on that basis, I am afraid that I should be led, and the Government would be led, to a worse position. I have been asked " Why go to the United Nations? " Any remedy that has been put up to the Government in the form of creating a Jewish State, will lead to one result—the Arab States will take you to the United Nations. Supposing we partitioned the country now, and the question then went to the United Nations. Syria, or some other country, would take us to the United Nations, where we should have our conduct discussed on the basis of our legal action in carving up a State that was not ours, and I venture to suggest, after my experiences in New York last year, that Britain would be placed in a very funny position. It is indefensible. We can discuss all these things, I know, quite easily, but, really, we cannot do that.

Therefore, the Government tried to get the best they could within the Mandate, and, in the end, we came to the conclusion that this Mandate is really unworkable. I think we could establish a case that we have carried out what the Mandate originally intended, provided that the problem had not been accentuated by the Hitler regime. If we take the ratio of migration and development unaccentuated by the Hitler regime, I think that the original basis of the Mandate, as visualised in 1922, has, in fact, been carried out. What we have not been able to do, is to meet with this Mandate the accentuated position created by the Hitler regime and the persecution in Germany. That is my view. I believe that continuous British Governments have done their best all the way through.

The Palestine Administration has had one of the most difficult tasks of any administration in the world. Sometimes, when reading the reports and documents, I wonder how they managed to carry through. They have had no support from the people, and they have been criticised by both sides. I believe that they have honestly tried to do their best, and that if there has been a failure in dealing with the problem of these displaced persons due to Jewish persecution, it has not been the Palestine Mandate, as administered on the original basis, which has been the cause of failure; it has been the failure of the moral consciousness of international organisations to grapple with this problem as a whole which has left the problem as it is at the present time.

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Take the position now. There are a million displaced persons on the Continent. I have said to Governments, week after week, what is a million people out of 4,000 million in the world? I have made the offer—and I make it from this Box today—that, to get over this problem, we will take a proportion, together with all the other countries of the world, of that million, and add them to our population in order to get rid of this miserable state of affairs. The thing ought to be taken up and grappled with. I pleaded with the United States to take in thousands—I do not mean Jews; I do not single out Jews, and I do not think they ought to be singled out. But all States ought to do it. It is really absurd to think that, with all the organisation built up for this business, one million people could not be thus absorbed. That ought to be done, but, everywhere I go, and everywhere I turn, nobody wants them. It is a tragedy. They are doing something in South America, and in some other parts of the world, but it is relatively very little.

I will not mention the name of one great statesman in the British Commonwealth who came and gave me a half hour's lecture on the Zionist problem. When he had finished, I said to him, "How many will you take? I will get a ship and send them to you tomorrow." Not one. That is really sympathy without relief. We really ought to get rid of this problem, and if I could get back to the contribution on purely humanitarian grounds of 100,000—that is, 60,000 more than we are now taking in over two years—into Palestine, and if this political fight for a Jewish State could be put on one side, and we could develop self-government by the people resident in Palestine, without any other political issue, I would be willing to try again. I honestly believe that it could be accomplished. But, if the attack is made that this is merely the advance proportion coming out of Europe, in order that more millions can be poured in, so as to get a complete Jewish State, which we have never undertaken to create, I am afraid—and I say this with great sincerity—that will provoke a conflict in the Middle East which I do not desire to see. There is enough conflict in the world already. I am convinced that if, as I have said today, we can bring the matter back to this contribution to the relief of European suffering, which was where His Majesty's Government originally started to deal with it, then there is a chance of solution.

Finally, there is the question of time. I have been asked whether we can do something before September. It is very difficult, and I cannot give an answer. I am studying the matter to see whether there is any process by which we can get it considered earlier, under the Charter. But I must ask for more time on that. I am in consultation with Sir Alexander Cadogan, who knows the Charter inside out, to see whether anything can be done. Even now, rather than that it should go to the United Nations, I would prefer that Great Britain, with all her traditions, should be allowed to deal with the problem on a humanitarian basis. Let us remove the political conflict and get back to relieving Europe of these 100,000 people as we are asked to do, and let us be allowed to deal with any further immigrants on the basis I have suggested. If there is a dispute, let there be arbitration, and, in the quickest possible time we can create an independent State in Palestine where Jew and Arab, who have such traditions and have contributed so much to the religious and cultural thought of the world, can work together and end these century-old conflicts.

4.58 p.m.

Mr. Oliver Stanley (Bristol, West): It had been the intention of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition to open this Debate from our side of the House. I am sure that the whole House will sympathise with the family bereavement which is the cause of his absence today, and I am also sure that the House will regret that one who has played such a prominent part in connection with the problem which we are now discussing, should be absent on such a vital occasion.

I am not always in agreement with the views of the right hon. Gentleman on Palestine, and perhaps many in this House have differed from it, but all of us have been impressed with the sincerity of his feelings and the generosity of the emotions which have led to it.

In the last 18 months, His Majesty's Government have had every reason to be grateful to hon. Members on this side of the House for their behaviour in regard to the Palestine question. During the whole of that time, we have refrained from Debate which might excite controversy on the policy to be adopted. We have, it

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[Mr. Stanley.]

is true, on several occasions discussed law and order, but the only Debate which has taken place upon policy was at the request of His Majesty's Government. I think the right hon. Gentleman will agree that, during that Debate, we tried to be constructive rather than destructive. We on this side have been actuated by a sincere desire that this Government, or any other Government, should be enabled to find a solution. That a successful solution would redound to the credit of the present Government is a little thing compared to the benefits that a successful solution would confer upon the nation. Looking back, I am not sure that we have been altogether wise. It may be that if we had pressed on more frequent occasions for a Debate we should not be in the situation in which we find ourselves now, which, shorn of all verbiage, is that after 18 months nothing has happened in Palestine, and now for the best part of another year nothing can happen.

I cannot disguise the fact that I and many of my hon. Friends did under those circumstances feel considerable disquiet at the statement made by the right hon. Gentleman last week. It was only a few days since we had had a Debate in this House upon the maintenance of law and order in Palestine. During that Debate all speakers on both sides of the House, whatever views they might have taken upon the immediate problem of the maintenance of law and order, expressed their opinion that it was inextricably bound up with the announcement of some policy by His Majesty's Government, and that the Administration could not indefinitely maintain law and order unless such a policy was produced. I remember that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in winding up that Debate, repudiated in a tone almost of ferocity—which is not usually one of the attributes of his Parliamentary speeches—the idea which seemed to be held by some that the Government have no policy on Palestine. In those circumstances the statement of last week, which no one after all can claim to be a policy, which is only a postponement of the issue and a plan to get others as well as ourselves to join in finding a policy, came as a great disappointment.

Today we have had from the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary a remarkable speech. With some of it I agree, with some I disagree. I am grateful for some of the things he said, and I am sorry for some of the things he omitted to say. Certainly in that speech he set out clearly and sombrely the difficulties which lie today, but which also have lain for several years, in the way of finding a solution for the Palestine problem. In that speech he certainly displayed a willingness to appreciate the Arab point of view and a fairness in stating the Arab case which has not always been shown in speeches made on this problem by members of his Party or by his colleagues. I cannot help thinking that it was a pity the right hon. Gentleman did not make that speech at the Blackpool Conference in June, 1945. How different it was in tone from the speech which was actually made then by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer. He saw no difficulties, he saw no two points of view. He did not think it was necessary to wait for the decision of the United Nations. He was quite clear—unlimited immigration and a Jewish State. That was to be the policy of the Labour Party.

Mr. S. Silverman: Unlimited except by economic conditions.

Mr. Stanley: Yes, unlimited except by economic conditions—that was to be the policy of the Labour Party, and he pledged his Party light heartedly to a solution the difficulties of which have today been put before us and before his Party so potently by the right hon. Gentleman. I did not sympathise with the solution then proposed, but I confess that today I have some sympathy with the Jews. If that had been said two years ago, if that had been the policy of the Labour Party over the last few years, if they had been told then as they are being told now that their aspirations for a Jewish State were unobtainable, who knows but that there might not have been some change in their policy, that they might not today be putting forward that policy with a vigour some of which they would draw from the belief that it was hon. Gentlemen opposite who for years had been supporting them in their demands?

Mr. S. Silverman: And that the White Paper of 1939 was binding on the Labour Government.

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HOUSE OF COMMONS

Monday, 24th February, 1947

TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING (SCOTLAND) [MONEY]

Considered in Committee under Standing Order No. 69.

[Major MILNER in the Chair]

[Continuation of Official Report, from Col. 1836, Monday, 24th February, 1947.]

10.25 p.m.

Mr. Thornton-Kemsley (Aberdeen and Kincardine, Western): Before coming to the point dealt with by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hillhead (Mr. J. S. C. Reid), I wish to raise one or two other important points connected with this Financial Resolution. The first part of the Resolution deals with what are commonly called " payments for depreciation of land values." We are asked to vote a considerable sum for that purpose, and the first question I want to ask if what is to be Scotland's share? We are voting a large sum for England and Wales, and for Scotland, and we, as Scottish Members, are entitled on a Resolution which deals primarily with financial arrangements arising from a Scottish Bill, to ask whether the share allotted to Scotland will be alloted in accordance with the customary eleven-eightieths rule; and if not, on what basis this global sum is to be divided between the countries concerned?

The Chairman: I do not think that the question of the eleven-eightieths rule arises here. The Bill will decide how the amount voted will be dealt with.

Mr. Thornton-Kemsley: With great respect, I submit it is not in the Bill——

The Chairman: The hon. Member is only entitled to discuss what is in the Resolution.

Mr. Thornton-Kemsley: Then perhaps I may come to another point. I am sorry if I transgressed, but I did so quite unwittingly, because I thought the point was covered by the Resolution. We are asked to agree to:

" The charging on the Consolidated Fund of the principal of and interest on stock to be issued under the Act in satisfaction of payments to be made "

Before I can agree to that provision, I want to know on what basis these payments are to be made. It is a point to which I hope the Secretary of State for Scotland will address himself when he comes to reply.

The Chairman: The precise conditions are a matter which it will be within the province of the Committee on the Bill to decide. The Financial Resolution is obviously in wide terms, and the Committee will have an opportunity to decide on any question of detail of that sort.

Mr. Thornton-Kemsley: Then I hope that I shall be lucky with my third point.

Sir John Mellor (Sutton Coldfield): On a point of Order. Cannot the hon. Member argue whether the Financial Resolution is too wide or too narrow?

The Chairman: I appreciate what the hon. Members says, but it does not seem to have any direct relevance to my Ruling. My Ruling was that details of stock to be issued, which is dealt with generally in the Financial Resolution, are matters which the Committee on the Bill would no doubt have a right to decide upon at a later date.

Mr. J. S. C. Reid: It is important to get this right for our guidance. Do I take it that your Ruling, Major Milner, is that there is nothing in the Financial Resolution which would limit Amendments on these particular matters to the Bill, if the Committee upstairs were so minded?

The Chairman: The question of the £300 million and any figure being one below that amount, is another matter, and I must not in any way prejudice the position of the Chair upstairs.

Mr. Reid: I take it that it is your view, Major Milner, that it would be in Order to put in the Bill upstairs, that Scotland should have a fixed sum of, let us say, £100 million; otherwise I should have thought my hon. Friend was entitled to make his point.

10.30 p.m.

The Chairman: I cannot prejudice in any way the Ruling which the Chairman of the Committee upstairs might give with regard to the hon. Member's speech. I should be glad to hear any more he has to say.

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Mr. Thornton-Kemsley: I was in some difficulty because I anticipated it would be difficult upstairs to suggest that Scotland's share of this global sum should be in accordance with the eleven-eightieths rule. Therefore I was anxious to hear what was in the mind of the Secretary of State about the provision of this global sum. I still hope it will be in order to ask the Secretary of State to enlighten us on how this sum is to be divided between England and Wales and Scotland. It is Scotland with which he and I are particularly concerned.

Mr. Scollan (Renfrew, Western): I am also interested in this matter, and I want some guidance. Is it, or is it not, the case that the setting aside of a sum for Scotland should have been dealt with on the original Town and Country Planning Bill, and not in the Scottish Bill at all.

The Chairman: I do not think I can give a Ruling on that. Parliament is omnipotent and it may be in Committee some proportion may be fixed. I do not know, but I do not think I can rule that the hon. Member's hypothesis is the right one.

Lieut.-Colonel Elliot: Surely it stands to reason that, a global sum of £300 million having been voted, it is perfectly competent for the Committee to allot that sum as it wishes. As it seems possible from your Ruling, Major Milner, that it will be in order to do so, we shall move an Amendment that there should be a larger share than the mere eleven-eightieths.

Mr. Scollan: How is it possible to vote £300 million for the purposes outlined in the first Bill for England, Scotland, and Wales—without any definition being given of the proportions to be paid—and then when the Scottish Bill comes forward, for somebody to move something into that Bill which obviously affects the previous Bill.

Lieut.-Colonel Elliot: It does not in any way affect the previous Bill, for the previous Bill did not lay down any division. It is still competent for those of us who see the possibilities of making a division, to move that the sum allotted to Scotland should be greater than the narrow eleven-eightieths and we shall have great pleasure in doing so. I submit that it is fully in Order, and does not in any way conflict with the more general provision. If not, what becomes of the suggestion of the Secretary of State that this is a separate Bill.

Mr. Scollan: If we get to the stage where under the second Bill we propose to pay more than the eleven-eightieths then we are taking the power from the Central Planning Authority to pay out £300 million for Scotland, England and Wales. You are obviously then saying "You pay out so much to England and Wales, and so much to Scotland," which is entirely different from the provision in the original Bill.

The Chairman: These, surely, are considerations which must be put before the Committee on the Bill when the time comes. No doubt the Government will in the first instance put forward the global sum, and its disposal will be a matter for consideration. It is not a point of Order, and it is not a point on which I can rule.

Mr. Thornton-Kemsley: I feel I must apologise for the fact that through me, though quite inadvertently on my part, the Chair has been involved in this difficulty. I am glad, Major Milner, that you have given us the satisfaction of your Ruling, and we will, of course, pursue this matter upstairs. There is just one point, following that raised by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hillhead (Mr. J. S. C. Reid), to which I would like to refer.

Mr. McAllister (Rutherglen): On a point of Order. After you have given your Ruling, Major Milner, the hon. Gentleman now says that the party opposite intend to pursue this matter upstairs because of that Ruling. May I submit that the matter is completely out of perspective; that the £300 million is not to be allocated as between England, Scotland and Wales, but that a sum is to be paid, *ex gratia,* to individual landlords, according to the degree of hardship suffered by them, and that the party opposite are really merely trying to make some cheap political capital by bringing in this foreign issue?

Mr. Thornton-Kemsley: If you will allow me, Major Milner, I should like to say how much I resent the hon. Member for Rutherglen (Mr. McAllister) saying that we are trying to make cheap political capital out of this issue. In point of fact, what

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we are trying to do is to obtain some sort of justice for Scotland. If the hon. Member for Rutherglen suggests that we are making cheap political capital out of this, then I suggest that he is not doing his best for his native country.

Mr. McAllister *rose*——

Mr. Thornton-Kemsley: No, I will not give way to the hon. Member. I would like to return to the point made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hillhead. Part of the money that we are asked to vote tonight is in respect of a Central Land Board, which we had hoped would represent Scotland, but which we now hear is to represent England, Wales and Scotland. What proportion of that Board of ten members will be elected in respect of Scottish interests. Before we vote this money we ought to know that. We have been told by the Minister that it is in his mind that the chairman of the Board will be a whole-time, salaried official, but that the other nine members of it will be on a part-time basis.

The Chairman: I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but the constitution of the Board is clearly a matter for discussion by the Committee on the Bill, and not in the Debate on the Money Resolution. None of these matters relate to the Resolution.

Mr. J. S. C. Reid: Surely, Major Milner, it is relevant, before we vote money for the setting up of a Board, that we should know the Government's intention in regard to the constitution of that Board? We should be perfectly willing, no doubt, to vote money for a Board constituted in one way, but very averse to voting money for a Board constituted in another way.

The Chairman: Are not the details of the constitution of the Board set out in the Bill?

Mr. Reid: There is not a word about it in the Bill.

The Chairman: Are they not set out in the previous Bill? This really seems to be a matter to be debated on the Committee stage of the Bill.

Mr. Thornton-Kemsley: If I may say so, Major Milner, the composition of the Board is set out in the English Bill, but we are now dealing with the Scottish Bill.

We are asked to vote money in connection with this Bill for some part of the salaries and expenses of the United Kingdom Board, and that is the point I am trying to make. I think that, as Scottish Members, we ought to know, before voting the money, how many members on the Board will be in receipt of that money. That was the only point I was trying to make. I hope that the Secretary of State will give a satisfactory reply on that and the other points I am raising.

Mr. McAllister: I would not have risen again except for the fact that the hon. Member for West Aberdeen and Kincardine (Mr. Thornton-Kemsley) was grossly discourteous in replying to my intervention. We are asked to vote £300 million, as we were asked to vote a similiar sum when the Bill dealing with England and Wales came before the House. As I said, when I interrupted the hon. Member, to make a perfectly reasonable and not a discourteous statement, that sum is not for allocation as between country and country, but for allocation between individuals, and it does seem to me to be a gross perversion of Scottish nationalism and Scottish national sentiment, by the party opposite to suggest that, because we are Scotsmen, we should attempt to grab the largest part of the £300 million. It is all the more so when we have no idea of the number of Scottish landlords who must receive these payments in comparison with the English landlords. This is a question of getting money for a group of people in Scotland—and it is a group well represented by right hon. and hon. Members opposite.

Mr. J. S. C. Reid: Before the hon. Member leaves that point, may I point out that it would be to his advantage if he would carefully read the relevant provision. Clause 48, (2) provides:

> "The aggregate amount of the payments to be made by virtue of this section shall be the amount apportioned to land in Scotland by order made by the Treasury under any Act of the present Session making fresh provision for planning the development and use of land."

The sum allotted is clearly by order of the Treasury, and my hon. Friend the Member for West Aberdeen (Mr. Thornton-Kemsley) is quite right in the point he has made.

Mr. McAllister: Land means building, and land and building means ownership, and this is a payment to the owner.

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Mr. Reid: Scotland also means Scotland.

Mr. McKie (Galloway): The hon. Member for Rutherglen (Mr. McAllister) went out of his way to accuse my hon. Friend of discourtesy. I can only say that, having watched the hon. Member throughout the discussion on this Resolution, and earlier in the day during the Second Reading of the Bill, I have been struck all the way through by his apparent discomfiture. He knows something of this Financial Resolution, and I suggest that that discomfiture arises from the fact that right hon. and hon. Members on his own Front Bench are being caught out this evening. But, I very much hope, Major Milner, that the right hon. Gentleman opposite will be in a position later, so far as is allowed within the limits of your Ruling, to reply to the points which have been made by my right hon. and learned Friend. I think that a very valuable contribution has been made to the Debate to-night. My right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Scottish Universities (Lieut.-Colonel Elliot) has made a valuable reference as to what we may be able to do with regard to the allocation of these moneys when we discuss this matter in the Scottish Grand Committee. But it was not to deal with this point that I rose. I press the Secretary for Scotland to reply to that very important point which has been raised on how far we may be able to go in the Scottish Grand Committee with regard to the Central Land Board.

The Chairman: The hon. Member is out of Order. The Secretary of State is not in a position to say what the Scottish Committee shall, or shall not, do.

10.45 p.m.

Mr. McKie: I am sorry, Major Milner, but I am pressing for the reason why this Financial Resolution, so far as it relates to the Central Land Board, has been drawn in this way. It may possibly prevent adequate discussion upstairs on this very important point. I feel sure I am entitled to point out on the Financial Resolution that, if our fears should be realised and if the unusual manner in which the Resolution has been drawn prevents discussion, this Bill will be viewed in Scotland with dissatisfaction and disfavour. I will say in passing, by way of illustration, that this is a matter which should be of special concern to a Socialist Government. This Left Wing Government have always held to the point made by my right hon. and learned Friend, the Member for Hillhead (Mr. Reid) of devolution in Scotland. That is a question with which the Left Wing in Scotland has been concerned for 60 years.

The Chairman: That is certainly not a question that can be raised now.

Mr. McKie: Let me just say that I hope the right hon. Gentleman will realise that this question of devolution——

The Chairman: I think the hon. Member has said all he can say on that point.

Mr. McKie: I hope the right hon. Gentleman will clear up the point whether this was done deliberately, or accidentally. If it was done deliberately, we feel that he has been less fair to the people of Scotland, who were promised Home Rule by Mr. Gladstone—[*Laughter*]. Certainly, and whether the right hon. Gentleman——

Hon. Members: Order.

The Chairman: The hon. Member has disregarded the advice I gave him. I must ask him to resume his seat.

Mr. McKie: With great respect, Major Milner, I apologise. But under the Rules of Order, if you ask me to refrain from referring to a certain subject, I think I am still entitled to say I hope that whether the right hon. Gentleman is in a position to clear up the point or not, we shall register our dissatisfaction and disapproval with the whole Bill, by voting against the Final Resolution.

The Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Westwood): I can assure the right hon. and learned Member for Hillhead (Mr. J. S. C. Reid) that I have not the slightest intention of withdrawing this Final Resolution tonight. If I were to do so, I would not have provision for the finance necessary to make operative the Bill which has now received a Second Reading. Nor have I any intention of changing the Resolution. There was no deliberate intention, when the Resolution was framed—as has been suggested—to keep the Scottish Grand Committee from discussing any legitimate point which should be considered by that Committee. On the Second Reading of the Bill, I made it clear that the question of having

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two Land Boards had received very careful consideration, and that in the interests of both Scotland and England—I put Scotland first, although some hon. Members opposite often put England first—I thought one Board could meet the requirements, and enable us to see that justice was done to Scotland. I have been asked to say what the constitution of the Board will be and if I am in Order——

The Chairman: I do not think the right hon. Gentleman is entitled to do that, either. The constitution of the Board is set out in the English Bill. I do not think the right hon. Gentleman is in order in referring to it here, any more than is any other hon. Member.

Commander Galbraith (Glasgow, Pollok): May I ask the right hon. Gentleman, regarding what he has just said, whether he really considers it appropriate that before any development can take place in Scotland, application has to be made to an English Board?

Mr. Westwood: No, Sir. It will not be an English Board; it will be a United Kingdom Board, on which there will be good Scotsmen representing Scottish interests. With that, I trust that the Committee will now let me have the Financial Resolution, which I believe is in the best interests of Scotland.

Lieut.-Colonel Elliot: We are in a rather extraordinary position. The Secretary of State has just been ruled out of Order in attempting to develop an argument to show why he should have this money. I have rarely seen a Secretary of State ruled out of Order. It puts the Committee in a difficulty. When asked if this was an English Board the right hon. Gentleman very strongly said it was not, that it was a United Kingdom Board. But he found himself totally unable to discuss it with reference to anything else but an English Bill. I put it to you, Major Milner, that the Secretary of State has placed the Committee in a position of extraordinary difficulty. He has drawn this Resolution so that it can only be valid by reference to a Measure which is not law, and which is still before the House, and he finds himself precluded from discussing the constitution of this body, to which we are being asked to vote money.

The Chairman: I would point out to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman that the reference is to " any Act of the present Session," and therefore covers the Town and Country Planning Bill, which is now in Committee upstairs, and also the present Bill.

Lieut.-Colonel Elliot: With the utmost respect and deference, the Resolution cannot in any way bind Parliament, and we do not know what this body is, because as you have said, Major Milner, the very Measure defining it is in Committee upstairs, in process of passing through the House. The body which is to be set up is not defined in that Bill because it is not yet an Act. Its terms are not before us. For the Secretary of State to ask for a blank cheque on this very flimsy basis is straining the authority even of a Secretary of State, and is straining the affection we have for the right hon. Gentleman almost to breaking point. The proposal which the Secretary of State is here making is brought forward in the name of Scotland. He explains that in doing this, he is putting Scottish interests first. He puts Scottish interests first by voting money to a body which he is not allowed to mention on the Floor of the House, and, as I understand it, he will not be allowed to mention it upstairs in the Scottish Grand Committee.

The Chairman: The right hon. and gallant Gentleman must not assume that. I do not know, nor do I for a moment say, whether or not the right hon. Gentleman will be allowed to mention this matter upstairs. As far as I am aware, it will be for the Chairman for the time being to decide. It is not correct to say that I have ruled in any sense that that Committee cannot discuss it.

Lieut.-Colonel Elliot: This is a most interesting point which we shall have the pleasure in pursuing. Do I understand you to mean, Major Milner, that we can move a new Clause upstairs defining the Board, because the Board may be the subject of discussion upstairs?

The Chairman: The hon. and gallant Gentleman knows quite well—no one better—that it is not my province to decide what may or may not be discussed upstairs. I say that these are matters for discussion in Committee on the Bill, and not on the Financial Resolution.

Lieut.-Colonel Elliot: Both the Secretary of State and myself are in a difficulty in

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[Lieut.-Colonel Elliot.]

this matter. As you have said, Major Milner, you have had to rule the Secretary of State out of Order. You have not yet ruled me out of Order but you have indicated—[*Interruption.*] I would point out to hon. Members that there is only one chairman in this Committee, and that he has not yet ruled me out of Order. You Major Milner, have indicated that those matters will be at the discretion of the Committee upstairs, and naturally I would fully agree to that. The fact that you have not found it possible to rule this completely out of Order, opens up some very interesting avenues of discussion, into which we do not propose to enter here. We do not ask any Ruling on it because, as you truly say, it would be limiting the discretion of the Chairman of the Committee upstairs. But it certainly is a fact that we find ourselves in a position of difficulty and considerable interest. [*Interruption.*] If it is desired by hon. Members we can pursue the matter for some time. If the hon. Lady the Member for the Exchange Division of Liverpool (Mrs. Braddock) objects to the faces of Conservatives and that objection leads her to interjections, it might lead me to pursue the question at considerable length.

Mrs. Braddock (Liverpool, Exchange): I will have a battle with the right hon. and gallant Gentleman at any time.

Lieut.-Colonel Elliot: The hon. Lady cannot have a battle with me because this happens to be a Scottish matter. If the hon. Lady wishes to make a speech on Scotland, no one would be more interested than myself. I should be very glad to resume my seat——

Mrs. Braddock: Get on with it. Do not "natter."

Mr. McKie: Is it in Order for an hon. Member to accuse the right hon. and gallant Gentleman of "nattering"?

The Chairman: I did not hear that expression. I certainly think it is reprehensible for the hon. Lady, or any other Member, to continue interrupting in this fashion.

Lieut.-Colonel Elliot: The Resolution before us asks the Committee to vote a considerable sum to a body, which, admittedly, is not defined in the Bill, for purposes of an indefinite character. The Lord Advocate directed the greater proportion of his speech in winding up the Debate on Second Reading, to a defence of the financial provisions of the Bill which this Resolution is to implement. The essential point he made was that under the Bill it would be possible for much greater developments to take place than ever before. The Government, he said, were facing up to the financial implications of these development projects. It is true that provisions are made here for grants to be made and for sums to be handed over to the local authorities, and for administrative expenses, and so on, to be paid. All we say is that this Resolution, among other Resolutions, is depreciating the value of the currency in which those grants are made. More and more, it is becoming clear that it is not possible to carry out the social policy of the Government, the housing policy of the Government, or any of the policies laid down in the Bill, because the cumulative weight of all these Financial Resolutions is piling upon the currency of this country an expense which it is not able to stand. It is shown by the gradually rising costs—in some cases, by the steeply rising costs—and by the great changes in administration which are taking place.

The Chairman: There will be other occasions for the discussion of these points, but the present discussion is limited to the Financial Resolution.

11.0 p.m.

Lieut.-Colonel Elliot: Far be it from me to want to discuss all the other expenses, because it would take too long. I merely say that £300 million is a substantial sum, of which a proportion, and an indeterminate proportion, has to be found by Scotland. I am saying that this, in particular, is proving that the social policy of the Government is breaking down because of the financial implications involved.

Sir J. Mellor: May I, as an English Member who made some reference to the Money Resolution on the English Bill, rise in support of the complaint made by my right hon. and learned Friend that this Resolution also is too narrow? I was astonished at the very cursory way in which the Secretary of State replied to the Debate. In the course of his Second Reading speech, he referred to the constitution of the Board, but now he seems to be quite content that the Committee

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should be deprived of an opportunity of discussing the question of whether there should be a United Kingdom or a Scottish Board. Surely, the whole question before this Committee—and it is an important constitutional question—is whether or not the Resolution is sufficiently wide to enable the Scottish Grand Committee to discuss Amendments? As things stand at present, it will be obviously impossible for the Amendments which my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hillhead (Mr. Reid) has in mind, to be discussed before the Scottish Committee. In my submission, that is manifestly wrong, and this Committee of the whole House would not be doing its duty if it insisted on passing a Financial Resolution in such narrow terms as to preclude discussion in the Scottish Grand Committee. It is a perfectly simple point. It is not necessary, in a Committee of the whole House, to go into these questions at all. That is not the function of this Committee. The function of this Committee is to see that the Financial Resolution is drawn in such wide terms as to give discretion to the Scottish Committee to debate the various points which arise and to come to a conclusion on them. I express my astonishment at the very offhand way in which the Secretary of State dealt with this important matter.

Mr. Niall Macpherson (Dumfries): There is one point to which I should like to draw attention. If I understand your Ruling rightly, Major Milner, it would be open to the Scottish Committee to make any Amendment to the Bill, but the point is whether, to carry the matter to a *reductio ad absurdum* the grant of compensation is to be up to the full amount of this Money Resolution, that is, £299,000,000 19s. 11½d. It might equally well be possible for the other Committee which is dealing with the English Bill to do exactly the same thing. I cannot understand how it is possible to reconcile the activities of these two Committees. I suggest that the Money Resolution has been drawn up in a manner which is unreal and ridiculous, and, for that reason, I shall oppose it.

Mr. Scollan: I want to know, when we get Amendments like this—and we have wasted nearly 20 minutes of time in skating over this question——

The Chairman: The hon. Gentleman is not addressing himself to the Question before the Committee. There is no Amendment before the Committee. The simple Question is whether the Financial Resolution, in the terms in which it appears on the Order Paper, shall be approved by the Committee or not, and that is the only Question which hon. Members are entitled to Debate.

Mr. Scollan: I am still wondering whether it would not be wise for the Secretary of State for Scotland, when a matter of this kind comes up, to accept what was originally proposed. All this row is about one pound. There is one pound difference between the actual estimate and the Amendment put down. I do not see why we should have wasted all this time on that.

The Chairman: The hon. Member is not entitled to speak about a waste of time. That is certainly not appropriate.

Mr. Scollan: The purpose of the Money Resolution is to meet the necessary expenses incurred in the passing of the Scottish Bill, and this requires the consent of the Committee. Obviously that is what we are discussing. I cannot understand why this Committee should be asked to grant permission for the Crown to spend a sum of money, without discussing the reasons for spending it.

The Chairman: The hon. Member is quite wrong. The purpose of the Resolution is to provide an overall maximum amount and the Committee on the Bill will have the right, as I understand it, to dispose of such sum as they think right and proper. It is perfectly competent for this Committee to propose a reduction. It is not competent for the Committee, nor is it competent for the Committee upstairs, to act except on the terms of the Resolution on the Order Paper.

Mr. Scollan: In that event, it means that a sum of money is being asked for, and that all we have to do is to vote that sum of money without giving reasons for or against it. If that is the case, it is a simple matter. After listening to the discussion tonight, I came to the conclusion that we were allowed to give certain reasons for or against. The Resolution includes a sum of £300 million, a proportion of which obviously is for Scotland. I put a question, earlier, to the Secretary of State for Scotland. That question was whether he would define for us how compensation for

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[Mr. Scollan.]

land for development which the landlord had planned, but was not allowed to carry out, would be arrived at. I was told that I would get the answer in the Committee. But I have not yet got this information, or any reason. Quite frankly, I do not think that is playing the game. This is like giving a man a blank cheque, on the understanding that he will tell you after he has spent the money what he is doing with it. Here we have a situation where landlords in Scotland—and now there will probably be a spate of them—will draw up plans for the development of their own estates. The planning committee will turn them down, and then there will be claims for compensation, although it is not called compensation. When I was told by the Minister that it was not compensation, I asked him what it was. The answer was "Oh, it is a kind of gratuity." So what we are to get is a kind of gratuity, without a means test, handed out to landlords in Scotland, to be paid out of this money we are voting in the Financial Resolution. [*Interruption.*] Evidently some hon. Members do not want to listen. There is no bolt on the door; they can go home at any time. The other point I do not like about this Bill is that this money is to be spent on town and country planning. Today, while listening to the discussion, we heard, first one hon. Member opposite telling us that there was no planning in the Bill, then another hon. Member——

The Chairman: Those are matters relating to the Bill itself, and not to the Financial Resolution.

Mr. Henry Strauss (Combined English Universities): The only point I wish to raise is a quite small but, I think, important one. I think we could all be satisfied if the learned Lord Advocate would explain the position that will arise. It is for that reason that I am raising this point. Let me say at once, I accept, of course, without question, all the Rulings you have given, Major Milner. The point I wish to raise is in connection with the words in brackets in lines 8 to 10 of the Financial Resolution. As you, Major Milner, have said, quite rightly, the purpose of this Financial Resolution is to fix the limits for the Committee on the Scottish Bill that will work upstairs. I can quite see that it might be possible to deal with the limits of this Financial Resolution by reference to a sum fixed by another Act. But when another Bill and not another Act is mentioned, it seems to me that we get this very great difficulty. You have suggested, Major Milner—and I think we can all appreciate the reasoning that actuated you in expressing that opinion—that it might be in Order for the Committee upstairs to fix a sum for Scotland—although without prejudice to the Ruling of the Chairman of that Committee—within the £300 million. In exactly the same way in the case of the English Bill, it might again be perfectly in Order for the Committee upstairs to fix a sum for England and Wales, provided it were less than £300 million. Now, the two sums together might exceed £300 million, and therefore be clearly wrong——

The Chairman: If the hon. and learned Member would be good enough to look at Clause 48 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Bill, the Financial Resolution of which is before us, he will see in Subsection (2):

> "The aggregate amount of the payments to be made by virtue of this section shall be the amount apportioned to land in Scotland by order made by the Treasury . . ."

I have not the English Bill before me, but presumably the Treasury have a similar power in that Bill. I also assume—although here I am afraid I am entrenching slightly on my own Ruling as to discussing the merits and demerits of the Bill—there will be a central body which will avoid the confusion to which I gather the hon. and learned Member is referring.

Mr. Strauss: I am much obliged to you, Major Milner. I hope I have understood your point correctly. I quite agree that under those Clauses, if they go unamended, the confusion will not arise. But we are not entitled to assume that these clauses will not be amended in any way; that is, within the Financial Resolution dealing with the particular Bill. That Clause which you have just cited to me may be amended perfectly consistently with the rules of order, provided it remains within this Financial Resolution. It could be amended by saying that the sum allotted to Scotland should be £200,000,000, and in possibly the same way the corresponding amendment could be made in the English Bill.

11.15 p.m.

Mr. Tiffany (Peterborough): On a point of Order. Does not the Money Resolution specifically state:

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" Not exceeding in the aggregate, together with payments to be made by virtue of any corresponding provisions which may be enacted in relation to England and Wales, the sum of three hundred million pounds."

Does that meet the point being raised?

Mr. Strauss: I think the hon. Gentleman who has just interrupted could follow the point if he would concentrate upon it. If the other Bill were an Act then his point would be perfectly sound, but when this Bill goes upstairs the only limitations to amendments on this Bill will be this Financial Resolution. As it will be unknown what has been done on the other Bill which is going simultaneously through the House, there would be nothing out of order, in my submission, and it would be quite consistent with your ruling, Mr. Chairman, in fixing a sum under this Bill which, together with the corresponding change made under the other Bill, would make the sums together in excess of this maximum. The point I want to put as the result of this reasoning is that this is an absurd way of proceeding, namely to proceed with a Financial Resolution that refers to two Bills proceeding simutaneously without imposing any limitations by rules of order on what may be decided by either committee. The learned Lord Advocate has studied all the precedents on this matter, and will be able to direct the Committee without any difficulty to such precedents as exist and will be able to explain how the difficulties which I have adumbrated to the Committee can be avoided. It is in order that the Lord Advocate can relieve all our minds on the absurd position to which the Government would otherwise admittedly be leading this Committee that I venture to put this point.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolution to be reported Tomorrow.

WAYS AND MEANS.

Considered in Committee.

[Major MILNER in the Chair]

TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING (SCOTLAND)

Motion made, and question proposed,

" That, under any Act of the present Session to make fresh provision with respect to Scotland for planning the development and use of land, and for purposes connected therewith—

(1) There shall be charged, in respect of the carrying out on land of operations for the carrying out of which planning permission is required under the said Act, and in respect of uses of land for the institution of which such permission is so required, and in respect of the retention on land of buildings or works, or the continuance of uses of land, in accordance with planning permission granted under the said Act, such development charges (or in the case of land acquired or appropriated by local planning authorities for the development or redevelopment of any area as a whole, or land acquired by development corporations under the New Towns Act, 1946, such sums in lieu of development charges) as may be determined in accordance with the provisions of the said Act;

(2) There shall be paid into the Exchequer any sums received by the Central Land Board to be established under any Act of the present Session to make fresh provision for planning the development and use of land, in respect of such development charges or other sums as aforesaid."

11.20 p.m.

Mr. J. S. C. Reid: I wonder whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Lord Advocate would explain why it was necessary to have the very elaborate framework of the Money Resolution, which he would not alter, and why, when we come to Ways and Means, we find a much more loosely drawn Resolution. All that we asked for in the other Resolution could easily be achieved by using the phraseology contained in this Ways and Means Resolution. Why does the right hon. Gentleman depart from the rigidity of the other Resolution and here propose a Resolution in terms which would have given us all we wanted had they applied to the Money Resolution? I hope that we can have an answer as to why the Government are reasonable in one case, and unreasonable in another.

Mr. Thornton-Kemsley: Before the right hon. and learned Gentleman replies, may I point out that, under the terms of the Money Resolution which we have just discussed, we have agreed to the sum of £300 million being allocated between England, Scotland and Wales for the purchase of development rights in land. Under this Resolution, we are asked to agree to the levying of what are called " development charges " in respect of development which is proposed to be carried out in perpetuity in Scotland by anyone desiring to develop his or her land. I suggest that this charge should be reduced, because it is illogical and

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[Mr. Thornton-Kemsley.]

wrong that we should buy out for a global sum of £300 million developments rights in land, in one case, and in the other collect in perpetuity development charges which, in the aggregate, may well amount to far more than the sum we have already voted. I am told on good authority that the amount of the development charges will, in about 20 years, be sufficient to wipe out altogether the £300 million. I suggest that, when that point is reached, we ought to regard the transaction as closed, and should then make no more development charges because, if we do not, it is tantamount to levying a differential tax payable in 20 years' time on one particular type of property, and the levying of a differential tax of that kind, in some future unknown period, would be quite wrong and quite foreign to the usual practice of this House.

Mr. Reid: Are we not to have any answer, Major Milner? Surely, the Government are not going to be as unreasonable as all that? Here we have a taxing Resolution, but no definition of the body which is to do the taxing. It says:

"There shall be charged in respect of the carrying out on the land of operations certain sums . . ."

It does not say "charged by the Central Land Board," or by anybody else, but just "shall be charged." I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman why, if in a taxing Resolution, which ought to be very tightly drawn—because we know that taxation is a matter which should be strictly dealt with—we do not need to say who is to levy the tax, in the other Resolution it is necessary to insert the words "the Central Land Board"? Why is it necessary there and not here to insert those words? Cannot we have an answer; or is it that the Scottish Office, as usual, take what is handed out to them by another Department, and do not know what it is that is being put forward?

Lieut.-Colonel Elliot: The Secretary of State for Scotland has decided, surely, that we must have some answer. It is not unreasonable to ask him to impart an answer to the Committee. Having asked a perfectly reasonable question on two resolutions dealing with great sums of money, we simply want to know what is the reason. Why, in one resolution is it given in very strict terms and in very general terms in the other? The hon. Member for West Aberdeen (Mr. Thornton-Kemsley) asked why the development charges should continue to be exacted long after the sum of money they are supposed to offset has been paid off entirely. I see that the Secretary for State is preparing to reply. I am only too willing to give way if he has the answer for us. I am sure that he is always most reasonable in these matters, and perhaps he could now give us the answer.

Mr. Westwood: The self-same words are used in the Ways and Means resolution and in the Money Resolution already approved. If the right hon. and gallant Gentleman will look at paragraph (2) of the Ways and Means resolution, he will find the words:

"There shall be paid into the Exchequer any sums received by the Central Land Board to be established under any Act of the present Session to make fresh provision for planning the development and use of land, in respect of such development charges or other sums as aforesaid."

The Central Land Board will collect and pay over to the Exchequer.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolution to be reported Tomorrow.

Committee to sit again Tomorrow.

LIVESTOCK SLAUGHTER (HUMANE METHODS)

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[*Mr. Snow.*]

11.28 p.m.

Brigadier Rayner (Totnes): In raising the question of the slaughter of livestock at so late an hour I do not propose to take very long. Nor do I want to sail under false colours, so I will say straight away to the hon. Lady who is to reply, that I am no sentimentalist. I have shot big game in various countries, and I shall hunt the fox so long as I am able to afford a horse. But to my way of thinking there is a great difference between death, which comes suddenly from the bush, or the heat of the chase and the cruel, casual process of domestic slaughter. In the first case, death comes unexpectedly in the way of nature, or in short, savage encounter. But in the second case, the animal suffers all the pain and terror of a slow, heartless routine. I claim that our slaughtering arrangements are inefficient

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and cruel, and that, although we profess to be a nation of animal lovers, we turn a blind eye to the bitter end of so many of our livestock. That, although we profess to cherish all young things we take no interest at all in the last days of our lambs and calves. Although I believe cattle to be almost as intelligent as horses, how differently we treat them. There would be a public outcry if horses had to suffer one half of the cruelty that so many of our cattle have to suffer between the market and the abattoir. Whether they are store beasts full of red meat, or old screws that have given their best in milk and cream to humanity for many a long day, their progress from the market to the slaughter-house in a bad area is inclined to become a cavalcade of misery. In the market there is exposure, overcrowding, irregular feeding, and watering, tail-twisting, goading, and the terror of the unknown. They may suffer some or all of these at the market, and slaughter-house, some or all again, probably with the terror of the known added. Hon. Members may have seen that fine play "Hassan", and will remember the scene called "The Procession of Protracted Death." I think that description might well apply to the progress of some of our livestock to the slaughter-houses of this country. Charles Dickens, writing nearly 100 years ago, in 1851, compared the abattoirs of England with those of France, to the great disadvantage of this country. He wrote:

> "The beasts have to be worried, and goaded, and pronged, and tail-twisted for a long time before they can be got in. What they see and scent makes them still more reluctant to enter."

I should like to compare that with an extract from a report published in 1946 by the Council of Justice to Animals. That says:

> "Owing to the lack of accommodation and equipment the animals suffer extensively from fright, overcrowding, and rough handling. Lack of space causes congestion, and it is an everyday sight to see a beast with a rope over its head being pulled from the waiting pen into the slaughter-house. This is often accomplished only after severe struggles on the animal's part, accomplished by blows and tail-twisting. In some of the smaller establishments, cattle waiting their turn can see their fellow creatures slaughtered in front of them."

There does not seem to have been a great deal of improvement in the last 100 years. In fact, owing to the reduction in slaughter-houses from something like 17,000 to 500, the overcrowding is sometimes so bad that conditions are probably a good deal worse. Our abattoirs still compare very unfavourably with those of other countries. I can assure hon. Members of that from my own experience, because I have always felt very strongly about this matter, and have studied the slaughter arrangements in several countries before the war. In Germany and Austria, they had some of the best abattoirs in the world. So interested was public opinion in humane slaughter, that in restaurants where a feature was made of live trout, they used to kill the trout electrically before the customer's eyes, when taken from the tank. Probably the best abattoir I ever saw was in Chicago. There the beasts were collected according to their kind in large covered pens, amply supplied with fresh air, water, and food. Each of these pens tapered off at the end to a narrow one-way passage which finished up in a lift. When the slaughtering hour arrived, the herd was gently moved forward, and, one by one, taken in the lift to the slaughtering chamber, where they were mercifully and quickly despatched. I ask hon. Members to compare that with a recent extract, one of many, from a report by a R.S.P.C.A. inspector:

> "In all the slaughter-houses animals are killed within sight of one another, and it is a common thing to see animals brought in for slaughter, standing directly over a recently killed animal which is still bleeding."

There are a few good slaughter-houses in this country, notably at Nottingham, Coventry, Newton Abbott and Penrith, but for every reasonable one there are 25 bad ones. If Members representing those areas were here tonight I would give a list of them. It is indeed a sorry tale. The best we can say is that when it comes to the actual end, most of these cattle are killed by the humane killer. By the Slaughter of Animals Act, 1933, this was made obligatory in licensed abattoirs and bacon factories. Even this mercy is denied to sheep and lambs, and pigs that are killed outside bacon factories. Local authorities can legislate specially to protect these animals in their own areas but to their abiding shame, there are 250 local authorities in this country which have not taken that action.

The humble sheep, which not only feeds but clothes us, surely deserves well of us. So gentle a creature is he that, Our Lord

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[Brigadier Rayner.]

Himself, used to refer to the sheep as a fit object for love and pity. But precious little love and pity we give him when his time comes. I do not want to harrow the feelings of hon. Members, but I have seen a sheep stuck, and it is not a pretty sight. First, the slaughterman cuts his throat, then he breaks his neck by jerking his head backwards. All the time the sheep is perfectly conscious. It is only when the slaughterman puts his hand in the hole and severs the spinal cord, that the sheep passes away, and for a longer or shorter time up to then, according to the skill of the slaughterman, the poor animal is in the most fearful agony. The same thing happens to lambs, and then the pig. In my opinion, the pig is almost as intelligent an animal as is the dog. To those of us who have chased him with a spear, he is a most noble, clever and courageous foe, and the tiger himself gives him a wide berth in the jungle. Hon. Members who have seen the domestic pig in circus acts will remember that in many of them, he compares very favourably in intelligence with the acts performed by dogs. But we put him to death as if he had no more feeling than a grass snake. I finally read to the House an extract from the report of a sanitary inspector:

"In agricultural areas, I can assure you, I have seen some terrible things happen to pigs. I have seen them pulled out of their sties, a rope thrown over a tree branch, and pulled up until their four feet could not touch the ground, and then stuck. But worse still, I have seen the rope slip off the nose, or break, and the poor animal run round, to be recaptured and restuck. On one occasion, I actually saw a pig get out of the scalding tub and have to be stuck again."

This is England, and these things are done by quite decent chaps, because it has become a matter of custom, and they have become a bit hard and unthinking in the course of their duties. In this twelve months 1,500,000 pigs will be killed in backyards and on smallholdings. Yet the Pig-Keepers' Council in all the literature they have issued, have not called attention, on one single page, to this question of humane slaughter.

All this thoughtless, horrible cruelty is completely unnecessary, for the humane killer can be borrowed with a little trouble, and with the necessary weight of cartridges. Some butchers hold that animals killed by the humane killer are not drained properly, but that is quite untrue.

In Scotland, the country about which we have been talking earlier tonight, all animals, pigs, sheep, cattle, and the rest, have been killed humanely since 1929, and Scottish mutton and lamb is as good as any one can get. There is a school of thought, which started with Professor Owen, the great physiologist of the early nineteenth century, which holds that meat from animals killed in pain and terror, is not really fit for human consumption and encourages serious disorders in the human body. I have no idea whether or not that is true. I would be inclined to say that if it were true, then it serves us jolly well right.

Of course, I am not attempting to lay the blame for this state of affairs on the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food or her Department. We must share it with many Governments of the past. I suggest to her four things that might be done. Although one realises that the provision of up-to-date abattoirs is a very long-term policy, I suggest that the Minister should take steps to apply the Act of 1933 to all animals, and that, if this is not possible, he, should address local authorities in no uncertain terms asking them to take the necessary protective action within their own areas. I suggest that the Minister should open more central abattoirs and so get rid of the grave overcrowding which is prevalent. The Minister should also get together with the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Agriculture and try, by propaganda and direction, to see that the conduct of markets is improved with a view to eradicating some of the quite unnecessary cruelty which takes place. Finally, I suggest that the Minister should try to waken public opinion through food offices and other ways which are available to the Ministry and not to any private body. It would take an army of officials to prevent the major and minor cruelties which take place, and, heaven knows, we do not want any more officials.

British public opinion when roused can do anything. We must rouse it. He that burns with indignation when he sees an emaciated horse being beaten up a hill, must realise that probably something worse is going on in the abattoir across the way. She who admonishes a small boy for ill-treating a dog, must give some thought to how the pig which provided her bacon ration was killed. They who delight in little lambs

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frolicking in the sun on a Sunday morning walk, must give some thought to what may happen to these lambs after Wednesday's market. It is only if we get people thinking on these lines that this fearful blot on our national copy book, in regard to which we compare so frightfully badly with other countries, will be rubbed out.

11.45 p.m.

Mr. Royle (Salford, West): I hope the hon. and gallant Gentleman will forgive me for intervening, but there are two sides to this question he has raised, and I want to put the other side. The Ministry of Food have to preserve a balance between two points of view on this issue, and I think it is necessary that the other point of view should be stated. Frankly, I am astonished at the exaggerated terms which the hon. and gallant Gentleman used when he spoke of "heartless cruelty," "cruel arrangements" and "a cavalcade of misery" and quoted what happened in the time of Charles Dickens. I would remind him that very many things have happened in this regard since the days of Charles Dickens, and also since 1926; and I would suggest to him that he is being illogical and inconsistent when he stands in this House and talks about cruelty in slaughter-houses, and, at the same time, talks about the joys of the chase of the hare and the fox. I humbly suggest to him that he would serve this House and the country very much better if he would concentrate his attention, not so much upon what is happening for the provision of human food, as on the horrible experiences which animals have as the result of the sport which he, apparently, so greatly enjoys.

I would also remind him that, in 1933, a very important Act of Parliament was placed on the Statute Book in reference to the humane slaughter of animals. This House, in the past, has given quite a lot of attention to this subject, and animals are universally slaughtered in this country by the mechanical killer, and usually by the captive bolt pistol. Pigs are all slaughtered by mechanical methods, except where electrical energy is not available, and the hon. and gallant Gentleman, in his speech tonight, has failed to refer to the types of slaughter which still goes on in Jewish and some other slaughter-houses. I think he might concentrate more of his attention upon that matter.

Animals are only slaughtered by mechanical means if the local authority has so approved, and the Act of 1933 provided very adequate safeguards. Slaughtermen today are all licensed, and nobody receives such a licence unless over 18 years of age. The medical officers and sanitary inspectors have full access to the slaughter-houses, and, in addition, in these days, the slaughter-house manager and the meat agents are also there to see that the Act is complied with. Except for electrical appliances, no particular instrument is stipulated in the Act. The men engaged in this occupation are not a set of rogues. They are carrying out a very undesirable occupation, and, in so doing, they are performing an essential public service in the provision of food for their fellows. I would remind the hon. and gallant Gentleman that there are very few prosecutions in this country against slaughtermen, in spite of the fact that such access to the slaughter-house is available to these officials.

I agree with him, in some degree, that the present system of control, under which many animals are slaughtered in few slaughter-houses rather than few animals in many slaughter-houses does make a little difference. But that is only in the peak period in the slaughter of cattle, particularly in the autumn. The arrival of large numbers of cattle, on Wednesday and Thursday every week, that have to be killed for that week's ration, does make it necessary to kill a large number in a short time. I do not want to stand between the House and the Parliamentary Secretary, but I would say that the safeguards are adequate. These people are doing an essential job of work. They are doing it with all the humanity that they can in somewhat difficult circumstances. In no circumstances would I like the impression to go out from this House, tonight, that cruelty is rife in our British slaughter-houses. That suggestion is certainly not true.

11.51 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food (Dr. Edith Summerskill): I agree with the Member for West Salford (Mr. Royle) who finds himself unable to reconcile the remarks of the hon. and gallant Member for Totnes (Brigadier Rayner) about the death throes of animals, with the fact that he prefaced those remarks by expressing a love of fox-hunting. I myself can think of no death, if one has to choose a death for an animal, which is

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[Dr. Summerskill.]

more horrible and brutal than that of a fox which is chased by dogs, and men on horseback. I hope that when the hon. and gallant Member next joins in the chase, he will dwell on the feelings of the fox, as he has dwelt tonight on the feelings of the pig and other animals of the farmyard. The hon. and gallant Member has made what I consider to be sweeping allegations. Such allegations have been made before, though they may have been a little more modified than his. But at no time has a specific case been quoted. At no time has he sent me a case in which he could allege that there had been cruelty, in order that proceedings could be instituted. He knows, as well as I do, that during the autumn there is a peak period of killing. Generally, during that period, and for a few months afterwards, we have many complaints from all over the country, because people have seen animals crowded along the roads to the slaughter-houses. They may have seen someone prodding an animal unnecessarily, and they feel that the way to obtain relief for these animals is to communicate with the Ministry of Food or some other Ministry.

Brigadier Rayner *rose*——

Dr. Summerskill: The hon and gallan Member will perhaps allow me to continue. I have only a few minutes. Of course, the treatment of animals on the road has nothing to do with the Ministry of Food, and it is for an individual who observes a case of cruelty to inform a local constable. Action will then be taken against the driver, or whoever it was who ill-treated the animal. In view of these complaints, I recently invited a number of hon. Members to the Ministry—because the Minister of Food is always accessible to hon. Members—so that they might meet some of the men who are in charge of our slaughtering arrangements, and question them to find out whether these men have a humane approach to their job. I think that meeting at the Ministry served a very useful purpose, and that hon. Members who were there, felt satisfied that everything was being done that the Ministry could do, within its powers to protect the animals.

The hon. and gallant Member is quite right when he says that we have now about 600 slaughter-houses, and it was necessary, as I think he will agree, to concentrate slaughtering when the Ministry decided to control the meat supplies of the country. I, personally, would like to see many of these slaughter-houses improved; but I would remind the hon. Gentleman of the difficulties which face us. In the first place, 401 of these slaughter-houses are privately owned, and 205 are owned by local authorities. Now, if a privately owned establishment needed any alteration, the alterations would have to be done at the public expense, and it is well known that at the moment houses are given priority. But within the limits we have, I think, done everything possible to improve these slaughter-houses, as far as that could be done without redesign and without rebuilding. So far as local authority slaughter-houses are concerned, I agree that many of them have approached us and asked whether the time is ripe for them to make certain alterations to their slaughter-houses. We decided that this could not be done until we had planned our long-term meat policy. I am very glad to say that recently we have felt that we could approach other Departments with a view to implementing some of these plans, and I hope that that will go forward very quickly. But in spite of these difficulties, the fact remains that the number of specific complaints about cruelty is very, very small. I think the last conviction was in 1942. If these incidents are so widespread, why is it that nobody has come to the Ministry of Food and made a complaint?

Finally, I want to say that the Slaughter of Animals Act, 1933, covers completely all the objections the hon. and gallant Member makes to the slaughtering of animals. The animals are protected within that Act. But they cannot be protected unless citizens, who are aware of certain cruelties being inflicted, inform the police and are prepared to institute proceedings——

The Question having been proposed after Ten o'Clock and the Debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER *adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Order made upon* 13*th November.*

Adjourned at Two Minutes to Twelve o'Clock.

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HOUSE OF COMMONS

Tuesday, 25th February, 1947

The House met at Half past Two o'Clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER *in the Chair*]

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

POLISH FORCES

Camps, Nettlebed Common

1. **Squadron-Leader Sir Gifford Fox** asked the Secretary of State for War when he anticipates removing the Army huts which disfigure Nettlebed Common, Oxfordshire, and which interfere with the amenities; and for what purpose the camp is being used at present.

The Financial Secretary to the War Office (Mr. John Freeman): The two camps at Nettlebed Common, Oxfordshire, are both occupied by units of the Polish Resettlement Corps. I regret, therefore, that I cannot yet state when the huts will be available for dismantling and removal.

Sir G. Fox: Will the Minister give an undertaking that when the Poles go, these huts will be removed and the common restored?

Mr. Freeman: No, Sir, but I will give consideration to the suggestion, and I should think it likely.

Palestine Evacuees (Dogs)

9. **Lieut.-Colonel Sir Thomas Moore** asked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that personnel of the Polish military forces now in Palestine who are being evacuated to this country are not permitted to take their dogs with them; and whether, in view of the hardship involved, he will make arrangements to have the present Order, under which all animals belonging to Polish troops must be destroyed before leaving Palestine, withdrawn.

Mr. J. Freeman: Polish troops are eligible to take part in the Service quarantine scheme, fully set out in Army Council Instruction 1148 of 1945, under which a limited number of dogs can be brought home under Service arrangements. The number of applications, however, under this scheme greatly exceeds the quarantine accommodation available in this country and there is a very long waiting list.

Sir T. Moore: As the Polish Forces, apparently, have so few friends in this country, especially on the benches opposite, would it not be a humane act to allow them to keep those who are really faithful to them?

Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: May I ask whether the hardship mentioned in the Question refers to the dogs or to the Poles?

Northern Ireland

29. **Mr. H. Hynd** asked the Secretary of State for War how many Polish troops are stationed in Northern Ireland; and whether members of the Polish Resettlement Corps will be found employment in that part of the United Kingdom.

Mr. Bellenger: No Polish troops are stationed in Northern Ireland. The employment of Poles is not a matter for my Department.


Mr. Hynd: Will my right hon. Friend consider enlisting the aid of the hon. Member for Queen's University (Professor Savory) to ensure that Ulster gets a fair share?

Professor Savory: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that we in Ulster gave hospitality to thousands of Gibraltarians during the war, and welcomed hundreds of thousands of American and Belgian troops?

Welfare Funds

39. **Major Bramall** asked the Secretary of State for War in what way it is proposed to dispose of the Polish Military Welfare Funds collected from the Polish forces in this country, in view of the gradual dissolution of these forces.

Mr. Bellenger: Consideration is being given to the disposal and future administration of these funds.



Major Bramall: Would the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that these funds were deducted from the pay of Polish soldiers, and that the men who have returned to Poland have had no benefit so far from these funds?

Mr. Bellenger: Certainly, Sir.

BRITISH ARMY

Court Martial System Inquiry

2. **Mr. Driberg** asked the Secretary of State for War how many times Mr. Justice Lewis's Committee, set up last October to inquire into the court martial system, has met; and how soon a report may be expected from it.

Mr. J. Freeman: The committee held its tenth meeting on 20th February. There is a great weight of evidence to consider and I cannot say how soon a report is to be expected.

Mr. Driberg: Does my hon. Friend recognise that this is a very serious matter, and that this committee's report is awaited most anxiously?

Mr. Freeman: I regard it as quite as serious as my hon. Friend does, and I have no doubt the committee will take note of what he has said.

Mr. Stephen: Will the Minister ask the committee to try to have the report ready before the Army Annual Bill is introduced?

Mr. Freeman: No, Sir, I should think that would be quite out of the question. The Oliver Committee, which did a somewhat similar job, took four and a half months to report, and the terms of reference in this case are such that I do not think it would be possible to have the report ready when the hon. Member suggests.

L.I.A.P., India

5. **Mr. Swingler** asked the Secretary of State for War why the men on the staff of Darua camp, H.B.T.D., Devlali, India Command, have to complete two years' overseas service before qualifying for L.I.A.P. leave, whereas the men of other units enjoy this privilege after 15 months' overseas service; and if he will remove this differentiation.

Mr. J. Freeman: No fixed period of overseas service is required in India for eligibility for L.I.A.P., but vacancies are allotted on a points basis, as my right hon. Friend explained in a reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) on 28th January. I am sending my hon. Friend a copy of that reply.

Territorial Army (Training Areas)

11. **Mr. J. H. Hare** asked the Secretary of State for War what plans have so far been completed to secure adequate training areas in this country for the new Territorial Army.

Mr. J. Freeman: It is proposed that, wherever possible, the training of the new Territorial Army should take place on training areas planned for the Regular Army and these, together with specific areas required for the sole use of the Territorial Army are, as previously stated, being considered by the Inter-Departmental Committee.

Mr. Hare: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether the Prime Minister will touch on this subject in the statement which he has promised for this afternoon?

Mr. Freeman: I am afraid the hon. Gentleman will have to wait and see.

Major Legge-Bourke: Will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind that it is most important from the point of view of the Territorial Army to have available training areas sufficiently close to each headquarters area so that a lot of time will not be wasted in travelling during training periods?

Mr. Freeman: Yes, that is one of our biggest problems.

Cyprus (Complaints)

13. **Major Legge-Bourke** asked the Secretary of State for War why British troops on the day prior to the visit of Press representatives to the camp at Xylotymbu, Cyprus, were ordered to clean up the filth of the camp with their hands as no shovels were available, and why this task was not performed by the Jewish inmates who had made the task necessary.

Mr. J. Freeman: I have no information on this matter, but have called for a report and will write to the hon. and gallant Member.

25. **Mr. Orbach** asked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that

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the lack of a canteen for our troops and the absence of a club for non-commissioned officers in Nicosia, Cyprus, is causing some dissatisfaction; and what steps he proposes to take to remedy the situation.

Mr. Bellenger: There is a N.A.A.F.I. club for other ranks in Nicosia. I am making inquiries about the details of the accommodation there and will write to my hon. Friend.

Mr. Orbach: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is an officers' club in the centre of the city, while there are no canteen or club facilities for troops or non-commissioned officers; and that the Church of England offered to bring an institute over from Cairo to Nicosia but have been refused facilities?

Mr. Bellenger: I have already said there is a N.A.A.F.I. club there, and from my experience N.A.A.F.I. clubs now are very good.

26. **Mr. Orbach** asked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that there is still delay in the delivery of troops' mail to Cyprus; and if he will take steps to see that our troops in Cyprus are informed of the extent to which this is due to the severe winter weather.

Mr. Bellenger: Mails to Cyprus have not been delayed recently until the onset of the bad weather, which has caused interruptions of as much as three days. Information of delays of more than 24 hours is broadcast or signalled to the troops, together with full reasons.

Mr. Orbach: Is my right hon. Friend aware that troops who have written to me from Cyprus complain that mails were delayed for 10 days, and no reason was given?

Mr. Bellenger: I am not aware of that. On the whole, the mail facilities to Cyprus have been very good.

27. **Mr. Orbach** asked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that there is no garrison cinema for our troops in Nicosia, Cyprus, and that this is causing some dissatisfaction; and what steps he is taking to arrange for films to be shown.

Mr. Bellenger: The Army Kinema Corporation has agreed with the industry not to operate cinemas within three miles of public ones that are able to cater for the needs of troops in the vicinity. It is for this reason that there is no garrison cinema at Nicosia.

Mr. Orbach: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the only cinemas available in Nicosia are two commercial vermin-ridden cinemas, and that the troops refuse to go to them?

Mr. Bellenger: I will look into the point raised by my hon. Friend.

Malaya (Officers' Families)

15. **Commander Noble** asked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware of the shortage of accommodation for officers' families in Malaya; and what steps are being taken to remedy this.

Mr. J. Freeman: Yes, Sir. Further semi-permanent married quarters in Malaya are being provided as part of the overall accommodation plan for that country. The hon. and gallant Member will appreciate that married quarters for officers are only one item in a heavy programme for improvements of housing generally in Malaya, which is being energetically carried out with available resources, but which is necessarily limited by labour and material shortages.

Troopship Conditions

18. **Mr. Granville Sharp** asked the Secretary of State for War how many troopships are now used to transport soldiers between this country and India and the Far East; to what extent the type of accommodation, meals and amenities have been improved during the last three months; and what further improvements are contemplated.

Mr. J. Freeman: An average of 15 troopships are at present employed to transport Servicemen between this country and India and the Far East. During the past three months, the capacity of troopships in service has been reduced, and the majority of the sleeping accommodation thus released converted to extra amenity space. In view of the accelerated rate of release in the next three months, this process of improving amenities at the expense of berths will be considerably slowed down. With a few exceptions, which have been corrected during the voyage, there has been no cause of complaint either as to quantity,

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[Mr. Freeman.]
quality or preparation of meals. These have been in accordance with the scales laid down in regulations.

22. **Mr. Sharp** asked the Secretary of State for War if he is aware that H.M.T. "Eastern Prince" is an unsatisfactory troopship; and when it is proposed to improve the ventilating system and the galley facilities and to ensure effective supervision of the catering service.

The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Bellenger): I am not aware that the "Eastern Prince" is an unsatisfactory troopship, though her most recent voyage to the Far East did give rise to an unusual number of complaints, which are being investigated. I have so far received no complaints about the homeward bound voyage just completed.

Mr. Hare: Will the right hon. Gentleman consult with his right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport who ordered an inquiry into the conditions of the outward voyage; and will he see that the shocking conditions endured by the passengers who had to undergo that voyage are taken into consideration when he is examining it?

Mr. Bellenger: I have already said the complaints are being investigated. I do not agree with the hon. Member that the conditions are shocking. Indeed, there were no complaints on the homeward voyage.

Personal Cases

20 and 21. **Colonel Gomme-Duncan** asked the Secretary of State for War (1) why the parents of 2888492 Private John Auchterlourie, Cameron Highlanders, have been refused payment of gratuity in respect of their son who was killed in action;

(2) why War Office letter, No. D/133937/W.G.7/Effects, dated 2nd August 1946, was addressed to the parents of the late Private John Auchterlourie, Cameron Highlanders, and not to the Coupar Angus branch of the British Legion who initiated the inquiries.

Mr. J. Freeman: I am sorry that the War Office reply of 2nd August, 1946, which gave the reasons for refusing payment of war gratuity, was addressed in error to the parents and not to the British Legion who had asked the Department to look into the matter. On 5th October, however, a letter was sent to the Legion explaining why war gratuity was inadmissible, and a further letter dated 29th November, 1946, reiterated the decision and explained fully the grounds on which it was based.

The conditions laid down in the Royal Warrant require a minimum of six months' reckonable service, and any service given before a conviction for desertion is not reckoned unless that service is subsequently restored. Private Auchterlourie did not qualify for restoration of the service which he forfeited as a result of conviction for desertion.

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: May I ask the hon. Gentleman, first, whether he realises the great distress that was caused to the family of this soldier by this letter being sent to them and not to the British Legion, that being the first they had heard of him being a deserter; and, second, does the second part of his answer mean that in the opinion of the War Office it is more important that a man should serve six months good conduct to get back his privileges than that he should give his life for his country?

Mr. Freeman: With regard to the first part of the supplementary question, I have expressed the apology of my Department. With regard to the second part, I am administering the Royal Warrant, and if the hon. and gallant Member would like that amended to allow desertion to count for gratuity, we will consider any representations he has to make.

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: This is a matter of great principle. This was a man who gave his life for his country, and had he lived another six months he would have had all his privileges restored to him. This is so unsatisfactory that I give notice I shall endeavour to raise it on the Adjournment.

23. **Mr. Lang** asked the Secretary of State for War the cause of death at Ballykinler Camp, County Down, on 31st December last, of 19094813 Private Turner, of Stalybridge; and why his relatives were not informed of his illness.

Mr. Bellenger: Private Turner was admitted to hospital at 2.45 p.m. on 31st December and died less than an hour later from heart failure. Two telegrams, one reporting that he was dangerously ill and

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the other that he had died, were sent to his next-of-kin on 31st December. I should like to express my sympathy with his relatives, in the sad and sudden loss.

Mr. Lang: Can my right hon. Friend tell me why, after the family had written and received a reply on 2nd December, the commanding officer wrote, and no other communication was sent, and the last they heard was a letter from their own boy on 8th December that he was all right and these two telegrams which were delivered together?

Mr. Bellenger: We had no reason to believe that Private Turner was seriously ill, and after his admission to hospital he died from heart failure, as I have said. We did all we could in those distressing circumstances to inform his relatives.

33. **Mr. W. R. Williams** asked the Secretary of State for War whether he has given further consideration to the claim made by Mr. A. S. Hill for payment at the rate of 20s. a day in respect of the period of leave granted to him on release from his duties at the special communications unit; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Bellenger: As I explained to my hon. Friend in my letter of 3rd December, 1946, I had given very careful consideration to Mr. Hill's claim but could not accept his contention. Men in his circumstances were quite properly treated in receiving, during release leave, the normal rate of pay of soldiers of their rank and service, and they have no just grounds for claiming pay at special rates during such leave.

Mr. Williams: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Mr. Hill, and many others who have been similarly treated in regard to their claims, firmly believe in the validity of their claims? Is he prepared to make a test case of this, by submitting the claim to the Law Officers of the Crown for their observations?

Mr. Bellenger: No, Sir. I have given both Mr. Hill and the hon. Member very full facilities for stating their case; and, on the legal advice I have received, I am informed they have no case at all.

Mr. Williams: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg leave to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment.

[2 G 2]

Funerals (Escorts)

24. **Mr. Lang** asked the Secretary of State for War if he will arrange, in the event of the death of a soldier away from home, for an escort of at least one soldier when the body is taken home for burial.

Mr. Bellenger: At present, if the next-of-kin so desire and arrangements can be made, commanding officers may allow one or two friends of the soldier to attend the funeral, at private expense.

Mr. Lang: If that is so, why is nothing of that said on the telegram which is sent about funeral arrangements, the price of the coffin and things of that sort?

Mr. Bellenger: I do not think the telegram could say that, but I will certainly look into the matter to see whether it is possible to inform the next-of-kin that these arrangements can be made.

Dr. Morgan: How old was this soldier; and was there any connection between the first illness and the second illness, which obviously caused his death?

Mr. Bellenger: I think my hon. Friend is referring to a previous Question; this deals with a general principle.

B.A.O.R. Families (Household Goods)

28 **Mr. Yates** asked the Secretary of State for War if household goods are being supplied to British families in Germany according to the scales mentioned in the pamphlet for the guidance of B.A.O.R. families, including 45 towels for a married officer; and if he will consider revising the booklet.

Mr. Bellenger: The pamphlet containing these scales was a provisional one, as indeed was stated in the introduction. A new pamphlet containing the authorised scales will be issued shortly.

Mr. Yates: While appreciating that answer, will my right hon. Friend, when revising the pamphlet, consider the distinction which has been made between the married officer and the married other ranker in this instance, which happens to be 45 towels for a married officer and 15 towels for a married other ranker; and is not that quite unfair?

Mr. Bellenger: I must say, I quite agree, speaking as a hard pressed civilian, that 45 towels seems a lot for anybody.

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Communication with M.P.s

35. **Mr. William Wells** asked the Secretary of State for War whether he will cause an instruction to be issued to all units of the Army making it clear that all ranks are entitled to write to Members of Parliament without permission from their military superiors.

Mr. Bellenger: It is well known throughout the Army that an officer or soldier is permitted to write to his own Member of Parliament. It is, however, most desirable, both in the interests of those who may have complaints and of the Army as a whole, that complaints should, at least in the first instance, be made in the proper and normal way. If this is done they can usually be dealt with far more quickly and efficiently.

Mr. Wells: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that some units are still issuing orders prohibiting the writing of letters to Members of Parliament, and that hon. Members of this House continually receive complaints about this? Will he take action that will prevent indiscipline on the part of colonels, as he would in the case of corporals?

Mr. Bellenger: Yes, I am aware of that, and I have taken steps to stop that. The hon. Member may or may not know that in the last Parliament I was one of the back bench Members who established this right.

Education

40. **Mr. Swingler** asked the Secretary of State for War what progress he has to report in the preparation of the education scheme for the post war Army.

44. **Mr. Kenneth Lindsay** asked the Secretary of State for War whether he is now in a position to announce the Army education plans for the coming years, in view of the disquieting reports on illiteracy, the paramount needs of trained manpower and the future intake at technical colleges and universities.

Mr. Bellenger: I hope to make a comprehensive announcement within the next three weeks.

Strength

41. **Mr. Swingler** asked the Secretary of State for War the total strength of the British Army on 31st December, 1946, and its estimated strength on 31st December, 1947, on the basis of the estimates contained in Cmd. 7042.

Mr. Bellenger: The strength of the Army on 31st December, 1946, was 896,757, including A.T.S. Exact figures cannot be given at this stage. A provisional estimate is that the strength on 31st December, 1947, will be in the neighbourhood of 660,000, but it clearly depends on a number of factors which cannot yet be resolved.

Brigadier Low: Will the right hon. Gentleman, having given those provisional figures, also give the provisional release programme, taking the release groups of the Army up to 31st December, 1947?

Mr. Bellenger: I do not think that arises on this Question.

Court Martial, Port Said

42. **Dr. Comyns** asked the Secretary of State for War when the hon. Member for Silvertown will have an opportunity of reading the evidence submitted at the court martial of the three non-commissioned officers at Port Said, held in December, and for which application was made on 23rd January last.

Mr. Bellenger: As my hon Friend has recently been informed by letter the proceedings have been sent back to the Middle East where they would be required in the event of any of the men submitting petitions I have asked for their return in due course but I am not prepared to press for their immediate despatch until I am satisfied that they are not required in connection with a petition When they arrive I will consider letting my hon. Friend see them.

Dr. Comyns: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is considerable feeling in my constituency about this case, that many resolutions of protest have been made, and numbers of signatures obtained for petitions? Is he also aware that the prevalent impression in my area is, that justice does not appear to have been done in this trial, and that one of the men has been made a scapegoat? Will he see that something is done?

Mr. Bellenger: Certainly Sir, but the matter is not entirely in my hands. I am bound to observe the ordinary machinery of justice, and, therefore I am bound to wait to see whether any of these men submit petitions.

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Mr. Martin Lindsay: Would the right hon. Gentleman say what precedent there is for Members of Parliament expecting to have the right to see court martial proceedings? Surely, in his own Department he has a department concerned with reviewing court martial proceedings? Surely, it is undesirable that Members should have any right to see them?

Mr. Bellenger: Courts martial proceedings are open to the public and, therefore, the public have access to them.

Mr. Gallacher: In view of the feeling of dissatisfaction there is with this case, and with other courts martial recently, is the right hon. Gentleman considering a complete overhaul of the court martial system?

Mr. Bellenger: I should have thought that the hon. Member would have known that there is now a committee, presided over by one of His Majesty's judges, considering that question.

Mr. Awbery: Will the right hon. Gentleman see that the hon. Member for Central Bristol, who has also written to him on this subject, has an opportunity of reading the evidence?

Mr. Bellenger: If the hon. Member is interested, no doubt he will.

Mr. M. Lindsay: Are we to understand from the right hon. Gentleman's reply to my supplementary question, that any member of the public has the right to ask for any particular court martial proceedings to read?

Mr. Bellenger: No Sir. I did not say that. All that I have said is that I am waiting for those proceedings to arrive here, and that I will consider letting the hon. Member see them.

Captain Crookshank: But why only that hon. Member? If all this sort of information is not to be available to the general public, why limit this to only one hon. Member?

Mr. Bellenger: For obvious reasons, I should have thought; because the hon. Member is interested in the particular case of one of his constituents.

Captain Crookshank: It might turn out that lots of people were interested if they knew all about it.

Ammunition Depot, Perthshire

78. **Mr. Snadden** asked the Secretary of State for War the tonnage, by categories and types, of ammunition and explosives removed from the depot in Perthshire since 1st September, 1946; the amount of each category received into the depot in the same period; and the present rate of removal in tons weekly

The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Bellenger): I am having the figures prepared and will send them to the hon. Member as soon as they are ready.

Mr. Snadden: Is the Minister aware that there is grave dissatisfaction at the slow rate of progress, and would he expedite this?

Mr. Bellenger: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would wait until he sees the figures.

79. **Mr. Snadden** asked the Secretary of State for War what measures are in force in each area of the ammunition depot in Perthshire for guarding the ammunition dumps therein by day and by night on week-days and at week-ends; what further measures are proposed to provide the additional protection required by the presence later in the year of hikers, cyclists, picnic parties and holiday-makers in general; and what special precautions are taken to prevent the illicit removal of gelignite or other explosive.

Mr. Bellenger: Twenty military personnel are on the average employed on guard duty each day, assisted by 12 civilian watchmen. There are no additional precautions at week-ends during the winter months, but as the hours of daylight lengthen, and improvements in the weather allows hikers and holiday makers to visit the area, the number of guards will be increased on the lines I explained to the hon. Member on 25th June. Such items as gelignite are concentrated into the areas which can be more readily guarded.

Mr. Snadden: Is there not a great danger in not having a guard or patrol on Sundays during the winter?

Mr. Bellenger: We are doing our best, not only in this area, but in other areas, but there is a limitation to the manpower at our disposal.

Mr. Henry Strauss: Does "20 military personnel" mean "20 soldiers"?

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Occupation Currency

82. **Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyre** asked the Secretary of State for War if he will state the total of allied occupation currency issued in lire, marks and francs, respectively, by English authorities.

Mr. Bellenger: The issue of allied military lire in Italy was initially a combined Anglo-American responsibility until under an agreement of February, 1946, it was assumed by the Italian Government. Lire currency, mostly Allied military lire, was made available to the various armies operating in Italy. The amount drawn by the British forces is about 75,000 million lire. The British authorities were not, however, as such, separately responsible for the issue. Responsibility for the supplemental francs issued in France was accepted by the French authorities who agreed to make available the currency required by the various Armies. The currency drawn by the British Forces under these arrangements was about 1,200 million francs. I understand from my hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster that about 1,790 million Allied military marks have been issued by the British authorities in Germany.

Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyre: Will the Minister make a supplementary statement about Austrian schillings, so that we may have the whole picture?

Mr. Bellenger: I should want notice of that. This Question deals specifically with lire, marks and francs.

PRISONERS OF WAR

Deferred Repatriation

3. **Mr. Symonds** asked the Secretary of State for War if he will extend beyond six months the period for which suitable German prisoners of war are allowed to volunteer to remain for work in this country after their normal repatriation dates.

Mr. J. Freeman: Prisoners of war who have deferred their repatriation for six months may in the fifth month defer for a further period, and so on each time.

Mr. Sidney Shephard: How many prisoners have taken advantage of this offer?

Mr. Freeman: I could not say without notice.

Canteen Purchases

4. **Mr. Symonds** asked the Secretary of State for War if he will make arrangements to enable German prisoners to obtain shaving materials, cigarettes etc., at times when they draw no pay owing to illness or inability to work through no fault of their own

Mr. J. Freeman: German prisoners of war who are unable to work are not necessarily without means to make canteen purchases as they may well have credits existing in their pay accounts from previous employment. Those who have no credits available for canteen purchases may be issued with items which are essential to the maintenance of health and hygiene such as shaving materials or tooth paste. The cost of such issues is recoverable from the prisoners if and when their accounts are again in credit. Cigarettes are not issued in such circumstances

Ditchingham Camp

17. **Mr. Skeffington-Lodge** asked the Secretary of State for War whether he is satisfied that the conditions at the prisoner-of-war camp at Ditchingham, Suffolk, are up to standard.

Mr. J. Freeman: Yes, Sir, except that at a recent inspection the camp was found to be slightly overcrowded. This matter is being dealt with.

British Prisoners (German Assistance)

30. **Mr. Skeffington-Lodge** asked the Secretary of State for War whether, in those cases where there is proof that German civilians helped our own prisoners of war, the same rewards and privileges can be extended to them as in the case of Italians; and whether, in the interests of justice, he will arrange to adopt in Germany the same means of discovering those who assisted the allied cause as is operated in Italy.

Mr. Bellenger: I am not prepared to extend to Germany, where there were very few active helpers, the procedure adopted in Italy, where there were many. In those cases that have come to light in Germany, preferential treatment has been given where justified.

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Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: I am afraid I did not hear the Secretary of State's reply. May I ask him whether he will do all he can to iron out the discrimination between Italian prisoners and German prisoners, where they have adopted the same attitude towards British prisoners of war?

Mr. Bellenger: Yes, Sir; but I am bound to say that there were thousands of Italians who helped our men actively in Italy, but very few Germans who helped our men in Germany.

Fuel Emergency (Assistance)

31. **Mr. Skeffington-Lodge** asked the Secretary of State for War whether he will make a statement about the service rendered by Poles and prisoners of war in helping to resolve the fuel crisis.

Mr. Bellenger: As arrangements are not made centrally I have no figures readily available of the number of Polish troops or prisoners of war who have been helping on the roads and railways during the fuel crisis, but I am sure that my right hon. Friends the Ministers of Fuel and Power and Transport join in welcoming the valuable assistance that has been and is being given from these services.

High Ranking Officers

34. **Air-Commodore Harvey** asked the Secretary of State for War how many German admirals and generals are detained in this country as prisoners of war.

Mr. Bellenger: Three field-marshals, 164 generals, and 17 admirals, Sir.

Air-Commodore Harvey: How many of these men have been returned to Germany since the end of the war? What does the right hon. Gentleman intend to do with those now in this country?

Hon. Members: Put them down the mines.

Mr. Bellenger: I am only the guardian of these officers. I think that the latter part of the supplementary question should be addressed to somebody else

Air-Commodore Harvey: Who is responsible for these admirals and generals?

Mr. Bellenger: All these prisoners of war are now in the process of being screened by my hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

Air-Commodore Harvey: In view of the most unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment at the earliest possible time.

Detention Powers

36. **Mr. Stokes** asked the Secretary of State for War under what provision of the Geneva Convention German prisoners of war are still detained in this country.

Mr Bellenger: The Geneva Convention is not the authority for the detention of prisoners of war, but deals with their conditions and treatment while detained. Article 75 of the Convention, however, does include mention of the liberation and return of prisoners of war, and on this point I have nothing to add to the reply given on 8th May, 1946, to my hon. Friend by my right hon Friend the then Minister of State.

Mr Stokes: Yes, but is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the whole of the Nuremberg Trial was based on the theory that the Control Commission was the legal Government of Germany; that under Article 75 of the Geneva Convention, we must enter into communication with the existing government of a State for the immediate return of its subjects we hold prisoners of war; and that we ought, therefore, to return the German prisoners of war to the C.C.G.?

Mr. Bellenger: That seems to me to be a very involved legal point. I have given the answer to the Question my hon. Friend put on the Paper.

Work Volunteers (Officers)

38. **Major Bramall** asked the Secretary of State for War how many officer prisoners of war at No. 20 Prisoner-of-War Camp, Llanover Park, have volunteered for work outside the camp; how many are actually working; and how many of those who have volunteered, but are not working, are graded C.

Mr. Bellenger: Between 60 and 70 officer prisoners of war at this camp have volunteered for work outside the camp, and they are all working.

SERVICE LAND REQUIREMENTS

45. **Brigadier Prior-Palme** asked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on the present policy of the Government with regard to training areas.

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The Prime Minister (Mr. Attlee): Perhaps the hon. and gallant Member will await the statement which I propose to make at the end of Questions.

86. **Lieut.-Colonel Sir Cuthbert Headlam** asked the Minister of Town and Country Planning what steps he is taking to reconcile the proposals of the War Office to extend the Redesdale artillery range with those of the Tynemouth Corporation to establish a reservoir in the same area; and whether he will ensure that, in doing so, he will do nothing to prejudice the creation of the proposed Coquetdale national park.

The Minister of Town and Country Planning (Mr. Silkin): The proposal referred to will be considered by the Inter-Departmental Committee on Services Land Requirements, and the considerations to which the hon. and gallant Member draws attention will be taken into account.

Sir C. Headlam: How long will it take the Minister and his committee to come to a decision on this matter, which is causing a great deal of unrest in the area in question?

Mr. Silkin: Not very long.

Mr. Quintin Hogg: Will the Minister undertake to hold a local public inquiry into this matter?

Mr. Silkin: I will not give an undertaking, but probably it will be held.

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

Restrictive Practices

46. **Mr. William Shepherd** asked the Prime Minister if he will hold a public inquiry into restrictive practices, both in respect of labour and of trade.

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. As regards labour, I think these matters are best dealt with by negotiation between the employers and the trade unions. As regards trade, my right hon. Friend the Lord President of the Council informed the hon. Member for Louth (Mr. Osborne) on 30th July last that the Government intend to introduce legislation on restrictive practices when time permits, generally on the lines foreshadowed in the White Paper on Employment Policy. Power will be sought to inquire into the extent and effect of particular arrangements and to take appropriate action to check those shown to be contrary to the interests of the nation.

Mr. Shepherd: Am I to understand that the Prime Minister regards the obtaining of this vital information of less immediate importance than the head-hunting by members of the Press Commission to which he has given sanction?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. It is a different method, that is all.

Ministerial Co-ordination

47. **Mr. Edelman** asked the Prime Minister whether, analogously with his appointment of a Minister of Defence, he will appoint a Minister of Production charged with the responsibility for co-ordinating those Departments concerned with production.

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. My hon. Friend may have in mind co-ordination by a Minister of the work of all the departments concerned with economic development, including production, and not the establishment of a Ministry with executive authority in the field of production. This is already provided for in the system of Cabinet committees.

WEEKLY PERIODICALS (SUPPRESSION)

48. **Mr. W. Smithers** asked the Prime Minister if, since the use of industrial electricity is to be resumed in some areas only, he will ensure that all weeklies and similar periodicals shall be suppressed or allowed to go to publication without discrimination.

The Prime Minister: To avoid discrimination, the restrictions on the publication of weekly and other publications imposed from Saturday, 15th February, applied equally in all areas of Great Britain. Similarly, the removal of the restrictions, announced on 21st February to permit the resumption of publication on and after 3rd March, applies to all areas, irrespective of the resumption in the use of industrial electricity in any particular area.

Sir W. Smithers: Is the Prime Minister aware there is a strong and widespread feeling that the suppression of these periodicals is for political ends, and to avoid criticism of Socialist mismanagement?

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The Prime Minister: If the hon. Member shares that impression he had better get rid of it, because the whole point is that it applies equally to all political opinions.

Mr. Frank Byers: By what statutory or other authority was this suppression made, and will the Prime Minister give a categorical assurance that there was a Statutory authority?

The Prime Minister: It was actually done by agreement——

Hon. Members: Oh!

Mr. Byers: In that case, is it not a fact that those people who are not members of the P P A. are not bound by the agreement which was reached?

The Prime Minister: This was done by agreement.

Sir W Smithers: Is it not a Communist trick to suppress the Press and avoid——

Mr Speaker: That is expressing an opinion, and is not asking for information.

INDIA (DEFENCE)

49. **Brigadier Low** asked the Prime Minister whether he will confirm that His Majesty's Government intend to maintain responsibility for the security of India from external attack after June, 1948.

The Prime Minister: The Government have declared their intention to transfer full power to Indian hands not later than June, 1948, and the responsibility for the security of India from external aggression will fall upon India from the date when full power is transferred. If India decides to remain within the British Commonwealth, the position as between His Majesty's Government and India will be similar to that now existing between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth If India decides to leave the British Commonwealth the continued security of India will, of course, be a matter of great interest to the British Commonwealth. His Majesty's Government will naturally be very willing to enter into discussions with India as to mutual assistance in matter of external defence subject, of course, to the obligations of both parties under the United Nations Charter.

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: In view of the Prime Minister's statement, will he give some assurance to British officers in the Indian Army in regard to their position during this critical time, as they want to know where they will stand in 1948 and to make plans?

The Prime Minister: That is a different question.

NATIONAL FINANCE

Coalmining Machinery Purchases

50. **Dr. Santo Jeger** asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what amount of money has been expended in the U.S.A. since 1st January, 1946, on the purchase of coal-cutting and mine-loading machinery, and other mining equipment for use in this country.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Dalton): £646 000.

Tax Rebates (P.A.Y.E.)

51. **Lord Willoughby de Eresby** asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is satisfied that the machinery for dealing with all claims for a rebate of tax already paid under Pay As You Earn is working satisfactorily in view of the recent increase in the numbers of the unemployed.

Mr. Dalton: Yes, Sir. I am glad to say that most employers are making these refunds themselves, and I take this opportunity of thanking them for their co-operation.

E.P.T. (Small Firms)

52 **Lord Willoughby de Eresby** asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will consider giving some form of financial assistance to small firms and businesses who had no E.P.T. standard in the past, and who were therefore unable to build up any substantial capital reserves, in view of the fact that they are today unable to meet the cost of keeping their businesses open during the present stoppage of work resulting from the fuel shortage.

Mr. Dalton: No, Sir. I am afraid that this would be quite impracticable.

Lord Willoughby de Eresby: In view of the fact that the losses these firms have suffered are in no way their responsibility, and the Government have a certain

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responsibility to provide for them, does not the Chancellor of the Exchequer consider they should have some assistance?

Mr. Dalton: I am afraid it is quite impracticable, from the administrative point of view, to single out the group of people the noble Lord has in mind. It is not possible to do it.

Sterling Balances

54. **Mr. W. Shepherd** asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what interest is being paid on the sterling balances which are held by overseas creditors.

Mr. Dalton: Most of these balances are in Treasury Bills at ½ per cent.

67. **Mr. Boothby** asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how much of the accumulated sterling balances held in London by our creditors have been used during the past 12 months for purchase of British goods and for the purchase of British assets abroad, respectively.

Mr. Dalton: In the year 1946 as regards the sterling area increases in accumulated sterling balances amounted to £98 million, and decreases to £149 million. In the case of the non-sterling area, increases amounted to £201 million, and decreases to £81 million. These increases and decreases of balances represent the net result of the purchase and sale of goods and services to or from the United Kingdom and other countries, expenditure on British troops overseas, receipts from surplus disposals overseas, and movements of capital. Figures are not available of the amount used for the two purposes referred to in the Question.

Mr. Boothby: Is it not clear that we had a deficit during the last 12 months, and that sterling countries have been permitted by the right hon. Gentleman to use some part of their credits in this country for the purchase of goods? Does the right hon. Gentleman think that we are in a position to afford this, and will he say whether there is any principle governing his action?

Mr. Dalton: If my hon. Friend will read the figures he will notice that whereas, in the sterling area, the decreases were greater than the increases, to the extent of £50 million, in the year, in the non-sterling area the reverse was the case, to the extent of £120 million. I do not think, therefore, that the position is so bleak as the hon. Gentleman may have imagined when he put his Question on the Paper.

Mr. Walter Fletcher: In spite of the cloud of mystifying figures which the right hon. Gentleman has produced, is it not plain that we are, against no profitable return, financing and equipping places such as India with cotton machinery that had better be kept in this country?

Territorial Army Pay (Taxation)

57. **General Sir George Jeffreys** asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer by what methods it is proposed to collect Income Tax on the pay, training expenses allowance and annual bounty recently announced for the reconstituted T.A.; and when the Pay-as-you-earn system is made use of, who is to make the calculations as to tax due, collect the money and keep the necessary accounts.

Mr. Dalton: In most cases, by set off against the Income Tax allowances to which the man is entitled. The answer to the second part of the Question is—the Army.

Sir G. Jeffreys: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that when the Territorial Army is reconstituted, it will be amateur officers who will have to go to these drills; and when he says "the Army," does he mean that these amateur officers have to add to their other tasks the great labour of keeping P.A.Y.E. accounts and making deductions? Is he aware that this is likely to wreck the whole scheme of reconstitution?

Mr. Dalton: I would hope that there were no grounds for the pessimistic view the hon. and gallant Member has expressed in the last part of his Question. We are now working out the exact detailed arrangements for all these matters regarding the Territorial Army, and we are approaching it with the utmost goodwill and desire to make the scheme work. If there is any proposal the hon. and gallant Gentleman can make on the matter, I shall be very glad to look into it.

Dollar Credits (Capital Goods)

58. **Mr. M. Lindsay** asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what percentage of dollar credits was spent on the purchase

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of capital goods during January, 1947, or during the last month for which figures are available.

Mr. Dalton: Five per cent. of our imports from U.S.A. in December were machinery.

Mr. Lindsay: May I ask how the right hon. Gentleman reconciles the figure he has given with the statement made to the House on 12th December, 1945, that it is indispensable some considerable part of the dollar credit should be spent on the purchase of capital goods? Does he consider 5 per cent. is a considerable part?

Mr. Dalton: I stand ready to deliver dollars for any orders for machinery from the United States sponsored by any Government Department.

Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyre: Can the Chancellor of the Exchequer give the corresponding figure for Canadian dollars?

Mr. Dalton: Not without notice.

Mr. Jennings: Can the Chancellor say why the Government Departments have not made these claims? Surely they must be asleep.

Car Taxation (Disabled Persons)

59. **Mr. Skinnard** asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether a war-disabled person who, by reason of his civil occupation, has been assisted to obtain a motor car instead of an invalid chair, can claim exemption from, or partial reduction of, the Road Fund tax normally payable on his vehicle.

Mr. Dalton: No, Sir.

Mr. Skinnard: In view of the fact that some relief is granted to disabled persons who have invalid chairs, and in view of the fact that cars are in lieu of chairs because of the nature of the work these people have to do, cannot some relief be given comparable to the other disabled persons?

Mr. Dalton: The position is that invalid carriages are totally exempt, providing they do not weigh more than 5 cwt. In the case of private cars, I have tried to explain on previous occasions that we must, for administrative reasons, base the tax on the nature of the article taxed, and cannot base the tax on the use to which it is put, which is administratively impossible. We have tried to meet the urgency of these cases by exempting invalid carriages in all cases up to 5 cwt.

Loans to Foreign Countries

60. **Mr. Charles Taylor** asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to which countries loans have been made by the British Government since the end of hostilities; and if he will give details.

Mr. Dalton: I will, with permission, circulate details in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Following are the details:

The Amount of loans made to foreign Governments since the end of hostilities, and not yet repaid, is about £37 million, viz.:

	£
France, under Agreement of March, 1945	21,350,000
Greece, for stabilisation of currency	10,000,000
U.S.S.R., execution of Wartime Agreement	4,050,000
Czechoslovakia, post-war reconstruction credit	2,120,000

Currency Export Restrictions

61. **Viscount Hinchingbrooke** asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to what extent restrictions on the amount of money taken out by travellers will be relaxed for those countries where visas have been, or may be, abolished.

Mr. Dalton: Not at all.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: What is the point of relaxing the technical restrictions on travel, if the financial restrictions are not also relaxed? Will not the right hon. Gentleman back up the Foreign Secretary, who I understand is interested in this matter?

Mr. Dalton: The Foreign Secretary is just as well aware as I and the noble Lord of the need to conserve foreign exchange, which is as great as if not greater than ever before.

Coal Output (P.A.Y.E.)

63. **Mr. De la Bère** asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that production graphs kept by most collieries throughout the country show good outputs of coal on Monday and Tuesday each week and general tendencies of a heavy decline on Thursday and Friday; and if he will inquire as to the extent such

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[Mr. De la Bère.]
declines are attributable to the dislike of the miners to Pay As You Earn and make the result of such an inquiry public.

Mr. Dalton: No, Sir.

Mr. De la Bère: Is it not the truth that P.A.Y.E. is doing an immense amount of harm to increased production throughout the country? Is it not the case that the Chancellor knows the truth of that, does not like it, and cannot think of a suitable answer?

Mr. Dalton: No, Sir, the fact is that the hon. Gentleman has been misinformed. I have consulted the Ministry of Fuel and Power, which are the authority on these matters, and they entirely disagree with the hon. Member's statement that coal output generally falls on Thursday and Friday. That is not the case, and so the hon. Gentleman's Question falls to the ground.

Mr. Gallacher: Is it not the case that output in this House begins to decline by Friday?

Mr. De la Bère: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the graphs I have demonstrate beyond all doubts that what I have said is so, and will he allow me to send him some copies so that he will not dispute what I have said? I would rather have the opinions which have been given to me than the opinion of the Ministry of Fuel and Power.

Mr. Dalton: I should be glad to receive relevant information from any pitman, including the hon. Member.

Re-exports (Customs Checks)

64. **Mr. Mallalieu** asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what steps he is taking to ensure that invoices and other documents covering goods re-exported from this country correctly describe the goods so re-exported.

Mr. Dalton: There are Customs checks on the accuracy of export documents. It would be contrary to the public interest to give details.

Mr. Mallalieu: But is the Chancellor aware that goods described on the invoice as "Fine quality cotton, British made" turned out on examination in Denmark to be poor quality woollen, Italian made, and that this was only one example of such complaints now being made in Denmark?

Mr. Dalton: If my hon. Friend will send me particulars I shall be glad to look into them, but the Customs are not so simple as they seem.

Canadian Loan (Purchases)

65. **Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyre** asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the classes of goods that have been purchased from proceeds of the Canadian Loan; and the amount expended on each class.

Mr. Dalton: No, Sir. As I explained to the hon. Members for Newbury (Mr. Hurd) and Hallam (Mr. Jennings) on 28th January, in connection with the American credit, it is impossible to separate dollars from the Canadian credit and dollars from current trade.

Anglo-Danish Trade

66. **Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyre** asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer in terms of sterling, the anticipated additional expenditure in kroner during 1947 as a result of the ratification of the Anglo-Danish trade negotiations.

Mr. Dalton: No, Sir. We do not yet know what quantities the Danes will, in fact, be able to deliver.

Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyre: Will the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that authoritative statements made at Copenhagen, that we were going to pay more for agricultural imports from Denmark, and undertake to ship animal feedingstuffs to Denmark, under this agreement, will not be realised?

Mr. Dalton: We have been negotiating with the Danes with a view to getting some food out of them, and the amount of food they can deliver will depend upon the volume of Danish imports of feedingstuffs. The two are connected, and are within the terms of the discussion which is now going on.

Colonel Crosthwaite-Eyre: Would it not be better to keep our feedingstuffs here, and let home agriculture have a chance, for once?

Mr. Dalton: I daresay that my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture would have an opinion about that, if the hon. and gallant Gentleman would put a Question on the Paper.

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National Savings

68. **Mr. Boyd-Carpenter** asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury if he will state, with reference to the latest convenient period, the proportion of National Saving Certificates bought through the savings group system of the National Savings Committee.

The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Glenvil Hall): Twenty per cent. in the six months ended 30th September last.

POST OFFICE (DISABLED PERSONS)

62. **Mr. W. R. Williams** asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer why the report of the Joint Committee of the Post Office Departmental Whitley Council on the employment of disabled persons in the Departmental grades of the Post Office, which was signed by all affected interests in May, 1946, has been held up by the Treasury since July, 1946, and when the report is to be promulgated.

Mr. Dalton: Most of the recommendations dealing with the types of work appropriate to disabled persons in the Post Office are already being put into effect. Those relating to conditions of service raise issues outside the Post Office field. These are now being considered.

HANSARD (PUBLIC LIBRARIES)

69. **Mr. Peter Freeman** asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury how many public libraries take the daily and weekly HANSARD; and how many do not.

Mr. Glenvil Hall: Three hundred and eighty-six take the daily, and 318 the weekly, edition. I am unable to give the number who do not take HANSARD.

Mr. Freeman: Can my right hon. Friend say how those figures compare with the numbers previously issued to public libraries?

Mr. Hall: I have not the exact figures, but I believe that an answer was given in the House a few years ago to the effect that about 454 libraries took HANSARD in one shape or another although, of course, the weekly edition was not then published.

Sir T. Moore: Has the right hon. Gentleman any analysis of the political hostility to the Government as the result of this widespread circulation?

Mr. Hall: On the contrary, it would appear that libraries are taking a greater interest than formerly in the proceedings of this House.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: Can my right hon. Friend say how much it would cost to make HANSARD available daily to every library in the country? Would not that be a matter worth considering?

Mr. Hall: I cannot give the exact figure but, obviously, it would mean a loss, depending on the number of libraries which actually took HANSARD. We are not sure how many libraries there are, but I believe they number 600 to 700. There is, of course, a loss on the daily issue.

TRADE AND COMMERCE

Departmental Staff

71. **Mr. De la Bère** asked the President of the Board of Trade the number of civil servants employed by his Department in London and the provinces on 1st January, 1946, and 1947.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Mr. Belcher): The number of non-industrial civil servants employed by the Board of Trade in London and the provinces was 8,121 on 1st January, 1946, and 15,197 on 1st January, 1947. The increase was mainly due to the transfer of staff during 1946 from the former Ministry of Production, Department of Overseas Trade, and the Raw Materials Department of the Ministry of Supply. In addition, the Board of Trade employed, on 1st January, 1947, 2,572 industrial civil servants who had been transferred during 1946 from the Ministry of Supply.

Mr. De la Bère: In view of the great shortage of manpower, surely it is possible for the Board of Trade to pull themselves together in this matter?

Mr. Belcher: The answer I have given indicates that the increase in the number of staff employed by the Board of Trade is due, in the main, to transfers from other Government Departments, including one which is no longer in being. If it will give the hon. Member any satisfaction, I

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can tell him that we are at present conducting an investigation into the establishment of the Board of Trade, with a view to reducing numbers.

Mr. Eden: Would the hon. Gentleman bear in mind, when making that investigation, that the transfers of which he speaks with so much pride are from wartime Government Departments, which should now be closed? Surely it is reasonable to hope that when wartime Departments are closed their staffs should be dispensed with, and not merely transferred.

Mr. Belcher: It is true that they are wartime Government Departments, but it is also true that many of their functions remain.

New Factories, Scotland

72. **Mr. Willis** asked the President of the Board of Trade the number of new projects completed in Scotland at the latest available date; and the number of jobs thus provided for men and women, respectively.

Mr. Belcher: At 31st January, 56 new factories and extensions had been completed and were employing 1,834 men and 1,342 women.

Railway Rolling Stock (Export)

74. **Mr. S. O. Davies** asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will now cease exporting locomotives and wagons, having regard to the fact that the shortage of such rolling stock has contributed to the failure in the distribution of our coal supplies.

Mr. Belcher: No, Sir. I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply which was given to the right hon. Member for the City of London (Mr. Assheton) on 28th January, which applies to wagons as well as to locomotives.

Football Pools (Supplies)

75. **Mr. Nally** asked the President of the Board of Trade what reply he intends to give to the application for a paper licence from an organisation known as National Football Pools; and if he will state the procedure adopted by his Department in dealing with this and other applications for paper licences made by the proprietors of newly-established football pool firms.

Mr. Belcher: No application for a licence for paper has been received from National Football Pools. It is, however, our practice to licence paper for pools only to firms which were operating before the war, and on the basis of their prewar consumption.

Mr. Nally: In view of the fact that, to meet the requirements of the proposed new venture mentioned in the first part of the Question, a staff of at least 1,000 would be needed, will my hon. Friend give a specific assurance that under no circumstances will any help be given to new firms in the industry to further waste man and woman power, and will he do his best to restrict the operations and expansion of the older pool firms.

Mr. Belcher: That is going rather beyond the terms of the original Question. My answer indicates that if an application for paper is received from a new organisation according to our present practice they will not be eligible to receive it.

76. **Mr. Nally** asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will give an undertaking that his Department will not issue any further licences to manufacturers of desks and other office equipment for production to meet the needs of football pools organisations.

Mr. Belcher: No, Sir.

Triplicate Forms

77. **Sir W. Smithers** asked the President of the Board of Trade why, in Form T.C.3/8/CPL to be completed in triplicate, the green and pink copies omit sections vii and viii which appear on the buff form.

Mr. Belcher: These particular sections of the form are for use by the consumer and the supplier after the licence has been granted. Since the green and pink copies are retained for official use there is no object in printing these sections on them.

Sir W. Smithers: Can the hon. Gentleman say how anyone can comply with the requirements to fill up a form in triplicate, if the forms are not identical?

Mr. Belcher: They will fill up the form in triplicate in so far as it is possible for them to do so. If, on two sections of the form, there is no question asked, it is impossible for an answer to be given.

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Sir W. Smithers: Is it not a trap being laid; and who but a Socialist bureaucrat would be responsible for such a farcical procedure?

OLD AGE PENSIONS

87. **Mr. William Teeling** asked the Minister of National Insurance whether he is aware that the hon. Member for Brighton has received over 50 complaints during the last 14 days from constituents who have been kept for anything up to five months without pensions and without replies to their queries from his Department; that they are running into debt and in some cases are in dire need; whether this constituency is exceptional; and what he proposes to do to stop these delays.

The Minister of National Insurance (Mr. James Griffiths): I assume the hon. Member refers to cases in which title to the higher rate of pension has been claimed after the beginning of October. I have had inquiries made, and I find that there have been special local difficulties in clearing these cases in the Brighton area. These have now been removed and the work of clearance should proceed speedily.

Mr. Teeling: The right hon. Gentleman says that they have now been cleared. Is he aware that only yesterday 15 people came to see me on this subject, and they simply have not the money and cannot carry on?

Mr. Griffiths: I said that they were being cleared immediately. I am sorry if there were local difficulties at Brighton, but as soon as I heard about them, I took immediate steps to clear them.

Major Bruce: In these circumstances, will my right hon. Friend resist all pressure from the Opposition to decrease the number of civil servants?

Major Legge-Bourke: Will the Minister bear in mind that, from all accounts, Blackpool seems to be working very slowly indeed, and that only today I had to send him four cases.

Mr. Griffiths: I am very conscious indeed of the difficulties in organisation, which I am trying to improve. We are working a very great scheme, and while there have been disappointments, I would remind hon. Members that there are millions of pensioners drawing a higher sion than ever before.

Mr. Keeling: Is the Minister aware that Brighton is by no means unique in this respect?

Mr. Driberg: Will my right hon. Friend take care to ensure that assistance board officials do, in every case, give help as promptly as possible, on an interim basis, as he intended, because, in some cases, they do not seem to know his intention?

Mr. Griffiths: Yes, Sir, and if my hon. Friend knows of any case perhaps he would let me know.

EMPLOYMENT

Poles, Scotland

89. **Mr. Hector Hughes** asked the Minister of Labour how many Poles are there now in Scotland; how many are in the city and county of Aberdeen, respectively; how many are still in uniform and how are they employed; and, of the remainder, how many are employed and unemployed, respectively

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour (Mr. Ness Edwards): As the answer contains a number of figures, I will, with my hon. Friend's permission, circulate a statement in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Mr. Hughes: Will my hon. Friend see that, as many of these men are retained in this country, they are properly trained for useful industries and absorbed into useful industries?

Mr. Ness Edwards: That is the task upon which we are engaged.

Mr. H. Hynd: Can some of them be transferred to Northern Ireland?

Following is the Statement:

There were, at 13th February, 29,772 uniformed Poles in Scotland of whom 541 were in the city of Aberdeen and 4,595 in the county of Aberdeen. About 13,200 of these were employed on camp maintenance and other service duties and tasks, and about 1,430 were on loan for civilian work. Others are receiving instruction or training. With regard to numbers out of uniform, about 1,010 had been relegated to the Reserve for civilian employment, of whom some 340 have remained in Scotland. I have no indication that any

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appreciable number of these are unemployed. Of the total number in uniform 9,350 had not yet joined the Resettlement Corps.

Dockers (Extra Payment)

90. **Commander Noble** asked the Minister of Labour whether he will enumerate the claims made by dockers in the past six months for special extra payments for unloading cargoes.

The Minister of Labour (Mr. Isaacs): I have no information on which a reply to this question can be based. The claims referred to by the hon. Member are normally settled through the joint negotiating machinery in the industry.

Disabled Persons' Factory

91. **Mr. Frank Anderson** asked the Minister of Labour when it is anticipated that building operations will commence for the disabled persons' factory at Cleator Moor and how many men this factory will employ.

Mr. Isaacs: I anticipate the building of a factory to employ 50 severely disabled persons will begin within the next two months. If so, it will be ready early in 1948. Meanwhile, I hope to open temporary premises to employ some of these disabled men.

Training Centre, Egremont

92. **Mr. F. Anderson** asked the Minister of Labour, with regard to the proposal to use the Egremont Army huts for a training centre, when this training centre will be opened; how many are to be trained as a first unit; from what source the trainees will be secured and for what particular trades they are going to be trained.

Mr. Isaacs: Progress on adaptations to the premises at Egremont has been retarded by weather but it is hoped they will be available for training during April. The centre will provide training for the building trades and will accommodate approximately 200 trainees who will be recruited from ex-Servicemen and others who are eligible for training under the Vocational Training Scheme.

R.A.F. Unit (Redundant Staff)

93. **Mr. Peter Freeman** asked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware that eight ex-Servicemen with more than five years temporary Government service, will be declared redundant at the Maintenance Unit, R.A.F. Branch in Newport, at the end of February; how many additional clerks in South Wales are required by Inland Revenue; and whether the above men will be offered some of these jobs, in place of the positions in temporary posts, at a reduction in pay and with no allowance for board and lodging that have hitherto been offered to them.

Mr. Isaacs: I understand that 20 men and women clerks, including eight ex-Servicemen, will become redundant as a result of closing the R.A.F. Maintenance Unit at Newport. All of these have been offered alternative employment at a Royal Air Force establishment at Bicester and five have accepted. I am informed that the Inland Revenue do not expect any vacancies for temporary clerks to occur in South Wales apart from those which result from normal staff wastage.

Mr. Freeman: Is my right hon. Friend aware that these men do not want to leave the camp in which they are now working because it would impose great hardship on them, particularly in finding housing and other accommodation; and may I ask him whether efforts could be made to find them other jobs in South Wales?

Mr. Isaacs: Yes, Sir. Efforts have been made and will continue to be made to find local employment of a suitable kind.

SERVICES LAND REQUIREMENTS

The Prime Minister: The Government have under close consideration the demands of the Service Departments for land for training and defence purposes. Particular matters under examination are the amount of land required, the extent to which training can be carried out abroad, the feasibility of utilising the more remote and less populated parts of the country, particularly Scotland, and the effect of the proposals on agriculture, amenity and other interests. When this examination is completed, a White Paper will be issued.

Meanwhile, through inter-departmental machinery, consideration has now been given to certain areas of particular importance, namely, Harlech, Dartmoor, Braunton Burrows, Ashdown Forest, Purbeck, Castlemartin, and Martindale. Decisions have been reached as follows, references to acreages being approximate:

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(i) **In** the case of Harlech, the Government have reached the conclusion that the harm to the public interest, if it were retained, would be so grave that its use for peacetime training purposes must be abandoned.

(ii) The original proposals of the War Office and the Admiralty in respect of Dartmoor, involving about 75,000 acres in all, have been modified with the result that the amount of land required has been reduced to 58,000 acres. It may be possible to reduce this even more by up to 11,000 acres by arrangements for joint use. Of the 58,000 acres, the public would be excluded from 28,000, as compared with 49,000 under the original proposals. Over 14,000 acres there would be not only prohibition of access to the public, but some restriction on grazing. A public local inquiry will be held into the proposals in their modified form before a decision on the retention of the area is reached.

(iii) As regards Braunton Burrows (including Northern Burrows) the area has been reduced from 1,200 to 700 acres, the land to be surrendered including a rifle range. No agricultural land would be involved and service use would not prevent public access to any part of the area apart from eight acres at Instow except for a total of 12 days in the year when firing takes place. Use of the area save for a very small portion would involve training rights only. The proposal, as modified, will be the subject of a public local inquiry before a decision on the retention of the area is taken.

(iv) The area of land required in the Ashdown Forest has been reduced from 7,500 to 7,000 acres, and public access and the use of the land for grazing purposes would be the same as before the war. In this case also a public local inquiry will be held before a decision on the retention of the area is taken.

(v) As regards the Purbeck area, comprising 6,940 acres, no reconciliation of military and civil interests has been found possible. The retention of the land for tank training purposes would involve the loss of 1,500 acres of cultivatable land, 3,000 acres of rough grazing land, and exclusion of the public from 6,540 acres, including the coastline from Worbarrow Tout to the west of Kimmeridge Bay. A public local inquiry will be held before a decision on the retention of this area is taken.

(vi) The use of the Castlemartin area as a tank training area was approved by the Government of the day in 1938, after full consideration of all the factors, and the land involved has, save for a very small portion, already been acquired by the War Office. The area is most suitable as a tank training range and considerable sums of money have been spent on the necessary installations. Moreover, as the result of discussions with the interests concerned, modifications of the original proposals have been made which would greatly reduce the detriment to civilian interests. Out of a total of 5,960 acres, about 5,000 are suitable for cultivation and grazing. Of this amount, 1,500 acres would be likely to remain permanently available for agricultural use, while some 2,500 would still be usable for these purposes until such time as the tank range came into full use. Limited access to the coastline by the public would also be possible. About $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles of the coastline would be open to the public on Saturdays and Sundays and on any other day when firing is not in progress, and special arrangements would be made for visits by scientific bodies to the remaining three miles of coastline which would otherwise have to remain closed on account of the danger of unexploded shells; but though much has been done to safeguard civilian interests, the Government have decided that a public local inquiry should be held before a decision is taken.

(vii) A decision regarding the Martindale field firing range awaits the result of a search for an alternative area in which local interests are co-operating. This search has been delayed by the weather, but is likely to be successful.

Sir C. Headlam: Can the Prime Minister tell me whether anything has been decided with regard to the Redesdale artillery range?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir, I cannot make an announcement on that particular area at the present moment.

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Mr. Clement Davies: May I ask the Prime Minister whether, apart from the specific cases to which he has referred, a local public inquiry will be held in every case before any land is taken, and whether such inquiries will be heard as near to the locality as possible; and may I add that there will be great satisfaction in Wales with regard to the decision concerning Harlech?

The Prime Minister: If it is a major matter there will be a public inquiry, but I am sure that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will realise that if the case were that of a small site such a procedure might not be worth while.

Mr. Medland: Will the Prime Minister bear in mind the necessity for fixing a very early date for the public inquiry on Dartmoor, having regard to the importance of arranging for the summer holiday tourist traffic?

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir, it will be arranged as soon as possible.

Mr. Eden: Although the right hon. Gentleman's announcement in regard to a number of cases in which public inquiries are to be held will no doubt be welcomed, may I ask him to give the House an assurance that no action will be taken by Government Departments in respect of any of this land until after the conclusion of the public inquiry?

The Prime Minister: Where land is already in occupation it will continue to be occupied as at present until the inquiry is held, but if there is a case which involves taking something new it would obviously be improper to do so before the inquiry was concluded.

Mr. Eden: I am much obliged to the Prime Minister, but does he realise that this has in fact happened?

Sir G. Jeffreys: Will the Prime Minister tell the House what will be the approximate increase in the acreage on Dartmoor as compared with what was occupied by the War Office before the war in the Okehampton range and the background to it, and in the Purbeck area, because both were occupied by the War Office to a certain extent before the war?

The Prime Minister: I am sorry, but I have not that prewar figure with me. If the hon. and gallant Member puts down a Question I will give him the information.

Mr. Driberg: Although it has not so far been found practicable, would my right hon. Friend re-examine the possibility of training in Canada, bearing in mind not only the question of expense of transport, etc., but the positively good effect on inter-Commonwealth relations of the Empire Air Training Scheme during the war?

The Prime Minister: All these matters have already been given close examination, but there are obvious difficulties such as expense and trouble of movements, etc., and I do not think it is possible at the moment.

Mr. Emrys Roberts: While expressing deep appreciation of the decision to release Harlech, which will be widely welcomed in my constituency and throughout Wales, may I ask the Prime Minister if consideration will be given to the position of Wales as a whole and not merely to particular camps, bearing in mind that the percentage of land occupied by military camps in Wales is about 10 per cent. of the whole as against 3 per cent. in England and 3 per cent. in Scotland; can we have an overall plan for Wales?

The Prime Minister: We shall consider the country as a whole and shall try to take areas which will do the least harm to agricultural amenities and other economic activities, and of course there are parts of Wales that are not very cultivable.

Mr. Vane: Could not the Prime Minister say a little more about the Lake District because he has only mentioned Martindale which is a small area, and there are many larger areas also involved?

The Prime Minister: I have given the information about areas where decisions have already been reached. I am awaiting a full report before other decisions are taken. Further decisions will be announced as soon as possible.

Mr. Skeffington-Lodge: Can my right hon. Friend say to what extent the proposed national parks areas are affected by what he has announced today.

The Prime Minister: Not without notice.

Mr. Keeling: At the beginning of his statement the Prime Minister referred to Service requirements of land for training

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Mr. Stanley: I will leave the hon. Gentleman to pursue that point. Although I agree with much of the right hon. Gentleman's definition of the difficulties that face anyone looking for a solution in Palestine, we must remember that a mere statement of difficulty in the end gets us nowhere, and that, however difficult it is, sometime, somehow, somebody must make a decision, somebody must choose between those difficulties, somebody must choose between the dangers, and among alternative courses all of which may be dangerous somebody must find the courage to choose the least bad.

I do not propose today to follow the right hon. Gentleman in his analysis of all the various solutions that have been put forward. If I did I should have something to say about the solution which I have always confessed would be the one I should prefer, but which he dismissed rather summarily and not entirely objectively. We have to face quite a different situation today from that to which the right hon. Gentleman's speech was devoted. We have to face the fact that the Government are not themselves announcing a policy, which we either criticise or approve, or against which we can put up some alternative solution. The Government are defending or explaining a decision that they will, under certain circumstances and at a certain time, go to the United Nations and obtain from them the advice, and if possible the support, which they need, and it is to that decision rather than to a perhaps airy discussion of the various alternatives which have been put forward for Palestine that I want to devote my attention this afternoon.

I want to make it plain from the beginning that as far as we on this side are concerned we have no complaint to make at all about a reference of this problem at this stage to the United Nations. We agree that in any case it would have been necessary, *ex post facto*, to submit any solution we proposed to the Trusteeship Council, and we agree that in the special circumstances of the day it may well be that rather than that it is better to get prior approval and support from the Assembly. While we do not criticise the decision to go to the United Nations, we criticise both the timing of that appeal and the method of the appeal. We find it very difficult to understand the delay that has already taken place. The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary advanced the principle, for which there is much to be said, that in default of agreement between the two parties, it is necessary to go to the United Nations for a decision, but the right hon. Gentleman must have known—and so must his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies—many months ago that there was really no prospect of agreement between Jews and Arabs, if by "agreement" one means a prospect of those two parties coming together and setting their names to a policy which is then to be carried out.

Certainly, in the years I was connected with the problem I never heard any expert connected either with the Foreign Office or with the Colonial Office suggest that there was any possibility of that occurring, and I should be very surprised if, in the intervening months, they had changed their minds. I was always told—and I believe this still to be the case—that in no circumstances would either side dare to make in advance the concessions that would be necessary to secure agreement, and therefore, what one had to aim at was not to attempt the imposition of an agreement beforehand, but to attempt oneself to find a solution which it might be possible that both sides would acquiesce in afterwards. If it was the decision of the Government that, in default of agreement, the whole matter should be referred to the United Nations, I suggest that it was the duty of the Government so to arrange their programme of announcements and discussions that, when the moment came to make that reference to the United Nations, it could come speedily and without the intolerable delay which now confronts us.

In view of the decision of which we are now told, I cannot understand the events of last summer. The Morrison plan, as it is called—I think not because the right hon. Gentleman the Lord President of the Council invented it, but because he read it—was produced at the very beginning of August. It was made abundantly clear by both parties, Jews and Arabs, that it was not acceptable to them, and the rejection was based not upon this or that detail which might have been susceptible to modification, but on a fundamental divergence of view which

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has come up on every proposal that has been made—who is to control immigration, not for this year, not for next year, but in perpetuity, because the man who controls immigration decides whether there is to be a Jewish or an Arab majority, and whoever decides whether there is to be a Jewish or an Arab majority decides whether there is to be a Jewish or an Arab State. In those circumstances, it would have been easy to have—as one had to have for the sake of courtesy—the discussions with Jews and Arabs, although they were bound to result in failure, at the beginning of August and some time in October, when the meeting of the Assembly of the United Nations took place. It would have been easy to establish at that time this fundamental disagreement between the two parties, and it would have been easy to bring it before the United Nations in October last for the decision which has now to be postponed until next September. Indeed, it is very difficult, if this has always been the plan of the Government, to understand one particular passage in the speech which the President of the Board of Trade made in that Debate, because the suggestion, which is now the policy of the Government, that the matter might be referred to the United Nations was made during the Debate by several hon. Members, and this was the answer of the President of the Board of Trade:

"One or two hon. Members yesterday made the suggestion that the whole matter ought now to be referred to U.N.O. for fresh decisions and suggestions. It will of course be necessary for the terms of the trusteeship agreement which is to supersede the Mandate to be settled by U.N.O. . . . indeed, many hon. Members have already stressed the need for a speedy decision, and have noted quite rightly"—

this was last August—

"the deterioration in atmosphere that has gone on while we have been awaiting the present agreement. In the existing circumstances we believe a quick decision to be absolutely essential."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st August, 1946; Vol. 426, c. 1241.]

It was because of the need for a quick decision last August that the idea that it might have been referred to U.N.O. last October was rejected by the President of the Board of Trade. How can we reconcile that with the present proposal that it should go to the United Nations next September? I shall await from the right hon. Gentleman an explanation, and failing that, the Government will have to bear a responsibility for a delay which, on their own claim, could have been avoided, and a delay which has already caused much difficulty. To turn now, not to the delay which has taken place, but to the delay that lies in front of us, is there no way of avoiding that seven months' delay between now and the meeting of the ordinary Assembly of the United Nations in September next? I regard that delay as being fraught with all possible dangers, as something that ought to be avoided at all costs, and I beg the Government, if it is in any way possible, to curtail that delay. The suggestion was made to the right hon. Gentleman that one might get over this difficulty by referring the matter to the Security Council under Article 34. He replied that it was not within the terms of Article 34, and he did not think it threatened the peace of the world, but perhaps I might quote to him something which he said on 30th November, 1945:

"Considerations not only of equity and of humanity, but also of international amity and world peace, are thus involved in any search for solution."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 13th November, 1945; Vol. 415, c. 1928.]

In his speech today, the right hon. Gentleman referred to Palestine as a sore spot which, if not settled, would lead to wider disturbances; and it is difficult to see how, in view of those statements of the right hon. Gentleman, it would not be possible to bring this question within the ambit of the Security Council. It may well be that the right hon. Gentleman does not think the Security Council the right body to settle the matter, but one of the merits of bringing it before the Security Council in the first place is that the Security Council, under Article 20, could call a special meeting on the Assembly to consider the question, and it might be possible then still to submit this question to the Assembly of the United Nations, but to submit it much earlier than September, which is the date of the ordinary meeting. I feel that, whatever the difficulties, every attempt should be made to bridge a gap which may well prove to be disastrous to the possibility of any final settlement, and will certainly impose an immense strain on our own people during that period.

The second thing that we regret about the form in which this appeal is being made to the United Nations, is the fact that His Majesty's Government propose

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to lay the question before the Assembly with no indication of the policy which they themselves prefer. All kinds of suggestions, with some of which the right hon. Gentleman has dealt today, are to be put before the United Nations, for them to make their choice, but we, apparently, are to express no choice ourselves. It is clear, of course, that, after all these months, His Majesty's Government must have some view of their own upon this question. They must, despite difficulties and dangers, have made up their own minds which plan they think will have the best chance of proving to be a final and lasting settlement in Palestine. If they have such a view, how can they avoid, in the long run, putting it forward? They cannot go to the Assembly of U.N.O., hear all those various plans, and sit there in complete silence, without joining in the discussion at all. Of course not. It would be a ridiculous attitude to adopt. If they are going to join in the discussion and add their view, they surely must know, before they begin, where they want to lead the discussion and what object their arguments are intended to reach. They must, therefore, whatever be the position now, disclose to the Assembly, as soon as the discussions start, and then to us, what policy His Majesty's Government prefer upon this question. If that is so, if, next September, they have to make a choice and a recommendation, would it not be very much better to make it now?

It seems to me that there are two good reasons for doing it. The first is that if His Majesty's Government have a view —they cannot go to the meeting of the Assembly without it—this House and the country are entitled to know what it is and whether it is a policy which they will support. When the policy is disclosed at the Assembly it may well be too late for this House or the country to express approval or disapproval of the course then taken. The second reason why it might be wise to make the declaration now rather than in September is this: we are to go through a very dangerous period in the next six months. Let us not close our eyes to that fact. Jew and Arab will start from now, and will spend the intervening months in lobbying members of the Assembly in support of their two viewpoints. All the arts and wiles of propaganda and persuasion will be brought, in these six months, from both sides upon the nations who will form the Assembly. During that time, those nations will be left without any guidance as to what is the middle course which we, as Mandatory, would recommend. It does seem that, in the absence of that guidance, and of any recommendation, there is a very great danger that quite a number of nations will arrive at the Assembly next September with their minds already made up, influenced by the propaganda and publicity which they have received.

Mr. Scollan (Renfrew, Western): Is there not a chance that if Arabs and Jews do not know what the policy of the Government is, they might reconsider the whole position in the intervening period before the meeting of the Assembly?

Mr. Stanley: Why should anybody, Jew or Arab, reconsider their position during the intervening period. Their obvious line, before they go to the Assembly, is first to get as many friends as they can for their point of view, and then to present to the United Nations their own point of view complete, and 100 per cent. That is why I should prefer that, during those six months, the whole field should not be held by those two rival policies, both of them extreme, and that there should be in the field a third policy, that of His Majesty's Government. It is for that reason that we think there will be far more chance of success if His Majesty's Government, when they go to U.N.O. in September, were not to go there merely to empty upon the table of U.N.O. a wastepaper basket full of all the discarded plans of past years, but should go there to state clearly what their own views are and to ask the Assembly to support and approve them.

Our final criticism of the way in which the appeal has been made is that it contains no indication of what is to be our line after the Assembly has discussed this plan. I know that it means that any decision we make and any views we adopt today, must be on certain assumptions. This is the sort of matter in which any Government must look forward. It is quite true that, by their decision to refer this matter to U.N.O., a certain amount of time has been bought, although I think it has been bought pretty dearly. For some months, right hon. Gentlemen opposite will be able to

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[Mr. Stanley.]

return the answer to any question on their policy, that they cannot be expected to anticipate the discussions in the United Nations. It is true that for their supporters this is a postponement of the inevitable conflict between the pledges which many of them gave at the Election, and action which is likely to be taken by the Government which they support. For those reasons, a postponement of this kind is generally popular. It is also usually disastrous, for the only result of the postponement is merely to let things drift on so that, a few months later, we can take up again the question that we have been afraid to tackle today.

The least the Government can do is to prepare now for the possibilities of the Assembly when it meets. It may happen that, when the Assembly meets in September, some new plan will be proposed and that the whole of the fifty-odd nations will gather together and will agree to it, and that it will then be approved by Jew and by Arab. It would be a miracle if that happened. For years, people on all sides, with ability and talent, have been searching for a possible variation of any scheme that might be used as a solution of this problem. It is unlikely that, in a few months some wholly new proposal will be found. Every proposal that has yet been made has caused divisions in Palestine, and divisions in parties here, and even, it is sometimes rumoured, divisions in Cabinets. Probably what will happen when the United Nations meets next September is that there will be no such unanimity; that, in fact there will be the same divisions among the nations there as can be found among peoples and parties; and that, whatever final decision is taken, if any decision is taken, it will be arrived at by a majority, with a minority supporting the other viewpoint.

If such a situation arises, as it is almost sure to arise, it is important that we should be quite clear what is the position of this country and to what we have committed ourselves. Therefore, I would like to ask the right hon. Gentleman when he replies to answer two questions. The first is this. Are we pledged by our reference to U.N.O. to accept the majority decision, whatever it may be, and, what is important, of whomsoever the minority may consist? I appreciate that if there were an overwhelming majority, including all the great States, and that unanimity were only broken by a few small nations whose interest in the problem might, perhaps, be very remote, we would be quite entitled to treat that as a unanimous decision and to act upon it. But there might be a very different situation. We might have a situation in which there was a majority for a certain proposal, but in the minority there might be included at least one of the major Powers. We have to face this fact, that if there were a divergence at the Assembly, with some taking one side and some taking the other, even if we had a majority in favour of a particular course, if the minority included powerful States it would be very difficult to get the communities concerned to accept the decision, as we want them to accept it, as a final settlement. I want to know, therefore, whether, if there is merely a majority decision, we are committed to accept it and enforce it on the people of Palestine. Secondly, I want to ask if we are to carry out the recommendations of the majority even if they indicate a course with which we ourselves disagree. I quite appreciate that if we are to be loyal to the United Nations we must accept and acquiesce in the decision which they make, but there is a great difference between that and asking our troops and using our resources to enforce a decision of which we ourselves may not be in favour and which we cannot defend.

Those are the two questions. I would like to know whether our reference to U.N.O. in any way commits us to carry out a decision of the United Nations, however it is arrived at, with which we ourselves are not in agreement. Surely, it would be better to say now what we shall have to say in the end, namely, that failing agreement between the United Nations upon some policy which we ourselves can support, we will surrender the Mandate of Palestine and leave it to the United Nations themselves to appoint a successor and frame a policy. The principle of fixing a date and saying that if by that date something does not happen, we should clear out, is not a principle to which His Majesty's Government have any objection. They are doing it in India in much more difficult circumstances, in much more complicated conditions of greater danger and in circumstances where there is no United Nations organisation as a residuary legatee to whom we can hand back the responsibility which we feel no longer able to carry.

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I believe it might have a considerable effect upon the deliberations of the United Nations if we were to make this announcement now. If they were to know that their deliberations might be followed by certain consequences and that every nation who spoke and voted might have to take some part of the consequences of their speeches and their votes, it might have a very considerable effect upon their willingness to reach some sensible, practical and tolerable conclusion. Therefore, I see quite an advantage in making such a declaration now. I do not see any disadvantages. If, after the meeting of the United Nations, there has been no agreement, if the countries are found to be divided into parties supporting the Arab case and parties supporting the Jewish case, and if there is to be no concrete conclusion from that meeting, I do not think this country could ever hope to impose upon the people of Palestine any solution, whatever it may be. If we cannot hope to impose a solution and, as the right hon. Gentleman himself has said, if we cannot find a basis upon which the Mandate, which was never meant to be eternal, can be brought to an end, it is much better that we should say so at once and restore our Mandate to the United Nations, instead of continuing to jeopardise the lives of our men and pour out the all too exiguous treasures of the State in a task which, by then, will have been demonstrated to be incapable of successful conclusion.

We cannot change what has happened in the past. No one, of course, accuses the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues in the last 18 months of wasting time in the sense that we believe they have been idle or trying to put things off. Of course, that time has been lost—no one looking back over the past 18 months can deny it—but it is not the past which now matters so much as the future, and the future can be planned. All of us, in all quarters of the House, agree in the present circumstances to the appeal to the United Nations. It is only after that, that divergencies appear. We believe that that appeal should be made as soon as practicable and that, if necessary, it should go to the Security Council and, through the Security Council, to a special meeting of the Assembly in order to save time. We believe that we should go there recommending a policy ourselves, giving to the United Nations what they are surely entitled to—the views of the people who, for 30 odd years, have been actually administering the country which the United Nations had to consider. We believe that we should say, here and now, that if that policy is not approved and if we are not promised not only approval but actual support for that policy, we shall surrender our Mandate to the United Nations and leave to them future decisions—no doubt, with our assistance as an ordinary member of the United Nations Organisation.

That, at least, is a policy which would be definite and strong. At best, it might be the last chance of getting the sort of agreement at the Assembly which might enable some settlement to be imposed and accepted in Palestine. At worst, it would, at any rate, give us a definite rest from the burdens which we are now bearing and which are now becoming intolerable. The alternative proposal of His Majesty's Government is to go to the Assembly of the United Nations next September without recommending any course of action, and with no definition of what our position is to be after the Assembly have taken their decision. I regard that not as a policy, but merely a postponement. It means that next winter we shall all be sitting here discussing, once again, just the problems we are discussing now, which were discussed last August; and having to face, once again, just the decisions which we are refusing to face today. It is for that reason that I appeal to the right hon. Gentleman, before it is too late, to make, not a change in the whole thing, not an abandonment of an appeal to which we have agreed, but changes in the main, which, I believe, might offer success where now little promise prevails.

I want to say a few words upon the actual situation in Palestine, and what is likely to happen during the next few months. All of us must echo the hopes of the right hon. Gentleman that Arabs and Jews alike, in view of the discussions at the United Nations in the autumn, will, meanwhile, exercise restraint and moderation; that they will not proceed to violent extremes, if not for the sake of morality, at any rate in order not to prejudice their own case when it comes up for decision. But alas, however wise and moderate the leaders may be—and all of us hope that they will be—there are the extremists still to reckon with; and while we are still saddled with the responsibility we shall

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[Mr. Stanley.]

have to carry it out, and law and order must be maintained in the interim as rigorously as we have tried to maintain it in the past.

I have two points which I should like to put to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The first is with regard to immigration, and the rate of immigration of Jews during the period between now and next September. As the fine weather draws on, there comes, of course, the time most favourable for illegal immigration. There have been quite a number of instances, even during the storms and difficulties of the winter months. We have to expect an increase as conditions become more favourable. As I see it, in that illegal immigration during this period lies the greatest danger to peace in Palestine between now and the meeting of the Assembly. I wonder if it would not be possible, during this period, to make some special approach to the Arabs? Any increase during these few months, on which they may be asked to agree, could amount to only a few thousand; it could not possibly influence either the decision of the United Nations in September or, still less, the final result, which depends so much on numerical proportions in Palestine.

Twice already the Arabs have been approached with regard to an alteration in Jewish immigration. Although the right hon. Gentleman is quite correct when he says that they have not formally agreed, they have on both occasions acquiesced, and I think it is to their credit that they have done so, and have recognised the greater need and given attention to it. I wonder if it is not possible that they might be approached again, and that again they might acquiesce? And is it not possible that their acquiescence would be much more likely if it were possible to base any proposal for an increase during these few months on women and children alone? I do not know what the proportions have been during the past year; but I am told that an exceptionally large proportion of the legal immigrants have, in fact, been able-bodied young men. It is quite clear that a large proportion of able-bodied young men is the form of immigration which raises most fears in the hearts of the Arabs. Would it not be possible to approach them with a proposal that, over and above the 1,500 a month, between now and September a certain limited increase, drawn from those classes of people which will not cause anxiety, could be made with their consent? It might do much to smooth down possible difficulties in the intervening period.

The second question I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman is with regard to our own people. Since we last debated this question in the House only a few weeks ago, a great change has been made in the conditions under which British people live and work in Palestine. They are today living under what are nothing but siege conditions. The women and children have all been evacuated; and I think it is true to say that all officials have certainly left their homes, and are congregating in reserved and safe areas. It is a terrible life for people to be expected to lead for any long period, entailing great sacrifices and great hardships. As the House will remember, many protests were made in Palestine when that decision was taken a few weeks ago. I, myself, gave no support to those protests, because, as I understood the situation then, I thought the action the Government were taking was right. The Arab Conference was obviously breaking down, and we had been promised a statement of policy by His Majesty's Government. Everyone has always realised that immediately after a statement of policy, whatever the final result, there must be inevitably an increasing tension, and the possibility of grave disturbance.

When I read that order, in view of the forthcoming decisions, I thought the Government were taking a wise precaution in clearing the decks, and in removing the women and children. But, of course, we find now that that is not the case at all. There is no decision; the decision is postponed for at least a year; and the crisis, because of which I thought these people had been removed, now cannot occur till the end of next winter, or the beginning of next spring. In those circumstances, is it necessary or wise to maintain, during the whole of this period, the very stringent conditions which have now been imposed, and which the Government will justify by some impending crisis? Would it not be possible, for the months that are bound to elapse before an official decision is taken, to have some relaxation? Because the danger is, that if people are kept under this tension, suffering these hardships in these unnatural conditions for too long,

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when the moment of crisis comes they may already be stale, and they may not be at their best to meet it. Those are the two points I desire to put, and I should be grateful to the right hon. Gentleman if he could deal with them.

No one in this House is under any illusion today. We realise that we are discussing a matter of very grave moment for the people of this country, and indeed for the world. It is only one of the great problems that this House has to discuss in the next few weeks. There is the discussion of our own economic situation, on which depends our standard of life, and indeed our survival; the discussion on India, with all that that means in peace or chaos for four hundred million people; the discussion on Germany, with all that it will mean for the future of European civilisation, and the peace of this country. But with all those problems, grave as they are, this problem is worthy to take its place. On its solution depends the whole future of the Middle East.

There was a time, until peace began, when the Middle East was regarded as one of the key points of the British Empire. On its solution depends the attitude of Jews and Arabs to this country all over the world, with grave consequences, because they may easily affect the whole tenor of international relations. On its solution depends the safety of 100,000 British troops and British officials. On its solution depends whether the weight of the burden which has been carried, and which has to be carried, by the staggering people of this country will be lightened.

We welcome the fact that this problem has been submitted to U.N.O., but we regret the time and the manner of the appeal. If the appeal is to be presented as is now proposed, we believe it can only lead to delay, and that that delay can only be disastrous. If it is made, as we suggest, with speed and decision, we believe that it still may succeed. Now, the Foreign Secretary is not a man who is deficient in either of those two qualities, and it is, therefore, to him that we appeal —the last appeal, probably, we shall have a chance of making—to make those changes which may give a chance of success. I repeat that this, I think, may well be our last opportunity. *Post hoç occasio calva.*

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5.53 p.m.

Mrs. Ayrton Gould (Hendon, North): We have listened with great interest to both the Foreign Secretary and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley). With much of what the latter has said many, I think, on this side agree; but, at the same time, I must point out that he rather over simplified the position when he said that it is perfectly easy to discover fundamental divergencies between Jew and Arab in a short time. I should like to remind the Opposition that there never would have been the difficulties which have arisen if it had not been for the White Paper policy which was instituted in 1939. That policy started a perfectly impossible situation.

The Foreign Secretary pointed out that, in his view, the Mandate would have worked quite well up to the time of the Hitler regime. Well, it could never have worked well if the completely iniquitious White Paper policy had been imposed. The difficulty that the Government have had since they came into power in connection with Palestine was quite simply stated—though I do not think he intended it to be—by the Foreign Secretary, when he said, at one point, that we could not carry out the White Paper policy, and, at another point, that we could not tear it up. Well, if we could not do either of those things we were obviously left in a fearful muddle, and that is the position we are in now: we have a muddle over a desperately serious affair. What, in their difficulties, the Government decided to do was to carry on a modified White Paper policy, and, of course, that was not acceptable to the Jews.

I believe that, if it could be left to the Jews and Arabs inside Palestine, a unitary State could be carried on, and that they could very well solve their difficulties in the future, as they have done in the past. But the moment we get these political difficulties arising from the Arab League and the Zionist Agency outside, we have an impossible position because both try to lay down bases for Palestine, which Palestine must accept. The Arab basis, quite simply, is that they are prepared to put up with the small minority of Jews that are there, but will not have any more immigration. In the last analysis, the Jewish basis is that they want immigration until they get a majority.

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[Mrs. Ayrton Gould.]

I want to suggest that the British proposals that have been made have been altogether too simple. On immigration, it was suggested 4,000 a month should be allowed for two years, and that, at the end of the two years, when 96,000 immigrants had legally been allowed in, an Advisory Council, which would sit under the High Commissioner, composed of both Arabs and Jews, would decide on further immigration. It sounds very well; it sounds a good bit of democratic work; but one has to remember that the Arab population compared with the Jewish population is two to one, and that, therefore, the democratic advisory council set up would inevitably give a majority to the Arabs, which would enable them alone to decide—that is what it would amount to—whether there should be any Jewish immigration into Palestine at all, and, if so, how much. The recommendation says that this council should decide even what immigration is to be allowed into the Jewish State. Knowing the Arab attitude, of course, the result would be that no immigration, after the 96,000, would be allowed at all.

There has been no mention of the Discriminatory Land Law, which would, in fact, play a very large part in the outlook of the Jews. In Western Palestine, only 5 per cent. of the Jewish population are allowed to purchase, or to settle on, the land. It is then suggested that, under the trusteeship, the local authorities should decide whether there should be an increase or a reduction, even whether the actual laws themselves should continue to be operative. As I said before, the majority of the authorities in the majority of States would be Arab. It would mean, again, that the majority ruling would inevitably prevent any expansion on the land for the Jews. Therefore, what really looks like a democratic suggestion, in fact, is not a democratic suggestion at all. It could only be democratic if there were approximately the same number of Arabs and Jews who were going to vote on these duly elected bodies to make these decisions. I can only say that it is no wonder that it was not accepted.

I agree that it has seemed to take a very long time to find out that it was not acceptable. Some of us have said from the beginning, right back in October, 1945, that it was not possible, along these lines, to come to any arrangement which would be acceptable to both sides. That leaves us in the position that, either we have to impose something, or we have to agree to allow a situation to go on like the present one.

There is, I suppose, no one in the House who is prepared to accept the present intolerable situation in Palestine. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol has said that we are not prepared to allow British troops to go on having their lives endangered, and we all agree about that; neither do we wish to see British people undergoing this artificial and extremely hard life, nor are we prepared to hold a mandated territory where there is continuous terrorism, or indeed, where there is any terrorism on the present scale in Palestine. I want to ask the Government what is to happen between now and the time when the whole question comes before the United Nations. It is all very well to say we hope that both the Jewish and Arab leaders will be able to persuade their followers to be moderate and behave, but it is impossible for them to do that. In view of the situation in Palestine, it is impossible for them to keep the terrorists under control, unless something is handed to them meantime, and they are offered unconditionally some definite hopes for the future. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol suggested that we should increase immigration, but, unlike him, I do not suggest it should be confined to women and children. It is absolutely necessary to have building operatives and other workers to provide accommodation for those who are to enter the country. It is necessary to have buildings for the women and children immigrants, many of whom are in a very bad physical and mental state because of what they have been through. I suggest that we allow immigration to continue at least to the extent of 4,000 per month, not only up to the time when the problem is handed over to the United Nations but during the time when it is being considered by the United Nations, because judging from what happened at the Assembly last year, and at all the conferences it will not be a week or a fortnight, but months before a decision will have been reached.

Does anyone suggest that the Jewish Agency or the moderate Jews can hold

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back the terrorists, when there is a miserable allocation of 1,500 immigrants per month? We know that illegal immigrants will be pouring in, and that they will consist of men, women and children who are the miserable remnants left in Europe. We must remember all the time what is behind all of this. It is no good talking about the humanitarian angle, as we did during the war, when we expressed horror over what the Nazis were doing, unless we face what is happening, and envisage what these remnants have gone through, remembering that Palestine is the only place in the world which wants them and welcomes them. I believe that the present state of affairs could be settled if we got out of Palestine. I do not believe the Government would dream of accepting this solution, but if the Haganah were allowed arms and Palestine was left to settle its own differences, I believe that before very long we should have a united country. What is the alternative? We shall have bloodshed in any case, and the alternative is that our boys will be involved in it. When history comes to be written, it will be decided that Palestine would have got a solution to her problems much more quickly if Great Britain had cleared out and let the people settle them herself. We are rightly asking that the Haganah, the moderate Zionists and others should root out the terrorists, bring them to justice, and hand them over, but it is too much to ask these people unarmed to root out the fanatical armed terrorists. I think it would be much better if we went to them and told them that during the interval we would allow them to be armed, if they would act as a localised police force—after all, we armed them during the war when we needed them. We should ask them to get down to rooting out the terrorists, and if that were done and Jewish immigration was raised to 4,000 a month, we could have peace in Palestine until the whole matter had been taken to the United Nations and a decision had been reached.

The British Government who have carried the burden of the Mandate for all these years, ought very definitely to make recommendations which will be acceptable to us, and if they are not agreed upon, we should simply hand over the Mandate to the United Nations. It is well known that residuary legatees do not do very well—and I do not think in these circumstances the United Nations will do very well—but what I am anxious about is that Britain should not be left as a residuary legatee, being expected to carry out a policy to which we may object very strongly, and have to risk the lives of our troops to carry it out. We ought to make it perfectly clear what we want and what we intend to do, and we should do everything possible to secure peace on both sides until the recommendations of the United Nations are made known.

6.10 p.m.

Mr. Clement Davies (Montgomery): Every reasonable man, in every country, must be longing to see a final settlement of this age-long problem. Every reasonable man must desire that that settlement should come by negotiation and agreement, and not by force or by war. I would like to pay my tribute to the Foreign Secretary, not only for the quite remarkable speech he made this afternoon, but for the manner in which he has undertaken and carried out his duties in his great office. At no period in history, was any Foreign Secretary ever called upon to face such problems as the present Foreign Secretary. No one has devoted himself more conscientiously to his duties. He has brought to them wide experience, great tact, and, above all, great human sympathy.

I would like to deal, here and now, with a point the right hon. Gentleman made, which, I believe, arose out of an interruption of mine. Let it be clearly understood that when he goes to Moscow, and discusses these great matters with other great States, this country, whatever Government may be in power, will always honour its word, and regard treaties as binding. This country will endeavour, so far as is possible, to carry out pledges which have already been given. But let it also be clearly understood that the decisions of this House are not even binding on itself, still less on its successors, and still less on successors who have gone to the country on a different programme from the one which the House followed at the time it made those decisions.

Having paid my tribute to the right hon. Gentleman, and said that, may I say that I can understand still less the criticism of the Foreign Secretary which came from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley)?

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[Mr. Davies.]

It was niggardly and carping, which is not unusual, coming from him. The right hon. Gentleman's criticism was that the Government's proposal was being presented at this time, that the offer might have been made last August. I may be doing the right hon. Gentleman an injustice, but I have tried to read, in the meantime, his own speech of last August, and I could not find in it any reference to handing this problem over to U.N.O.

Mr. Stanley: The right hon. and learned Gentleman is quite right. That was not my policy. I thought the Government would come to their own decision, and that when they were ready would impose it. We are now told that that has never been the policy, and that in default of agreement the Government will go to U.N.O.

Mr. Davies: I understood that the right hon. Gentleman accused the Government, and especially the Foreign Secretary, of wasting time. The only suggestion on those lines, last August, came from a supporter of Government for the President of the Board of Trade spoke in that Debate. After the right hon. and learned Gentleman had spoken there was a speech by the Leader of the Opposition, with which I am sure the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol did not agree. He and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) have never agreed on a real policy for Palestine. Speaking personally, I have never had any doubt whatever about the meaning of the Balfour Declaration. I have always felt, and said, that a home was not destroyed when lodgers came in. There is a whole world of difference between the right of a lodger in a house, and a right to people to recognise that place as their home.

Mr. Kenneth Lindsay: That is a piece of argument which is quite unworthy of the right hon. and learned Gentleman. The question is: What is the constitutional definition of a lot of people living together?

Mr. Davies: What was the pledge that was drawn up and signed by Mr. Balfour as Foreign Secretary, and agreed to by the Cabinet? It was brought before the League of Nations when His Majesty's Government undertook the Mandate. There has never been much doubt in the minds of those who were largely responsible for that Declaration, or those who remained in that Government. Neither the then Prime Minister, the late Earl Lloyd-George, or the present Leader of the Opposition, have ever doubted that what they had in mind that was in the course of time a home should be created for Jews, a true home where they could control their own affairs.

Mr. Gallacher (Fife, West): It was not just a home but a National Home.

Mr. Davies: Undoubtedly it was understood that in course of time such a state of affairs would come about that the Jews would be in control of their own affairs in Palestine. I cannot help feeling that a great part of this controversy would not have arisen today but for the fact that in the main those in charge of affairs in Palestine from 1922-39 never took that view. Although they were advised by those who had more to do with it than anyone, namely, the present Leader of the Opposition and Mr. Amery, they took the other line entirely. I should say that their desire was to whittle down the Balfour Declaration as much as it could be whittled down. It ill becomes anybody to say now that there have not been changes of view, both in the Government and in this House.

Look at the vacillation, right from 1922 down to today. I remember, in 1937, the Government coming forward with a wonderful scheme for partition. But in 1938, they said that partition would never do. In 1939, a White Paper was produced. That White Paper was described by the Lord President of the Council—I think rightly—as an evil thing. It was described by the Leader of the Opposition, in a most eloquent speech, as a breach of the Mandate. I would like to point out to the Foreign Secretary that in almost the last part of the speech delivered by the Lord President of the Council he made it clear that whatever the decision of the House then—and it was obvious what it would be—it would not be binding on the party opposite, in spite of the advice of Mr. Amery and the Leader of the Opposition. May I also remind him of the pledges that were given, not after the Election, but before the Election, with regard to this matter. Be that as it may, I am perfectly sure of this—that the Foreign Secretary and those who have assisted him, the ex-Secretary of State for he

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Colonies, and the present Secretary of State for the Colonies, have done their very best to deal with this situation as wisely as it was possible to do under the circumstances. I feel also that it was right that they should try to see, even now, whether there was not a way out of it, without having to resort even to the United Nations Organisation. We had undertaken the Mandate, and it was our duty, as trustees, to see how best that could be arranged to the advantage of all the beneficiaries under it.

I agree with the hon. Lady the Member for North Hendon (Mrs. Ayrton Gould) that there was little trouble before the White Paper of 1939—little trouble from the Jews prior to 1939; and, what was more, trouble from the Arabs had more or less died down in 1937 and 1938. One has only to read the pledges then made by Members of the Tory Government. Nothing, I think, has been so terribly sad and agonising as the attitude of the Jews since then, and recently, with regard to this country, its Government and its people. No nation in the world has been as generous to the Jewish people as this nation; it has not only opened its gates and protected them, but made every office in the land open to them. That, I agree, has not only been to their advantage but to the advantage of this country. It ill becomes anyone, anywhere, to malign this country; still more so to destroy the young British men who are actually in Palestine to try to ensure justice and fairness.

I have never regarded this as a purely Jewish question. The Arabs are not the cause of it, it is the treatment of the Jews by other nations throughout 2,000 years that is the cause of it. It is not merely an Arab question, and it is certainly not merely a British question. This has become a world question, and I would, therefore, ask that all the nations of the world should make their contribution towards its solution, once and for all, and among the peoples of the world are the Jewish people and the Arab people. They should see if there is not some way by which the Jewish people can reach their ambition, which is linked up with their faith, because a good deal of the ritual connected with that faith is meaningless outside Palestine. They have always built their synagogues facing towards Jerusalem and it has been linked up with their faith that once a covenant was made between the Almighty and themselves, that that land should be theirs. In every country to which they have gone they have formed their own little communities. If they could be brought back, many of the Arabs would assist, and then I should regard it as the duty of the United Nations of the world to do anything which the Arabs would require in return in order to help them. It is along those lines that I hope this matter will be approached, and approached successfully, so that, at any rate, we can say that in this generation, although we have fought two most terrible wars, we have tried to solve problems which have worried people for generations.

Finally, may I ask one question? The right hon. Member for West Bristol rather assumed that the question which will be put to U.N.O. is one of advice. I am not sure. I gather from the Foreign Secretary's speech, and the statement which he made to the House the other day, that the Government had come to the conclusion that the Mandate has failed, but until some other solution has been brought forward, they would, of course, carry out their duties as trustees. I want to know what is the matter that is to be put before U.N.O.? Is it, "We have not been able to arrive at a solution with regard to this. Will you advise us; and then we will follow that advice and carry out, more or less, your directions, and do our duty there once more as a Mandatory Power, acting now for the United Nations Organisation as we did for the defunct League of Nations"? Or do the Government intend to go to the United Nations Organisation and say, "We can no longer carry out this Mandate. It is finished. We will do our best to protect the Mandate in the meantime, but take it back and decide what is best for the future for these people, so that there may be a new Mandatory power given to the United Nations Organisation." Which of the two is it to be?

In the meantime, I am reminded that Members of this Government, having fought against and denounced that White Paper, and having gone to the country not only denouncing it, but saying that they would reverse it, are still carrying out, more or less, the policy which they told the country they would not carry out. Will they, from now until this new decision has been arrived at by the United Nations Organisation, go back to what

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[Mr. Davies.]

they conceive, what I conceive, and what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) conceived was the true meaning of the Mandate, and the true meaning of the Balfour Declaration? I most sincerely hope and pray that, finally, a peaceful solution may be found for this problem, so that never again will it worry any man in any country.

6.29 p.m.

Mr. Pickthorn (Cambridge University): I can find almost nothing—[HON. MEMBERS: "Speak up."] I will try to speak up but I am suffering from a sore throat and must ask the House to be kind to me. I can find almost nothing to agree with in the speech to which we have just listened. I cannot believe that it is very useful now for the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) to tell us what Mr. Balfour thought when Mr. Balfour composed his letter, more particularly as Mr. Balfour did not compose the letter. The history of it is pretty well known, particularly how it got composed and issued and why and when it was published. I think that the best comment which can be made upon it briefly—and I desire to be brief for the convenience of the House and for the convenience of myself—is to read a quotation, from a speech by Dr. Weizmann. I think I have got the date right, April, 1918, though I may be a year wrong. He said:

> "The fears of the Arabs that they are to be ousted from their present position are due either to a fundamental misconception of Zionist aims or to the malicious activities of our enemies."

I do not really see how in the light of that statement taken from Dr. Weizmann, who was certainly at that time even if he be not thought so now, the greatest possible authority upon these things, it can be said that the Balfour promise gave the Zionists the right to expect that British arms should be used to impose on a long settled society unwanted immigrants until they should become the majority under it, because that is the gloss put upon the national home by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery, and by the hon. Lady the Member for North Hendon (Mrs. Ayrton Gould) who spoke before him and whose arguments he adopted. I do not believe that the House should really allow itself to be stopped by that gloss, which I think is demonstrably unfair. Further, supposing it to be fair, I think this House would make a mistake to pay any attention to it, because if there is one thing plain it is that no man can ever have had, politically or morally the right to promise what Mr. Balfour is by that interpretation alleged to have promised. If there is one thing clearer even than this it is that if such a promise could have been made legitimately in 1918 it could not be legitimately kept now. There is nothing in such a promise or the keeping now of such a promise that can be defended by any principles of politics or morality, democracy, Christian principles, or I make bold to say, to my Jewish friends and Jewish colleagues, of the Jewish faith.

I want to say a very few things and to say them as shortly as I can. If I am longer than I mean it will be because it has been very difficult to listen to the Foreign Secretary's speech today and to be sure that one has exactly got hold of the right bits of it. I should like to begin by asking the Colonial Secretary whether he can quite easily—because I realise that it is not fair to face him with it—tell us now, or anyway at the end of the Debate, again exactly what are the interim immigration proposals. I do not blame the Foreign Secretary but I am bound to say that he did not leave me quite clear in mind as to what the position was, and I feel sure that the House ought to have its mind made quite clear about that.

Then I should like if I may without impertinence to compliment him in one respect. That is always a little difficult. I myself do not think much of compliments in this House, and especially compliments from one side to another, which are often not very useful. Above all I dislike the compliment on sincerity. I feel that when we address each other as hon. Gentlemen what we assume by that is that each of those of us who speak tries to the best of his intellectual power to say what he means. This is an occasion, however, when I hope that without fulsomeness or impertinence I may say that as political opponents we were moved by the sincerity of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I mean that not in the ordinary drawing room sense of being sincere, in the sense that he was not really telling us what he himself knew to be

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lies but in the far more important sense that he had performed the difficult and painful operation of thinking as hard about the subject as he could before he dared to inflict upon his countrymen what his opinions were. That is what I take sincerity to mean in our relations to each other here, and I hope he will not think it fulsome or impertinent of me if I say that he showed a shining example of it this afternoon.

Having paid him that compliment, I should like if I may to utter a small reproach. It is a very small one and I do not do it from any personal point of view. Today he clearly distinguished between two main parts of the difficulty with which we are concerned, which has not been done so clearly before by anyone speaking from that Box of whatever party. He continued as almost all have done—and I shall probably slip into the expression myself although I regard it as a bad habit—to speak of the Palestine Problem. It is the cutting up of life into Problems which tends to the assumption that if only we could get to the back of the teacher's book we would find a solution on the back page. This Palestine affair is a thing not of that sort. Although the Foreign Secretary used that, as I think, dangerous language, he did distinguish between the problem of what ought to be done with Palestine and the problem of what ought to be done with displaced Jews. I think that to make that distinction clear and clean is the beginning of wisdom in all this question. The small reproach I do address to him is that he did nothing to make clear that there have been here a few, a comparatively few, members who have made that distinction over and over again. I do not say that because I believe that I have been an important one of them, but Members who have been here during the war and in the last two Parliaments know the names of Members who made this distinction and could write their names on the back of a postcard.

I think that if this Debate has been carried on, continued as reasonably as it has been, and has been something quite different from the sort of way the subject was debated 12 years ago, that change in the climate of opinion has been made by people who may sometimes have seemed to the Foreign Secretary to be pertinacious questioners and tiresome debaters, and I do not think that it would have done any harm to acknowledge the service that has been performed by them, because if we wish to have Parliamentary Government continuing in the world, it is by noting advantages of that sort which accrue from Parliamentary Government that we shall do it. There is one other preliminary thing I should like to say before I pass on to the main matter and that is that it seemed to me that the Foreign Secretary dropped what I think were his two main heresies of a year ago. Of course hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite who have grown grey or great, or both grey and great in some cases, in working machinery whose honourable business was to try to raise the material conditions of the less fortunate parts of the population are rather specially tempted to think that economics is what matters in politics, that politics are scarcely more than the shadow of economics and that if they get economics right then politics will come right of themselves. I believe that to be the worst and the most actively harmful of the heresies of the last 50 years.

The right hon. Gentleman seemed to me a year ago to have that heresy, but today, whether consciously or unconsciously, he seemed to throw it away. He also seemed to throw another heresy away into what I hope will be an unregretted limbo—that is, the notion that international organisation should be built up by going over the heads of national states, straight to the people themselves. He threw away that notion very completely today and I congratulate him upon it.

The questions I wish to put to His Majesty's Government are, I am afraid it will be thought, of a rather verbal nature, but all our discussions and the discussions which may take place at the United Nations must be conducted with words as counters. I think we were almost, although I agree not entirely, promised some time ago by the Prime Minister that we should have a Palestine Debate before any decision had been taken, but now a decision of sorts has been taken, a decision not to decide, a decision to refer elsewhere, and I think the least we have a right to ask is that in that reference elsewhere we should know what the technical terms are going to mean and how the brief is going to be produced,

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[Mr. Pickthorn.]

and I am inviting the Colonial Secretary to make these matters clear to us this evening.

I speak in the presence of professional gentlemen who will correct me if I am wrong, but I imagine that any really competent Solicitor can so put a question to counsel, especially if the counsel be chosen as not very competent or practised, as to be pretty certain beforehand what counsel's opinion will be, and it is of the utmost importance that we should know in what shape and form this question is to be put to the United Nations. We have been told that there is not going to be any recommendation. There is going to be a mere statement of history. Can we be reassured that all the history is going to be drawn to the attention of the United Nations? I have no fear here that we might suggest something which would be tiresome to the British Government that might otherwise have passed unforseen. We may be quite sure that there will be people and indeed, it will be the duty of the United Nations to see that there should be people, who will drag up everything which seems to show that the British Government at any stage has been disingenuous or inadequate.

I wish to be quite sure that the British Government itself will do that work for them, that we can be perfectly sure that it is going to be perfectly clearly put to the United Nations if the matter is to be put at all, what is a mandate—a new word; how it got drawn up; what was an A Mandate, how an A Mandate was something which from the first admitted the existence of a society dwelling within the territory concerned with a right to nationhood provisionally admitted. It was admitted from the first that these were people provisionally to be recognised as deserving of political independence. What was the method by which and the date at which the Mandate become (*a*) politically and (*b*) legally a governing factor in the situation? It is far more complicated than people generally think, and than I myself think unless I have looked up the books and the papers the day before, and than the right hon. Gentleman below the Gangway thought. My recollection is that the Mandate did not acquire any legal or quasi legal force until I think it was the end of 1923. So there was a long period before that when whatever we were doing we were not doing it under the Mandate, nor did the Mandate come from the League of Nations as many people seem to think. We ought to be quite sure that all these things and all the relevant facts and documents are quite clearly set forth in the dossier which we put before the United Nations.

Secondly I should like to ask when we put this matter before them, are we going to define quite clearly what is Palestine for our purposes? Does it mean the borders and boundaries as they exist now or are there other possibilities which will be taken into consideration? Then, since it is The Palestine Problem which is being referred, it is extremely important that we should know what is from this point of view The Palestine Problem. Is it going to be sharply defined from the problem of dealing with the Jews in Europe? Those hon. Gentlemen with whom I have been more particularly associated on this question have always insisted all along that it is no use putting the difficulties and the blame upon Hitler.

Upon him primarily much of the blame is, but also upon all the rest of us who did not somehow find ways of taking in the persons whom Hitler persecuted or threw out. There is some blame. We have always said that, and I think it very important that now it should be made quite clear which of these things it is that we are putting before the United Nations, whether it is all one or whether it is two separable questions. I thought the most moving passage in the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State's speech this afternoon was when he, if I may say so with an absurd sort of arrogance, agreed with me on this point in advance, that whatever else we do we ought to be prepared to play our full share on the humanitarian side of the thing. We should make that quite clear, first that the burden ought to be taken off the Arabs. It should not be the Arabs upon whom the burden is left that they have to look after this terrible, cruel by-product of the vices of European civilisation, for which we all of us to some extent or another are responsible.

Then I want to ask one more small and one more large question about these definitions that are going I hope to be put to the United Nations. About the Jewish Agency for instance. The Jewish Agency originally was set up for a highly limited

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purpose, but it was from the first by the British Government allowed to develop into something far wider than its terms of reference properly warranted. There is no doubt of that.

Mr. Janner: Will the hon. Member permit me one question? Would he be good enough to say what the Mandate says about the Jewish Agency because if he reads it out he will find that the Jewish Agency had and have an extremely important position under the Mandate.

Mr. Pickthorn: I have not the reference in my pocket but on the last occasion on which I made a speech of this sort the hon. Gentleman interrupted me with exactly the same question and on that occasion I did read out the Mandate and it did carry out my argument to a sufficient extent. Perhaps I may leave hon. Members to look it up themselves. The argument then and now is whether the Jewish Agency is to be continued in its functions and decisions during this interim period and if so is it tolerable that that should be done without at least some similar council for consulting and co-operating with the Arabs. Now I come to my last question on this matter and indeed the last thing I have to say. What for this purpose is the United Nations organisation? I know we ought to know. The Foreign Secretary told us this afternoon that Sir Alexander Cadogan does know and I am quite sure that he does and for all I know by some means, direct or indirect, Sir Alexander Cadogan has told the Colonial Secretary, and I think the Colonial Secretary ought to tell us when he comes to reply. We none of us do know these documents and constitutions half as well as we ought and I take as much blame as anyone for that, but we are trying to learn too many things and to read too many papers.

What does it mean in practice for these purposes? Does it mean, to use a few letters, us, the U.S., and the U.S.S.R., or is there more in it than that? Is it in fact going to be a horse swapping deal, *a Kahhandel,* as the Germans say between the two or three both great Powers who have the proper power of the veto or what more than that does it mean? because on that, I think, does depend the next question which we ought to go into: that is, are we assuming that whatever decision is handed down we shall operate? If so, are we ourselves to be judges in the matter? Are we in on this matter, or do we, as fellows of a college do, if I may use an illustration from my own humble experience, when their own affairs are being discussed, go out politely into the outer combination room and read "Punch", or are we there all the time? That is always assuming that the Minister of Fuel allows "Punch" to be printed next September. I think it highly important and we want to know what the machinery is going to be, in simple terms which those of us who have read the covenant once and do not remember much about it now, will understand. We ought to know to whom it is we are appealing, whether we ourselves are to be there as advocates or judges, or both, or neither or as witnesses, or with some two of these functions, or what. It seems to me that this question ought to be properly explained to us by the Colonial Secretary this evening when he comes to wind up.

6.50 p.m.

Mr. Benn Levy (Eton and Slough): The hon. Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Pickthorn) reminded the House that this is a topic which has been wont in the past to rouse high feelings. I shall attempt myself to tackle it in a temperate and reasonable way because if my own emotions are engaged, I honestly believe they are not so through any Jewish prejudice but are engaged, as those of most hon. Members of this House would be, on behalf of any people or group of people who are in distress. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary himself underlined that point. In a rhetorical passage which I shall not attempt to emulate, he showed considerable sympathy, but I am bound to say that those Jewish people in distress can derive little comfort from his speech because there was little else he had to offer. His speech was, I admit, the best exposition of the Arab case that I have heard, but it had to me an air, if I may say so, not merely of unreality but of special pleading.

Let me take for example his treatment of the problem of partition. He argued against it on the grounds that any proposed scheme of partition would involve the leaving of an Arab minority in the Jewish sector in such a position that that minority would be permanent or would have to get out. But surely precisely the same argument would be valid against his own plan for a unitary Palestine in which the Jews were a permanent minority or

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[Mr. Levy.]
had to get out? Apparently in that case it was not thought a valid argument, because in another part of his speech, after expatiating on the various abilities of the Jews as statesmen, businessmen and the rest of it, he practically exhorted them to exercise their gifts for nationhood as a permanent minority inside an Arab state. That does not seem to me to be a very practicable or serious proposition——

Mr. Lipson: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that that is exactly what the Jews in this country and every other country are doing?

Mr. Levy: If the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Mr. Lipson) supposes for a moment that the position of Jews—he ought to know better—is the same in this country as it is or would be under Arab Government in Palestine, he really is not qualified to make an intervention. It is a libel on the British people.

Mr. M. Philips Price (Forest of Dean): Is the hon. Member aware that 120,000 Jews have lived in Bagdad since the days of Nebuchadnezzar?

Mr. Levy: There are 120,000 Jews who have lived in Bagdad and have been happy, and I do not know how many have lived in America. There have been 600,000 in Germany. I am talking about Palestine and not Great Britain or Bagdad.

To revert to my argument, there is another point which the Foreign Secretary made. I am trying to illustrate what seems to me to be the essential unreality of his argument. When last year he made Transjordan into an independent State, that action was criticised in some quarters as premature on the grounds that it would make possible future partition difficult. Today he comes down to the House and says, "Partition is difficult, if not impossible, because last year I made Transjordan an independent State, and there is, therefore, no longer room for a second viable Arab State if there is to be a viable Jewish State." The essential argument in favour of partition was never even mentioned. That essential argument is this, that it is surely at this day and age abundantly clear to everybody that it is impossible to submit Arabs to Jewish domination in a unitary Palestine and it is impossible to submit Jews to Arab domination in a unitary Palestine. The second course is even more impossible. I think both are impossible, but the second is more impossible because, whatever the hon. Gentleman for Cheltenham may think, there is a wide discrepancy between the grades of social development of the Jews and the Arabs. To put the socially more advanced under the government of the socially less advanced is an absolutely untenable proposition.

I have never been a Zionist, though I am bound to confess that the Foreign Secretary has gone some way towards converting me; but his success is only partial. My conversion is still only half-hearted because my reasons are largely negative. I have felt in the past no mystic conviction of a national Jewish destiny. I have been averse also from the multiplication and intensification of nationalisms in a world which is striving, however ineffectually, towards internationalism; and moreover, there was to my mind objection to the avowed intention of Zionists to swamp Palestine by immigration in order to create a Jewish state in Palestine when the time for independence should arrive. But that objection has now been removed. There is no possibility any longer of the Jews being able to swamp Palestine—[An HON. MEMBER: "Why?"]—because six million of them have been slaughtered in Europe. There are not sufficient numbers waiting to go to Palestine—[An HON. MEMBER: "Oh."] Perhaps the hon. Member will allow me to quote from Sir Frederick Leggett, one of the members of the Anglo-American Committee, who is himself an anti-Zionist. He says:

> "As the average annual rate of natural increase of the Arabs is nearly twice that of the Jews and as mortality among the Arabs is declining, partly by reason of the better conditions which have followed the activities of Jews, it is fairly clear that no measurable amount of Jewish immigration will produce a Jewish majority."

I do not believe there is any serious possibility of that, so that objection has been removed so far as I am concerned.

But a more important reason and a new factor is this. I believe indeed that although every side of the House is committed to the establishment of a National Home in Palestine, it is quite impossible now to establish a National Home which is not also a National State, and for this reason. The Foreign Secretary admitted that he had some difficulty in understanding precisely what was meant by

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"a Jewish National Home." I sympathise. It is a nebulous phrase. But whatever it may mean, one thing is certain and that is that one cannot call a man's home his home if he is prevented from entering it at the point of a gun. Therefore, it seems to me that unless we have free immigration we cannot have a National Home.

It is merely specious to maintain that there are 600,000 Jews there now and that, therefore, the promise of a National Home has been fulfilled because there they are—at home. For, after all, that argument could have been equally well applied in 1922 when there were only 85,000 Jews there. So if the Home means anything, it must mean free immigration; yet it is clearly incontestable that the Arabs will not consent to further immigration into Palestine.

I feel, therefore, that the crux of the problem is immigration and I am convinced that if, when this Government took office, it had torn up the White Paper and the 100,000 had been admitted, the extreme Zionist argument would have lost very much of its force; and, moreover, paradoxically enough, Arab resistance would not have increased but would have diminished, for the simple reason that you fight so long as there is a chance of getting what you want, but you do not always fight against a *fait accompli*.

Very briefly, that is at least one aspect of the Jewish case. What I want to suggest to the House is that at no point does it conflict with British interests but, on the contrary, British interests are identical. There are three British interests of which I want to remind the House. One is of prime importance, namely, the reputation of British good faith. I know there has been a mass of contradictory promises in the past—that is deplorable, but it is an undeniable fact; and it is impossible, therefore, for any Government to come in now and fulfil all the pledges of its predecessors; but it can at least fulfil its own pledges——

Mr. Stokes (Ipswich): The Government as a Government have not made any.

Mr. Levy: Is the hon. Member advancing the theory that a party is only bound by pledges made when it is on the Government bench, and not when it is in Opposition? I should have thought he would have been the last person to suggest such a thing.

Mr. Stokes: My hon. Friend surely does not suggest, especially in the field of foreign affairs, that what is said in Opposition must be carried out at all costs by the party when it comes into government?

Mr. Levy: I should have said so; and what is absolutely indisputable is that this party is pledged not up to the hilt but up to the elbow, to repeal the White Paper when it came into office. The Foreign Secretary said this afternoon that there was a great difficulty about that, and he advanced what to me was a novel and extremely subtle doctrine in defence, that you cannot really do it without consulting the other party. That might have some substance if the original arrangement had been a matter of negotiation between parties, but when it is a unilateral one, why in the world cannot it be unilaterally repealed? After all, if unilateral commitments cannot subsequently be repealed by different governments, then an extremely bizarre theory is imported into government, and one which would have to apply also to internal affairs. Yet I did not notice that the Foreign Secretary was reluctant to repeal the Trades Disputes Act until he had consulted the employers; yet it is a completely parallel case.

Dr. Morgan (Rochdale): Specious.

Mr. Levy: I do not think I am being specious.

Dr. Morgan: You called it bizarre.

Mr. Levy: There are two other things I want to speak about. One is the question of safeguarding and preserving British lives; the other is the safeguarding of British economic and strategic interests. One word about the first. One thing which is quite clear is that this delay of 18 months, which has weakened the hands of the moderates, which has played into the hands of the terrorists, has cost us British lives. We cannot wash our hands of that responsibility. It is a deplorable thing but it is true and, unfortunately, as the right hon. Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley) has pointed out, the delay is not over. We are at the outset of another large delay. I hope

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[Mr. Levy.]
sincerely that means will be found by the Foreign Secretary to abbreviate the period of waiting before the matter can be submitted to U.N.O., but even when it has been submitted, there will still be a long period when we shall be left holding the baby.

As to the other point regarding our vital interests or key points, as the right hon. Member for West Bristol called them, it has for a long time been the orthodox Foreign Office view that we have vital economic and strategic interests in the Middle East which can only be protected by appeasing the Arabs. The Labour Party, rightly or wrongly, has disagreed with that view, but if the Foreign Secretary, since he has been accessible to the blandishments of the Foreign Office, has abandoned the Labour Party view and accepted the Foreign Office view, what is to happen if, when U.N.O. comes to a decision, it should decide that Great Britain must evacuate what the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office believe to be an essential strategic and economic position? Are we to invoke the veto? Are we to hedge? Are we to use all the machinery of delay open to us? If so, to submit the thing at all to the United Nations is a farce, and is merely a device for delay. I cannot believe that, but there is no alternative to that if the Foreign Secretary is persuaded that the *status quo* in Palestine is essential. If he is not so persuaded, then he must obviously have some alternative plan. But if we have some alternative plan, why cannot it be put into operation now before we continue to incur the odium of the present situation and the dishonour of broken pledges?

For these reasons, I believe the course that we are embarked upon is injurious to the interests of Great Britain, and I urge the Foreign Secretary to call a halt before it is too late.

7.9 p.m.

General Sir George Jeffreys (Petersfield): I do not propose to attempt to deal with the general situation as regards the government of Palestine. It is common ground that Jews and Arabs have been unable or are unwilling to agree, and will not accept any compromise proposals. It may be that the Government are well advised in referring this matter to the United Nations Organisation but, as we have heard from the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Levy) and from the Foreign Secretary himself, that must take time. It cannot come before the United Nations before next September but, whatever the eventual judgment of the United Nations may be, we must continue for some time at least to carry out our Mandate. I want to urge that, so long as we hold the Mandate, we should carry it out properly and, in particular, that we should enforce law and order in Palestine and shall suppress and rigorously punish terrorism.

It is with this question of the suppression of terrorism, and with the part that must be played in that suppression by British troops, that I wish especially to deal tonight.

The Foreign Secretary referred last week to the great strain which he said was put on the civil government of Palestine. No one will doubt that that strain is very great, but I suggest that it is nothing like the strain which is thrown on the British troops who have been living under the constant menace of kidnapping, murder, and outrage in its worst forms, and who have to treat the population as being supposedly friendly until some outrage is committed, or at least threatens. Those troops have never been called upon, nor permitted, to take any sustained offensive against terrorism. In that connection, I think the observations last summer by the Lord President of the Council regarding the order of the General Officer Commanding in Palestine were very unfair to the General Officer Commanding.

The troops in Palestine are in a very similar position to that of police in a criminal area. If those police are on friendly social terms of intercourse with the friends and families, possibly, of the criminals, their movements, and their intentions, will almost certainly be known by the criminals in due course, and those criminals will be able to take precautions accordingly. I think the position of our troops in Palestine is very analogous to that of police under those circumstances. If they go about, and are allowed to have social intercourse with the Jewish population, to go to public places of amusement and refreshment amongst them, they are not only risking kidnapping and outrage, but every unguarded word and indication of movement or intentions is sure to be overheard by someone. Even if it is not

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overheard by terrorists, it is certain to be passed on to them by their friends. I am sure that the instructions of the General Officer Commanding as to the avoidance by troops of social intercourse with Jews were fully justified for these reasons, apart from the strain on the troops involved in the present methods, a strain which is so great that I believe it would be too great for any troops except British troops, because of their morale and discipline, I say that these methods have been ineffective. When an outrage has been committed, according to reports which reach England, measures are at once taken locally and temporarily. They are strong measures, certainly, of searches, restrictions, curfews, arrests, and all the rest. But, after a short time, these measures are relaxed and finally taken off altogether, until the next outrage occurs. I would urge that what is necessary is a continuous and sustained offensive against terrorism, with no let-up whatever, no relaxation of pressure, and regardless of the inconvenience and restrictions which may in consequence fall on the Jewish population.

Mr. H. Hynd (Hackney, Central): Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman allow me? Is he quoting from Hitler's instructions to his troops for the occupation of Palestine?

Earl Winterton (Horsham): The hon. Member for Hackney, Central (Mr. H. Hynd) ought to be ashamed of himself. That was a most insolent interruption.

Mr. H. Hynd: I did stand up to make my interruption. That is more than the noble Lord did.

Sir G. Jeffreys: They should be treated in the way the civil population might be treated in a hostile country, until the hostile forces have been defeated. For instance there might be restrictions for intelligence purposes. After all, the Jewish Agency have refused co-operation against the terrorists, and can scarcely claim any consideration on that account. I believe everyone in this House will agree that the terrorists must be completely knocked out and exterminated. To my mind, the defended areas behind barbed wire should not be regarded as refuges, but as bases from which offensive operations can be conducted against the terrorists. Those operations should be continuous and sustained. There should be no relaxation, but they should be carried out with the use of every appropriate weapon which is available. There should be no question of waiting for the terrorists to shoot first. With the object of knocking out terrorism, I urge that complete discretion be allowed to the military authorities to deal with the situation. I do not know whether that is given now, but the general impression is that the military authorities are hampered at times by instructions from the Colonial Office, and are not allowed the completely free hand which they ought to have to deal with such a situation. There should be one order, and one only, to the G.O.C., to completely knock out terrorism with any and every means available. The terrorists should be brought to justice if possible, and, if brought to justice, they should be dealt with by the utmost rigour of the law.

The British troops who have this most unpleasant and invidious duty of attempting to restore law and order in Palestine and to suppress odious outrages there, should be given every form of encouragement and support. Their hands should not be tied in any way. They have displayed admirable restraint, and can be depended upon to display equal restraint in any offensive measures they take. Those measures should be taken, they should be continuous, there should be no relaxation until the moment terrorism is completely knocked out. So, and only so, shall we be carrying out the terms of our Mandate to govern Palestine properly, and to enforce law and order so long as we are there.

7.18 p.m.

Mr. Turner-Samuels (Gloucester): We are considering today a question of a very grave character, the treatment of which by this House, and in the future, might have very grievous results. I profoundly agree with the view that was expressed by the right hon. Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley) when he laid emphasis on the future in its relation to the present Debate. It is very easy in a matter of this kind to evoke emotion and to cover it with a lot of complications. Heaven knows there are plenty of complications on this subject which bear upon the past, and the sooner the past buries itself the better. We must concentrate on the future even if it is somewhat uncomfortable as we all know it very often is, to face facts.

It seems to me that the two material matters which concern this country, Palestine, and indeed, the world are, first the

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[Mr. Turner-Samuels.]

question of the Mandate, and secondly the question of the White Paper. The Foreign Secretary, in his speech, which I do not for a moment doubt was made with the greatest sincerity, and was intended to be helpful, was, in my humble submission, on the two critical points which I have mentioned, entirely unsatisfactory. He gave no guidance to the House on the crucial question of the White Paper as regards the period between now and September, when the matter is to go to U.N.O. Indeed, when I challenged him during his speech, to try to reconcile what he was saying—that this House was committed to the White Paper—with the entirely opposite version we had from the Prime Minister as recently as 1st July of last year, he observed that he was coming to that matter, but he never did.

I noticed one remarkable thing that he said about the Mandate. He said that it had become unworkable. All I can say is that it must have been through a long and painful course that he arrived at that conclusion after 23 years. Even if it were true that the Mandate was unworkable, it does not lie in the power of this or any other Government to abrogate the Mandate. If that is to be done, if the Mandate is to be changed, if there is to be a new document or a new policy, then the only power, the only source from which that can be done is the United Nations, and because of that it is to that body that it is now intended to refer this particular Mandate. The Foreign Secretary said at the same time, that the Mandate "was intended to lead to something." I find it difficult to see how it is to lead to something, if, according to the Foreign Secretary, it is in fact to lead to nothing, because that was the effect of what he told us this afternoon. The effect was not to implement the Mandate, not to try to carry out any of its terms, either in the language in which it is now framed, or in a modified form. His view was that it was unworkable.

There is one other point I would like to mention before I come to the point of the legal status of the Mandate, and a few words about the White Paper. The Foreign Secretary said what I thought was rather an extraordinary thing. I do not honestly believe that he intended to convey what his words, in my submission, did convey, namely, that the Jews were contending that they should be entitled to become members of the United Nations organisation on the single ground that they were Jews. Speaking as a member of that faith, if any Jew or any body of Jews were to suggest to me that they should have an entitlement for inclusion in the United Nations organisation, merely because they were Jews, I should just laugh at them. There is no possible foundation for any such claim. As the Foreign Secretary truly said, that would at once open the doors of the United Nations to all sorts of absurd and unsustainable applications for membership. But the Jews have never made any such far-fetched proposal. What they have said, as regards representation on the United Nations, has been that if they built up their National Home in Palestine, as the Mandate, in the most explicit terms, prescribes that they are to do, then they would be eligible in respect of that home on political grounds for a seat upon the United Nations organisation, in exactly the same way, it should be noted, as the Arabs are entitled to representation on the United Nations organisation, not because they are Arabs but because they have been given national independence in the particular States they now occupy. That is precisely the basis upon which the Jews put forward their claim, not on the basis of an absurd suggestion that because of some religious reason they ought to be members of the United Nations organisation.

Earl Winterton: I am sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman does not wish to indulge in an historical inaccuracy, which quite inadvertently he indulged in, and which might give offence to certain countries. The Arab States have not been given their independence. They have enjoyed independence for hundreds of years.

Mr. Turner-Samuels: May I remind the noble Lord that this country and America, with their treasure and their blood, fought to liberate large areas in the Near East. Therefore, is it not right to say that we, in this country, as well as the Americans, have some claim to say what ought to be done in the Near East in regard to those States? Indeed, that is precisely what has happened, because we were given Mandates of these places and these Mandated territories have now been converted into independent States. That is the position.

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Earl Winterton: I thank the hon. and learned Member most sincerely for having reminded me that I fought in the Desert in the 1914-18 war, with Lawrence. I was aware of the fact he mentioned, but I was dealing with the statement which he quite inadvertently made, that the Arab States have been given independence. Some of them were independent long before the 1914-18 war.

Mr. Turner-Samuels: Perhaps I did not quite catch the noble Lord's point because it was quite irrelevant. I was trying to underline the fact that as far as the position of the Jews in Palestine is concerned it is exactly the same as the position of the Arabs in the Arab States which had been under Mandate and had since been converted into independent States.

The senior Burgess for Cambridge University (Mr. Pickthorn) had an extraordinary idea about the origin of the Mandate. So far as I can gather from what he said, it appears to him to have come out of the blue and no one can trace its descent. Actually, the position is that the Mandate came into being as a result of an agreement of all the Allied Powers after the first World War. As a result of that, the Council of the League of Nations handed this particular Mandate to this country. The Mandate contained in its first recital, a clear statement as to why it was being handed to this country at all, and what its express object was. It said that the Government of His Britannic Majesty had made a declaration on 2nd November, 1917, and that that declaration was adopted by the other Powers,

"in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people."

Subject to preserving certain rights to which I will refer to in a moment. That was the premise upon which this Mandate was established. That was the object of this Mandate. Every Article which follows is intended to carry out that object, subject to the modifications that other civil and religious rights are not to be prejudiced. I challenge anyone to contradict that statement. The reason why the phrase, "Jewish National Home" was used is not hard to understand. Advantage has been taken of the word "home" in order to raise some legal refinement about the fact that the word "State" is not used, but the word "Home." In my submission there is no distinction of substance between the phrase, "Jewish National Home" and "Jewish National State."

I will tell hon. Members why the word "Home" was, in my view, used instead of the word "State." It was perfectly clear that there was a large body of Jews outside Palestine who were anxious about what was taking place in Palestine as regards a Jewish State. They were people who were closely attached to their own particular countries. They had been born there, they were resident there, their families and businesses and hopes and their traditions were there. They were as much a part of the country as those who had been native to it for hundreds of years. They were troubled about the setting up in Palestine of what was to be described as a "Jewish State." As they were Jews themselves, they did not want the idea to be accepted that a Jew must necessarily be identified with Palestine because it was a Jewish State. That was I am sure one of the main reasons which operated to cause the phrase "Jewish National Home" to be used rather than the phrase "Jewish National State."

The other cause was obviously diplomatic. There was a good deal of sense in that. There were people who were already seated in Palestine. There were people there who had civil and religious rights. Naturally, everyone concerned was anxious that these people ought not to feel that they were to be dispossessed or prejudiced in the arrangement that was being made. If the word "State" had been used that might easily have aroused these doubts, whereas by using the word "Home", a modified term, it was no doubt desired to avoid that. We must remember in this case that as a substitute for "State" we have the word "National." It is impossible for anyone reading the Articles of the Mandate and wishing to put an honest interpretation upon them, to come to any conclusion but that it was intended that a National Home should be set up in Palestine for the Jews, and, as it says in Article 2 that should lead gradually to "the development of self-governing institutions" there. There appears to be no doubt about that whatsoever. The whole context of the Mandate justifies that conclusion.

I would like to say a word about the Jewish Agency. A suggestion has been made that we can merely wave our hands

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[Mr. Turner-Samuels.]
and get rid of the Jewish Agency. The Agency is an integral part of the Mandate. Before we can get rid of the Jewish Agency, we must get rid of the Mandate. In Article 4 are stated precisely the functions of the Jewish Agency. Certainly it is not one of the prescribed functions that they should deal with matters of terrorism or anything of that kind. In fact, the Jewish Agency has neither the power nor the means to do that. The function of the Agency was:

"for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine."

That was their principal purpose. As immigration, under Article 6, was one of the main purposes of the Mandate, it was not likely, and it is not likely, that the Jewish Agency would do anything which would stop that immigration, for that would be a contravention of the Mandate itself. The Agency has never contravened a single one of its duties under the Mandate. I defy anyone to prove a single contravention by the Agency of any duty, obligation or function which it was given or has exercised under this Mandate.

Major Legge-Bourke (Isle of Ely): What about the White Paper?

Mr. Turner-Samuels: The White Paper is another matter; the White Paper is illegal. So far as the question of immigration is concerned, I would like to mention Article 6 of the Mandate which is very important. It is the Article which controls the question of immigration and it says:

"The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections"——

Brigadier Mackeson (Hythe): On a point of Order. Many of us are well acquainted with this question. Could we not get on with the modern problem?

Mr. Turner-Samuels: Hon. Members may be well acquainted with it, but the speeches already made have not indicated that. Those speeches and the errors they evince are on record and I think that I am, at least, entitled to correct them. Article 6 says:

"The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes."

Mr. Manningham-Buller (Daventry): Would the hon. and learned Gentleman read the carlier words:

"while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population . . ."

Mr. Turner-Samuels: I have just read those words. I do not know why I should be required to read them twice. I wish to say a few words about the White Paper of 1939. I will be brief, because I know others want to take part in the Debate. We are bound as regards the White Paper of 1939 to take into account what has been the policy of this party and the right hon. Gentlemen who now sit on the Front Bench. It is an absolute heresy, in my humble submission, for anyone to say that because they have become Members of the Government they can throw off, or discard, all the statements and pledges that they have ever made. If that were to pass as being the political principle of this country, we should have come to a sorry state of affairs. While the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary was speaking, I interrupted him. He said that this House was bound by the White Paper. That proposition cannot be sustained. It is a piece of pure advocacy. As I said when I interrupted the right hon. Gentleman earlier, the Prime Minister himself has repudiated any such position. I quoted his view as expressed in this House on 1st July, 1946, reported in HANSARD of that date in col. 1907. I am sorry that time does not allow me to go more fully into the White Paper, and I conclude by saying that the document is from beginning to end, illegal and ought now to be repudiated by the Government which opposed it originally in this House and had prior to this Parliament, consistently denounced it.

7.40 p.m.

Mr. Stokes (Ipswich): I will deal with some of the points mentioned by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels) in the course of my speech, but in regard to his suggestion about the Foreign Secretary changing party policy, I would say that I was not at the recent party meeting, but, from Press reports, I gather that, on the whole, the party supported him.

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Mr. Turner-Samuels: I was referring to the Labour Party.

Mr. Stokes: The hon. Member ought to have been long enough in the House to realise that the Parliamentary Labour Party does not have the job of interpreting the Foreign Secretary's policy in the House of Commons, and I would add that, when the Parliamentary Labour Party supports the Foreign Secretary, that is good enough for me. I was particularly delighted with the Foreign Secretary's speech, because I think that, for the first time, I heard him state a moderately fair case for the Arabs, though he did not go far enough for me. I thought he stated the Jewish case absolutely fairly, but I am assured by my Zionist friends, that he did not go far enough for them. We know that a good many promises have been made, but what must never be forgotten is that the Arabs were first promised the return of Palestine. Both my hon. and learned Friend who spoke before me and the Foreign Secretary expressed views as to the meaning of the Balfour Declaration. I think that a great deal of misapprehension exists there because people do not realise that the Balfour Declaration was only a sentence embodied in a long letter from Mr. Balfour to Lord Rothschild.

Mr. Janner *rose*——

Mr. Stokes: I am not going to give way. I want to make it quite clear that the Arabs never accepted the Balfour Declaration, and were never consulted about it. They never accepted the Mandate because they considered it to be completely contrary to Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Foreign Secretary went on to say that he did not find it easy to decide what a National Home for the Jews meant. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Gloucester explained that it really meant a national State, and said that the wrong word had been used. I am going to quote from the important White Paper which was issued on 3rd June, 1922—a British White Paper—which said:

"Unauthorised statements have been made to the effect that the purpose which is in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become 'Jewish as England is English.' His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab Delegation, the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine."

That was issued by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill), who said the other day that he stood completely by that declaration. I do not think there is any doubt whatever about what was intended.

My contention, and I speak with some limited experience of Arab affairs, is that, numerically, at any rate, the intentions of the Balfour Declaration have been carried out. When the last war ended, there were some 60,000 Jews in Palestine, forming about 7 per cent. of the population. There are now 600,000 Jews in Palestine, forming 30 per cent. of the population, and we cannot expect the Arabs to consent to more and more European Jews going into Palestine, when they were not responsible for the persecution of the Jews in Europe, and so long as Britain and America—and the Jews in England number 1 per cent. and the Jews in America 4 per cent. of the population—are not prepared to open their doors to let them in. I am quite sure from what I have been told by our Arab friends that, if we were prepared to raise our Jewish population up to 33 per cent., there would be no difficulty with the Arabs in Palestine.

I was very glad to hear the Foreign Secretary say that he was not going to give up his efforts to solve this problem. I was sorry when he said the other day that the matter had to go to U.N.O. I would much prefer, and I understand that my Arab friends would much prefer, that this matter should be settled between the British Government and the parties concerned, and I hope that the appeal which has been thrown out today will not fall on deaf ears.

To turn to another subject, that of the stamping out of violence, these acts of violence were condemned on both sides of the House with great unanimity. The point to which I would call attention is that our methods of stamping out violence in the case of Arabs are very different to the methods until recently used against the Jews. I think it was in 1937 that the Arab Higher Committee was declared an illegal organisation, and four members

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[Mr. Stokes.]

of the Arab Higher Committee and other Arab politicians were arrested and deported. Following on that, we had the attempted assassination of the High Commissioner, followed by the assassination of Lord Moyne, and what happened next? The Jews merely told us that they would be good boys, and we could get no further. Recent revelations have made it plain that there was some responsibility on the part of the Jewish Agency for being concerned in matters leading up to the blowing-up of the King David Hotel, and it is astonishing to me, in view of what has been said about the Mandate, that the Jewish Agency has not been declared illegal and the leading people in it removed from that country.

There is one other thing I would like to say. If the Foreign Secretary fails, and does not bring about a reconciliation of some kind, there can be no question of partition, because the Arabs will not have it at all. There can only be a unitary State, and I hope that if, in the end, the matter is going to U.N.O., the Foreign Secretary will make it clear that some time limit should be set. It seems to me that we should follow the excellent policy which has been announced in regard to India. I think that, in the case of India, the time is wrong, but that is by the way. We ought to have a time limit; otherwise, U.N.O. will mess about and not come to a decision, and our men will have to bear the heat and burden of the day.

There is one other small point. I hope the attention of U.N.O., as well as of this House, may be called to the extraordinary concessions granted in Palestine in 1921 and in 1927 both in regard to water and hydro-electric power and mineral resources. In the Colonial Office White Paper, it was stated that the salts in the waters of the Dead Sea, at the valuation at that time, were worth £240,000 million. The figure is at least double that value today. It is an astonishing thing that, when these concessions were granted, an hon. Member of this House—Sir W. Joynson-Hicks—said:

> "I have had some experience of contracts in this city, but the Rutenberg contract contains the most astonishing concessions I have ever seen or read in my life."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th July, 1922; Vol. 156, c. 304.]

I think that will bear investigation. I am sure that, behind the scenes, these matters have a great bearing on this situation.

I think it was a great mistake to mix up the question of the persecution of the Jews in Europe with the Palestine problem. But people always seem to do that. We all know that Mr. Balfour had no thought of Hitler in mind when the Declaration was made. There was no thought of thousands of Jews wanting to leave Europe. [An HON. MEMBER: "What are the figures?"] I cannot give the figures, but no doubt, when my hon. Friend speaks, he will say what was in Mr. Balfour's mind. I am quite certain that he did not contemplate the huge influx of Jews from the West to the East; he certainly did not contemplate that the Arabs were to be asked to take into their midst a huge European colony. It really is a matter of Arabs and Europeans—not Jews—against whom their military effort was sought in the 1914-18 war. I think that ought to be clear in people's minds when they discuss this subject.

I agree with the Foreign Secretary, and I believe that anybody who has travelled in that part will also agree that Arabs and Jews, if left alone, will get together. I believe that, even with this European influx, it is still possible, with a bit of good will on both sides, for them to do that. But, with no decision and the matter being allowed to drift on the thing becomes more and more difficult. As to our own party policy, I never agree with party policy; I am also violently against our foreign policy, as declared in that White Paper. In the Labour Party paper called "The International Post-War Settlement," under the heading "Colonies," we declare that the important thing is to develop the country and to give the indigenous population fair play and to support the Government. In the next column we say that we must doublecross the population in Palestine. That is fantastic. I do not believe that the party which passed that White Paper, had the slightest conception of what they were doing.

Finally, I will say that there is a common point between the Jews and the Arabs. They both dislike us; they dislike all our schemes, and they dislike one another. But they all realise that they must get together. That is a very good common ground from which to start. At least, one knows where one is. I believe that the Foreign Secretary's suggestion is right.

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If they would only follow the policy which he has outlined and try to get on together for three, five or ten years, as he said, under a properly constituted Government, in which everybody is represented, I think we should achieve the solution of our difficulties, and that this unhappy chapter will be closed for all time.

7.54 p.m.

Sir Ralph Glyn (Abingdon): I do not propose to detain the House for long, but I would like to say something in support of what the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) said just now. I am one of the few Members who were in this House when the Balfour Declaration and the White Paper were discussed. I think it is only right that, in such circumstances, one might say what one's recollections are of the intentions of that time, because, since then, many things have happened, and many things have overlaid the views then held.

We must first of all remember that the United States was to have had the Mandate, and that important point should not be forgotten. It was accepted by the United States, and, when President Wilson turned down the League of Nations, it passed to us to hold this troublesome baby. We accepted the Mandate, not because we wished to have it, but in order to do something for the benefit of the Middle East. The White Paper of 1922 was issued in an endeavour to correct what Mr. Balfour had said in that unhappy declaration about the National Home. There was an idea that the Jewish National Home should be not far from Jerusalem, and that there should be a university to which the Jews should go. It was at one time proposed that there should be a passport or a nationality office so that Jews could go there and obtain Jewish nationality. Having done that, they could then go wherever they wished, and could travel with a Jewish passport. But the British Jews, whose views I have always respected, and who made a great contribution to our efforts, were strenuously opposed to such a plan.

Mr. Janner: The hon. Gentleman is making a statement which is absolutely incorrect. There were a few British Jews who signed a letter, but they were in a very minute minority, and certainly did not represent the opinions of British Jewry at all.

Sir R. Glyn: No doubt the hon. Member will have a chance of stating his views later. All I can say is that at that time Zionism, as we know it today, was unknown, and our preoccupation at that time was to try and help settle those difficult problems in Palestine in such a way as was in accordance with British practice and tradition.

I believe that an immense amount of harm has been done both in the United States and elsewhere by mixing up strategical considerations with the Mandate. There have been a great many people in America who thought that we were manipulating the Mandate for strategical purposes. If a Mandate is used at all, it must be used largely in the interests of the people concerned in the territory for which a country is responsible. There ought to be no other consideration. The hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Levy) said, I think, that one of the reasons why we should continue with the Mandate was strategical. That, surely, should be the last reason. It shows that we are not carrying out the purpose of the Mandate quite disinterestedly, which was the original intention.

It was never felt that this country should be saddled with this Mandate for a long period. It was always considered that it should be for a fairly short time, but, unfortunately, we have got more and more into the morass. We must keep absolutely distinct the problem of Palestine from that of the Jewish displaced persons. There are certain figures which have been issued quite recently, and some hon. Members had an opportunity of seeing the distress in Europe and the number of Jews who are now in camps in Germany, Austria and Italy and are being looked after by U.N.R.R.A. Indeed, a great many of them are not in the camps, but are mixed with the people of these countries. There is no greater distress or misery in any part of the world than that suffered by these unfortunate people, and this country should give a lead in this matter. It is our duty to do it.

As reported by U.N.R.R.A. the actual number of Jews up to October last was 152,600. That is apart from the other displaced persons who, I think, number nearly a million. It is quite obvious that we are not going to help those people by thrusting them, willy-nilly, into Palestine. For one thing, many of them do not want

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[Sir R. Glyn.]

to go there, but they do want to get out of all the associations and the miseries of the Hitler persecution. It is a great blemish on the postwar conduct of foreign affairs that we have not been able to find a proper solution to that problem. But we should be in a far worse mess if this House—and, after all, this House is responsible for the Mandate—did not make it perfectly clear at this moment how far we are to be tied to this affair, even if we do go to the United Nations organisation. What I am afraid of—and I ask the House to consider this—is that too much time will be taken in arriving at a settlement. I believe it is right that we should go to the United Nations organisation, but that it is essential that we should fix a time limit for arriving at a decision.

We have done it for India, and I believe that policy will succeed, and we ought to do it for Palestine. If the meeting of the United Nations is in September, surely it would be reasonable to say that on 1st January, 1948, we quite definitely go out, because it would be intolerable that British troops, the Palestine police and our administration in Palestine should be forced to carry out a policy which we not only do not approve, but are not really capable of carrying out. It should be remembered that, though we may have numbers of men in uniform, unless the financial position of the country is such that they can be maintained at a necessary war potential, we have no business to accept the responsibility. We stand now upon the edge of a completely new situation. We have published to the world what our financial and economic position is. We have given the details and the numbers. I cannot conceive that anybody in his right senses could possibly doubt that Palestine and the Middle East are today a danger spot. Unless handled with the utmost care it will be the beginning of such trouble between East and West, and we shall find ourselves involved in such a situation, that it will be quite intolerable to the people of this country to have to bear the responsibility for law and order while not in fact being able to ensure it.

Having heard the statement of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, therefore, I believe today we stand as we did in 1922. Then we accepted the situation which somebody else had produced. Now today we acknowledge a situation with which we are no longer able to cope within the terms of the Mandate. We should go to the United Nations, as successor to the League of Nations, and say that for all these years we have struggled and done our best; circumstances are such that we honestly believe we cannot carry on any further, and we therefore fix a date when we come out, refusing to be tied to a position which is no longer tolerable.

Mr. Scollan: Will the hon. Member please explain how we can submit the matter to the United Nations for a decision while, at the same time, making a declaration that in no circumstances would we continue in Palestine?

Sir R. Glyn: The hon. Member may feel that we should give up all our sovereign rights in this country, but our first duty as a member of the United Nations is, surely, to point out that we are not any longer in a position to undertake the risks entailed by a continuation of the Mandate. The greatest mistake we could make today would be to do something in connection with Palestine which would be misunderstood, as the Balfour Declaration was. The whole history of the Middle East and of Britain's administration there is one series of misunderstandings and misconceptions, and, surely, we have had sufficient warnings of the difficulties which follow from not facing the facts and telling the truth. After all, what is it that is at stake? It is not a question of party politics, it is a question of right and wrong. Either we are able to do this job or we are not, and I am convinced that the time has come when we can say quite honourably that we have done our level best, but we are anxious that the world should take up this burden. We have failed to produce a policy—that is a fact—which brings peace to both sides. Nobody can say we have not tried; let somebody else try, and bring fresh minds to bear upon it.

My last word is in regard to the Arab League. The Arabs, and indeed all peoples, at our request, made a contribution to fighting the terrorism of Hitler. The Arab League represents a great assembly of religious people, believing in Mohammedanism, and forming an enormous block of power stretching right across that part of the world. We have had contacts with Moslems in every part of the world, we respect their faith and

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understand it. The Arab League are looking to those nations which understand them to give them a lead. It is not a question of domination, it is a question of help. There are many Arab states which are struggling forward. Let us not put ourselves in a position which perhaps does not permit us to give free and unfettered advice and help to those people, who have always looked to us in the past for honourable and fair dealing. I believe that we have a great opportunity; if we take it now we may save the world from another conflict, but if we do not take it, I think a conflict is more than possible.

8.6 p.m.

Brigadier Peto (Barnstaple): We have in the last three-quarters of an hour heard three totally different and extremely good speeches. The first, perhaps a little long, was by the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels), who took the Jewish point of view. The second was by the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes), who took a totally different view, that of the Arab, and the third was by my hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon (Sir R. Glyn), and with it I, personally, wholeheartedly agree. In the past I think both parties have made mistakes. The hon. and learned Member for Gloucester prefaced his remarks by saying that he was not going into the past, and from then on never mentioned the future in the rest of his speech. I, however, am going to mention the past, and at the beginning I feel it right to say that I do know a little about Palestine. I have been there and served there, and I was there right at the beginning, from 1921 until 1924. I have seen, and can bear witness to what the Foreign Secretary said, that it is perfectly possible for Jew and Arab to work together. They have not identical interests, and that is perhaps why it is quite easy for them to work togther. They are jealous of each other only when it comes to a question of which shall be the dominating people in the country. It is then that the quarrel begins.

As the Foreign Secretary said, the Jew is a town-dweller; 78 per cent. of them live in the urban districts, in Tel Aviv and so forth. The Arab, on the other hand, does not live in the towns, he cultivates the soil. It is quite possible for those two communities to live in harmony together. For my part I have always been in favour of partition, not as a permanency but as an initial stage with a view to getting them to live together without quarrelling for a certain period, meeting each other and possibly working for each other in a way which will lead ultimately to unity. There is no doubt in my mind that it is possible to start by partition and finish with unity in that country.

I have heard with some interest the views expressed by various hon. Members on the meaning of the term "National Home." I thought it was quite enlightening to hear the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester give his view that it meant a pre-eminently Jewish State. I have no doubt that is the view of many other hon. Members on the Labour side. It is not my view. While it is quite impossible to say what was in Lord Balfour's mind, my view is that the National Home was not intended to be an exclusive State for Jews only. I thought the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester gave the impression that it was to be an exclusive home for Jews.

Mr. S. Silverman: Is not the hon. and gallant Gentleman getting a little confused? A National Home is, surely, a home in which a nation lives, in which it is there as of right, and in which it is not dominated by anybody else. There are cases where one can have that, as in Wales and Scotland, without a State.

Brigadier Peto: The hon. Member answered that point himself, I think, when he interjected, a little while ago, that it was to be a Jewish home with free immigration into it, limited only by the economic capacity for absorption. That is obviously what it must be, and what it was intended to be—a limited number of Jews would be allowed to immigrate into the country, but the number would be limited by the economic capacity of the country, and it would not be to the exclusion of the Arabs who are there already. I find it very hard to understand how the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with their knowledge, could possibly have stated, in December, 1944, and May, 1945, at Labour conferences, things which are totally and absolutely different from the interpretation of the term "National Home" to which I have referred. According to those statements, it was to be to the exclusion of the Arabs. If I

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[Brigadier Peto.]
remember rightly, the Prime Minister's remark was to the effect that the Arabs must be encouraged to leave the country as soon as possible and that the Jews must be allowed to immigrate into Palestine absolutely freely, without any let or hindrance, and that no obstacle was to be placed in their way. I have the quotation here.

Mr. Hoy (Leith): Perhaps it would be better if the hon. and gallant Member would read the quotation, because I do not think it was exactly as he has said.

Brigadier Peto: The Prime Minister said:

> "There is, surely, neither object nor meaning in a Jewish National Home unless we are prepared to let Jews, if they wish, enter into this tiny land in such numbers as to become a majority, the Arabs being encouraged to move out as the Jews move in. Let them be compensated handsomely for their land and let them settle elsewhere . . ."

and so on.

Mr. S. Silverman: What is the date of the quotation?

Brigadier Peto: December, 1944, at the annual conference of the Labour Party. I could also quote what the Chancellor of the Exchequer said the following year, which was even stronger. I cannot understand how two men of great integrity and wisdom could possibly make such statements and lead the Labour Party, at a conference of that sort, completely up the garden path. Now those statements have come back on them. They are in a position of great responsibility. Their words can be quoted. Their party is entirely at sixes and sevens; some people in it think one thing, and some another; some people hold that the Jewish problem should be solved by allowing Jews to go into Palestine freely, and others hold totally opposite views, as, for example, the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes). We know that the great Labour Party has often been confused before as to their policy, and without wishing to rub it in, I mention their lack of policy with regard to Russia, India and Palestine, and I would add with regard to domestic affairs. They were full of promises before they had responsibility, and now that they have responsibility, they are not putting their promises into effect.

Mr. Scollan: Is that the reason the hon. and gallant Gentleman's party has no policy?

Brigadier Peto: The Foreign Secretary said that Palestine was, and is likely to be, a sore spot. The position in Palestine is extremely like that in Ireland after the 1914-18 war. I also happen to have served in that country at the time of the Sinn Fein troubles. The problem in Palestine now, with the terrorists, is almost identical with the problem that had to be solved from 1918-20 in Ireland. I think there is only one way of solving that problem, and that is to handle it very strictly and very firmly, or to get out. There used to be a saying at the time of the Irish troubles which is equally applicable today, although I hope that in mentioning it I shall not deter recruiting. It was

> "Join the Army and see the world"—

and in those days, they used to say:

> "Join the R.I.C. and see the next."

If one said now

> "Join the Palestine Police and see the next."

there would be a certain amount of similarity in it. Our men in Palestine have a very unpleasant task to do. Whatever is done, whether the Foreign Secretary goes to U.N.O. with a policy or without a policy, whether U.N.O. in the end comes to no decision or comes to a decision which we feel we have to implement, I ask one thing only, and it is this, that policy or no policy, we shall be guided by the rule that whatever is decided as a result, it shall not make the position of our troops in that country more difficult than it now is.

8.17 p.m.

Mr. Crossman (Coventry, East): Every time I have listened to a discussion in the House on Palestine, and particularly in listening to certain passages of the Foreign Secretary's speech, I have become increasingly aware that the chief problem is the distance, psychological and physical, between this country and Palestine. When I listen to our quiet discussion, and when I remember that, while we are talking cheerfully about keeping the door open and asking what, in two thousand years is a year in solving the problem, and that, on the other hand, in Jerusalem today British officials are cooped into ghettos and no British official

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can go about among the people he is trying to serve; when I remember that, in the last two days, I have received from two men, one an Englishman and one a New Zealander, who have spent their lives in serving Jews and Arabs, desperate appeals to be released from the prison into which they have been put by the British authorities; when I remember the feelings of Jews and Arabs, exasperated by 18 months' constant delay—and it is really ten years of delay from 1937—then I feel we ought to get some actuality and some real relationship between the urgency of the problem and what we are doing about it.

I welcome this Debate if for no other reason than that it will have impressed upon the Foreign Secretary the sense of hon. Members on all sides of the House, whether they are pro-Jew or pro-Arab or, as I prefer, mainly pro-British, our deep concern and our lack of policy today—lack of short-term policy, lack of long-term policy—and the dangers to this country which such a lack of policy will bring. There was one particular thing in the Foreign Secretary's speech which concerned and worried me. It is very easy to generalise from one's own experience. One has spent one's life in negotiations between reasonable British people, where one just gets them into two rooms, and then, after all, it is a question of the employers offering 8d. and the men demanding 10d., and then splitting at 9d., and it is very easy to believe that the Jews and the Arabs in their passionate national opposition, can be somehow jostled together by personal influence, and made to sign on the dotted line some compromise. Not one person who has visited Palestine in the last few years has come back disagreeing with the view that no agreed solution is possible, and that if we try to get people to conferences there will be endless postponement and delay. That was the view of the Peel Commission in 1937 and the view of Mr. Malcolm MacDonald in 1939; it is the point upon which the White Paper agrees and it was also the view of the Anglo-American Committee, of which I was a member, last year. Every person agrees that it is an absolute waste of time to go on bringing these people together into conference. I agree with the spokesman for the Opposition today that a whole year has been completely wasted, and that this matter should have gone to U.N.O. last year if it was going at all. I hope that after this Debate there will be no more talk about leaving the door open.

Arab and Jew have both of them an impregnable moral case. They have something that they really believe in, and they cannot be wangled out of it by some trick solution which everybody sees through. They know the problem from A to Z, and they look at every proposal with their eyes on the two questions of land and immigration. They judge every proposal according to the way in which those two questions are dealt with. There is no way of bringing them together before we impose something on both Jews and Arabs.

Mr. Alpass (Thornbury): Would the hon. Member impose a settlement by force?

Mr. Crossman: Perhaps my hon. Friend will allow me to develop the argument. There are only two ways of ending the situation, unless we continue the Mandate and continue spending £40 million a year on keeping a large army and being unpopular with both sides. One way is the 1937 way of partition. The other is the way of the White Paper of 1939. Now, 52 nations in U.N.O. are to find more devices for wanting to keep up the Mandate. One is the Arab way, and the other is the Jewish way. One way is that which enables the Jews to survive and have a reasonable chance of surviving, with a stake in parts of Palestine, where they can either come to terms with the Arabs or fight it out. The other way is to be at the mercy of an Arab majority.

Those two policies, partition and the White Paper, do not differ very much at the moment. The Jewish population in Palestine would, if the White Paper were imposed and our troops were withdrawn, create a *de facto* republic. British troops would go out and Jewish troops would take over what they could hold, and then there would be negotiations between the two sides. Whether we impose our wishes, or impose the White Paper, the future of Palestine will, in fact, be decided between the Jews on the one side and the Arabs on the other. What we have to decide is between an illegal or irregular way of dividing the country; walking out and leaving the parties to fight it out, or an internationally agreed partition of the country which will reduce

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[Mr. Crossman.]

the bloodshed to some extent. There is not a very great variety of solutions.

Now I would say a word or two about the reference to U.N.O. I am alarmed at the very easy way in which some people believe that reference to U.N.O. will settle the matter. I remember the days when a reference to the Anglo-American Committee was going to solve the problem. The problem is not to be solved in that way. As time goes on we find Arabs and Jew terrorists grow stronger, so that when we have to impose a solution the cost will be greater in British, Jewish and Arab blood the longer we wait. In regard to the reference to U.N.O. let us see realistically what is going to happen. There is a Russian *bloc* and an American *bloc*. The aim of the Russian *bloc* will be to have the British troops removed out of Palestine. The Russians want us out. What about the Americans? The Americans want us in. We have to understand that position. There has been a certain amount said about the Americans and upon the subject of elections in New York. Self-righteousness is rather dangerous. Apparently if there had been a million Jews in London we might have seen a slightly different attitude on the Front Benches on both sides of this House. There were Election pledges about the Jewish question. That British pressure group is big enough to get an election pledge at the conference, but not big enough to formulate the policy of a Government.

It is unwise to bicker at Americans about the size of the Jewish community in that country. We ought to look soberly at American interests. There are two factors which determine America's attitude, the Jewish democratic vote and Standard Oil. Jewish lobbying is vocal; oil lobbying is silent but highly influential. The oil lobby is quite powerful enough, in view of the close connection with the American Chiefs of Staff, to prevent the Americans assuming any responsibility in the Middle East, to jeopardise the relationship with the Arab world by which the oil supply would suffer. I do not blame the Americans for that. The Jewish group at home and Standard Oil abroad, make it their obvious interest to sit on the fence and to avoid ever making themselves get into the Middle East where they would have to fight pro-Jew or pro-Arab. Every American politician will do all he can to sit on the fence in the Middle East, so as to ensure that the British are there and that the Russians are not.

If this problem goes to U.N.O. the Americans will prevent the Russians having their way and will try to press the thing back on us. There will be some fantastic new constitution proposed, with a quite unworkable Mandate. We shall be politely pushed back into running the country to defend British and American interests in the Middle East. We shall, therefore, be no whit further on than if we had done it all ourselves. All U.N.O. brings is another Mandate which we shall not have written ourselves, but which others will have written for us. We may be much worse off than we are at present. Therefore, those Members of this House who have pressed for a time limit for the withdrawal of British personnel and troops are completely justified.

Secondly, we have not only to press for the time limit, but we have to make it clear to U.N.O. that, in our view, the Mandate is unworkable. On that point we agree with the Peel Commission and with the White Paper, and this House even agrees with the hon. and learned Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller) and myself, who were on the Commission which came to that simple conclusion—a conclusion which has only dawned on the Front Bench. The Mandate is unworkable. We are not prepared to work it. A new compromise cannot work, and we are not prepared to fail again. I believe it is essential that we should go to U.N.O. saying not only that we have this record but that this record has led us to this conclusion: It is impossible for an alien to go on ruling Jew and Arab. The problem has to be settled either by the White Paper or by partition which may both mean the same thing. But it has to be settled in one way or the other, enabling foreign rule to get out of Palestine. That would be to the interest, not only of the British but of the Arabs and the Jews.

I wish to say one harsh thing in conclusion. There are times, even in industrial disputes, when a strike or a lock-out is necessary, when a trial of strength has to come, when the task of the conciliator is to say, "The boys have got to have their heads and try it out." I believe that situation has arrived in Palestine, when it is preferable for Jew and Arab, who have

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passionate convictions, to " have it out " as equals and free men, even though it involves some bloodshed, than to continue fighting us. That is the case for partition. It is the case for the White Paper, and it is a case for ending the Mandate.

Mr. Kenneth Lindsay: It is a case for abdication.

Mr. Crossman: When two mature peoples are being ruled by a third people through a police State, I do not call it abdication. I call it liberation of the peoples concerned. It is not abdication to say that the Jews are now strong enough to defend themselves and the Arabs think they can defend themselves, that they should, therefore, have their freedom, and that we should not be tied up to some arrangement which the Americans want to impose on us for keeping us in Palestine with another " phoney " constitution and another compromise which will keep us balancing between the two. We all know that we are now ruling Palestine—we did not know it until last week—under the White Paper. The Foreign Secretary says we are bound to do it because it is a pledge to the Arab world. I would point out that if it is a pledge to the Arab world, it was also declared illegal by the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations—[An HON. MEMBER: " No."]—by a majority of one. It was declared illegal by the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations by four to three. It was declared illegal by Labour Ministers in the House of Commons, and I think I would be supported by the hon. and learned Member for Daventry opposite if I said that there was not a member of the Anglo-American Committee who could find a way of making the White Paper compatible with the Mandate.

We ought to be quite clear on what we are about. We are now saying that we do not want to impose a solution in Palestine. I would point out that we are imposing a solution in Palestine. With enormous force, we are imposing the White Paper. If, through that, we came to war, as at any moment we may, and this country were to find itself fighting to impose the White Paper which was declared illegal by the international authority under which we hold the Mandate, I must frankly say that I would be doubtful whether it would be a just or an unjust war.

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Mr. Pickthorn: Did the hon. Member say that we hold the Mandate under the Mandates Commission? If so, I think he should correct himself.

Mr. Crossmann: I said we hold it under the League of Nations.

Mr. Pickthorn: We do not.

Mr. Crossman: I will correct myself and say, " confirmed by the League of Nations." The point I was coming to was this: we have to face the reason why we are imposing the White Paper today. It is the same as in 1939. In 1939 we had to impose the White Paper because the Arab world might have joined the Axis in the years of the war. We all know that was the reason, and it may be it was a perfectly good strategic necessity, though an unpleasant one. We all know that today we are still imposing the White Paper, because we are afraid that otherwise the Arab world might go over to Soviet Russia.

I think it is time we were honest about this, and knew what we are doing from strategic reasons is taking precedence over morality and legality. If it does, at least we should know it in this House of Commons, and should know the motives behind our policy. It is intolerable to continue in this way, in which expediency is constantly having to take precedence over morality and legality. We know, of course, that there is a large terrorist movement; and if we increase Jewish immigration who in the Arab world will not say, " You are giving way to Jewish nuisance value "? The Arabs are bound to say that. Just as if the Arab view prevails the Jews will say, " You are giving way to Arab nuisance value." We have now reached the situation in Palestine in which both sides believe, and passionately believe, that the British give way to nuisance value. It is not a question of this Government, but a question of the last 10 years. The attitude is: The British give way to nuisance value, therefore the revolver is the " Esperanto." I say it is that which now utterly corrupts life in Palestine for Briton, Jew and Arab. If we have reached that point, and if the hon. Member for the English Universities (Mr. K. Lindsay) calls it abdication, I say that is nonsense.

Let us close down this lamentable story. Let us, for once, make up our minds, and go to the United Nations with the follow-

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[Mr. Crossman.]

ing three plain statements. First: The Mandate is unworkable, and we cannot possibly agree to any United Nations' recommendation for reconstituting the Mandate with any compromise solution at all. Secondly: We are in favour of an orderly partition of Palestine instead of a disorderly partition, which is what would occur if Palestine were made an Arab State and the Jews merely took what they wanted by means of the Haganah fighting for it; let us say we would rather do it under international guarantee. Thirdly: Whatever happens we will have our troops and adminstrators out by a certain date, because that will speed up the solution.

8.38 p.m.

Mr. Lipson (Cheltenham): It seemed to me that the whole burden of the argument of the hon. Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman) has been to lead up to his suggestion of partition. If I may say so, he has been extremely dogmatic.

Mr. Crossman: Brief.

Mr. Lipson: He is quite sure that no agreed solution is possible. But that was not the view put forward by the Foreign Secretary this afternoon. The Foreign Secretary told us that even at this late hour he has not given up hope that an agreed solution may be found. In the course of his speech he showed us how on two occasions he had almost brought the two parties together with the possibility of an agreed solution, when the untimely intervention of America made the position entirely impossible.

Mr. Crossman: Might I correct the hon. Member on one point? I was not, I think, quite dogmatic. All I said was that no one who has been to Palestine in the last three years has come back with the view that agreement is possible. That view is limited to people who sit in London.

Mr. Lipson: At any rate, personally I prefer the more optimistic view taken by the Foreign Secretary. The alternative offered by the hon. Member for East Coventry is that we should come out, and leave it to the Jews and Arabs to fight it out between themselves. That is an alternative which, to my mind, is quite unworthy of the responsibilities which we have had in that country for so many years; and the result of which, I think, would be too terrible to contemplate.

In all the Debates on Palestine in which I have been privileged to take part, I have tried to take as objective a view as possible of this problem.

Mr. Crossman: We all have.

Mr. Lipson: I have tried to be fair to the Government; I have tried to be fair to the Jews; I have tried to be fair to the Arabs; and have endeavoured to apply to this problem the principle which, in my view, ought to be applied to all political problems—the principle of justice. I have refused to forget that principle, or to turn a blind eye towards it, because, as a Jew, the problem of Palestine has a special significance to me. Starting from that premise, I want to say that I think that many of the charges which are brought against the Government in the handling of this problem are not fair. It has been said that there has been unreasonable delay. But to bring about a solution of the Palestine problem does not lie with this country alone. The other parties concerned, the Jews and the Arabs, have also their contribution to make, and I think it is clear that they have not been at all helpful. Both of them have maintained an extreme point of view.

Mr. Gallacher: Who are " they "?

Mr. Lipson: The Jews and the Arabs.

Mr. Gallacher: Then why does not the hon. Member say " We and the Arabs "?

Mr. Lipson: Perhaps the hon. Member will allow me to make my speech in my own way. Both of them have adopted an extreme point of view, and have not made the task of His Majesty's Government easier. Then, too, I think it is only fair to the Government to appreciate the fact that this is by no means the only problem with which they have had to deal since they came into office. After all, the war has created problems much greater and far more numerous than many people imagined it would, even when the war ended. Peace has not yet been made with Germany and Austria; the United Nations organisation had to be set up; economic problems of tremendous magnitude have had to be dealt with; the world has been, and still is, in danger of famine; in our own country we have had our domestic problems. In these circumstances it is most unreasonable of the extreme Jewish

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nationalists to complain that the Government have not given priority to their own particular problem.

Personally, I want to thank the Foreign Secretary for the speech which he made today. In my opinion, that speech is the best speech that has been made on the Palestine problem by anybody, and I think it has served a most useful purpose, because it has, at least, given all the facts, and it has made all the difficulties with which the Foreign Secretary has had to deal crystal clear; and to that extent, I think, it has considerably cleared the air. I was very much impressed by the obvious sympathy with which the Foreign Secretary has approached this problem, and the courage he has shown, in spite of all the difficulties, in trying to find a solution.

Therefore, I think that the supporters of the Zionist cause ought to show a little more understanding of his difficulties—perhaps they will after that speech—and realise it is not possible for him to meet all their demands, unless he is to sacrifice many of the political principles for which he and his party, and, indeed, all parties in this country have stood for so many years. It is, I think, obvious, that as a result of the terrorist activities in Palestine, the Zionist cause and the cause for a Jewish State have much less support than before. These people, by their actions, have done infinite harm to the cause of Jewry generally, and also to the cause of Jewish nationalism in Palestine. People are naturally asking now what kind of Jewish State is likely, when the terrorists show the particular attitude of mind indicated by their actions. As a result of the breakdown in the negotiations, it was inevitable that the Government should decide to refer this problem to U.N.O. The Foreign Secretary has said that the Mandate as it exists at present is unworkable, and it is only proper, therefore, that it should be handed over to U.N.O., which has been created to deal with problems of this kind. Personally, I hope the view expressed by the Foreign Secretary that there is still a chance that solution by agreement may be found between the Arabs and the Jews and the British Government before the matter goes to U.N.O. may be justified, because if agreement can be arrived at, it is far better than anything which is forced upon the country from outside. We can all hope and pray that that confidence is justified.

I should like to strengthen the appeal which has been made to the Foreign Secretary, that in the interval between now and, if need be, when the matter goes before U.N.O. in September, there should be an increase in the number of immigrants allowed into the country. I suggest the Government might agree, until the matter has been considered by U.N.O., to the figure being raised to 4,000 per month, which was the figure envisaged in the latest Government proposals for the settlement of the Palestine problem. I appeal to the Arabs to give sympathetic consideration to this request. I think I have shown that I have some understanding and appreciation of their point of view on this matter, and I trust that an appeal, coming from me, might have some influence with them. It is clear that an increase of this kind could not possibly do the Arab cause any harm whatsoever. On the other hand, it would relieve a tremendous amount of suffering, and help to create a better atmosphere in Palestine itself until a happier solution of the problem could be found. If the Colonial Secretary could assure the House that the Government are prepared to consider increasing the number of immigrants to 4,000 a month, I believe that such an assurance would meet with general acceptance, particularly when coupled with the plea which the Foreign Secretary made today, that all nations in the world should be prepared to open their gates and take their share of the displaced persons who are so sadly in need of a home.

I am glad that the Government have turned down the proposal for partition, because although partition might buy an easy peace for a time, like Munich, it would tend to keep Arab and Jew apart, with all the possibilities of conflict that might arise in consequence. As, in my view, the only ultimate solution of the Palestine problem is to be found in a Unitary State, in which Jews and Arabs would live and co-operate together for the common good of all, I believe that it would be a fatal mistake to start dividing the country. Palestine is smaller than Wales, and partition is a solution which the Government have rejected for India, where the case is so much stronger. If we were to accept partition for Palestine it would be difficult, from a logical, fair, and just point of view, to refuse Pakistan to India. There are differences of opinion

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[Mr. Lipson.]

as to how the Palestine problem is to be solved, but we are all agreed in desiring the earliest possible solution. I hope the Foreign Secretary will continue, as he told us he intends to do, in his efforts, so that, at long last, peace may be brought to Palestine, and that in peace and prosperity Palestine can once again make her proper contribution to human good and human happiness.

8.54 p.m.

Mr. Lever (Manchester, Exchange): I hope I shall not offend my hon. Friends, and give comfort to the Philistines, by extending to the Foreign Secretary's plan a conditional welcome, a welcome which I might describe as being with open arms, but crossed fingers. I believe in a united Palestine, and that partition, logically, would involve what my hon. Friend the Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman) says it would involve, namely, Jews and Arabs deciding to fight out their differences. I believe in a united Palestine because I believe that Jews and Arabs have to get together in Palestine, work together, and settle their differences, and I feel that partition as between Jews and Arabs would be the preliminary bout to a major fight. It would give no pleasure to me as a Jew to see the Jews of Palestine use their brilliant organising skill and great mental superiority and knowledge in Palestine to give them a victory in arms against their more primitive opponents. I think that nothing more dreadful could be contemplated, in the interests of the Jewish people anywhere, than a blood bath of that kind should be preceded by a partition policy. I believe in an independent Palestine, because I believe, as the Foreign Secretary has said—I hope sincerely—that the relationship between Jew and Arab in Palestine has been bedevilled from outside.

The Foreign Secretary seems to have in mind exclusively the hysteria of Madison Square Garden meetings and the efforts of some extreme Zionists. But there are other intermeddlers whom we ought to have in mind outside Palestine the moguls who rule the Arab States who represent every backward and reactionary tendency in the Middle East—and the oil moguls too, whose influence makes itself felt at every conference and on every decision about Palestine. I am bound to tell the House that I can think of another interfering party, who had no right to be there, and that is the British Government and the British Army. I am bound to say that it is not in the interests of British people that they should remain there any longer as one of the intermeddling parties of whom the Foreign Secretary has spoken. I give him hearty support in his desire for a united, free and genuinely independent Palestine, and a democratic Palestine which will govern its own destinies in every way. I do not think that that means that we can walk out tomorrow, but I think we ought to have a time limit. No one is going to believe the story that if we go out Jews and Arabs will massacre each other. If Britain goes out under a ruling of the United Nations Organisation and proper arrangements are made for a short interim period, the Jews and Arabs of Palestine will learn to live together, as everyone acknowledges they are able to do, if not subject to outside interference. They already work together in their trade unions, in big business, and in many other ways.

Mr. S. Silverman: How are we to get it?

Mr. Lever: The way to get it is to go to the United Nations organisation for the temporary cover under which we release our troops and set up the framework of a democratic self-governing Palestine. [*Interruption.*] With the Jews in a minority, at the moment, certainly. That is a matter for the people of Palestine to decide in a democratic way. I am bound to tell the House that I do not believe that any such solution will work without the temporary umbrella provided by the United Nations, it will not work if we do not at once admit a substantial number of Jews into Palestine. That is very different from demanding a Jewish State in Palestine, or a Jewish majority in Palestine. I am told by the Foreign Secretary, and I believe it, because I ventured to suggest the same thing myself some time ago, that, if we do not insist on the idea of a Jewish State and join with the Arabs in demanding self-government in Palestine, we can get agreement with the Arabs to let at least 100,000 Jews into Palestine. I want to see at least 100,000 Jews admitted into Palestine in the immediate future. I think the effect in soothing the

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whole situation would be immense and would give the denial to the pessimistic expectations of permanently bad relations between Jew and Arab. We are told by all sorts of people that these two races can never live together. Of course, they will not, if people with political and financial motives are continually bedevilling their relations. Let us see what are the genuine minimum needs of both sides and we might get rather a different and less gloomy picture of the possibilities from that which has been painted by my hon. Friend the Member for East Coventry.

One of the pressing problems of the moment is the question of the displaced persons, and this problem of displaced persons, if we try to for some academic reason, cannot be separated from Palestine. That problem is inseparably linked up with Palestine. We have to see these helpless people do not rot any longer in the displaced persons camps of Europe, and that we no longer pay mere lip service to humanitarian efforts which ought to have been made on their behalf. I am not afraid to say that there is a difference between displaced Jews and other displaced persons, because the Jews require rather different treatment and consideration. I must tell the House quite candidly that my view is that it is dishonesty and hypocrsy to pretend that the world should take them as an alternative to Palestine when at the present time the whole world shows no sign of wanting to take them. The only people in the world who have offered to take the displaced Jews are the Jews of Palestine who are prepared to die for the right to take them. I do not think that that can be ignored although the Jews are a minority in that country.

I want to put one or two questions and make a short statement. I should like the Colonial Secretary when he comes to reply to tell me in plain terms what steps the Government propose to take in regard to Palestine if the United Nations disagree on that subject. Secondly, I should like him to tell me what the Government proposes to do if the United Nations agree on Palestine. What steps are they to take in the interview. I should like an assurance from him now, particularly after all the statements that have been made on this matter in the House, that there are going to be no deals of an unsavoury kind, but that the British Government will take steps to get out of Palestine and leave Jew and Arab the job or running and ruling their own country. Those who are genuinely concerned about the British troops in Palestine want to see those troops brought home to England, where they are badly needed for the tasks confronting us today.

One final word. Some people in this country seem to have difficulty in understanding the position of the Jews in England and their special interest in the Jews in Europe and the Jews in Palestine. Some Members on both sides of the House in the course of Palestine Debates have made remarks of which on reflection they cannot be proud. I remember when my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) was valiantly fighting the battle of these unfortunate people the hon. and gallant Member for North Blackpool (Brigadier Low) made some remark suggesting a dubious loyalty existed on the part of the British Jews when he made his plea for these people. There is no mystery or secret about it. The British Jews are concerned about the suffering Jews in Europe and in Palestine, and in being so they do not abate one whit their loyalty to this country, but they desire to waken the conscience of the people of the world to the terrible plight of these unfortunate people. I ask the House to see that the Foreign Secretary sincerely fulfils the pledge he has given to get out of that country as soon as possible. I ask the House to insist that there is no double dealing now, because the history of the last 20 years is riddled with double dealing and false promises, which have helped to bring about this intolerable and ruinous state of affairs in Palestine, resulting in injustices to the Jews, fears on the part of the Arabs, and in no confident hope for the peace and prosperity of Palestine in the coming years.

9.6 p.m.

Mr. Manningham-Buller (Daventry): The hon. Gentleman the Member for the Exchange Division of Manchester (Mr. Lever) in the course of his extremely fluid speech took to task the hon. Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman) sitting in front of him. I was sorry that that should occur because that showed on the part of the hon. Member for the Exchange Division of Manchester a singular ignorance of the conditions in Palestine which

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[Mr. Manningham-Buller.]
would be likely to ensue if British troops forthwith left that country. The other point he made was the interest that the British Jews had in Jewish displaced persons. I was sorry that he confined his interest to British Jews. I think that on both sides of the House we are concerned with the interests of the displaced persons whether they be Jews or non-Jews who are now in camps in Europe.

Mr. Lever *rose*——

Mr. Manningham-Buller: I will not give way because I have not the time. I think that everyone will agree that we have listened to a good Debate today on this problem which has been so often debated in the House of Commons. The Foreign Secretary started his momentous and courageous speech by saying that there was no denying the fact that the Mandate was contradictory. That is no new discovery. It has already been pointed out by the hon. Member for East Coventry and it was mentioned in the Peel Report and confirmed in other documents. That in itself is a reasoned and cogent argument for the decision to refer this problem to the United Nations organisation. The right hon. Gentleman then went on to reduce the Palestine problem to three simple questions—simple in the sense that they can be simply asked but by no means easily answered.

The first was, should the claims of the Jews be admitted; secondly, should that of the Arabs; or, thirdly, should it be a United Palestinian State? As he said, we cannot solve these problems, but he invited this House "to face up to" them as he said His Majesty's Government have to "face up to them now." I do not know whether really there is very much point in this House facing those problems now if the Government are going to put them before the United Nations without any recommendation of any kind whatsoever. I agree that in the absence of agreement between Jews and Arabs those are questions which fall to be answered if there is to be a final solution of a difficult and persistent problem. My view of these answers is contained in the Report which I signed and which the hon. Member for East Coventry, among others, also signed. We said there that there should be no Jewish State. I think we were right in that, and having heard arguments since we signed it I personally adhere to that position. After all, the official Zionist demand for a Jewish State has a fairly recent origin, starting, I think, in 1942 with the Biltmore Declaration. I believe that is the first declaration——

Mr. Janner *rose*——

Mr. Manningham-Buller: I am limited in time.

Mr. Janner: That is not correct.

Mr. Manningham-Buller: I think I am entirely correct in saying that the Biltmore Declaration was the first official declaration of the Zionist demand for a Jewish State——

Mr. Paget (Northampton): Surely, there was one before?

Mr. Manningham-Buller: Not official Zionist policy. The hon. Member can correct me later if he desires, but I cannot give way because time is short and the Colonial Secretary wants sufficient time in which to reply. I do not believe that the claim for a Jewish State in Palestine is in the true long-term interest of the Jews in Palestine, and that is why I hope that even at this late date the Jewish organisations may reconsider their official policy. If they study the trend of population, there is no prospect of maintaining a permanent Jewish majority, or of obtaining one without some expulsion of the Arab inhabitants already there. I also agree that there should be no Arab State. I should not assent to the Arabs, with their present intensity of feelings, having any domination over the Jews now in the country. The hon. and gallant Member for Barnstaple (Brigadier Peto), who spoke with knowledge of the country, gave testimony to the fact that politics are removed when Jews and Arabs work together. We on the Commission did not exclude the possibility of both Arabs and Jews working in unison. If we had excluded that, we should have published a very different Report. There has been testimony from both sides of the House to the effect that the door is not yet completely closed to the possibility of Jewish and Arab co-operation in a united Palestine. In my belief, that—a united Palestine, if it can be achieved—is the policy which is likely to lead to greater prosperity in that country than any other.

There has been some discussion this evening on the thorny question of what

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is meant by the "National Home." The hon. and learned Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels) gave us a lengthy disquisition on that subject. The right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) said that the meaning was quite clear to him—that it meant a home and not lodgings, but he did not go further than that, and while he would say, no doubt, that Wales was his national home, he did not go on to indicate whether in his view that meant that Wales should be a national State.

It is agreed on both sides of the House that the Mandate is not only ambiguous but that it contains obligations which it is impossible to reconcile. From that it follows that there must be revision, and in recommendation No. 4 of our Report we anticipated that this matter would go to the United Nations—and that it would go without the delay that has occurred. If there was agreement between the Jews and Arabs as to what should be the contents of a trusteeship agreement, the revision would be so much easier, but even if there is no agreement, still, the revision is equally necessary.

But what is the cause of the delay which has occurred? We were asked to perform our duties in the short period of 100 days, and since then we have been told that there have been these efforts to secure agreement between Jews and Arabs. I listened with great interest to what the right hon. Gentleman had to say as to the history of those efforts and the reasons for the breakdown and change of attitude. I admire him for his optimism but I should have thought that anyone with any knowledge of this problem would have realised that at this present time agreement between Jews and Arabs was really completely impossible.

Indeed, it was completely impossible, as the Peel Report showed, before 1939, and long before the White Paper of that date—and in that respect the hon. Lady the Member for North Hendon (Mrs. Ayrton Gould) was entirely inaccurate. It would be a miracle in my view if that agreement was achieved; it could not be achieved unless the mutual fears of the Arabs and the Jews were resolved. I think we could all agree upon that. Now what are the Arab's fears? The Arab's fears, in the first place, are of Jewish domination; secondly, of dispossession and deprivation of his means of livelihood; thirdly, he fears a flood of immigration which will lead to that domination and to his dispossession. Those are the chief fears, in my belief, in the Arab mind. On the Jewish side, what are their fears? I am talking now not of the political Jews not residing in Palestine who have such an influence on the policy of the Jewish Agency but, so far as I can judge, of the Jews in Palestine. I believe their fear is this, and it can be stated quite simply: the fear that they will be dominated by the Arabs unless, with the aid of immigration, they can keep up their numbers.

We cannot resolve those fears, we cannot dispel them. It can only be done by a change of attitude on the part of the Jews, and also a change of attitude on the part of the Arabs. I regret that since 1942 Jewish domination has been in the forefront of Jewish policy. That was confirmed today by the Foreign Secretary when he said that the Jews thought it wrong that he should consult at all with the Arabs on the question of immigration. As I say, I regard this policy of the Jews, from the point of view of Jewish interests, to be really disastrous on long-term because, whether there is a Jewish state or not in Palestine, the livelihood and well being of those Jews who reside in Palestine must depend on their getting on well with the Arab inhabitants of that country and the surrounding people in the nations alongside. I cannot think that there can be any final settlement by agreement of this problem unless the Zionist attitude changes completely. Like the right hon. Gentleman, I would much prefer an agreed solution because that would have a much greater chance of finality, but I regret the right hon. Gentleman's statement the other day that the only proposals which would be put before the United Nations would be those contained in the White Paper, those which have been rejected either by Jews or by Arabs or by both. What does that mean? It means that if the United Nations accept any of the suggestions put forward in that White Paper, they either have to be imposed by force on the entire population of Palestine or on a majority or minority of the inhabitants who are opposed to that solution, and I cannot regard that as desirable.

Furthermore, these proposals are put forward by the right hon. Gentleman with a view to trying to secure agreement between the Arabs and Jews The proposals

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[Mr. Manningham-Buller.]
put forward to try to negotiate a settlement may not be quite the same as the proposals you put forward if you are trying to determine what is the right course to pursue in the interests of the inhabitants of Palestine. I hope that after this Debate there will be further consideration by His Majesty's Government as to whether or not they should put suggestions before the United Nations when the matter is referred to them.

I do not propose to spend much time on the proposals contained in the White Paper, but I take the view—opposed as I am to partition, having signed that Report—that any policy is better than no policy and, at the present time we have none, but in the final suggestions put forward by His Majesty's Government we give notice that we will quit Palestine in five years. That White Paper concludes with these remarkable words:

"The proposals contained in the present Memorandum are designed to give the two peoples an opportunity of demonstrating their ability to work together for the good of Palestine as a whole and so providing a stable foundation for an independent State."

That is a great and pious aspiration. But, these people in the past have had many opportunities of working together. They have not taken them, and I feel confident, but reluctant, in expressing the opinion that if that sort of proposal is put forward in the present state of mind in Palestine, it will mean that both sides will prepare for the day when we withdraw and they will then settle their differences by the sword.

Mr. K. Lindsay: I gather that the hon. and learned Member's views were not in complete accord with those of the right hon. Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley). I know it is not usual for the Opposition to put forward policy, but when a matter is so serious as this, I think we should know the policy of the Opposition, as well as that of the Government.

Mr. Manningham-Buller: I signed this Report expressing my view. I am speaking for myself and not committing anyone, nor the party behind me, to adhere to the view stated in the Report.

Mr. S. Silverman: The hon. and learned Gentleman agrees that the Report he signed was expressly not intended to be a long-term agreement, but was a set of transitional proposals? Will he say now what he thinks is a permanent solution?

Mr. Manningham-Buller: I am asked by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) whether our Report was merely a set of transitional proposals? I do not agree with that, and I think that if the hon. Member studies it carefully he will see that it contains both short-term and long-term proposals. I am also asked to suggest the course to be followed now. The question we have to discuss tonight is not so much the policy which one of us might think right, but the course which His Majesty's Government should now pursue—[HON. MEMBERS: "That is the same thing."]—It is not the same thing. The course we are told His Majesty's Government should pursue now, is to throw this matter on to the table of the United Nations, with no recommendation at all. I have said before, and say again, that whether the policy put forward by His Majesty's Government is one with which I personally agree or not, I am prepared to go so far as to say that any policy put forward by them is better than no policy.

Mr. Lever: What policy would the hon. and learned Gentleman like to put forward?

Mr. Manningham-Buller: I wish to carry on with what I was saying before I was interrupted on these matters. I think the House will agree that to throw this matter at the United Nations without any advice, without any recommendations, in the hope that some nation, free from any responsibility, will put forward a solution which is universally acceptable, is a most impracticable hope. We, having governed Palestine, and not too badly at that since the Mandate, are really in the best position to say in what respects the Mandate should be revised, and what the trusteeship agreement, which will replace the Mandate, should contain. If there is no hope, as I think there is no hope, of getting a solution from the United Nations which is really universally acceptable, one can only regard this as another factor leading to delay. During that delay, apparently, the present situation must continue, and, for an indeterminate period, we shall continue to bear alone an intolerable burden, a burden we have borne for the last 18 months largely owing to the fact that His Majesty's Government have had no policy. We shall have to

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bear that burden, apparently, until next September, and we shall have to go on bearing it, apparently, until the United Nations has come to a conclusion, which may be for a much longer time.

I wish to say one word about immigration, because immigration is one of the first things, as the hon. Member for East Coventry said, to which the Arabs and Jews look in considering whether or not a policy is right, the second being land. I cannot help wondering whether, to assist in the solution of the problem in Europe, to which we drew attention in the forefront of our Report, it really would not assist immigration into Palestine if, in future, the selection was made by Great Britain or those to whom immigration certificates were to be given, and if priority was not given in future, and it has not been, I understand, in the last few years, to the aged and infirm who are now in these displaced persons centres, to the very young and to some skilled workmen, whose services are required in Palestine to provide accommodation for them.

As I understand it, the Jewish Agency now has the power of selection. That selection has, in the past, been criticised, I think rightly criticised by the orthodox Jews, Agudath Israel, for not including sufficient orthodox Jews. I criticise it on the ground that in determining to whom certificates for legal immigration should be granted, they have not selected those categories from inside the camps in Europe. I also ask the right hon. Gentleman to say whether the policy with regard to illegal immigrants has now changed. In 1945 an illegal immigrant who was detained, put in a camp, gained priority in securing immigration, under the quota, into Palestine. After he was caught, he went to the head of the queue to gain admission. I hope that that practice has ceased, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will be able to say it has, because of the danger of a wave of illegal immigration which will accentuate the tense situation this summer. I can think of few things so likely to encourage people to attempt this operation than the knowledge that if they are caught they will at least get priority in admission to Palestine.

I wish we had heard today, from the Foreign Secretary, a statement of the terms upon which we were prepared to carry on in Palestine. I wish we had heard from him that he was prepared to go to the United Nations and say, "This, in our view, is what the Mandate should contain. If the Mandate contains this, if it contains these obligations, then if the United Nations, the United States of America and every other country are prepared to support us, we will do our best to carry it through." I hope that we shall get some assurance that by going to the United Nations we are not getting ourselves into the position of undertaking an obligation to fulfil anything which the United Nations, in their wisdom, may determine to be right for the future of Palestine.

9.29 p.m.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Creech Jones): I want to assure the House that all the suggestions which have been made during this Debate will be most carefully studied by the Government. The Debate has shown, once again, how difficult is this problem of the two communities in Palestine, and how divided are the parties in this House in regard to a solution of the difficulties. It is not a problem out of which any party dare attempt to make political capital. I think the approach of the present Government has been that it is a great human problem, calling for the most careful handling, because of the deep human feelings which have been expressed and evidenced over a long period.

Therefore, we would accept the view that any contributions which can be made from any quarter of the House towards finding a method by which Arab and Jew communities can live together in Palestine, will have our most sympathetic examination. It is hardly reasonable to pronounce that His Majesty's Government have not had a policy in connection with this matter. I shall seek to show, if I can, what that policy has been over the past 18 months. It is not necessarily a failure on the part of the Government if, so far, they have been unable to bring the two communities together, for the finding of a constructive solution to a problem which has baffled us over so many years.

Mr. Pickthorn: The Minister spoke about not making political capital. Now he talks about a problem "which has baffled us"—by which I take him to

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[Mr. Pickthorn.]
mean his party—" over so many years." Surely, they were not baffled until after the General Election?

Mr. Creech Jones: I just do not understand the interruption. The problem is one which has baffled the British Government, as the Mandatory Power, almost ever since Great Britain has held the Mandate. There have been difficulties, and disturbances of all kinds. Numerous policies have been announced in the hope of resolving the difficulties between the two communities in Palestine. It is an easy gibe to say that the Government have wasted 12 months on this business, that we should have realised 12 months ago that this problem of trying to administer Palestine under the Mandate was insoluable, and that then we should have gone to the United Nations with the problem. Again, I want to show, it was the responsibility and the duty of the Government to attempt to find the means whereby the two communities could live in harmony together. It was an obligation upon the Government to exhaust all possibilities to achieve this end. When the Labour Government came into office, both Britain and the United States were entangled in promises which had been made to the Arabs. It was clear that, if this problem were to be solved, then a new approach would have to be found to what had already been an intractable problem for previous Governments. It was clear that any possible scheme, if it was to work, would have to be enforced and therefore, it was obviously desirable that an effort should be made to try to procure some agreement by negotiation. There had been the White Paper policy, which presumably was still being applied, and which, brought criticism from the United States. It was the responsibility of the new Government to decide whether, if the approaches which had previously been tried had proved ineffective, a new way should be discovered. Accordingly, representations were made to the United States for the purpose of seeing what degree of co-operation could be obtained from them in finding a way through these difficulties.

It has been said that a great deal of time was lost in obtaining the co-operation of the United States, but I submit that the difficulties were not with the Government, but on the other side of the Atlantic. There was no time lost in obtaining the Report of the Anglo-American Mission, and, immediately, the Mission reported, steps were made for the Report to be studied by the experts. A unanimous series of recommendations—unanimously agreed by the Anglo-American experts—was in our hands on 26th July. Within four or five days, an announcement was made in this House of what the British Government would seek to do in respect of the recommendations of the experts.

Mr. Stanley: When the right hon. Gentleman talks about Anglo-American experts, he is differentiating, is he not, between them and the Anglo-American Mission?

Mr. Creech Jones: I thought it was within the knowledge of the House that, immediately following the report of the Anglo-American Mission, the recommendations were submitted to two bodies of experts drawn from both the United States and the United Kingdom.

Mr. Crossman: Is it not a fact that, on the American side, not one of the experts had visited Palestine, whereas, at least, the Anglo-American Mission had been there?

Mr. Creech Jones: Certainly, but let us get the facts. These were, in the main, persons who were very familiar with these problems, many of them had had very long experience in regard to Palestinian affairs, and they certainly made a series of recommendations as to how the Report which had been received from the Mission——

Mr. Manningham-Buller: The right hon. Gentleman has not answered the question. He has repeatedly called these unknown gentlemen experts. Can he say how many of them have ever been to Palestine?

Mr. Creech Jones: In any case, the point is quite irrelevant. Some of these men were experts in regard to the Palestinian Administration and the problems of the Middle East. The problem which had to be tackled was the implementation of the report of the Mission, and I submit that, when it became obvious that the United States Government were not prepared to implement the Report of the Anglo-American Committee, the British Government themselves took the initiative and

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made their announcement on 31st July. This offered a basis for discussion to both the Arabs and the Jews. At that time, there was a reasonable hope of discussion on the basis of the recommendations contained in the Morrison Report. But let me add this important fact——

Mr. Pickthorn: On a point of Order. May we know, Mr. Speaker, what is meant by the " Morrison Report "?

Mr. Creech Jones: The Morrison Plan, obviously.

Hon. Members: Hear, hear.

Mr. Pickthorn: Hon. Members cannot " Hear, hear " for 20 minutes; the hon. Gentleman will have to say something.

Mr. Creech Jones: I also want to make another point clear. In January, 1946, the British Government made an announcement at the Assembly of the United Nations. They declared that the Palestine Mandate was receiving the close attention of the American and British Governments, and that, as early as possible, an announcement would be made to the Assembly in regard to these discussions. On the winding up of the League of Nations a few months later, Britain again declared, with the other Powers holding Mandates under the League of Nations, that she would observe the obligations of the Mandate until a new arrangement was made with the United Nations. That meant that if we were to present the problem of Palestine to the United Nations, we could only do it in one of two ways. Palestine could either achieve its independence, which was not a practical proposition, because of the opposition of both Jews and Arabs inside Palestine, or alternatively, the trust arrangements could be continued. But if an agreement were to be registered with the United Nations, and Palestine brought under the Trusteeship Council, then it became necessary that an understanding should be reached as between Jews and Arabs, and with the neighbouring Arab States who would also expect to give their agreement. Therefore, whether we liked it or not, if independence was not a possible immediate course for Palestine, sooner or later a trusteeship agreement would have to be negotiated. It was consequently an obligation on the British Government to attempt to find out what the terms of that agreement could be.

It has been suggested that we might have attempted to impose a solution, either of partition or of some plan along the lines which had previously been announced in the House of Commons in July of last year. It was not possible to impose a partition plan in Palestine, even if there had been the unanimous backing of the whole of Jewry, or even assuming that some practical scheme could have been found which would have satisfied the Jews. [HON. MEMBERS: " The Arabs."] No, the Jews. Any attempt to impose a partition solution in Palestine would have been out of harmony with the Mandate itself; it would not have been consistent with the terms of the Mandate. Moreover, it would have exposed us to a great deal of suspicion and distrust, and certainly the other nations in the United Nations would have declared that we were seeking to serve some ulterior purpose.

Mr. Stanley: Is it not a fact that the old League of Nations held that partition was within the terms of the Mandate, and at that time recommended the British Government to find a solution on those lines?

Mr. Creech Jones: That is not the interpretation which has been placed upon it by our own legal advisers. [*Interruption.*] I wish we could at least have an exhibition of good manners on the other side. This argument is of some importance because the Government have been criticised for not having imposed a solution in Palestine; I am trying to show that, as far as partition was concerned, it was not within the power of the Government to impose such a solution. It could only have been enforced by military operations which would have been repugnant to the British people. It would have been a threat to peace and would have brought us before the Security Council, with very doubtful results. In addition, I think, it would have brought us an enormous amount of resentment from the Arabs, and a continuing hostility. That was the position in regard to partition.

It was equally difficult for us to consider the imposition of any alternative scheme which implied the preservation of a united Palestine. The success of such an arrangement depended again on the collaboration of the Arab and Jewish communities, but both Arabs and Jews were

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[Mr. Jones.]

in opposition to a scheme of that kind and neither would accept it. Therefore, our responsibility as a Government, if we could not impose a scheme, and if it was essential to get some kind of basis for a trusteeship agreement, was to discover whether in some way we could obtain the co-operation of both Arabs and Jews. The Morrison Plan had been rejected. When, latterly, His Majesty's Government got the Arabs in conference and the Jews in informal discussions, we attempted very hard to find some plan which might be a basis for securing their co-operation. I want to make clear that what was offered, and what has been known as the Bevin plan, was merely a basis for discussion with the two sides. I do not accept the description of the proposals that was given by my hon. Friend the Member for North Hendon (Mrs. Ayrton Gould). What we attempted to do was to build up in Palestine, for the two communities, self-government, and we tried to give in various areas, to Jews and to Arabs, very real powers, and then to build up, if we could, some central political institutions whereby reasonable parity might be obtained in order to meet Jewish and Arab objections that one might conceivably dominate the other in the national political life of Palestine. Further, in the proposals that were made, we suggested areas which would give reasonable opportunities for economic expansion and land development; indeed, the land which could be freely acquired by the Jews was, I think, three times larger than they are permitted to expand in at the present time. Not only that, we attempted to find a satisfactory formula to cover immigration, because the Jews themselves were dissatisfied lest they found that economic absorptive capacity as a formula would not give them the volume of immigration which they regarded as necessary.

Sir Patrick Hannon (Birmingham, Moseley) *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: I cannot allow any interruptions. There are only seven minutes to go; the Government have been attacked, and they must be allowed to meet those attacks.

Mr. Creech Jones: Those proposals were in the spirit of the Charter. They were within the framework of the United Nations, and responsibilities were given to the respective authorities under the United Nations in the event of difficulties arising.

I come to the next criticism which has been made in regard to Government policy. Why are we making no recommendation to the United Nations? I do not accept the view that our line is to deny British leadership in the United Nations I do not accept the view that to offer this problem for the consideration of the United Nations is derogatory to the prestige of Britain. We shall offer to the United Nations our experience in the working of the Mandate; we shall submit all the schemes which have emerged in the discussions when a settlement has been sought. We shall not be a silent member when these deliberations are going on. The whole history of the Mandate will be objectively presented. There will be no special pleading for a particular solution. But I would like to put this, that on the practical side, when this problem is submitted, we as a nation, in regard to our administration of the Mandate have had to tolerate a great deal of villification, and we have been bitterly attacked, and our administration has come under the most severe scrutiny of various nations.

We have been very unfairly attacked in regard to our administration. Therefore, we feel that it is right and proper that we should let the world now judge what is the best to be done for Palestine. There is a great deal of suspicion and distrust in regard to Britain. If that is so, and if we are told that we are continuously seeking our own self-interest in connection with the affairs of Palestine, let there be a solution which we do not attempt to prejudice, a solution which is likely to give satisfaction to the rest of the world.

Further, all our plans which we have submitted for a solution, have so far been rejected. If we put all our plans within the possession of the United Nations it is far better that the United Nations, knowing of our experience and knowing why those plans were submitted and the defects associated with the working of the Mandate, should be able to form their own judgment. If it should happen that another nation has a bright idea for solving this problem, let that idea be put into the pool. Do not let it be thought that Britain is trying to prejudice consideration of other schemes.

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If other nations have ideas and proposals for schemes, let those schemes be fairly considered and let us not seek to deflect from their fair consideration by advocacy of particular schemes of our own.

Mr. C. Davies: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer this question? In what way is this question to be put before the United Nations? Are we the mandatory Power asking for advice, or do we surrender the Mandate and ask the United Nations what they will do about it?

Mr. Creech Jones: That is the point to which I was just coming. We are not going to the United Nations to surrender the Mandate. We are going to the United Nations setting out the problem and asking for their advice as to how the Mandate can be administered. If the Mandate cannot be administered in its present form we are asking how it can be amended. It would be folly for us at this point to prejudice that discussion by ourselves imposing any duress on the United Nations, or trying to set a time limit within which the decision must be taken. If we go to the United Nations we shall do all in our power to get as early a discussion as is possible. We are already exploring the question of how a speedier discussion of this problem can be achieved. It has been represented to us that we should go to the Security Council. I suggest that for the purpose of dealing with a problem such as this the Security Council is an imperfect instrument. Indeed, the machinery of the Security Council is such that it may not make a recommendation to the Assembly. [An HON. MEMBER: "It can call a special meeting."] True, it can call a special meeting. The Security Council may, under the Charter, keep this problem entirely within its own purview. There are other difficulties, and, likewise, there are difficulties about reference to the Trusteeship Council.

It being Ten o'Clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

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[For Continuation of Proceedings, see Official Report for Wednesday, 26th February, 1947.]

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BRITISH ARMY

Demobilisation

6. **Mr. Callaghan** asked the Secretary of State for War on what basis he has decided that a further three groups may be demobilised by next July.

Mr. J. Freeman: Programmes announced far in advance, such as that issued in November last year, must always be subject to revision in the light of events. The progress of releases is regularly reviewed and it recently became clear that we would be justified in making the acceleration referred to in the Question.

7. **Mr. Callaghan** asked the Secretary of State for War how many additional men will be released as a result of the decision to demobilise up to Group 53 by July.

Mr. J. Freeman: The number in the three additional groups to be released was, when the last check was made, of the order of 50,000. The exact numbers will depend on the number of men in these groups who may enlist, remain in the Army on bounty engagements, or defer their release voluntarily.

B.A.O.R. (Amenities)

12. **Mr. Medlicott** asked the Secretary of State for War if, in making representations to the G.O.C. the Rhine Army as to expenditure of money and materials on entertainment, he will make it clear that it is not intended in any way to discourage the provision of reasonable and appropriate amenities for the troops, especially those amenities which formations and units seek to provide by their own efforts and initiative.

Mr. J. Freeman: Yes, Sir.

African Troops (Rioting)

16. **Mr. Piratin** asked the Secretary of State for War whether he will now make a further statement with regard to the riot and shooting of African native troops on 2nd January at Gilgil, Kenya.

Mr. J. Freeman: The trial of the 14 ringleaders to whom my right hon. Friend referred in his reply to the hon. Member on 28th January was due to take place this month. He has not yet received details. The 24 Askaris who opened fire have been released from arrest. They had, in fact, been released at the time of my right hon. Friend's previous answer, but owing to a corrupt passage in a signal, he was under the impression that they were still under arrest.

Milton Rifle Range (Houses)

19. **Mr. Garry Allighan** asked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that five dwellings which the Ministry of Health has made available to the Strood Rural District Council for domestic housing cannot be so used because the approach to these houses is within the danger area of the Milton rifle range; how often this range has been used during the past 18 months; and whether he considers its retention sufficiently important as to render five houses uninhabitable.

Mr. J. Freeman: Five dwelling houses, which were built in 1817, are in the danger area of this range. These houses are the property of the War Deparment. They were offered to the local authority but were rejected as not suitable for civilian occupation because of their location. The range has been in use six days a week up to the beginning of this year. It is not in use at the moment, as it is being repaired, but will be required in the near future. The possibility of moving the range to an alternative site is already being investigated.

Technical and Non-Technical Arms

43. **Mr. R. Adams** asked the Secretary of State for War approximately the proportion of men employed in technical and non-technical arms in January, 1945, and the latest available date.

Mr. Bellenger: There is no strict line of demarcation between the technical and non-technical arms. Today all arms and Corps in the Army require a proportion of technicians. If, however, arms other than Royal Artillery, Royal Armoured Corps and Infantry are regarded as technical, the proportion of men employed in technical and non-technical arms both in January, 1945, and at the end of last year was about one to one.

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Personal Case

37. **Mr. Wilkes** asked the Secretary of State for War whether he is yet able to announce whether 19114754 Private R. D. Wallace, R.A.M.C., D Company, Boyce barracks, Crookham, Hampshire, whose two young children are at home in the sole care of a sister 16 years of age, has been yet granted compassionate long leave.

Mr. Bellenger: Private Wallace is still on compassionate leave which has been extended to 1st March, while his case is being considered.

Rate of Exchange

Mr. Sharp asked the Secretary of State for War on what date in early 1946 was the rate of exchange of lire to the £ for British troops in C.M.F. devalued from 400 lire to 900 lire to the £; what were the conditions under which Servicemen holding lire at that time could receive compensation; and whether the alteration in the £ to lire exchange rate came into operation at the same time.

Mr. Bellenger: The British military rate of exchange in Italy was altered from 400 lire to 900 lire to the £ with effect from 30th January, 1946. British troops were compensated for the loss on the lire they held at the time by being given five additional lire for every four held, up to the level of their total pay drawings since 1st January, 1946. The change brought the military rate approximately into line with the rate obtained by Italian exporters.

Defence Works; Coast Areas

Mr. Marlowe asked the Secretary of War whether he is aware that coast areas, particularly in the neighbourhood of Brighton, are still much encumbered with wire placed there by his Department; why he has ignored repeated requests for its removal; when he anticipates action being taken; and whether, if it is removed by the local authority, his Department will defray the cost.

Mr. Bellenger: Defence works on sea fronts in the South-East Coast Areas have been and are being removed by the local authorities under schemes agreed between them and the War Office, the cost being defrayed by the War Office. Defence works other than those on sea fronts where removal is necessary in the public interests, are dealt with under arrangements described by my predecessor in reply to the hon. Member for Maidstone (Mr. Bossom) on 20th December, 1945, of which I am sending the hon. and learned Member a copy.

SERVICES
LAND REQUIREMENTS

8. **Mr. Emrys Roberts** asked the Secretary of State for War whether he is now able to make an announcement regarding the release of the military training camp at Harlech, Merioneth.

Mr. J. Freeman: I would ask the hon. Member to await the statement to be made today by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister.

10. **Mr. Prescott** asked the Secretary of State for War what proposals are entertained by his Department for making a permanent training area of the Burbage Valley, near Sheffield.

Mr. J. Freeman: I would refer the hon Member to the reply given on 18th February to my hon. Friend the Member for Brecon and Radnor (Mr. Watkins), of which I am sending him a copy.

Mr. Swingler asked the Secretary of State for War what steps have been taken to establish Army training centres in Germany, with a view to relieving pressure on training areas in this country.

Mr. Bellenger: No steps have been taken to establish Army training centres in Germany specifically for the purpose of relieving pressure on training areas in this country. The maximum use is made of training areas in Germany for the training of the Rhine Army. Owing to the very large expenditure which would be involved, it is not practicable to move the long established instructional schools from the United Kingdom to Germany for the temporary period of our occupation of that country. Training areas are, therefore, required in the United Kingdom for War Office schools, for the Territorial Army and for the basic recruit training of the Army intake, apart from provision that has to be made for the training of the Regular Army in this country as and when our commitments overseas decrease.

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84. **Mr. Dye** asked the Minister of Town and Country Planning whether it is the intention to hold a local public inquiry regarding the future of the Stanford battle training area; and where such an inquiry will be held.

Mr. Silkin: The proposal referred to is to be considered by the Inter-Departmental Committee on Services Land Requirements. If, on examination, it is desired to adhere to the proposal, a public local inquiry will be held at a convenient place in the locality.

PRISONERS OF WAR

Repatriation

14. **Mr. Stokes** asked the Secretary of State for War why repatriation of prisoners of war, at the rate of 5,000 a month from the Middle East, cannot start until July; and whether he will give an assurance that the undertaking that repatriation from the Middle East would be completed no later than repatriation from this country is still valid.

Mr. J. Freeman: The programme of repatriation from the Middle East has been arranged to conform generally to that from this country. The increase of the rate to 5,000 from July will ensure that repatriation from the Middle East is completed no later than that from the United Kingdom.

32. **Mr. Stokes** asked the Secretary of State for War whether prisoners of war who were captured by the U.S. Army and subsequently handed over for work in Great Britain are, in accordance with the request made to the French Government for the return of similar prisoners to Germany, to be repatriated at the same time.

Mr. Bellenger: The prisoners of war who were transferred from the U.S.A. to Great Britain had been held on our behalf in the United States under a pooling arrangement; the United States Government ceased to have any responsibility for them from the date of transfer. They will, therefore, be repatriated under the same terms as all others in the United Kingdom.

81. **Mr. Sorensen** asked the Secretary of State for War whether representations concerning the prisoners of war at Dunkirk have been made to the French Government, in view of the fact that these men surrendered to the British Army by special armistice in May, 1945, and were promised early repatriation.

Mr. Bellenger: I am making inquiries into the case of these prisoners. Perhaps my hon. Friend will send me any information he has.

Mr. Stokes asked the Secretary of State for War whether, in deciding priority for the repatriation of prisoners of war, due regard is being taken of the circumstances of the dependants of the men awaiting their return in Germany.

Mr. Bellenger: The circumstances of dependants of German prisoners of war are taken into account in selecting prisoners of war for inclusion in the quota of 500 compassionate cases a month, but not in other cases.

Visitors

80. **Mr. Sorensen** asked the Secretary of State for War why those wishing to visit prisoner-of-war camps in the United Kingdom have to sign an agreement promising that, should their application be not granted, they will not again make application privately or publicly.

Mr. Bellenger: This is purely a private arrangement between the Y.M.C.A. and those people who visit prisoner-of-war camps as official Y.M.C.A. visitors and nothing to do with me.

Newspapers

105. **Mr. Symonds** asked the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster what German newspapers are available to German prisoners in this country; and if he will consider increasing the proportion of German, as compared with English, newspapers available to them.

Mr. J. Hynd: Last month about 10,500 copies of 130 different German newspapers were distributed. It is hoped to increase this number, but my ability to do so is limited by the acute paper shortage in Germany.

NATIONAL FINANCE

Taxation (Suggested Concessions)

53. **Mr. McAdam** asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he has considered a

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letter from the Town Clerk of Salford protesting, on behalf of the Salford City Council, against the Purchase Tax on dustbins; and if he will take that protest into consideration when considering his new Budget proposals.

Mr. Dalton: Yes, Sir.

55 and 56. **Colonel Stoddart-Scott** asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer (1), whether he will consider, when framing his next Budget, abolishing the 16⅔ per cent. Purchase Tax on all drugs used for the treatment of disease;

(2) whether he will consider, when framing his next Budget, abolishing the 33⅓ per cent. Purchase Tax on toothpaste and other preparations used in the prevention of disease.

Mr. Dalton: The hon. and gallant Member will not expect me to anticipate my Budget statement.

Land Tax (Revenue)

Viscount Hinchingbrooke asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what revenue is derived annually from the Land Tax; and what is the estimated cost of collection.

Mr. Dalton: £501,000 in 1945-46. The cost of collection cannot be distinguished from the total Inland Revenue cost.

TRADE AND COMMERCE

Dresses (Imports from U.S.A.)

70. **Major Lloyd** asked the President of the Board of Trade the total value in sterling of the ladies' dresses recently imported from the U.S.A. and now on sale in this country.

Mr. Belcher: No separate figures are available in respect of women's and girls' dresses, but the value of women's and girls' dresses and skirts imported from the United States during the last quarter of 1946 was £57,495.

Surplus Government Tyres

73. **Mr. Renton** asked the President of the Board of Trade how and where tyres 9.00 by 16, of which plentiful stocks were held by the Government last year, can now be obtained.

Mr. Belcher: Supplies of this size of tyre are likely to be irregular as it is not in common use. The Director of Disposals, Ministry of Supply, Great Westminster House, London, disposes of any surplus Government tyres which may arise.

Agricultural Machinery (Exports)

Mr. York asked the President of the Board of Trade what was the total value of exports of tractors and agricultural machinery during 1946 and also during January, 1947; and what proportion of total output do these figures represent.

Sir S. Cripps: The value of agricultural machinery (including tractors) exported from the United Kingdom was £6,800,000 in 1946 and £504,000 in January, 1947. Production figures are not available for these periods, but in the first nine months of 1946 production for export represented 24 per cent. of the total.

TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING

Housing Sites, Rural Areas

83. **Mr. Manningham-Buller** asked the Minister of Town and Country Planning what instructions he has given with regard to the use of sites for housing in small rural parishes.

Mr. Silkin: General principles on the choice of housing sites in rural areas are stated in paragraph 21 of the Housing Manual, 1944, a copy of which I am sending to the hon. Gentleman. More specific guidance can only be given in the light of particular local circumstances.

85. **Mr. Dye** asked the Minister of Town and Country Planning how many applications for approval of housing sites were received by his Department from the Downham Market Rural District Council during 1946; how many received approval; how many were rejected; and what was the number of proposed houses involved.

Mr. Silkin: During 1946, 17 housing sites, involving 462, houses were submitted to my Department by the Downham Rural District Council. Twelve of these sites, providing for 238 houses, gave rise to no objections, while one site for 32 houses was later withdrawn by the

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council. In the case of the four remaining sites, involving 192 houses, the council were asked to consider the possibility of more suitable alternative sites, and this matter is shortly to be further discussed with my Regional Office.

New Town (Micklefield-Sherburn)

Colonel Ropner asked the Minister of Town and Country Planning whether any decision has yet been reached by him with regard to the advisability, or otherwise, of approving the scheme to site a new town in the Micklefield-Sherburn area.

Mr. Silkin: Representatives of the Leeds City Council and West Riding County Council discussed this proposal with me and I indicated that, apart from other objections, a site in this area would be too close to Leeds to permit the new town becoming a self-contained and balanced community.

EMPLOYMENT

Foreign Workers

94. **Mr. Byers** asked the Minister of Labour whether he will undertake an exhaustive survey of all existing camps and hutments in preparation for sponsored immigration of foreign workers; and if he will publish a report as soon as it has been completed.

Mr. Ness Edwards: Such a survey is now in progress. As regards publication my right hon. Friend does not think this would serve any useful purpose.

96. **Mr. Lipson** asked the Minister of Labour what steps he has taken to secure the agreement of the representatives of organised labour to the employment of foreign workers to make good the shortage of manpower in this country; and what progress has been made.

Mr. Isaacs: As I informed the House on 11th February, agreement to the employment of Poles has been reached with a number of industries where there is a shortage of labour and consultations are in progress with others. Agreements have also been reached for the employment of other foreign workers in certain cases and I have in hand arrangements for expanding recruitment. I propose to continue my discussions on the question of the employment of foreign labour with the Joint Consultative Committee of the National Joint Advisory Council later this week.

Lodging Allowances

97. **Mr. Lipson** asked the Minister of Labour if lodging allowances will be paid to workers temporarily unemployed owing to the fuel shortage, whose places of employment are not in the towns where their homes are situated, and who have to pay for their lodgings during the stoppage.

Mr. Isaacs: Yes, Sir, provided the workers were in receipt of lodging allowances from my Department before the stoppage, and remain in the area of transfer.

Factory Sites, Scotland (Disabled Persons)

98. **Mr. Willis** asked the Minister of Labour what progress has been made by the Disabled Persons Employment Corporation in the provision of special factories in Scotland for the severely disabled.

Mr. Isaacs: Sites have been approved in seven areas—Motherwell, where building is in progress; Govan and Springburn, Glasgow; Cowdenbeath; Dundee; Edinburgh; Coatbridge. The Corporation is negotiating for the acquisition of a voluntary undertaking already employing severely disabled persons at Edinburgh. Search continues for suitable sites in a number of other areas.

Wallasey

Mr. Marples asked the Minister of Labour what was the number of people registered as unemployed in Wallasey on 14th February, or the nearest convenient date.

Mr. Isaacs: Three thousand two hundred and fifty at 19th February.

Herring Nets (Disabled Men)

Miss Colman asked the Minister of Labour whether, in view of the shortage of female labour in the manufacture of herring nets and trawls, he will consider taking steps to bring to the notice of employers the possibility of employing disabled men.

Mr. Isaacs: Every opportunity is taken of drawing the attention of employers, in areas where there is a shortage of female

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labour, to the possibility of engaging suitable disabled men for work previously undertaken by women. I am obliged to my hon. Friend for her suggestion and will see that it is followed up.

Housing Contracts, Ennerdale (Craftsmen)

Mr. F. Anderson asked the Minister of Labour for particulars of applications for craftsmen that have been made from the housing contractors in the Ennerdale Rural District Council area, covering the districts of Cleator Moor and Egremont; how many applications have been complied with; how many applications are outstanding; what he intends to do to meet the serious shortage of craftsmen that has been existent for many months; if he is aware that contractors are refusing to tender in this area; and what steps will be taken to overcome the difficulty.

Mr. Isaacs: The demands outstanding on local authority housing contracts in this area are for six bricklayers and two hod carriers. Since the contracts started three joiners, 24 bricklayers (including three trainees) and six other craftsmen have been supplied. The main method of overcoming the shortage of craftsmen is to increase the supply by means of the Government Training Scheme which is steadily improving the position.

Vocational Training Scheme

Mr. Piratin asked the Minister of Labour how many ex-Servicemen have already been trained under the Government Vocational Training Scheme.

Mr. Isaacs: 21,571 ex-Servicemen had completed training under the Government Vocational Training Scheme on 13th January, 1947.

Distribution of Workers

Mr. Swingler asked the Minister of Labour if he is aware that there are approximately 900,000 able-bodied men of working age in Great Britain who are employed in private domestic service or are not gainfully occupied, in addition to those registered as unemployed; and what steps he is taking to attract these men into industrial employment.

Mr. Isaacs: No, Sir, the number of men employed in indoor private domestic service is relatively small. The men not gainfully occupied, numbering about 1½ million, consist mainly of students, those unfit for employment, men who have retired from employment and those with independent means. I would refer the Member to what is said in the White Paper entitled "Economic Survey for 1947" as regards the distribution of workers. The majority of the outstanding demands for male labour are, however, for heavy work or work requiring certain types of skill and experience which these men in general would not be able to undertake.

NATIONAL INSURANCE (WOMEN LAND WORKERS)

88. **Mr. Renton** asked the Minister of National Insurance whether he is aware of the hardship that is caused to women land workers in Huntingdonshire who have been informed by the local employment exchange that when they are temporarily out of work they must either work at a fruit-canning factory at Huntingdon, which frequently involves journeys up to eight miles by bicycle, or be disqualified from unemployment benefit to which they are contributors; and if he will take steps to put an end to this treatment.

Mr. J. Griffiths: Claims for unemployment benefit are decided by the independent statutory authorities in the light of the circumstances of the individual case. In all the cases under reference the Insurance Officer disallowed benefit because good cause had not been shown for refusal of the employment. Appeals were lodged against his decision in a number of cases and in each case his decision was confirmed by the local court of referees. I am informed that the longest bicycle journey involved in these cases was two miles each way.

NATIONAL SERVICE (STUDENTS)

95. **Mr. W. Fletcher** asked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware of the hardship being caused to young men through there being no Class B release to enable them to start or complete training for the law or chartered accountancy; and what steps he is taking to remedy this anomaly.

Mr. Isaacs: I regret that it is not possible to extend to these young men the

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special arrangements for the release of students which I announced on 4th February.

99. **Colonel Hutchison** asked the Minister of Labour whether he has any further announcement to make in respect of the release of students serving in the Forces, so that they may be free to resume their studies in October, 1947.

Mr. Isaacs: I have nothing to add to the reply given to the hon. Member for Stockton-on-Tees (Mr. Chetwynd) on 4th February.

SCOTLAND

Council on Education

100. **Mr. Hector Hughes** asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will appoint some person experienced in Scottish Library legislative matters to serve on the Advisory Council on Education.

Mr. Westwood: No, Sir. There are no vacancies on the council, the size of which is fixed by the Education (Scotland) Advisory Council Order, 1942.

Water Supply Schemes (Grants)

101. **Mr. Spence** asked the Secretary of State for Scotland when he will make known the amounts of grants to local authorities in connection with water schemes.

Mr. Westwood: On 31st December last, I notified 14 local authorities that certain water supply schemes or parts of schemes submitted by them had been selected for further consideration with a view to an offer of grant under the Rural Water Supplies and Sewerage Act, 1944, and I asked those authorities for the further information which would enable me to determine the grant to be offered. Three local authorities have now submitted information relating to eight schemes, and, as soon as the particulars have been examined, I shall inform the local authorities of the position as regards grant.

Island of Soay (Communications)

102. **Sir M. MacDonald** asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he has been able to make arrangements for the normal communications with the island of Soay, in view of the fact that the islanders have not recently received rations or mails and of their desire that if these normal communications cannot be resumed they wish to be removed from the island to some suitable place on the mainland.

Mr. Westwood: The normal weekly steamer service between Mallaig and Soay which carries rations and mails has been regularly maintained with the exception of one call when special arrangements were made for another vessel to call two days later. The Soay motor boat which also gave a weekly service between Soay and Mallaig has recently been lost. The islanders were consulted on a proposal to replace this service by a similar motor boat based on Mallaig, but did not regard it as adequate. They asked for an additional call by the mail boat but I am informed that time is not available for this call if necessary connections are to be maintained. I am looking into the situation urgently, in consultation with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport. The islanders will no doubt consider whether they wish to pursue the suggestion of evacuation in the light of such arrangements as may be found practicable.

Forth Bridge Provisional Order

103. **Mr. Henderson Stewart** asked the Secretary of State for Scotland when the Forth Road Bridge Provisional Order will be presented to Parliament.

Mr. Westwood: The final adjustments to this order are now being discussed with the promoters and I hope it will be possible to introduce the confirming Bill before the Easter Recess.

MINISTRY OF PENSIONS

Total Disability

104. **Mr. Medlicott** asked the Minister of Pensions how many ex-Servicemen of the 1914-18 and 1939-45 wars, who are in receipt of 100 per cent. disability pension of 45s. a week, are receiving that sum only, without any of the permitted additional allowances.

Mr. Wilfred Paling: At 30th September last there were in payment to ex-Servicemen of the 1914 and 1939 wars about 715,000 disablement pensions, of which about 47,000 were at the 100 per cent.

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rate. In about 13,750 of these latter cases the pensioner was receiving 45s. a week.

Appeals (R.A.F. Cases)

Mr. S. Marshall asked the Minister of Pensions the number of outstanding cases before the appeals tribunal relating to the R.A.F. at the last convenient date

Mr. Wilfred Paling: The form in which the records of appeals to the tribunal are kept by my Department does not enable me to give information with regard to one particular Service without a disproportionate expenditure of time and labour.

AGRICULTURE

U.S. Tractor Engines

107. **Mr. York** asked the Minister of Agriculture whether any of the 10,000 U.S. petrol engines ordered for agricultural purposes have arrived; and what proportion of the machines fitted with these engines will be made available for British farms.

Mr. Collick: Twenty-five thousand petrol engines are on order from the U.S.A. for fitting into British-made tractors. Some of these have arrived and others are on the way. It is expected that at least 75 per cent. of the tractors will be available for British farmers.

Sheep Feedingstuffs

Mr. York asked the Minister of Agriculture if he is aware of the heavy losses of sheep in the Yorkshire Dales, both on the moors and at the steadings, owing to insufficient feedingstuffs; and what action he is taking to meet this situation.

Mr. T. Williams: I am aware of the difficulties with which sheep farmers in Yorkshire and elsewhere are faced owing to the present weather and transport conditions. County war agricultural executive committees are assisting with issues of rationed feedingstuffs to the extent that the limited resources which could be placed at their disposal this winter permit, having regard to the needs of other stock, but I regret that there are no additional supplies of such feedingstuffs available from which those resources could be augmented.

PALESTINE

British Proposals (Replies)

108. **Mr. Janner** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what replies were received from the Jewish Agency and the Arab Delegations to the proposals of the British Delegation published in Cmd. 7044; and if he will publish them as a White Paper.

Mr. Mayhew: As the House has already been informed, the latest British proposals were not accepted as a basis for negotiations by either the Arab delegations or the Jewish Agency. My right hon. Friend will consider the suggestion that the Arab and Jewish statements on these proposals should be published as a White Paper.

United Nations Meeting

109. **Mr. Wilkes** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the British Government will take action, as authorised under Article 20 of the United Nations Charter, and request that the Security Council shall agree to convene through the Secretary General a meeting of the Assembly at the earliest convenient date in order to consider the question of Palestine and to make their recommendation for the interim policing and administration of this country until the Assembly makes its decision known.

Mr. Mayhew: My right hon. Friend is still considering the method of our approach to the General Assembly. It is not his present intention to ask the United Nations to make any recommendation concerning interim policy in Palestine

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS (BRITISH MEMBERSHIP)

110. **Mr. K. Lindsay** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what are the international organisations of which His Majesty's Government are formally members; and what are the financial commitments in each case.

Mr. Mayhew: The main international organisations of which His Majesty's Government are formally members, together with the financial commitments in each case, are as follow:

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United Nations: United States dollars 3,184,522 (for 1947).

International Labour Organisation: About £129,000 (payable in Swiss francs) (for 1947).

United Nations Educational and Cultural Organisation: £100,000; the definite scale for the United Kingdom contribution has not yet been fixed, but will probably work out at about 13.5 per cent. of the total annual United Nations Educational and Cultural Organisation Budget.

Food and Agriculture Organisation: United States dollars 1,125,000 (for the financial year 1946-7).

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: The authorised capital Stock is United States dollars 10,000,000,000 of which the United Kingdom has subscribed 1,300 shares of dollars 100,000 each. This subscription is payable as follows: 2 per cent. in gold or United States dollars; 18 per cent. in currency of the subscriber; 80 per cent. either in gold or United States dollars or in currency required to discharge the obligations of the Bank for the purpose for which the call is made, at the convenience of the subscriber.

International Monetary Fund: The United Kingdom's quota of the Fund is dollars 1,300,000,000 (i.e. £325,000,000). Of this quota the United Kingdom have to pay in gold, as a minimum, whichever sum is the smaller of: (*a*) 25 per cent. of our quota, or (*b*) 10 per cent. of our own reserves of gold and United States dollars at 12th September, 1946. The balance of our quota is payable in sterling.

Provisional International Civil Aviation Organisation: Canadian dollars 196,000 (for the financial year 1946-7).

Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees: £800,000 for the year 1947-8.

European Central Inland Transport Organisation: Approximately £62,000 for the current year.

International Telecommunications Union: Approximately £500, payable in Swiss francs.

Universal Postal Union: Approximately £775, payable in Swiss francs.

European Coal Organisation: Contribution for 1947: £11,350.

Emergency Economic Committee for Europe: This organisation has as yet no budget of its own but the Secretariat is provided by member Governments and the small administrative and accommodation expenses are at present provided by His Majesty's Government.

The World Health Organisation, the constitution of which has been signed by His Majesty's Government, has not yet been formally established, nor has the International Refugee Organisation.

RURAL HOUSES, ESSEX

106. **Mr. Driberg** asked the Minister of Health if he will detail the necessary differences in design between agricultural and other houses built by local authorities in such areas as the Dengie Hundred of Essex.

Mr. Edwards: There would be no essential difference of design in an area like this which is entirely rural in character.

MINISTRY OF SUPPLY

Foundries, Southern England

111. **Mr. Touche** asked the Minister of Supply whether in view of the industrial importance of iron castings and the interdependence of industry in the North and South of England, he will consider an immediate reopening of foundries in southern England.

Mr. Leonard: The majority of the foundries closed during the war have reopened, and permission to do so will be given to any others who seek it.

Alarm Clocks

Mr. Swingler asked the Minister of Supply what steps are being taken to improve the supply of alarm clocks; and how the present production of alarm clocks compares with that in 1938.

Mr. Wilmot: We have actively encouraged a British alarm clock industry and two factories are already making alarm clocks on a considerable and rising scale; a further two factories will start this year. Supplies from these sources are being augmented by imports. There was no British production in 1938.

Rail Locomotives, 1946

Mr. Lennox-Boyd asked the Minister of Supply how many railway locomotives were produced in 1946.

Mr. Wilmot: The number of steam railway locomotives produced in 1946 was 791.

ELECTRICAL PLANT PRODUCTION

112. **Mr. De la Bère** asked the Minister of Fuel and Power whether he will now make some statement indicating in what way the Government propose to expedite the delayed construction programme in connection with the electrical generating plants; and whether it is the Govern-

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ment's intention to make the 6,000,000 kilowatts of new capacity available before the winter of 1949.

Mr. Gaitskell: The manufacture of heavy electrical plant already enjoys a high priority and the Government are considering in consultation with the industry what further steps can be taken to expedite deliveries for home use. As regards the last part of the Question I would refer the hon. Member to the reply which I gave to the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok (Commander Galbraith) on 29th January, to which I have, at the moment, nothing to add.

RAILWAY CHARGES (GOVERNMENT DECISION)

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth asked the Minister of Transport whether he has received the Report of the Consultative Committee appointed by him to advise as to the method of adjusting the charges made by the controlled main line railway companies for the year 1947; whether, in view of the fact that the inquiry held by the Consultative Committee in September and October, 1946, was a public inquiry, it is his intention to publish the Report of the committee; and, if so, when.

Mr. Barnes: I would refer the hon. Member to the answer which I gave to the hon. Member for Eccles (Mr. Proctor) yesterday, of which I am sending him a copy.

INDIAN ARMY CADETS (TRAINING ADMISSION)

Mr. King asked the Under-Secretary of State for India what prospects of admission were held out to Indian Army cadets who joined at Caterham last summer; how long they have been doing elementary infantry training at Caterham and how long it is proposed they should continue to do so; what prospects they now have of a W.O.S.B.; what is the maximum length of time any one cadet whose efficiency is unquestioned has remained a cadet at Caterham; and whether he is satisfied that hopes held out to these cadets have been fulfilled.

Mr. A. Henderson: No cadets admitted to the Indian Army Cadet Wing last summer were promised that they would be commissioned into the Indian Army. The period of training at Caterham lasts five to six months, with a maximum period of training of six months except in those cases where cadets have been held back for military or physical inefficiency. All candidates have a prospect of going before a War Office Selection Board, and any delay which occurs after passing the War Office Selection Board is due to the difficulty of finding room for them in O.C.T.Us. None of the cadets had grounds for thinking that they would be commissioned into the Indian Army. The decision that they could not be sent to India for O.C.T.U. training before being commissioned in the British Service was due to a change in the policy of the Government of India, regarding O.C.T.U. training generally.

FOOD SUPPLIES

Costings Division

Sir W. Smithers asked the Minister of Food if he is aware that the costing machinery of his Department is functioning so slowly that small businesses, faced with substantial rises in prices, cannot maintain their businesses on a sound footing; and what action he is taking to expedite it.

Dr. Summerskill: The costings division is working under pressure, but we have had no specific complaints from the trade. If the hon. Member knows of any cases of difficulty and will let me have particulars, I shall, of course, willingly look into them.

Oranges (Grading)

Sir W. Smithers asked the Minister of Food, in view of the fact that a large percentage of oranges delivered to retailers recently were bad, whether he will compensate shopkeepers or replace the bad deliveries.

Dr. Summerskill: All the oranges we import are classified at the first hand sale into eight categories, according to the percentage of bad fruit in the packages, and wholesalers are permitted to claim reclassification if the condition of the fruit so warrants. The prices charged by the wholesaler to the retailer are correspondingly graduated and claims for compensation or replacement do not, therefore, arise against the Ministry at that stage.

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reference to Cabinet paper

PALESTINE

(Draft for Secretary of State's speech)

A

The course of events which has led His Majesty's Government to decide that the problem of Palestine must be referred to the United Nations was outlined in the announcement which I made to the House last week.

His Majesty's Government administer Palestine in accordance with a mandate conferred by the League of Nations. In accepting that mandate, we undertook to facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish National Home, and we undertook also to safeguard the rights of the non-Jewish population of the country. I think it can fairly be claimed, if the history of the mandate is viewed as a whole, that successive British Governments have made possible the growth of a thriving National Home for the Jews and have at the same time shown a careful regard for the rights of the Arab population.

~~But there was a third obligation laid upon us in the mandate, namely,~~ In putting forward this plan, we hope to promote the development of self-governing institutions with a view to making Palestine independent at an early date. ~~In this we have failed completely, not, I think, through any fault of our own, but because~~ It has been impossible to devise any form of self-government in which both Arabs and Jews would agree to co-operate. Great Britain has therefore been compelled to maintain a Government with which the people of the country have never been sufficiently associated. I am not criticising the Palestine Administration. It has tackled a difficult situation

So far we have made no progress whatever towards self-government in Palestine. This has not been our

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with great skill and devotion. I am afraid that neither of the two communities in Palestine realises how much the country owes to the patient work of the small group of British officials who are responsible for the conduct of the Government. I am not surprised to hear from time to time that these men, while carrying out their task with undiminished courage, are neverthless affected by an increasing sense of hopelessness. They do not see any end to their task, or any prospect of sharing their heavy responsibility with the leaders of the Arab and Jewish communities.

This is the aspect of the problem which has caused me the greatest anxiety, ~~and to which I now invite the attention of the House.~~ It is true that the mandate for Palestine, unlike the other Middle Eastern mandates, does not explicitly look forward to the creation of an independent State. But it cannot have been contemplated by the framers of the mandate that Palestine should be denied its independence for all time. Sooner or later, mandatory government must come to an end.

In principle, of course, both peoples agree that independence should be the aim of our policy. ~~The Arabs have lived in Palestine for about as long as England has been a Christian country.~~ Despite Jewish immigration since the last war, the Arabs still form two-thirds of the population of the country and they have so high a rate of natural increase that I think it extremely doubtful whether the Jews could ever become a majority of the population. The Arabs of Palestine are indistinguishable in their general cultural level

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from the Arabs of neighbouring countries and are certainly not less fitted to govern themselves than the populations of the other Arab countries which were formerly under mandate and are now independent - Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan. In view of all these facts, they say, it is inconsistent with the principles of freedom for which Great Britain and her allies have fought two world wars that the Arabs of Palestine should any longer be denied their independence. They recognise that the constitution of an independent Palestinian State must take account of the rights of the existing Jewish population and they offer safeguards for these rights. But they maintain that it is wrong to prevent the majority from exercising its right of self-determination on account of the presence of the minority.

This is a point of view with which I believe the House would feel the fullest sympathy if it were expressed with equal cogency in any other part of the world. But in Palestine we have also to take account of the pledge given in the Balfour Declaration and of the terms of the League of Nations mandate. We have to ask ourselves whether we are entitled to apply in Palestine the general principle of self-determination if the result would be to put an end to the further development of the Jewish National Home.

The Zionists for their part argue that this development was the primary purpose of the mandate, and that no other consideration should stand in the way of its fulfilment. Their leaders told us, in the course of our recent conversations with them, that they would be satisfied if His Majesty's Government

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continued to administer the mandate as it was interpreted before 1939. They would wish us to permit Jewish immigration up to the full extent of the country's economic absorptive capacity, to permit the purchase of land by Jews in all parts of the country, and in general to hold the ring while the Jewish Agency attempted to create conditions in which they could reasonably claim independence for the whole country ~~and~~ as a Jewish State.

This is our dilemma. It arises from a fatal obscurity in the mandate itself. That document gives us no guidance whatever as to the length of time over which we are to promote the development of the Jewish National Home nor as to the period required for the development of self-governing institutions. If we do not regard the mandate as perpetual, the difficulty obviously is to time our departure from Palestine in such a way as to avoid injustice to one or other of its two peoples. If we go soon, we thereby set a limit to the development of the National Home. If we delay, we threaten the Arabs with the loss of their position as a majority and in effect permit an act of conquest to take place under British protection.

I think it is because of a general realisation of this dilemma that the idea of partitioning Palestine between the two peoples has recently become so popular. Superficially, this seems to be an attractive and logical solution. I should therefore like to examine it in some detail, in order to show why we have not found ourselves able to recommend it.

Partition is a vague word and covers a great variety

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of proposals. The implications and consequences of any particular scheme of partition depend almost entirely on where it is proposed to draw the frontier between the Arab and Jewish States. I have examined many proposals for partition and one thing that emerges clearly is that those who agree among themselves in advocating partition as a general principle would not remain in agreement after they began to draw lines on the map. Let me consider, by way of illustration, the plan of partition recommended by the Royal Commission in 1937, and let me first examine the arguments which the Arabs could advance against that proposal if we were to put it forward. They would point out that the Jewish State contemplated by the Royal Commission would contain approximately 430,000 Jews and 380,000 Arabs. They would ask why, if we thought it reasonable to form a Jewish State in which the Arabs comprised 47% of the population, we refused their own proposal for an Arab State in which the Jews would form only 33%. In the matter of land, they would point out that two-thirds of the territory proposed for the Jewish State is at present under Arab ownership. From the economic point of view, the formation of a Jewish State on these lines would deprive the Arab community of its major economic assets. In Palestine the Arabs own about half the area in which citrus fruits are grown. This is the richest land in Palestine and the country is largely dependent on its citrus crop for foreign exchange. Under the Royal Commission's plan only one-tenth of the citrus-growing area would fall into the Arab State. For these and other reasons, the Arab exchequer would receive only one-third of the

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These facts are inescapable, and in the light of them it would be extremely difficult to argue before an impartial tribunal that the Royal Commission's proposal was equitable from the Arab point of view. It may be said that the answer to these objections is to draw a frontier less favourable to the Jews. But we have been left in no doubt, as a result of our recent conversations with Zionist leaders, that they would not be satisfied with any partition of the country which did not give them a very much larger share than was proposed by the Royal Commission. In fact, I can see little hope that the Zionists would acquiesce in any form of partition which His Majesty's Government would feel justified in advocating. The Arabs, for their part, are implacably opposed to partition of any kind. It is therefore clear that this solution would have to be imposed by force on one and possibly both of the two peoples in Palestine. It thus shares what I regard as the major defect both of the Arab Plan and of the Jewish Agency's alternative proposal, that it could only be put into effect at the point of the bayonet.

This we are not prepared to do. ~~We have therefore~~ searched for a means of moving towards our goal, which is the independence of Palestine, through some form of transitional constitution in which Arabs and Jews might be brought to co-operate with one another and with the High Commissioner for the wellbeing of the country as a whole.

The proposals which we communicated to the Arab Delegations in London and to the Jewish Agency on the 7th February were designed with this end in view. From the Arab point of view, these proposals had the advantages that they placed in Arab hands the maintenance of the existing safeguards against the dispossession of Arab cultivators, and that at the end of two

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PALESTINE

(Draft for Secretary of State's speech)

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The course of events which has led His Majesty's Government to decide that the problem of Palestine must be referred to the United Nations was outlined in the announcement which I made to the House last week.

His Majesty's Government administer Palestine in accordance with a mandate conferred by the League of Nations. In accepting that mandate, we undertook to facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish National Home, and we undertook also to safeguard the rights of the non-Jewish population of the country. I think it can fairly be claimed, if the history of the mandate is viewed as a whole, that successive British Governments have made possible the growth of a thriving National Home for the Jews and have at the same time shown a careful regard for the rights of the Arab population.

In putting forward this plan, we hope ~~But there was a third obligation laid upon us in the mandate, namely,~~ to promote the development of self-governing institutions. ~~In this we have failed completely, not, I think, through any fault of our own, but because~~ It has been impossible to devise any form of self-government in which both Arabs and Jews would agree to co-operate. Great Britain has therefore been compelled to maintain a Government with which the people of the country have never been sufficiently associated. I am not criticising the Palestine Administration. It has tackled a difficult situation

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C

years they would have given the Arabs a voice in determining the rate of immigration. The Jews would have received a guarantee of the entry into Palestine during the next two years of approximately 100,000 new immigrants. The formation of a Jewish local administration would also have given them greater authority than they now have to control the pace of their own development. Both peoples were to be associated with the Central Government immediately, and so far as we were concerned the road was open to their full independence in five years' time. Nothing in fact could have prevented their attainment of independence at the end of that period, except their own inability to agree on how to attain it. And we proposed to divest ourselves in advance of the power to impose a solution should they disagree. In that event, we would have asked the United Nations to advise upon the next step forward.

I am satisfied that these proposals were compatible with the terms of the existing Mandate, and also with the Charter of the United Nations. ~~I think further that our approach to the problem, as shown in these proposals, had much in common with that of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry which reported last year.~~

Given a willingness to co-operate on the part of both Arabs and Jews, we could have started immediately to operate the proposed policy under the existing Mandate, while preparing a Trusteeship Agreement for submission to the United Nations. I regret that neither side was able to accept the British plan even as a basis for further negotiation. Since the plan depends entirely upon the readiness of the two peoples to co-operate in working it, we have no option but to lay it aside, and to approach the United Nations without first introducing any new policy in Palestine.

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We have reached ~~the~~ a point in the administration of the Mandate which was not clearly foreseen 25 years ago, but which was bound to come if events proved that the two peoples could not agree upon the future government of the country. As I have said, the Mandate makes no provision for this contingency. His Majesty's Government cannot by their own authority alone fill this gap in the Mandate. We have therefore decided to ask the United Nations to consider the whole problem and to recommend a solution.

I have already given some account of the reasons which have led us to this conclusion. In addition I wish to draw the attention of the House to a document which defines the nature of our obligation to the United Nations in respect of Palestine. This is the Resolution on Mandates adopted at the final Assembly of the League of Nations in April 1946. The Resolution takes note that the Mandatory Powers intend to continue to administer their Mandated territories in accordance with the obligations contained in the Mandates "until other arrangements have been agreed between the United Nations and the respective Mandatory Powers." It is thus clear that we could not implement any policy involving a departure from the Mandate - and this includes Partition - until we had first referred it to the United Nations.

In any event and apart altogether from the relevant documents, we must have regard to the peculiar position which Palestine occupies in world opinion. All Christian States and all Moslem States are

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interested in what is done there. So are the Jews of all nationalities. Our ~~administration~~ policy in ~~of~~ Palestine affects our relations with the independent Arab States and may have an important bearing on the maintenance of peace and the development of prosperity in the Middle East as a whole. The Government of the United States follows events in Palestine with a deep concern, arising not only from its position as a Christian power, but also from the connections of its large Jewish population with the Jewish National Home. For all these reasons we think it natural and right that international opinion as represented by the General Assembly of the United Nations should be given the opportunity of expressing itself upon the future of Palestine before any further steps are taken.

Critics of this policy have told us that we are taking a risk, that we cannot foresee what recommendation the United Nations will make, that we have abdicated our control over the situation, and so on. But the inescapable fact is that we have reached a situation which cannot continue and from which there is no escape except by the use of force or by invoking the authority of the United Nations. It was precisely as a means of dealing with situations of this kind that the United Nations was established by the collective action of the victorious powers after the last war. The question whether deadlocks are to be broken by the forceful action of one or more powers, or by negotiation within the framework of the United Nations, is one upon the answer to which the peace of the world will depend. There is no doubt in my mind that it is in the broadest interests of this

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country to help in building up a tradition of referring difficult international problems to the United Nations rather than attempting to settle them by unilateral action.

I think there can be no doubt that in this case the appropriate organ of the United Nations is the General Assembly. I am of course aware of all the disadvantages of waiting until September, when the General Assembly holds its next regular annual session. We are still examining the possibility of having some preliminary work done upon the problem by the United Nations so that the General Assembly when it meets mave have an adequate basis for its discussion. But I do not yet know whether this is possible and I ~~do not~~ cannot ~~wish to~~ say any more at the moment.

Meanwhile we must do our best to maintain peace in Palestine, and to avoid any development there which might prejudge any of the issues which we desire to leave open for the consideration of the General Assembly.

~~I was asked last week whether this would involve a further period of administration under the terms of the White Paper of 1939. I must point out that no effect has been given to the constitutional proposals which formed the most important element in the policy laid down in that White Paper, and that His Majesty's Government have already decided to permit the continuance of Jewish immigration.~~ Since we took that decision, in December 1945, 21,000 Jewish immigrants have entered Palestine over and above the 75,000 for whom the White Paper provides. Immigration is now proceeding at the rate/

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rate of 18,000 a year. There seems to be an impression that this is an abnormally low rate of entry, but the fact is that it has only been exceeded five times in the whole history of the Mandate - in 1925 and in the first four years of Nazi rule in Germany. In other words, 18,000 a year is ~~well~~ above the average for the whole mandatory period.

I can assure the House that in the difficult interval between now and September, we shall continue to ~~exercise~~ observe our existing obligations and to promote to the best of our ability the welfare of the two peoples in Palestine. We shall await the judgment of the United Nations with confidence in our past record and with the hope that they will find a way of transforming Palestine from a centre of discord into a land of peace.

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PALESTINE.

SPEECH BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE ERNEST BEVIN, M.P.

IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON

25TH FEBRUARY, 1947.

The course of events which has led His Majesty's Government to decide that the problem of Palestine must be referred to the United Nations was outlined in the announcement which I made to the House last week.

This problem of Palestine is a very vexed and complex one. There is no denying the fact that the Mandate contains contradictory promises.

In the first place it promised the Jews a national home and in the second place it declared that the rights and position of the Arabs should be protected.

Therefore it provided for what was virtually an invasion of the country by thousands of immigrants

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and at the same time said that this was not to disturb the people in possession.

The question therefore arose as to whether this could be accomplished without conflict, and events/ the 9th Ltr 25 years have proved that it could not.

The Jews set about colonising, and there is no doubt that in the sphere they have developed they have carried out some great experiments.

But many of the Arabs, as I shall explain later, are ~~also~~ involved in these developments, such as citrus growing which is vital to the economy of Palestine.

So far as Jewish development is concerned, everybody in this country who was associated with the affair, certainly up to 1931, assumed it was a national home/ for 15 years we were talking about.

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I want to remind the House that that is not the issue now.

All that is over.

The issue ~~we are asking~~ which the United Nations must and should consider is this:

(1) Shall the claims of the Jews be admitted that Palestine is to be a Jewish State?

(2) Shall the claim of the Arabs be admitted that it is to be an Arab State with safeguards for the Jews under the scheme for a national home

(3) Shall it be a Palestinian State in which the interests of both communities are as carefully balanced as possible?

~~Now~~ That is the issue which has got to be decided, and we, as mandatory power, cannot solve ~~this~~ that problem until the United Nations has recommended which of these three alternatives is to form the basis for future ~~policy.~~ organisation of Palestine

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We have no power to make the decision. // The Mandate does not give it.

In our recent negotiations, the Colonial Secretary and I have come up against this fundamental problem over and over again.

All the proposals we have made for the gradual evolution of Palestine towards independence have been judged by the Arabs and Jews according to the effect they might have on the final decision - what kind of a State is Palestine to be when it becomes independent?

Now let me trace the history of this business since we came into Office.

We gave early consideration to the problem and discussed the matter very fully.

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There had been various schemes evolved in the past, including partition, but all of them would have had to be introduced by force against one or other of the parties and we came to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, that after all the force we had seen throughout the world in the last few years, force would not produce a final solution and might create wider difficulties in the whole Middle East, and might indeed start us on a road which might well lead in another quarter of a century to another war.

Therefore we proceeded not too hopefully but with the conviction that it was our duty to make the effort, to try and get a negotiated settlement.

To begin with we agreed that we could not enforce the White Paper of 1939 as a basis for our policy.

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It has been suggested to us that all we needed to do was to tear the white paper up.

Statements have often been made in this House by the Opposition that they would not be bound by this or that decision of the Government.

There are many precedents, but it has always been accepted that a party, coming into office after making such a declaration, does not just tear up existing undertakings but seeks to change them by proper negotiation and by substituting another policy. Once we depart from that and treat ruthlessly people to whom, whether rightly or wrongly, pledges have been given, then it is impossible to carry on international affairs.

My colleagues and I have made it clear to the Arabs what the attitude of the Labour Party was and is.

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The question then became: what policy and how?

Now in the first place we took steps to allow Jewish immigration to continue at 1,500 a month.

Since we took that decision, in December 1945, 21,000 Jewish immigrants have entered Palestine over and above the 75,000 for whom the White Paper provides.

Immigration is now proceeding at the rate of 18,000 a year.

There seems to be an impression that this is an abnormally low rate of entry, but the fact is that it has only been exceeded five times in the whole history of the Mandate - in 1925 and in the first four years of Nazi rule in Germany.

In other words, 18,000 a year is above the average for the whole mandatory period.

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I think we might have been able to do more for the Jews at that time if the bitterness of feeling which surrounds this problem of immigration had not been increased by American pressure for the immediate admission of 100,000.

However that may be, we had to take American interest into account.

We accordingly invited the Government of the United States to join us in forming the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry.

Now I must point out, for I have been very severely criticised by people in the United States for not accepting the Committee's Report, that none of the Report was accepted by the United States except one point, namely the admission of 100,000 immigrants.

We could not undertake this except as part of a general settlement and therefore we had to continue our efforts to work out a policy.

Our/

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Our first attempt resulted in the plan for provincial autonomy, which we put forward as a basis for negotiation.

We then tried to convene a conference with both Arabs and Jews.

We tried very, very hard to get the Jews into the Conference.

Interview after interview with them was held.

They would not join unless as a prerequisite we would more or less commit ourselves to a Jewish State.

We pointed out we could not do that.

We did agree that we would put any plan the Jewish Agency cared to submit on the agenda and would examine it on its merits.

We knew that we could not get them in the same room, but at least we hoped that we could go from room to room and keep exchanging views until we got some solution, either of an interim character or final.

As/

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As the House is aware, we had to open the Conference with the Arabs alone.

It was clear from the discussion with the Arabs that they wanted finality.

The Jews also want finality if it is to take the form of a Jewish State, but they would be prepared to see British rule continue if it was clearly aiming at a Jewish Sovereign State.

The Conference had to be suspended during the meetings of the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

While I was there I discussed the matter again with the American Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes.

He made a public statement saying that the basis upon which Great Britain was holding the Conference merited, in his view, the attendance of Jews as well as Arabs.

Even this produced no result.

Then/

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Then came the second session of the Conference with the Arabs.

At the same time we were able to have informal talks with representatives of the Jewish Agency.

We were at a deadlock.

The Arabs adhered to their plan for a unitary independent state in Palestine.

They have never accepted the Palestine Mandate or recognised the legality of the Balfour Declaration.

Nevertheless they told us, they were willing to recognise the results of this policy so far as the 600,000 Jews already living in Palestine were concerned.

I may say in passing that if it were only a question of the 100,000 I think a settlement could be found.

Unfortunately, that is not the position.

From the Zionist point of view the 100,000 is only a beginning, and the Jewish Agency talk in terms of millions/

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millions.

I think the Arabs could be persuaded to accept 100,000 new immigrants if immigration after that was to be determined by the elected representatives of the people of Palestine.

What they are afraid of is the uncertainty of the future.

They are determined not to be pushed out of a country which they regard as their own, and in which they have been living for just about as long as England has been a Christian country.

Under/

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Under the Arab plan, the Jewish National Home would continue to exist within a unitary state with an Arab majority.

The Jews argued that this would leave them in the same position as they were in in every other State, that of a more or less tolerated minority.

They claimed that they had a right to establish a State of their own in Palestine, which they had previously occupied for hundreds of years.

My Right Honourable Friend and I now tried our hand at another plan, which honourable Members will have seen in the White Paper issued last week.

This plan has certain features in common with both the Anglo-American Committee's Report and the provincial autonomy plan.

From the Arab point of view, these proposals had the advantages that they placed in Arab hands the maintenance of the existing safeguards against the dispossession of

Arab /

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Arab cultivators, and that at the end of two years they would have given the Arabs a voice in determining the rate of immigration.

The Jews would have received a guarantee of the entry into Palestine during the next two years of approximately 100,000 new immigrants.

The formation of a Jewish local administration would also have given them greater authority than they now have to control the pace of their own development.

Both peoples were to be associated with the Central Government immediately, and, so far as we were concerned, the road was open to their full independence in five years' time.

Nothing in fact could have prevented their attainment of independence at the end of that period, except their own inability to agree on how to attain it.

And we proposed to divest ourselves in advance of the power to impose a solution should they disagree.

In /

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In that event, we would have asked the United Nations to advise upon the next step forward.

I am satisfied that these proposals were compatible with the terms of the existing Mandate, and also with the Charter of the United Nations.

Given a willingness to cooperate on the part of both Arabs and Jews, we could have started immediately to operate the proposed policy under the existing Mandate, while preparing a Trusteeship Agreement for submission to the United Nations.

I regret that neither side was able to accept the British plan even as a basis for further negotiation.

Since the plan depends entirely upon the readiness of the two peoples to cooperate in working it, we have no option but to lay it aside, and to approach the United Nations without first introducing any new policy in Palestine.

In /

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In putting forward this plan, we hoped to promote the development of self-governing institutions with a view to making Palestine independent at an early date.

So far we have made no progress whatever towards self-government in Palestine.

This has not been our fault.

It has been impossible to devise any form of self-government in which both Arabs and Jews would agree to cooperate.

Great Britain has therefore been compelled to maintain a Government with which the people of the country have never been sufficiently associated.

I am not criticising the Palestine Administration.

It has tackled a difficult situation with great skill and devotion.

I am afraid that neither of the two communities in Palestine realises how much the country owes to the patient work of the small group of British officials who are responsible for the conduct of the Government.

I/

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I am not surprised to hear from time to time that these men, while carrying out their task with undiminished courage, are nevertheless affected by an increasing sense of hopelessness.

They do not see any end to their task, or any prospect of sharing their heavy responsibility with the leaders of the Arab and Jewish communities.

This is the aspect of the problem which has caused me the greatest anxiety. It is true that the Mandate for Palestine, unlike the other Middle Eastern mandates, does not explicitly look forward to the creation of an independent State.

But it cannot have been contemplated by the framers of the Mandate that Palestine should be denied its independence for all time.

Sooner or later, mandatory government must come to an end.

In /

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In principle, of course, both peoples agree that independe
should be the aim of our policy.

Despite Jewish immigration since the last war, the Arabs still form two-thirds of the population of the country and they have so high a rate of natural increase that I think it extremely doubtfullwhether the Jews could ever become a majority of the population.

The Arabs of Palestine are indistinguishable in their general cultural level from the Arabs of neighbouring countries and are certainly not less fitted to govern themselves than the populations of the other Arab countries which were formerly under mandate and are now independent - Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan.

In view of all these facts, they say, it is inconsistent with the principles of freedom for which Great Britain and her Allies have fought two world wars that the Arab of Palestine should any longer be denied their independence.

They /

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They recognise that the constitution of an independent Palestinian State must take account of the rights of the existing Jewish population and they offer safeguards for these rights.

But they maintain that it is wrong to prevent the majority ~~for~~ from exercising its right of self-determination on account of the presence of the minority.

This is a point of view with which I believe the House would feel the fullest sympathy if it were expressed with equal force in any other part of the world.

But in Palestine we have also to take account of the pledge given in the Balfour Declaration and of the terms of the League of Nations mandate.

We have to ask ourselves whether we are entitled to apply in Palestine the general principle of self-determination if the result would be to put an end to the further development of the Jewish National Home.

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The Zionists for their part argue that this development was the primary purpose of the mandate, and that no other consideration should stand in the way of its fulfilment.

Their leaders told us, in our recent conversations with them, that they would be satisfied if His Majesty's Government continued to administer the mandate as it was interpreted before 1939.

They would wish us to permit Jewish immigration up to the full extent of the country's economic absorptive capacity, to permit the purchase of land by Jews in all parts of the country, and in general to hold the ring while the Jewish Agency attempted to create conditions in which they could reasonably claim independence for the whole country as a Jewish State.

This is our dilemma.

It arises from a fatal obscurity in the mandate itself.

That/

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That document gives us no guidance whatever as to the length of time over which we are to promote the development of the Jewish National Home nor as to the period required for the development of self-governing institutions.

If we do not regard the mandate as perpetual, the difficulty obviously is to time the change over in Palestine to independence in such a way as to avoid injustice to one or other of its two peoples.

If we go too soon, we thereby set a limit to the development of the National Home.

If we delay, we threaten the Arabs with the loss of their position as a majority and in effect permit an act of conquest to take place under British protection.

I think it is because of a general realisation of this dilemma/

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dilemma that the idea of partitioning Palestine between the two peoples has recently become so popular.

Superficially, this seems to be an attractive and logica solution.

I should therefore like to examine it in some detail, in order to show why we have not found ourselves able to recommend it.

Partition is a vague word and covers a great variety of proposals.

The implications and consequences of any particular scheme of partition depend almost entirely on where i is proposed to draw the frontier between the Arab and ewish States.

I have examined many proposals for partition and one thing that emerges clearly is that those who agree among themselves in advocating partition as a general

principle/

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principle would not remain in agreement after they began to draw lines on the map.

Let me consider, by way of illustration, the plan of partition recommended by the Royal Commission in 1937, and let me first examine the arguments which the Arabs could advance against that proposal if we were to put it forward.

They would point out that the Jewish State contemplated by the Royal Commission would contain approximately 450,000 Jews and 350,000 Arabs.

They would ask why, if we thought it reasonable to form a Jewish State in which the Arabs comprised 47% of the population, we refused their own proposal for an Arab State in which the Jews would form only 33%.

In the matter of land, they would point out that two-thirds of the territory proposed for the Jewish

State/

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State is at present under Arab ownership.

From the economic point of view, the formation of a Jewish State on these lines would deprive the Arab community of its major economic assets.

In Palestine the Arabs own about half the area in which citrus fruits are grown.

This is the richest land in Palestine and the country is largely dependent on its citrus crop for foreign exchange.

Under the Royal Commission's plan only one-tenth of the citrus-growing area would fall into the Arab State.

For these and other reasons, the Arab exchequer would receive only one-third of the property taxation now paid by the Arab community in the whole country.

These facts are inescapable, and in the light of them it would be extremely difficult to argue before an

impartial/

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impartial tribunal that the Royal Commission's proposal was equitable from the Arab point of view. It may be said that the answer to these objections is to draw a frontier less favourable to the Jews. But we have been left in no doubt, as a result of our recent conversations with Zionist leaders, that they would not be satisfied with any partition of the country which did not give them a very much larger share than was proposed by the Royal Commission. In fact, I can see little hope that the Zionists would acquiesce in any form of partition which His Majesty's Government would feel justified in advocating.

The Arabs for their part, are implacably opposed to partition of any kind.

It is therefore clear that this solution would have to be imposed by force on one and possibly both of the

two/

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two peoples in Palestine.

It thus shares what I regard as the major defect both of the Arab plan and of the Jewish Agency's alternative proposal, that it could only be put into effect at the point of the bayonet.

This we are not prepared to do.

We therefore searched for a means of moving towards our goal, which is the independence of Palestine, through some form of transitional constitution in which Jews and Arabs might be brought to cooperate with each other and with the High Commissioner for the well-being of Palestine as a whole.

Unfortunately, as I have told the House, our proposals to this end were rejected even as a basis for negotiation by Jews and Arabs alike.

We have thus reached a point in the administration of the/

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the Mandate which was not clearly foreseen twenty-five years ago, but which was bound to come if events proved that the two peoples could not agree upon the future government of the country.

As I have said, the Mandate makes no provision for this contingency.

His Majesty's Government cannot by their own authority alone fill this gap in the Mandate.

We have therefore decided to ask the United Nations to consider the whole problem and to recommend a solution.

I have already given some account of the reasons which have led us to this conclusion.

In addition I wish to draw the attention of the House to a document which defines the nature of our obligation to the United Nations in respect of Palestine./

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Palestine.

This is the Resolution on Mandates adopted at the final Assembly of the League of Nations in April 1946.

The Resolution takes note that the Mandatory Powers intend to continue to administer their Mandated territories in accordance with the obligations contained in the Mandates "until other arrangements have been agreed between the United Nations and the respective Mandatory Powers".

It is thus clear that we could not implement any policy involving a departure from the Mandate - and this includes Partition - until we had first referred it to the United Nations.

In any event and apart altogether from the relevant documents, we must have regard to the peculiar position which Palestine occupies in world opinion.

All/

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All Christian States and all Moslem States are interested in what is done there.

So are the Jews of all nationalities.

Our policy in Palestine affects our relations with the independent Arab States and may have an important bearing on the maintenance of peace and the development of prosperity in the Middle East as a whole.

The Government of the United States follows events in Palestine with a deep concern, arising not only from its position as a Christian power, but also from the connexions of its large Jewish population with the Jewish National Home.

For all these reasons we think it natural and right that international opinion as represented by the General Assembly of the United Nations should be given the opportunity of expressing itself upon the future of Palestine before any further steps are taken.

Critics/

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Critics of this policy have told us that we are taking a risk, that we cannot foresee what recommendation the United Nations will make, that we have abdicated our control over the situation, and so on.

But the inescapable fact is that we have reached a situation which cannot continue and from which there is no escape except by the use of force or by invoking the authority of the United Nations.

It was precisely as a means of dealing with situations of this kind that the United Nations was established by the collective action of the victorious powers after the last war. The question whether deadlocks are to be broken by the forceful action of one or more Powers, or by negotiation within the framework of the United Nations, is one upon the answer to which the peace of the world will depend.

There /

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There is no doubt in my mind that it is in the broadest interests of this country to help in building up a tradition of referring difficult international problems to the United Nations rather than attempting to settle them by unilateral action, involving the use of force.

I think there can be no doubt that in this case the appropriate organ of the United Nations is the General Assembly.

I am of course aware of all the disadvantages of waiting until September, when the General Assembly holds its next regular annual session.

We are still examining the possibility of having some preliminary work done upon the problem by the United Nations so that the General Assembly when it meets may have an adequate basis for its discussion.

But /

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But I do not yet know whether this is possible and I cannot say any more at the moment.

Meanwhile, we must do our best to maintain peace in Palestine and to avoid any development there which might prejudge any of the issues which we desire to leave open for the consideration of the General Assembly.

I can assure the House that in the difficult interval between now and September, we shall continue to observe our existing obligations and to promote to the best of our ability the welfare of the two peoples in Palestine. We shall await the judgment of the United Nations with confidence in our past record and with the hope that they will find a way of transforming Palestine from a centre of discord into a land of peace.

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MR BURNS FOR H.1 4.40 - 4.50

MR BOWE

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IMMEDIATE

S/S's speech on the Palestine debate in the House of Commons upon the 25th Feb. 1947.

~~Following is text of Foreign Secretary's speech on Palestine of 25th February~~

~~Motion made and questn proposed, "T this House do now adjourn". [Mr Whitley.]~~

Tel Washington.

~~3.44 p.m.~~ ~~From Bevin~~ ~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS~~

~~(Mr Bevin)~~: The course of events has lead His Majesty's Government to decide t the problem of Palestine must be referred to the United Nations, as outlined in the announcement which I made to the House last week. The problem of Palestine is a very vexed and complexed one. There is no denyg the fact t the mandate contained contridicatory promises. In the first place, it promised the Jews a National Home, and, in the se ond place, it declared t the rights and positn of the Arabs must be protected. Therefored, it c provided for what was virtually an invasion of the country by thousands of immigrants, and at the ame time said t this was not to disturb the people in possesion. The questn therefore, arose as to whether this cld be accomplished without a conflict and events in the last 25 years h proved t it cld not.

No 1811 Feb 26 Cabinet

Jack

Enclair.

B.1.S

223 Dilution.

The Jews set about colonisg and there is no doubt t, in the sphere they h developed, they h carried out some very great experiments. Many of the Arabs, as I shall explain later, are involved in those developments, such as citrus growing which is vital to the economy of Palestine. As far as Jewish development is concerned, everybody in this country who is associated with the affairs, certainly up to 1931, assumed t it was a National Home for the Jews about which we were talkg. I want to remind the House, however t t is not the issue now. All t is over. The issue which the United Nations must consider and decide is first (1) shall the claims of the Jews t Palestine is to be a Jewish State be admitted; or second (2) shall the claim of the

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Arabs be admitted it it is to be an Arab State with safeguards for the Jews under the decision for a National Home; or (4) shall it be a Palestinian State in which the interests of both communities are as carefully balanced and protected as possible? I have put it in this form, because in all negotiations I have had to conduct and whatever proposals we have adopted today, I come back to these three provisions every time, and I cannot escape them and neither do I think anyone who has been Colonial Secretary, who has handled this problem hitherto, however much they have argued it, has either in fact, escaped it. them

This, therefore, raises the issue which has got to be decided and we as a Mandatory Power cannot solve this problem until the United Nations have recommended which of these three alternatives is to form the basis of the future organisation of Palestine. We, as a Mandatory power, have no power to make this decision. Nothing that I can find in any of the documents, either at the League of Nations or in the discussions between the great Powers at Versailles and after indicate that we have that power. The Mandate certainly does not give it, and I am quite certain that the Anglo-American Committee, faced with the problem that we have been faced with, came to the view not to recommend a Jewish State and everybody who has touched the Palestine question is forced back to this every time. I really want the House to face up to this problem which His Majesty's Government has got to face up to now. In our recent negotiations the Colonial Secretary and I over and over again came up against this fundamental problem. All the proposals we have made for the gradual evolution of Palestine towards independence have been judged by the Arabs and the Jews according to the effect they might have and the final decision as to the kind of State Palestine is to be when it becomes independent, and independent it must become. The Mandatory Power cannot go on for ever.

(J follows)

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MR.SLADE. J.1. 3.50. 4.0.

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MR BEVIN SPEAKING:

Let me trace the history of this business since we came into office. We gave early consideration to the problem and discussed the matter very fully. I do not escape the fact - I do not desire to escape it - but when I was a member of the Coalition Govt with r h g opposite I took my corner in trying to see what solution we could find for Palestine, and I have a perfectly open mind about it. All I want is a settlement, and I want a settlement, because it is one of those sore spots in the Middle East that may if not settled lead to much wider trouble - (hon Members: "Hear hear.) There have been various schemes evolved in the past, including partition, but all of them which have come before me, whether in the coalition Govt or in this Govt, would have to be put into operation by force. That is to say, everybody came to the conclusion that we should not get agreement, but that we would have to come to a decision and then apply force to put it into operation.

His Maj Govt, after reviewing the situation, came to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, that after all the force we had seen throughout the world in the last 25 years, force applied to this problem would not produce a final solution and might create wider difficulties in the Middle East, and might indeed start us on a road leading in another quarter of a century to another war. That we have had to face, having regard to the importance to the world economy of the raw materials and the whole position of the Middle East. We therefore proceeded, not too hopefully, but with the conviction that it was our duty, to make the effort to try to get a negotiated settlement. To begin with, and I want to make this very clear, we agreed that we could not enforce the White Paper of 1939 as a basis for our policy. But it has been suggested that all that ~~was needed was to te r the~~

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was needed was to tear the White Paper up. This raises a very serious question in ~~I~~international affairs, ~~b~~one that cannot be approached ~~very~~ lightly. Statements have often been made in this House and outside, ~~that~~ when Labour was in Opposition, ~~they stated~~ that they would not be bound by that decision of the Govt of the day. But there are many precedents. It has always been accepted, in international ~~affairs~~affairs at least, that the Party coming into office after making such a declaration does not just tear up existing ~~xxxx~~ undertakings but seeks to change them by proper negotiation and by substituing another policy. I have to emphasize this because this House of Commons did vote for the White Paper. It is true that the Mandates Commission did not endorse it -

MR CLEMENT DAVIES: (Montgomery) Not this House - a ~~xxxxxxxx~~ predecessor~~x~~.

MR BEVIN: I always regard this House as continuing from eternity to eternity, and I meant it in that sense. I think I am right - (hon members "Hear, hear") I did not mean the actual members of this House. What I meant was that the House in 1939 ~~by a vote~~ did in fact - and the Arabs took that as a decision of the British Parliament - (interruption) I must say that I should be reluctant to remain Foreign Secretary for five minutes if I thought that I might go to an international conference with a vote of a majority of this House and ~~I gave~~ give undertakings, and that those undertakings were going to be torn up without proper negotiations at the end -

MR SYDNEY SILVERMAN: (Nelson & Colne): Will the r h g permit me - (hon members "Oh") ~~Does~~ would my r h friend say that the White Paper of 1939 represents any kind of agreement or undertaking with any other power with whom we were in international relations? Was it not merely a declaration of policy by the mandatory power.

MR BEVIN: It was regarded by the Arab States at that conference as an undertaking by the British Parliament and ~~that it~~ one which would be carried out.

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May I suggest - (Interruption). Please do not interrupt. We are dealing with one of the most serious problems. I suggest to my hon friend that if the vote had been the reverse way and an undertaking of an inverse character had been given to the Jews, the hon member would have been on his feet and said that this was a vote from the House and that we could not tear it up. Really I must stand for this as a point of principle because all my negotiations of any kind with Foreign Powers depend on the integrity of a vote of this House of Commons -

MR THELMER-SAMUELS (Gloucester): If that is right, how can the Foreign Sec reconcile that with the statement of the Prime Minister on 1st July last year in which he said:

> "The Govt have never stood by the White Paper Policy. It is quite wrong to say that we are carrying on the White Paper policy." [Official Report, 1st July 1946; Vol. 424, c. 1907.]

MR BEVIN: That is quite right, and if the hon and learned member will wait a moment, I will show him why. The point I am making is this - and really I must ask the House, whether it is my Party, or any Party to support me in this because it is fundamental - I am going away next week to Moscow, and when I go to Moscow I shall be asked to give undertakings. When I arrive at conclusions, I shall have to say that they are subject to the ratification of the House of Commons, and when that ratification of the House takes place, whatever the vote is, and an undertaking is given, I assume that whatever Party succeeds us, whatever their political colour may be, it will honour that undertaking until it negotiates a change.

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I must ask my hon friends only to accept that, otherwise they ought never to send me to an International Conference at all for any other purpose. Really I have to state this because it is fundamental to the carrying on of the business of the Country. This is not a question of continuity of policy but a question of keeping one's word, and indeed, if there is one thing I have grown up in, not merely as a politician but as a Trade Union leader, it is that I have kept my word whatever the opposition may have been. Therefore, I told the Arabs quite straight that my Party had declared that they could not be bound by this, and that change must be negotiated, and I have proceeded on that policy with my right hon friend the Colonial Secretary ever since. I think that is a perfectly legitimate action to take.

K follows.

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(MR. BEVIN SPEAKG)

There upon the present question arose, what shd the approach be? The position had become accentuated by the European situation and I thought, with the then Colonial Secy, that the first step which shd be taken shd be - and I agree with the r h G who corrected me the other night about the date - the question, was shd immigration come to an end at December 31st, 1945? I communicated with the Arabs and told them that I thought it shd not. My r h F the Colonial Secy in his Dept, took it up with the Arabs in Palestine - I dealt with the Arab States - and we agreed that it shd continue at 1,500 a month. I will not say, and it wd be wrong of me to say, that there was an agreement by the Arabs to that, but there was at least acquiescence, and on the acquiescence in a friendly way we proceeded to ingue certificates at 1,500 a month.

Since we took that decision in December of 1945, 21,000 Jewish immigrants have entered Palestine over and above the 75,000 for whom the White Paper provided and immigration now is proceeding at the rate of 18,000 a year. There seems to be an impression everywhere that this is an abnormally low rate of entry, but the fact is that it has only bn exceeded five times in the whole history of the Mandate - in 1925 and in the first four years of the Nazi rule in Germany. In other words, 18,000 a year is above the average for the whole Mandatory period and I must say that I felt, having moved up to that as the first step in the opening of negotiations, it was not a bad rate of entry. But I think we might have bn able to do more for the Jews, and have increased this rate at that time, if the bitterness of

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feeling which surrounds this problem of immigration have not bn increased by American pressure for the immediate admission of 100,000. I do not desire to create any ill feeling with the United States; in fact, I have done all I can to promote the best possible relations with them, as with other countries, but I shd have bn happier if they had had regard to the fact that we were the Mandatory Power, and we were carrying the responsibility; (H Ms: "Hear, hear".) and if they had only waited to ask us what we were doing. Then we cd have informed them but, instead of that, a person named Earl Harrison went out to their zone in Germany collecting certain information, and ~~this document~~ report was issued and I must say it really destroyed the basis of good feeling that we - the Colonial Secy and I - were endeavouring to produce in the Arab States, and it set the whole thing back.

However, we realised that we had to take American interest in this problem into account. We accordingly, having regard to what they had said, invited them to join us in forming the Anglo-American Cttee of Inquiry. Now I must point out that I have bn very severely criticised by people in the United States for not accepting the Cttee's Report. I was reminded of this when I was over there recently almost every day. But none of the Report was accepted by the United States except one point, namely, the admission of 100,000 immigrants. I was perfectly willing to stand up to the problem of the Report as a whole, which included 10 points. ~~and~~ I have never gone back on that, but even if I had, as events have turned out, it wd not have settled the Palestine problem, as I shall show before I sit down. We cd not undertake this except as a part of the general settlement, and we ~~have~~ had to continue our efforts to work

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out policy.

Our first attempt resulted in the plan for ~~provisional~~ provincial autonomy, and I must remind the House that the Anglo-American Cttee reported against a Jewish State. Therefore, taking the Report as a basis, we put forward this ~~provisional~~ provincial autonomy plan as a basis for negotiation. We did not lay down - and, if I may say so, if other countries with different races and different religions can work on the canton principle, I really cannot see why it cannot work in Palestine as elsehwere. We then tried to convene a conference of both Arabs and Jews. We tried very hard to get the Jews into the conference. I interviewed their representatives in Paris, in London, and I tried to persuade them to the best of my ability to come in and face the issue with us. I profoundly regret they did not. (H Ls: "Hear, hear.") I know - and I do not want to set one section of Jews against another - that those who have bn trained in England and grown up under English customs and practice, wanted to come in but the Jewish Agency, very largely dominated by New York, wd not really come in, and it was with gentlemen from there that I had to deal ~~xxxx~~ so much. They wd not join the conference unless, as a prerequisite, we wd more or less commit ourselves to a Jewish State in ~~xxxx~~ advance, either ~~our~~ partition or as a whole. How cd I? I have to consult Arabs, I have to consult and discuss the whole problem, and how cd any representative of His Majesty's Govt give an advance declaration one way or the other? However, we did agree to put any plan which the Jewish Agency cared to submit on the Agenda and to examine it on its merits whatever it involved. The proposal I put to them was, "Here is the British plan, There is the Arab plan which by then had bn drawn up. You have your plan. Let us take these three plans and see if out of them we can produce a

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solution." I knew from experience that I cd not get them in the same room. That, too, I think is regrettable when you have a problem of this character to solve. And in this case it was the Arabs who were the greatest difficulty. I want to make a balanced statement on this quite fairly. They argued that experience of the past was not helpful, but the Jews were willing if I wd accept the Jewish State, in some form, in advance.

L follows

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(MR. BEVIN SPKG.)

I cd not do t, so they did not come into the conference. Neither cd I get them into one room.// I did reach a stage, however, in meeting the Jews separately, in wh I advanced the idea of an interim arrangement, leading ultimately to self-govt. I indicated t I did not mind whether the interim arrangement was five years, or 10 years, or three years, or whatever it was. I said to them, "If you will work together for three, five, or 10 years, it might well be t you will not want to separate. Let us try to make up the difference." At t stage things looked more hopeful. There was a feeling, I do not think I over-estimated it, when they left me in the Foreign Office t day t I had the right approach at last. But what happened? I went back to the Paris Peace Conference, and next day, I believe it was the Day of Atonement, or a special day of the Jewish Religion, I forget wh, my r h F the Prime Minr telephoned me at midnight, and told me t the President of the United States was going to issue another statement on the 100,000. I think the country and the world ought to know about this.

I went next morning to the Sec of State, Mr. Byrnes, and told him how far I had got the day before. I believed we were on the road, if only they wd leave us alone. I begged t the statement be not issued, but I was told t if it was not issued by Mr. Truman, a competitive statement wd be issued by Mr. Dewey. In international affairs I cannot settle things if my problem is made the subject of local elections. I hope

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I am not saying anything to cause bad feeling with the United States, but I feel so intensely about this. A vexed problem like this, with a thousand years of religious differences, has to be handled with the greatest detail and care. No one knows t more than I do. I have seen these tense religious struggles in parts of this country, in Ireland, and elsewhere. I know what it involves. It can lead to civil war before you know where you are. However, the statement was issued, ~~and with the~~ representatives ~~with whom I was dealing~~ at the time, and I had to call it off bec the whole thing was spoilt. ~~Arising out of this~~, this is clear. I had to open the conference with the Arabs alone and they put the point to me t they wanted finality. They wanted to determine what the future of Palestine is to be. The Jews also want finality, provided it takes the form of a Jewish state. But they wd be prepared to see British rule continued as a protecting Power, provided it was clearly aiming at a Jewish sovereign state. The conference was suspended at t time. The United Nations was meeting in New York. I thought t by going to New York I cd talk to a lot of people, and try to help the thing along by meeting people, and so on. While there I discussed the matter with the Sec of State, Mr. Byrnes, and at the end he made a public statement saying t the basis upon wh Gt Britain was proposing to hold the conference, in his view, merited the attendance of the ~~views~~ Jews as well as the Arabs. Even t, from America, produced no results.

Then came the second session of the conference with the Arabs. In view of the difficulty, we agreed to have informal talks with the Jewish Agency. We did not press them to come into the conference. I have bn too long a negotiator to stand on form, ~~and~~ I thought it was better, if they cd not see their way clear to come into

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the conference, t I shd meet them informally, and s e whether, with my colleagues, I cd get over this difficulty. When we met, the Arabs adhered to their plan for a unitary independent state in Palestine. They have reiterated it at every meeting t they have never accepted the Palestine mandate, nor recognised the legality of the Balfour Declaration. Nevertheless, they told us they were willing to recognise the results of this policy so far as the present residents in Palestine ~~are~~ ~~existed at present~~ (counted. Those excluded). T is about 600,000 Jews, now nearer 700,000 I am told, already living in Palestine with 1,200,000 Arabs. I say this in all seriousness. If it were only a questn of ~~alleviating~~ relieving Europe of 100,000 Jews, I believe a settlement cd be found. I believe a settlement can now be found it if is purely the humanitarian problem I have to solve. Unfortunately, t is not the position. From the Zionist point of view the 100,000 is only a beginning, and the Jewish Agency ~~talked~~ in terms of millions. I think the Arabs cd be persuaded to agree to 100,000 new immigrants, in an orderly way, on humanitarian grounds, having regard to the Europenn situation if - and I emphasise this - immigration after t was to be determined by the elected representatives of the people of a Palestine.

The claim made by the Arabs is a very difficult one to answer. Here we in Gt Britain as a House of Commons determine whether the people shall be admitted into ~~Palestine~~ the country, or not. No one else is doing t. Why shd an external agency, largely financed from America, determine how many people shd come into Palestine, and interfere with the economy of the Arabs, who have bn there for 2,000 years? This is what I have to face. There may be an answer to it, If it is on the merits of how long the respective parties have owned ~~this~~ the country. But, the Arabs say they are not going to be pushed out,

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by an external agency from a country wh they regard as
- I am using their words -
their own/and in wh they have bn living for just about

as long as England has bn a christian country.

M follows

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(Bevin spk)

T is what the Hse has to face, and i is a difficult thing to answer. I do not know what wd happen if therewere a lot of Welshmen in America and they ~~began~~ tried to drive the Englishmen out. There wd have to be a buffer state. The difficulty wd be, no doubt, intense. Under the Arab plan the Jewish National Home - and they now accept the National Home, although they did not accept the Balfour Declaratn or the Mandate, they will accept the National Home -

MR. KENNETH LINDSAY)English Universities): Does t also mean partitn?

MR. BEVIN: No. I will deal with partitn in a moment. But they accept the Home within a unitary state. T gives an Arab majority. I have argued with both Jews and Arabs. What is it we have got to solve? Are the Jews a state or are they a religion. I have got to face the qn of Catholics, Mahommedans and everybody else, and really, this is a difficult thing to decide. I cannot believe t if there is a unitary state in Palestine every Arab will vote for an Arab candidate - he may in the first instance - or t every Jew will vote for a Jewish candidate. The only constituency in this country wh returned a Communist candidate was Mile End and their M is not exactly a Zionist, and they have a perfect right to do so. No one is elected to this Hse either as a Jew or a Christian. One is elected as a man, as a repve. Therefore one will have Communists, one will have Socialists, and it depends on the intelligence of thepeople whether there will be Conservatives. There may be t there will be some liberalism, even in Palestine. There is no doubt t people will form views wh will crystallise. Therefore the Arabs argue "Leave it to the intelligence of the people who live in the State."

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MR. SYDNEY SILVERMAN (Nelson & Colne): Will my r h F explain to the Hse exactly what he understands by the word "National" in the phrase "Jewish National Home"?

MR. BEVIN: I am sorry t I cannot give an accurate definitn, and Balfour is dead. I do not say t unkindly but whether anyone can explain what people meant at the time I do not know. When I used it there was an understandg on the part of the Arabs t in Palestine, in view of certain historical assocns, those Jews who had migrated there shd have their liberty and freedom - no pograms, no persecutn - and be equal citizens of the State. T makes it a national home is (Interruption) My national home in England with the same conditns.

MR. TURNER-SAMUELS (Gloucester): My r h F says t the Arabs are prepared to accept the National Home. If he does not know what t is, and cannto give a definitn of it, what is the good of tellg the Hse t Arabs are prepared to accept it.

MR. BEVIN: Bec they agreed in their plan - h Ms have it before them - t "You can your own language, your own university, your own religion, everything" (Interruption) My h F says "Very kind of them" but if other countries t persecuted Jews had only given them t there wd never have bn a problem.

MR. LIPSON (Cheltenham): It is the people who matter.

MR. BEVIN: It is h man rights wh are the basis of the United Nations and in the proposals wh I thought were perhaps too limited - I did not accept them - they were fundamental principles wh I thought gave effect to what I understood to be the basis of the claim originally made by Nathan Rothschild and other people - I have read all the papers - in the original discussns.

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I want to put the other side. The Jews say t if t is done they will be tolerated as a minority. I cannot alter the balance of people in a State, t is impossible, anymore than one can alter it between Nehru and Jinnah today in India. The numbers are there and one cannot alter it in any country. Then we tried our hand at another plan. Ms will have seen it in the White Paper. The Plan had certain features in common to the Anglo-American Report and the Provincial Autonomy Plan. From the Arab point of view those proposals have the advantage t they placed in Arab hands the maintenance of existg safeguards against the dispossession of Arab cultivators, and at the end of two years they wd have give the Arabs a voice in determining the rate of immigration. We proposed to set up a Governors council, and after two years and he was not baseon anything but humanitarian principles 96,000 people wd have been allowed in from Europe without any questn of economic absorbtive capacity. T was a proposal. Afterwards the High Commissioner was to consult a council of both Jews and Arabs, and after consultg them he was to decide, on the basis of economic absorbtive capacity incorporatg the words of the r h M for Bodford (Mr. Churchill) wh he included in the 1922 White Paper.

MR. JANNER (Leicester, West): Will my r h F permit o to ask one qn, a rather important one. What is the proposal with regard to the provisns in the Mandate of the Jewish Agency wh is recognised as an international body?

MR. BEVIN: I will come to t but the h M is delayg my statemt, and I hope t I shall be allowed to proceed. We proposed t if the High Commissioner's Decisn was not accepted by either party, the Secy Genl of the United Nations wd appoint an arbitratn tribunal and we, as the Mandatory power, wd abide by the result. Was t not reasonable? What was the answer? It was t t proposal was rejected bec we proposed t the Arabs shd be consulted at all.

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Really, His Majesty's Govt cd not accept a positn in wh one was going to admit people into a country and must not even consult repves of the people living in it. It was really too tall an order, and I really cd not, on behalf of His Majesty's Govt, accept t. I am sayg this bec I am leadg up to the point where I shall say, at the end, t there is a chance of a settlemt yet, without going to the United Nations, if people will come off their arbitrary positns. I am still open to try.

(IT FOLLOWS)

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MR GILES N.1. 4.30 - 4.40

(MR BEVIN SPKG) 13

Then the other difficulty was t the present Government has no ~~root~~ roots in the people at all. It is an Alien Government imposed on the top by a Mandatory Government. I do not know what previous people who held the office of Colonial Secretary had in their mind but I am perfectly sure in the disucssion of this problem durg the five years when I was in the Coalition Government it was never intended t we should be a Mandatory Power for ever. It was intended to lead to something and t the regulations of our relationship with Palestine shld in the end be on a treaty basis and not a Mandatory basis. T is as I understood it and I believe t there is agreement on t. Therefore, I thought it wld be a good thing. Suggestns been put to me over and over again by hons of this House and from another place, "Why not try and establish a British dominion to try to solve the problem?" But really it is too late for t.

The Trusteeship Council h been established and there is no other road but the establishment of ~~either~~ a trusteeship leadg to independence from a Mandatory positn unless we get agreement between the parties, and there was not a chance of agreement. Therefore, we proposed a trusteeship for five years - for two years with 96,000 immigrants, and arbitratn after t on the questn of the economic absorptive capacity - and t we shld begin at once by creatg municipal areas in certain parts of Palestine which wld h Jewish majorities and others which wld h Arab majorities. In order to achieve t we designed our plans to give the Jews the benefit of Tel Aviv. It is not realised t 78 per cent. of the Jews live in Tel Aviv and the balance are on the land. It is sometimes assumed t they are all on the land. T is not true. They are an Urban populatn.

MR OLIVER STANLEY: (Bristol, West): The r h G said t 78 per cent. live in Tel Aviv. I do not think he meant t. I think he meant t they live in Urban districts.

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MR BEVIN: I beg pardon. They live in Urban areas. Takg the Tel Aviv populatn with t of other Urban areas we h this majority of 78 per cent. It is quite clear t the police for the maintenance of order i no ~~duties~~ in the place. We sug ested devisg ~~dixidg~~ a police system like our own which wld be partly central and partly municipal in the respective ~~ar~~ areas. It wld be recruited in a way similar to t ~~adopted in~~ Birmingham or any other local government area in this country. This was suggested so s to begi build up a government with roots in the people ready to hand over. After ~~At~~ four years we sug ested a constituent assembly which shld endeavour to ork out a constitutn. If they cld not succeed - this is not British territory; we hold it under trust- we wld return to to the United Nations and sk for their help and advice. We felt t if we cld begin self government, begin getting people to work together, it wld help to solve the problem. I am convinced t if the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine - I emphasise in Palestine - are given a chance to work to ether they will work together and solve this problem, but if it is to be settled in accordance with the Jewish Agency's dictates it will never be settled. I am speakg, I hope, impartially.

MR JANNER (Leicester, West): With the greatest respect -

HON MEMBERS: Order.

MR BEVIN: I have given way many times. In the Citrus Board, in the Trade Boards and the various Boards of commerce, they do work together. If they can work together in trade and commerce in t way, personally I am convinced t if given the chance and removed from political difficulty, then the Jews and Arabs will develop a State of which they can well be proud. T is my view, and I am entitled to my view after all these negotiations. We have been compelled to maintain a Govt with whic which the people, as I say, have not been sufficiently associated. We therefore tried a new method. It was rejected. N.B. In the other States of the Middle East where we also had a Mandate,

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it has led to self Govt in Syria, Lebanon, Irak and all the rest. I want to suggest t the cultural development of the Arabs and Jews in Palestine is of ~~a higher~~ as high a standard ~~than~~ as the cultural development and aptitude for Govt to be found in any other Arab States. T being so, we rather pinned our faith on developing independence in t way.

If this policy was expressed in connection with any other place in the world, I believe this House, the United Nations, and everybody else, would say t our policy was right ~~and~~ in t we were aiming for independence, ~~in~~ getting rid of the Mandate and developing self Govt and self ~~det~~ determination with proper protection for the rights of any minorities. T has been our policy and I think if this was not Palestine it would have been successful.

I was asked a question about defining the national home. This has been a great puzzle to me. When the Balfour declaration and the subsequent Mandate were made, nobody indicated, as far as I can discover, when the national home would be established. I cannot find it anywhere. Was it millions of Jews; was it a majority; was it a Jewish State, or what was it? The only expression t I can find is this vague ~~question~~ expression of a Jewish "National home". I know the reason for this declaration. I know why it was made, but I do not believe it would help ~~in~~ the discussion now. It was thought by most people, prior to 1939, t the steps t had been taken up to date, did really fulfil the Balfour declaration. Between the Labour Party and the Party then in office a great ~~dispute~~ dispute was carried on in this House. But, frankly, the more one reads the documents the more difficult it is to find any guide as to when a Jewish national home has been completed or established.

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It was for t reason t we thought if we developed these municipal areas, if we transferred the land regulations, the laws and the police, and all this kind of thing, to majorities in t area, we should have established in fact the national home. ~~But~~ We should have established the national home within a unitary State, with a free chance with the Jews for their own development which would have allowed them in the joint Parliament of Arabs and Jews to have had their say in the ~~rest~~ affairs of the world.

O follows

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(MR BEVIN) Speaking. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

That leads me to another point, which is another very difficult one. It is said that if we have a unitary State, the Jews, as Jews, will not be in the United Nations. Really, this is raising a very big question. Are we in the United Nations as a religion, are we in the United Nations as a people, geographically situated, or how are we in ? If the United Nations is to be ~~turned into the~~ arrived at a position in which it will have five or six great religions as dominant factors, then that will be a very disturbing situation, and, as far as I am concerned at any rate -

MR TURNER-SAMUELS (Gloucester) Rose-

MR BEVIN: I have given way very often already, and the h & l G will have his turn. I must raise this issue because really it is fundamental. I have to deal with the points put to me by the Jewish Agency, and the Jewish Agency says that, as nationals but not as Jews, we shall be in the United Nations. I never knew and I never thought that we had promised or done anything to establish a situation of that character, but, if that is the case, let us do it with our eyes open. This is one of the difficulties which I see, and I say this because I want both the Jews and the Arabs to reconsider their position. We are united in the United Nations to-day as ~~States~~, and, within every State of the United Nations there are any number of religions. ~~They~~ It may be different, but that is the situation that is put to me, and I hope it will be debated and brought out, because it does raise a very serious ~~position~~ question, especially for a Commonwealth like this, which represents every possible phase of people in the world. We cannot divide ourselves like that.

Therefore, I have asked over and over again if it will not be possible to have a Palestinian State, and with the ability that is there - ~~xxxx~~ the business ability and it is exceptional

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and has done remarkably well, The statesmanship ~~and ability~~ and the aptitude for govt cannot we find a place through a Palestinian State to deal with these problems in the United Nations from a State point of view? That is the question which I should like debated in the course of this debate, because it is the issue upon which the whole crux of this settlement really depends. I hope it will not be dealt with in any spirit of prejudice, because we have to face these issues, and because, when we go to the United Nations next September, these are the issues which I suggest are going to come before us. Take the position of Russia. I do not know how many races there are in that great territory, covering one seventh of the globe, but it is colossal, and I have never heard that this particular theory has been advanced there. Therefore, I ask for consideration of this problem.

May I now just turn to the question of partition? A good many people have said that the way out of the difficulty is to have partition. I am sure that if we had agreed to partition we would have had ~~ten times the~~ a tremendous row as to where the frontier should be. We have drawn frontiers in the ~~Morrison~~ Provincial Autonomy Plan, and I have ~~only~~ seen the Jewish idea of partition in an American paper, but we really cannot make two viable States of Palestine however we may try. We cannot do it. We can make one viable State, and, so far as I can see, or as far as any student of the map could see, the only thing we could do would be to transfer the rest nearer to ~~the~~ one of the Arab States but I ask what trouble is that going to cause in the whole of the Arab world? That will set going a conflict which will be worse that the conflict we have tried to settle.

It has been suggested that we could do it by knitting in Transjordan, and it is argued ~~our view~~ that we carried out partition when we created Transjordan. That may be, but, if we try now with Palestine as we know it today, to make it into two viable states, I say that we cannot do it. If we try to take away

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the taxable capacity of the best areas of Palestine for production purposes, and that taxation goes entirely to the Jewish portion, you cannot expect the others to accept it. You cannot expect to make the one State dependent upon somebody else. The best partition scheme and the most favourable one that I have seen up to now, has the effect that it would leave, at the present moment, 450,000 Jews and 360,000 Arabs in the Jewish State. I put that to the Arabs quite frankly, and what was their answer? The Arabs say "If it is wrong for the Jews to be in a minority of 33⅓ or 40 per cent. in the whole country, what justification is there for putting 360,000 Arabs under the Jews? What is your answer to that?" I have no answer to that. N.P. Therefore, you transfer one large issue to solve your problem of partition, and there are only one way to carry on. Either the Arabs in the partitioned State must always be an Arab minority or else they must be driven out - the one thing or the other - and, on that basis, I am afraid that I should be led, and the Govt would be led, to a worse position. I have been asked "Why go to the United Nations?" Any remedy that has been put up to the Government in the form of creating a Jewish State will lead to one result - the Arab States will take you to the United Nations. Supposing we partitioned the country now, and the question then went to the United Nations. Syria, or some other country, would take us to the United Nations, where we should have our conduct discussed on the basis of our legal action in carving up a State that was not ours, and I venture to suggest, after my experiences in New York last year, that Britain would be placed in a very funny position. It is indefensible. We can dismiss all these things, I know, quite easily, but, really, we cannot do that. Therefore, Either the Government should have tried to get the best they could within the Mandate, and, in the end, we came to the conclu-

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t this Mandate is really unworkable. I think we cld establish a case t we h carried out what the Mandate originally intended, provided t the problem had not been accentuated by the Hitler Regime.

(P follows)

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Dup

(MR. BEVIN SPEAKG)

If we take the ratio of ~~migration~~ Jewish migration and development unaccentuated by the Hitler regime, I think that the original basis of the Mandate as visualised in 1922, has, in fact, ~~bn~~ been carried out. ~~What we have not bn able to meet~~ What we have not bn able to do is to meet with this Mandate, the accentuated position created by the Hitler regime and the persecution in Germany. That is my view. I believe that ~~continuous~~ throughout British Govts have done their best all the way through.

The Palestine administration has had one of the most difficult tasks of any administration in the world. Sometimes, when reading the reports and documents, I wonder how they have managed to carry through. They have had no support from ~~the~~ people, and they have ~~bn~~ been criticised by both sides. I believe that they have honestly tried to do their best, and that if there has ~~bn~~ been a failure in dealing with the problem of these displaced persons due to ~~Jewish persecution~~ persecution of the Jews, it has not ~~bn~~ been the Palestine Mandate ~~which xxxxxx~~ as administered on the ~~xxx~~ original basis which has been the cause of the failure; it has ~~bn~~ been the failure of the moral consciousness of international organisations to grapple with this problem as a whole ~~and, which~~ whether has left ~~it xxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ the problem as it is at the present time.

Take the position now. There are 1 million displaced persons on the Continent. I have said to Govts, week after week, what is 1 million people out of 4,000 million in the world? I have made the offer - and I make it from this Box today - that, to get over this problem, we will take a proportion, together with all the other countries of the world, of that 1 million and add

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them to our population in order to get rid of this miserable state of affairs. The thing ought to be taken up and grappled with. I pleaded with the United States to take in thousands - I do not mean Jews; I do not single out Jews, and I do not think they ought to be singled out. But all States ought to do it. It is really absurd to think that with all the organisation built up for this business, 1 million people cd not be thus absorbed. That ought to be done, but everywhere I go and everywhere I turn nobody wants them. It is a tragedy. They are doing something in South America and in some other parts of the world, but it is very little.

I will not mention the name of one great Statesman in the British Commonwealth who came and gave me a half hour's lecture on the Zionist problem. When he had finished I said to him, "How many will you take? I will get a ship and send them to you tomorrow." Not one. That is really sympathy without relief. We really ought to get rid of this problem and if I cd get back to the contribution on purely humanitarian grounds of 100,000 - that is, 60,000 more than we are now taking in over two years - into Palestine and if this political fight for a Jewish State cd be put on one side and we cd develop self-govt by the people resident in Palestine without any other political issue, I would be willing to try again. I honestly believe that it could be accomplished. But, if the attack is made that this is merely the advance proportion coming out of Europe in order that more millions can be poured in so as to get a complete Jewish State, which we have never undertaken to do, I am afraid - and I say this with great sincerity - that will provoke a conflict in the Middle East which I do not desire to see. There is enough conflict in the world already. I am convinced that

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if ~~what~~ I have said today, that we can bring the matter back to this contribution to European suffering, which was where His Majesty's Govt originally started to deal with it, then there is a chance of solution.

Finally, there is the question of time. I have bn asked whether we can do something before September. It is very difficult, and I cannot give an answer. I am studying the matter to see whether there is any process by which we can get it considered earlier, under the Charter, ~~and so on~~. But I must ask for more time on that. I am in consultation with Sir Alec Cadogan, who knows the Charter inside out, to see whether anything can be done. Even now, rather than it shd go to the United Nations, I wd prefer that Great Britain, with all her traditions, shd be allowed to deal with the problem on a humanitarian basis. Let us remove the political conflict and get back to relieving Europe of these 100,000 people ~~which~~ we are asked to do, and let us be allowed to deal with any further emigrants on the basis I have suggested. If there is a dispute, let there be arbitration, and, in the quickest possible time we can create an independent State in Palestine where Jew and Arab, who have such traditions and have contributed so much to the religious and cultural thought of the world, can work together and end these century-old conflicts.

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PALESTINE
(GOVERNMENT POLICY)

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[*Mr. William Whiteley.*]

3.44 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ernest Bevin): The course of events has led His Majesty's Government to decide that the problem of Palestine must be referred to the United Nations, as outlined in the announcement which I made to the House last week. The problem of Palestine is a very vexed and complex one. There is no denying the fact that the Mandate contained contradictory promises. In the first place it promised the Jews a National Home, and, in the second place it declared that the rights and position of the Arabs must be protected. Therefore, it provided for what was virtually an invasion of the country by thousands of immigrants, and at the same time said that this was not to disturb the people in possession. The question therefore arose whether this could be accomplished without a conflict, and events in the last 25 years have proved that it could not.

The Jews set about colonising and there is no doubt that in the sphere they have developed, they have carried out some very great experiments. Many of the Arabs, as I shall explain later, are involved in those developments, such as citrus growing which is vital to the economy of Palestine. As far as Jewish development is concerned, everybody in this country, who has been associated with the affair, certainly up to 1931, assumed that it was a National Home for the Jews about which we were talking. I want to remind the House, however that that is not the issue now. All that is over. The issue which the United Nations must consider and decide is, first, shall the claims of the Jews that Palestine is to be a Jewish State be admitted; second, shall the claim of the Arabs that it is to be an Arab State, with safeguards for the Jews under the decision for a National Home be admitted; or, third, shall it be a Palestinian State, in which the interests of both communities are as carefully balanced and protected as possible? I have put it in that form, because in all negotiations I have had to conduct, and whatever proposals we have adopted today, I come back every time to these three provisions. I cannot escape them and I do not think anyone who has been Colonial Secretary, or who has handled this problem hitherto, however much the question has been argued, has in fact, escaped them.

That, therefore, raises the issue which has got to be decided and we, as Mandatory Power, cannot solve that problem until the United Nations have recommended which of these three alternatives is to form the basis of the future organisation of Palestine. We as Mandatory Power have no power to make that decision. Nothing that I can find in any of the documents, either at the League of Nations, or in the discussions between the great Powers at Versailles and after, indicate that we have that power. The Mandate certainly does not give it, and the Anglo-American Committee, faced with the problem that we have been faced with, came to the view not to recommend a Jewish State, and everybody who has touched the Palestine question is forced back to that every time. I really want the House to face up to this problem which His Majesty's Government have to face up to now. In our recent negotiations the Colonial Secretary and I, over and over again, came up against this fundamental problem. All the proposals we have made for the gradual evolution of Palestine towards independence have been judged by the Arabs and the Jews according to the effect they might have on the final decision of the kind of State Palestine is to be when it becomes independent, and independent it must become. The Mandatory Power cannot go on for ever.

Let me trace the history of this business since we came into office. We gave early consideration to the problem, and discussed the matter very fully. I do not escape the fact—I do not desire to escape it—that when I was a member of the Coalition Government with right hon. Gentlemen opposite I took my corner in trying to see what solution we could find for Palestine. I have a perfectly open mind about it. All I want is a settlement, and I want a settlement because this is one of those sore spots in the Middle East that may, if not settled, lead to much wider trouble—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Various schemes have been evolved in the past, including partition, but all which have come before me, whether in the Coalition Government or

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in this Government, would have to be put into operation by force. That is to say, everybody came to the conclusion that we should not get agreement, but that we would have to come to a decision and then apply force to put it into operation.

His Majesty's Government, after reviewing the situation, came to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, that after all the force we had seen throughout the world in the last 25 years, force applied to this problem would not produce a final solution, that it might create wider difficulties in the Middle East, and might, indeed, start us on a road leading in another quarter of a century to another war. That we have had to face, having regard to the importance to the world economy of the raw materials and the whole position of the Middle East. We, therefore, proceeded, not too hopefully, but with the conviction that it was our duty, to make the effort to try to get a negotiated settlement. To begin with, and I want to make this very clear, we agreed that we could not enforce the White Paper of 1939 as a basis for our policy. It has been suggested that all that was needed was to tear up the White Paper. This raises a very serious question in international affairs, one that cannot be approached lightly. Statements have often been made in this House and outside that when Labour was in Opposition, they stated that they would not be bound by that decision of the Government of the day. But there are many precedents. It has always been accepted, in international affairs at least, that the party coming into office after making such a declaration, does not just tear up existing undertakings, but seeks to change them by proper negotiation and by substituting another policy. I have to emphasise this because this House of Commons did vote for the White Paper. It is true that the Mandates Commission did not endorse it——

Mr. Clement Davies (Montgomery): Not this House—a predecessor.

Mr. Bevin: I always regard this House as continuing from eternity to eternity, and I meant it in that sense. I think I am right—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I did not mean the actual Members of this House. What I meant was that the House in 1939 did, in fact, vote—and the Arabs took that as a decision of the British Parliament—[*Interruption.*] I must say that I should be reluctant to remain Foreign Secretary for five minutes, if I thought that I went to an international conference with a vote of a majority of this House and gave undertakings, and that those undertakings were to be torn up without proper negotiations at the end——

Mr. Sydney Silverman (Nelson and Colne): Would my right hon. Friend say that the White Paper of 1939 represents any kind of agreement or undertaking with any other Power with whom we were in international relations? Was it not merely a declaration of policy by the Mandatory Power.

Mr. Bevin: It was regarded by the Arab States at that conference as an undertaking by the British Parliament and one which would be carried out. May I suggest—[*Interruption.*] Please do not interrupt. We are dealing with one of the most serious problems. I suggest to my hon. Friend that if the vote had been the reverse way, and an undertaking of an inverse character had been given to the Jews, the hon. Member would have been on his feet and said that this was a vote from the House, and that we could not tear it up. Really, I must stand for this as a point of principle, because all my negotiations of any kind with Foreign Powers depend on the integrity of a vote of this House of Commons——

Mr. Turner-Samuels (Gloucester): If that is right, how can the Foreign Secretary reconcile that with the statement of the Prime Minister on 1st July last year in which he said:

> "The Government have never stood by the White Paper policy. . . It is quite wrong to say that we are carrying on the White Paper policy."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st July, 1946; Vol. 424, c. 1907.]

Mr. Bevin: That is quite right, and it the hon. and learned Member will wait a moment, I will show him why. The point I am making is this—and really I must ask the House, whether it is my party or any party, to support me in this because it is fundamental—I am going away next week to Moscow, and when I go to Moscow I shall be asked to give undertakings. When I arrive at conclusions, I shall have to say that it is subject to the ratification of the House of Commons, and when that ratification of the House takes place—whatever the vote is—and that undertaking is given, I assume that

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whatever party succeeds us, whatever its political colour may be, will honour that undertaking until it negotiates a change. I must ask my hon. Friends to accept that; otherwise they ought never to send me to an international conference at all for any purpose. Really I have to state this, because it is fundamental to the carrying on of the business of the country. This is not a question of continuity of policy, but a question of keeping one's word, and, indeed, if there is one thing I have grown up in, not merely as a politician but as a trade union leader, it is that I have kept my word, whatever the opposition may have been.

Therefore, I told the Arabs quite straight that my party declared that they could not be bound by this, and that a change must be negotiated, and I have proceeded on that policy with my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary ever since. I think that is a perfectly legitimate action to take. Thereupon, the present question arose; what should the approach be? The position had become accentuated by the European situation and I thought, with the then Colonial Secretary, that the first step which should be taken—and I agree with the right hon. Gentleman who corrected me the other night about the date—was to decide about immigration. The question was, should immigration come to an end at 31st December, 1945? I communicated with the Arabs and told them that I thought it should not. My right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary in his Department, took it up with the Arabs in Palestine—I dealt with the Arab States—and we agreed that it should continue at 1,500 a month. I will not say, and it would be wrong of me to say, that there was an agreement by the Arabs to do that, but there was at least acquiescence, and on that acquiescence in a friendly way, we proceeded to issue certificates at 1,500 a month.

Since we took that decision in December of 1945, 21,000 Jewish immigrants have entered Palestine over and above the 75,000 for whom the White Paper provides, and immigration now is proceeding at the rate of 18,000 a year. There seems to be an impression everywhere that this is an abnormally low rate of entry, but the fact is that it has only been exceeded five times in the whole history of the Mandate—in 1925, and in the first four years of the Nazi rule in Germany. In other words, 18,000 a year is above the average for the whole Mandatory period and I must say that I felt, having moved up to that as the first step in the opening of negotiations, it was not a bad rate of entry. But I think we might have been able to do more for the Jews, and have increased this rate at that time, if the bitterness of feeling which surrounds this problem of immigration had not been increased by American pressure for the immediate admission of 100,000. I do not desire to create any ill feeling with the United States; in fact, I have done all I can to promote the best possible relations with them, as with other countries, but I should have been happier if they had had regard to the fact that we were the Mandatory Power, and that we were carrying the responsibility—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—and if they had only waited to ask us what we were doing. Then we could have informed them. But, instead of that, a person named Earl Harrison went out to their zone in Germany collecting certain information, and a report was issued. I must say it really destroyed the basis of good feeling that we—the Colonial Secretary and I—were endeavouring to produce in the Arab States, and it set the whole thing back.

However we realised that we had to take American interest in this problem into account. Accordingly, having regard to what they had said, we invited them to join us in forming the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Now I must point out that I have been very severely criticised by people in the United States for not accepting the Committee's Report. I was reminded of this when I was over there recently almost every day. But none of the Report was accepted by the United States except one point, namely, the admission of 100,000 immigrants. I was perfectly willing to stand up to the problem of the Report as a whole, which included 10 points. I have never gone back on that, but even if I had, as events have turned out, it would not have settled the Palestine problem, as I shall show before I sit down. We could not undertake this, except as a part of the general settlement, and we had to continue our efforts to work out policy.

Our first attempt resulted in the plan for provisional autonomy. I must remind the House that the Anglo-American Committee reported against a Jewish State. Therefore, taking the Report as a basis,

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we put forward this provisional autonomy plan as a basis for negotiation. We did not lay it down but, if I may say so, if other countries with different races and different religions, can work on the cantonal principle, I really cannot see why it cannot work in Palestine as elsewhere. We then tried to convene a conference of both Arabs and Jews. We tried very hard to get the Jews into conference. I interviewed their representatives in Paris, in London, and I tried to persuade them, to the best of my ability to come in and face the issue with us.

I profoundly regret they did not. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I know—and I do not want to set one section of Jews against another—that those who have been trained in England and grown up under English customs and practice, wanted to come in, but the Jewish Agency, very largely dominated by New York, would not really come in, and it was with gentlemen from there that I had to deal so much. They would not join the conference unless, as a prerequisite, we would more or less commit ourselves to a Jewish State in advance, either partition or as a whole. How could I? I had to consult Arabs, I had to discuss the whole problem, and how could any representative of His Majesty's Government give an advance declaration one way or the other? However, we did agree to put any plan which the Jewish Agency cared to submit on the agenda, and to examine it on its merits whatever it involved.

The proposal I put to them was, "Here is the British plan. There is the Arab plan"—it by then had been drawn up—"You have your plan. Let us take these three plans, and see if, out of them, we can produce a solution." I knew from experience that I could not get them in the same room. That, too, I think is regrettable when you have a problem of this character to solve. And in this case it was the Arabs who were the greatest difficulty. I want to make a balanced statement on this, quite fairly. They argued that experience of the past was not helpful, but the Jews were willing if I would accept the Jewish State, in some form, in advance. I could not do that, so they did not come into the conference. Neither could I get them into one room.

I did reach a stage, however, in meeting the Jews separately, in which I advanced the idea of an interim arrangement, leading ultimately to self-government. I indicated that I did not mind whether it was five years, or 10 years, or three years, or whatever it was. I said to them, "If you will work together for three, five, or 10 years, it might well be that you will not want to separate. Let us try to make up the difference." At that stage things looked more hopeful. There was a feeling—I do not think I overestimated it—when they left me in the Foreign Office that day, that I had the right approach at last. But what happened? I went back to the Paris Peace Conference, and next day—I believe it was the Day of Atonement, or a special day of the Jewish religion—my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister telephoned me at midnight, and told me that the President of the United States was going to issue another statement on the 100,000. I think the country and the world ought to know about this.

I went next morning to the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, and told him how far I had got the day before. I believed we were on the road, if only they would leave us alone. I begged that the statement be not issued, but I was told that if it was not issued by Mr. Truman, a competitive statement would be issued by Mr. Dewey. In international affairs I cannot settle things if my problem is made the subject of local elections. I hope I am not saying anything to cause bad feeling with the United States, but I feel so intensely about this. A vexed problem like this, with a thousand years of religious differences, has to be handled with the greatest detail and care. No one knows that more than I do. I have seen these tense religious struggles in parts of this country, in Ireland, and elsewhere. I know what it involves. It can lead to civil war before you know where you are. However, the statement was issued. I was dealing with Jewish representatives at the time, and I had to call it off because the whole thing was spoilt.

One thing is clear. I had to open the conference with the Arabs alone, and they put the point to me that they wanted finality. They wanted to determine what the future of Palestine was to be. The Jews also want finality, provided it takes the form of a Jewish State. But they would be prepared to see British rule continued as a protecting Power, provided it was clearly aiming at a Jewish Sovereign

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I profoundly regret they did not. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I know—and I do not want to set one section of Jews against another—that those who have been trained in England and grown up under English customs and practice, wanted to come in, but the Jewish Agency, very largely dominated by New York, would not really come in, and it was with gentlemen from there that I had to deal so much. They would not join the conference unless, as a prerequisite, we would more or less commit ourselves to a Jewish State in advance, either partition or as a whole. How could I? I had to consult Arabs, I had to discuss the whole problem, and how could any representative of His Majesty's Government give an advance declaration one way or the other? However, we did agree to put any plan which the Jewish Agency cared to submit on the agenda, and to examine it on its merits whatever it involved.

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State. The conference was suspended at that time. The United Nations was meeting in New York. I thought that by going to New York, I could talk to a lot of people, and try to help the thing along by meeting people, and so on. While there I discussed the matter with the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, and at the end, he made a public statement saying that the basis upon which Great Britain was proposing to hold the conference, in his view merited the attendance of the Jews as well as the Arabs. Even that, from America, produced no results.

Then came the second session of the conference with the Arabs. In view of the difficulty, we agreed to have informal talks with the Jewish Agency. We did not press them to come into conference. I have been too long a negotiator to stand on form. I thought it was better, if they could not see their way clear to come into the conference, that I should meet them informally, and see whether, with my colleagues, I could get over this difficulty. When we met, the Arabs adhered to their plan for a unitary independent State in Palestine. They have reiterated at every meeting that they have never accepted the Palestine Mandate, nor recognised the legality of the Balfour Declaration. Nevertheless, they told us they were willing to recognise the results of this policy so far as the present residents in Palestine were concerned. These included about 600,000 Jews, now nearer 700,000 I am told, already living in Palestine with 1,200,000 Arabs.

I say this in all seriousness. If it were only a question of relieving Europe of 100,000 Jews, I believe a settlement could be found. I believe a settlement can now be found if it is purely the humanitarian problem I have to solve. Unfortunately, that is not the position. From the Zionist point of view the 100,000 is only a beginning, and the Jewish Agency talk in terms of millions. I think the Arabs could be persuaded to agree to 100,000 new immigrants, in an orderly way, on humanitarian grounds, having regard to the European situation if—and I emphasise this—immigration after that, was to be determined by the elected representatives of the people of Palestine.

The claim made by the Arabs is a very difficult one to answer. We here in Great Britain as a House of Commons determine whether people shall be admitted into this country or not. No one else is doing that. Why should an external agency, largely financed from America, determine how many people should come into Palestine, and interfere with the economy of the Arabs, who have been there for 2,000 years? This is what I have to face. There may be an answer to it, if it is on the merits of how long the respective parties have owned the country. But, the Arabs say they are not going to be pushed out, by an external agency, from a country which they regard as their own—I am using their words—and in which they have been living for just about as long as England has been a Christian country. That is what the House has to face, and it is a difficult thing to answer. I do not know what would happen if a lot of Welshmen tried to drive the Englishmen out. There would have to be a buffer state. The difficulty would be no doubt intense. Under the Arab plan the Jewish National Home—and they now accept the National Home—although they did not accept the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate, they will accept the National Home——

Mr. Kenneth Lindsay (Combined English Universities): Does that also mean partition?

Mr. Bevin: No. I will deal with partition in a moment. But they accept the Home within a unitary State. That gives an Arab majority. I have argued with both Jews and Arabs. What is it we have got to solve? Are the Jews a State or are they a religion. I have got to face the question of Catholics, Mahommedans and everybody else, and really, this is a difficult thing to decide. I cannot believe that if there is a unitary State in Palestine every Arab will vote for an Arab candidate—he may in the first instance—or that every Jew will vote for a Jewish candidate. About the only constituency in this country which returned a Communist candidate was Mile End and they have a perfect right to do so. No one is elected to this House either as a Jew or a Christian. One is elected as a man, as a representative. Therefore, one will have Communists, one will have Socialists, and it depends on the intelligence of the people whether there will be Conservatives. It may be that there will be some liberalism, even in Palestine. There is no doubt that people will form views

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which will crystallise. Therefore, the Arabs argue, "Leave it to the intelligence of the people who live in the State."

Mr. S. Silverman: Will my right hon. Friend explain to the House exactly what he understands by the word "National" in the phrase "Jewish National Home"?

Mr. Bevin: I am sorry that I cannot give an accurate definition, and Balfour is dead. I do not say that unkindly, but whether anyone can explain what people meant at the time, I do not know. When I used it, there was an understanding on the part of the Arabs that in Palestine, in view of certain historical associations, those Jews who had migrated there should have their liberty and freedom—no pogroms, no persecution—and be equal citizens of the State. That makes it a national home—[*Interruption.*] My national home is in England, with the same conditions.

Mr. Turner-Samuels: My right hon. Friend says that the Arabs are prepared to accept the National Home. If he does not know what that is, and cannot give a definition of it, what is the good of telling the House that the Arabs are prepared to accept it?

Mr. Bevin: Because they agreed in their plan—hon. Members have it before them—that "You can have your own language, your own university, your own religion, everything"—[*Interruption.*] My hon. Friend says, "Very kind of them," but if other countries that persecuted Jews had only given them that, there would never have been a problem.

Mr. Lipson (Cheltenham): It is the people who matter.

Mr. Bevin: It is human rights which are the basis of the United Nations, and in the proposals, which I thought were perhaps too limited—I did not accept them—they were fundamental principles which I thought gave effect to what I understood to be the basis of the claim originally made by Nathan Rothschild and other people—I have read all the papers—in the original discussions.

I want to put the other side. The Jews say that if that is done they will be tolerated as a minority. I cannot alter the balance of people in a State—that is impossible—any more than one can alter it between Nehru and Jinnah today in India. The numbers are there, and one cannot alter it in any country. Then we tried our hand at another plan. Members will have seen it in the White Paper. The plan had certain features common to the Anglo-American Report and the Provincial Autonomy Plan. From the Arab point of view, those proposals had the advantage that they placed in Arab hands the maintenance of existing safeguards against the dispossession of Arab cultivators, and at the end of two years they would have given the Arabs a voice in determining the rate of immigration. We proposed to set up a Governor's Council, and in two years—and this was not based on anything but humanitarian principles—96,000 people would have been allowed from Europe, without any question of economic absorptive capacity. That was the proposal. Afterwards, the High Commissioner was to consult a council of both Jews and Arabs, and after consulting them he was to decide, on the basis of economic absorptive capacity, incorporating the words of the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill), which he included in the 1922 White Paper.

Mr. Janner (Leicester, West): Will my right hon. Friend permit me to ask one question, a rather important one. What is the proposal with regard to the fulfilment of the provisions in the Mandate about the Jewish Agency, which is recognised as an international body?

Mr. Bevin: I will come to that, but my hon. Friend is delaying my statement, and I hope that I shall be allowed to proceed. We proposed that if the High Commissioner's decision was not accepted by either party, the Secretary-General of the United Nations would appoint an arbitration tribunal, and we, as the Mandatory Power, would abide by the result. Was that not reasonable? What was the answer? It was that that proposal was rejected because we proposed that the Arabs should be consulted at all. Really, His Majesty's Government could not accept a position in which one was going to admit people into a country, and representatives of the people living in it must not be consulted. That was really too tall an order, and I could not, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, accept that. I am saying this because I am leading up to the point where I shall

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say, at the end, that there is a chance of a settlement yet, without going to the United Nations, if people will come off their arbitrary positions. I am still open to try.

Then the other difficulty was that the present Government have no roots in the people at all. It is an alien Government imposed on the top by a mandatory government. I do not know what previous people who held the office of Colonial Secretary had in their minds, but I am perfectly sure in the discussion of this problem during the five years when I was in the Coalition Government it was never intended that we should be a Mandatory Power for ever. It was intended to lead to something and that the regulation of our relationship with Palestine should, in the end, be on a treaty basis and not a mandatory basis. That is as I understood it, and I believe that there is agreement on that. Therefore, I thought it would be a good thing. Suggestions have been put to me over and over again by hon. Members of this House and by Members of another place, " Why not try to establish a British Dominion to try to solve the problem?" But really it is too late for that.

The Trusteeship Council has been established and there is no other road but the establishment of a trusteeship leading to independence from a mandatory position, unless we get agreement between the parties, and there was no chance of agreement. Therefore, we proposed a trusteeship for five years—for two years with 96,000 immigrants, and arbitration after that on the question of the economic absorptive capacity—and that we should begin at once by creating municipal areas in certain parts of Palestine which would have Jewish majorities, and others which would have Arab majorities. In order to achieve that, we designed our plans to give the Jews the benefit of Tel Aviv. It is not realised that 78 per cent. of the Jews live in Tel Aviv and the balance are on the land. It is sometimes assumed that they are all on the land. That is not true. They are an urban population.

Mr. Oliver Stanley (Bristol, West): The right hon. Gentleman said that 78 per cent. live in Tel Aviv. I do not think he meant that. I think he meant that they live in urban districts.

Mr. Bevin: I beg pardon. They live in urban areas. Taking the Tel Aviv population with that of other urban areas, we have this majority of 78 per cent. It is quite clear that the police for the maintenance of order have no roots in the place. We suggested devising a police system like our own which would be partly central and partly municipal in the respective areas. It would be recruited in a way similar to that adopted in Birmingham, or any other local government area in this country. This was suggested so as to begin building up a government with roots in the people, ready to hand over. After four years, we suggested a constituent assembly which should endeavour to work out a Constitution. If they could not succeed—this is not British territory; we hold it under trust—we would return to the United Nations and ask for their help and advice. We felt that if we could begin self-government, begin getting people to work together, it would help to solve the problem. I am convinced that if the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine—I emphasise in Palestine—are given a chance to work together, they will work together and solve this problem, but if it is to be settled in accordance with the Jewish Agency's dictates, it will never be settled. I am speaking, I hope, impartially.

Mr. Janner: With the greatest respect——

Hon. Members: Order.

Mr. Bevin: I have given way many times. In the Citrus Board, in the trade boards and the various boards of commerce, they do work together. If they can work together in trade and commerce in that way, personally I am convinced that if given the chance and removed from political difficulty, then the Jews and Arabs will develop a State of which they can well be proud. That is my view, and I am entitled to my view after all these negotiations. We have been compelled to maintain a Government with which the people, as I say, have not been sufficiently associated. We, therefore, tried a new method. It was rejected.

In the other States of the Middle East where we also had a Mandate, it has led to self-government—in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and all the rest. I want to suggest that the cultural development of the Arabs and Jews in Palestine is of as high a standard

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as the cultural development and aptitude for government to be found in any other Arab State. That being so, we rather pinned our faith on developing independence in that way. If this policy was expressed in connection with any other place in the world, I believe this House, the United Nations, and everybody else, would say that our policy was right in that we were aiming for independence, getting rid of the Mandate and developing self-government and self-determination with proper protection for the rights of any minorities. That has been our policy and I think if this was not Palestine, it would have been successful.

I was asked a question about defining the National Home. This has been a great puzzle to me. When the Balfour Declaration and the subsequent Mandate were made, nobody indicated, as far as I can discover, when the National Home would be established. I cannot find it anywhere. Was it millions of Jews; was it a majority; was it a Jewish State, or what was it? The only expression that I can find is this vague expression of a " Jewish National Home." I know the reason for this Declaration. I konw why it was made, but I do not believe it would help the discussion now. It was thought by most people prior to 1939, that the steps that had been taken up to date, did really fulfil the Balfour Declaration. Between the Labour Party and the party then in office a great dispute was carried on in this House. But, frankly, the more one reads the documents, the more difficult it is to find any guide as to when a Jewish National Home has been completed or established. It was for that reason that we thought if we developed these municipal areas, if we transferred the land regulations, the laws and the police, and all this kind of thing, to majorities in that area, we should have established in fact the National Home. We should have established the National Home within a unitary State, with a free chance to the Jews for their own development, which would have allowed them in the joint Parliament of Arabs and Jews, to have had their say in the affairs of the world.

That leads me to another point, which is also a very difficult one. It is said that, if we have a unitary State, the Jews, as Jews, will not be in the United Nations. Really, this is raising a very big question. Are we in the United Nations as a religion, are we in the United Nations as a people geographically situated, or how are we in it? If the United Nations is to arrive at a position in which it will have five or six great religions as dominant factors, then that will be a very disturbing situation, and, as far as I am concerned, at any rate——

Mr. Turner-Samuels *rose*——

Mr. Bevin: I have given way very often already, and the hon. and learned Gentleman will have his turn. I must raise this issue, because really it is fundamental. I have to deal with the points put to me by the Jewish Agency, and the Jewish Agency says that, " as nationals, but not as Jews, we shall be in the United Nations." I never knew, and I never thought, that we had promised or done anything to establish a situation of that character, but, if that is the case, let us do it with our eyes open. This is one of the difficulties which I see, and I say this because I want both the Jews and the Arabs to reconsider their position. We are united in the United Nations today as States, and, within every State of the United Nations, there are any number of religions. It may be different, but that is the situation that is put to me, and I hope it will be debated and brought out, because it does raise a very serious position, especially for a Commonwealth like this, which represents every possible phase of people in the world. We cannot divide ourselves like that.

Therefore, I have asked, over and over again, if it will not be possible to have a Palestinian State, and with the ability that is there—the business ability, and it is exceptional and has done remarkably well, the statesmanship and the aptitude for government—cannot we find a place through a Palestinian State to deal with these problems in the United Nations from a State point of view? That is the question which I should like debated in the course of this Debate, because it is the issue upon which the whole crux of this settlement really depends. I hope it will not be dealt with in any spirit of prejudice, because we have to face these issues, and because, when we go to the United Nations next September, these are the issues which I suggest are going to come before us. Take the position of Russia. I do not know how many races there are in that great territory, covering one-seventh of the globe, but it is colossal,

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and I have never heard that this particular theory has been advanced there. Therefore, I ask for consideration of this problem.

May I now turn to the question of partition? A good many people have said that the way out of the difficulty is to have partition. I am sure that, if we have agreed to partition, we would have had a tremendous row as to where the frontier should be. We have drawn frontiers in the Provincial Automony Plan; I have seen the Jewish idea of partition in an American paper, but we really cannot make two viable States of Palestine, however we may try. We can make one viable State, and, so far as I can see, or as far as any student of the map could see, the only thing we could do would be to transfer the rest to one of the Arab States, but I ask what trouble is that going to cause in the whole of the Arab world? That will set going a conflict which will be worse than the conflict we have tried to settle. It has been suggested that we could do it by knitting in Transjordan, and it is argued that we carried out partition when we created Transjordan. That may be, but, if we try now, with Palestine as we know it today, to make it into two viable States, I say that we cannot do it. If we try to take away the taxable capacity of the best areas of Palestine for productive purposes, and that taxation goes entirely to the Jewish portion, you cannot expect the others to accept it. You cannot expect to make the one State dependent upon somebody else. The best partition scheme, and the most favourable one that I have seen up to now, has the effect that it would leave, at the present moment, 450,000 Jews and 360,000 Arabs in that Jewish State. I put that to the Arabs quite frankly, and what was their answer? The Arabs say: "If it is wrong for the Jews to be in a minority of 33⅓ or 40 per cent. in the whole country, what justification is there for putting 360,000 Arabs under the Jews? What is your answer to that?" I have no answer to that.

Therefore, you transfer one large issue in solving your problem by partition, and there are only two possible consequences. Either the Arabs in the partitioned State must always be an Arab minority, or else they must be driven out—the one thing or the other—and, on that basis, I am afraid that I should be led, and the Government would be led, to a worse position. I have been asked "Why go to the United Nations?" Any remedy that has been put up to the Government in the form of creating a Jewish State, will lead to one result—the Arab States will take you to the United Nations. Supposing we partitioned the country now, and the question then went to the United Nations. Syria, or some other country, would take us to the United Nations, where we should have our conduct discussed on the basis of our legal action in carving up a State that was not ours, and I venture to suggest, after my experiences in New York last year, that Britain would be placed in a very funny position. It is indefensible. We can discuss all these things, I know, quite easily, but, really, we cannot do that.

Therefore, the Government tried to get the best they could within the Mandate, and, in the end, we came to the conclusion that this Mandate is really unworkable. I think we could establish a case that we have carried out what the Mandate originally intended, provided that the problem had not been accentuated by the Hitler regime. If we take the ratio of migration and development unaccentuated by the Hitler regime, I think that the original basis of the Mandate, as visualised in 1922, has, in fact, been carried out. What we have not been able to do, is to meet with this Mandate the accentuated position created by the Hitler regime and the persecution in Germany. That is my view. I believe that continuous British Governments have done their best all the way through.

The Palestine Administration has had one of the most difficult tasks of any administration in the world. Sometimes, when reading the reports and documents, I wonder how they managed to carry through. They have had no support from the people, and they have been criticised by both sides. I believe that they have honestly tried to do their best, and that if there has been a failure in dealing with the problem of these displaced persons due to Jewish persecution, it has not been the Palestine Mandate, as administered on the original basis, which has been the cause of failure; it has been the failure of the moral consciousness of international organisations to grapple with this problem as a whole which has left the problem as it is at the present time.

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Take the position now. There are a million displaced persons on the Continent. I have said to Governments, week after week, what is a million people out of 4,000 million in the world? I have made the offer—and I make it from this Box today—that, to get over this problem, we will take a proportion, together with all the other countries of the world, of that million, and add them to our population in order to get rid of this miserable state of affairs. The thing ought to be taken up and grappled with. I pleaded with the United States to take in thousands—I do not mean Jews; I do not single out Jews, and I do not think they ought to be singled out. But all States ought to do it. It is really absurd to think that, with all the organisation built up for this business, one million people could not be thus absorbed. That ought to be done, but, everywhere I go, and everywhere I turn, nobody wants them. It is a tragedy. They are doing something in South America, and in some other parts of the world, but it is relatively very little.

I will not mention the name of one great statesman in the British Commonwealth who came and gave me a half hour's lecture on the Zionist problem. When he had finished, I said to him, "How many will you take? I will get a ship and send them to you tomorrow." Not one. That is really sympathy without relief. We really ought to get rid of this problem, and if I could get back to the contribution on purely humanitarian grounds of 100,000—that is, 60,000 more than we are now taking in over two years—into Palestine, and if this political fight for a Jewish State could be put on one side, and we could develop self-government by the people resident in Palestine, without any other political issue, I would be willing to try again. I honestly believe that it could be accomplished. But, if the attack is made that this is merely the advance proportion coming out of Europe, in order that more millions can be poured in, so as to get a complete Jewish State, which we have never undertaken to create, I am afraid—and I say this with great sincerity—that will provoke a conflict in the Middle East which I do not desire to see. There is enough conflict in the world already. I am convinced that if, as I have said today, we can bring the matter back to this contribution to the relief of European suffering, which was where His Majesty's Government originally started to deal with it, then there is a chance of solution.

Finally, there is the question of time. I have been asked whether we can do something before September. It is very difficult, and I cannot give an answer. I am studying the matter to see whether there is any process by which we can get it considered earlier, under the Charter. But I must ask for more time on that. I am in consultation with Sir Alexander Cadogan, who knows the Charter inside out, to see whether anything can be done. Even now, rather than that it should go to the United Nations, I would prefer that Great Britain, with all her traditions, should be allowed to deal with the problem on a humanitarian basis. Let us remove the political conflict and get back to relieving Europe of these 100,000 people as we are asked to do, and let us be allowed to deal with any further immigrants on the basis I have suggested. If there is a dispute, let there be arbitration, and, in the quickest possible time we can create an independent State in Palestine where Jew and Arab, who have such traditions and have contributed so much to the religious and cultural thought of the world, can work together and end these century-old conflicts.

4.58 p.m.

Mr. Oliver Stanley (Bristol, West): It had been the intention of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition to open this Debate from our side of the House. I am sure that the whole House will sympathise with the family bereavement which is the cause of his absence today, and I am also sure that the House will regret that one who has played such a prominent part in connection with the problem which we are now discussing, should be absent on such a vital occasion.

I am not always in agreement with the views of the right hon. Gentleman on Palestine, and perhaps many in this House have differed from it, but all of us have been impressed with the sincerity of his feelings and the generosity of the emotions which have led to it.

In the last 18 months, His Majesty's Government have had every reason to be grateful to hon. Members on this side of the House for their behaviour in regard to the Palestine question. During the whole of that time, we have refrained from Debate which might excite controversy on the policy to be adopted. We have, it

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[Mr. Stanley.]

is true, on several occasions discussed law and order, but the only Debate which has taken place upon policy was at the request of His Majesty's Government. I think the right hon. Gentleman will agree that, during that Debate, we tried to be constructive rather than destructive. We on this side have been actuated by a sincere desire that this Government, or any other Government, should be enabled to find a solution. That a successful solution would redound to the credit of the present Government is a little thing compared to the benefits that a successful solution would confer upon the nation. Looking back, I am not sure that we have been altogether wise. It may be that if we had pressed on more frequent occasions for a Debate we should not be in the situation in which we find ourselves now, which, shorn of all verbiage, is that after 18 months nothing has happened in Palestine, and now for the best part of another year nothing can happen.

I cannot disguise the fact that I and many of my hon. Friends did under those circumstances feel considerable disquiet at the statement made by the right hon. Gentleman last week. It was only a few days since we had had a Debate in this House upon the maintenance of law and order in Palestine. During that Debate all speakers on both sides of the House, whatever views they might have taken upon the immediate problem of the maintenance of law and order, expressed their opinion that it was inextricably bound up with the announcement of some policy by His Majesty's Government, and that the Administration could not indefinitely maintain law and order unless such a policy was produced. I remember that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in winding up that Debate, repudiated in a tone almost of ferocity—which is not usually one of the attributes of his Parliamentary speeches—the idea which seemed to be held by some that the Government have no policy on Palestine. In those circumstances the statement of last week, which no one after all can claim to be a policy, which is only a postponement of the issue and a plan to get others as well as ourselves to join in finding a policy, came as a great disappointment.

Today we have had from the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary a remarkable speech. With some of it I agree, with some I disagree. I am grateful for some of the things he said, and I am sorry for some of the things he omitted to say. Certainly in that speech he set out clearly and sombrely the difficulties which lie today, but which also have lain for several years, in the way of finding a solution for the Palestine problem. In that speech he certainly displayed a willingness to appreciate the Arab point of view and a fairness in stating the Arab case which has not always been shown in speeches made on this problem by members of his Party or by his colleagues. I cannot help thinking that it was a pity the right hon. Gentleman did not make that speech at the Blackpool Conference in June, 1945. How different it was in tone from the speech which was actually made then by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer. He saw no difficulties, he saw no two points of view. He did not think it was necessary to wait for the decision of the United Nations. He was quite clear—unlimited immigration and a Jewish State. That was to be the policy of the Labour Party.

Mr. S. Silverman: Unlimited except by economic conditions.

Mr. Stanley: Yes, unlimited except by economic conditions—that was to be the policy of the Labour Party, and he pledged his Party light heartedly to a solution the difficulties of which have today been put before us and before his Party so potently by the right hon. Gentleman. I did not sympathise with the solution then proposed, but I confess that today I have some sympathy with the Jews. If that had been said two years ago, if that had been the policy of the Labour Party over the last few years, if they had been told then as they are being told now that their aspirations for a Jewish State were unobtainable, who knows but that there might not have been some change in their policy, that they might not today be putting forward that policy with a vigour some of which they would draw from the belief that it was hon. Gentlemen opposite who for years had been supporting them in their demands?

Mr. S. Silverman: And that the White Paper of 1939 was binding on the Labour Government.

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Mr. Stanley: I will leave the hon. Gentleman to pursue that point. Although I agree with much of the right hon. Gentleman's definition of the difficulties that face anyone looking for a solution in Palestine, we must remember that a mere statement of difficulty in the end gets us nowhere, and that, however difficult it is, sometime, somehow, somebody must make a decision, somebody must choose between those difficulties, somebody must choose between the dangers, and among alternative courses all of which may be dangerous somebody must find the courage to choose the least bad.

I do not propose today to follow the right hon. Gentleman in his analysis of all the various solutions that have been put forward. If I did I should have something to say about the solution which I have always confessed would be the one I should prefer, but which he dismissed rather summarily and not entirely objectively. We have to face quite a different situation today from that to which the right hon. Gentleman's speech was devoted. We have to face the fact that the Government are not themselves announcing a policy, which we either criticise or approve, or against which we can put up some alternative solution. The Government are defending or explaining a decision that they will, under certain circumstances and at a certain time, go to the United Nations and obtain from them the advice, and if possible the support, which they need, and it is to that decision rather than to a perhaps airy discussion of the various alternatives which have been put forward for Palestine that I want to devote my attention this afternoon.

I want to make it plain from the beginning that as far as we on this side are concerned we have no complaint to make at all about a reference of this problem at this stage to the United Nations. We agree that in any case it would have been necessary, *ex post facto*, to submit any solution we proposed to the Trusteeship Council, and we agree that in the special circumstances of the day it may well be that rather than that it is better to get prior approval and support from the Assembly. While we do not criticise the decision to go to the United Nations, we criticise both the timing of that appeal and the method of the appeal. We find it very difficult to understand the delay that has already taken place. The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary advanced the principle, for which there is much to be said, that in default of agreement between the two parties, it is necessary to go to the United Nations for a decision, but the right hon. Gentleman must have known—and so must his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies—many months ago that there was really no prospect of agreement between Jews and Arabs, if by "agreement" one means a prospect of those two parties coming together and setting their names to a policy which is then to be carried out.

Certainly, in the years I was connected with the problem I never heard any expert connected either with the Foreign Office or with the Colonial Office suggest that there was any possibility of that occurring, and I should be very surprised if, in the intervening months, they had changed their minds. I was always told—and I believe this still to be the case—that in no circumstances would either side dare to make in advance the concessions that would be necessary to secure agreement, and therefore, what one had to aim at was not to attempt the imposition of an agreement beforehand, but to attempt oneself to find a solution which it might be possible that both sides would acquiesce in afterwards. If it was the decision of the Government that, in default of agreement, the whole matter should be referred to the United Nations, I suggest that it was the duty of the Government so to arrange their programme of announcements and discussions that, when the moment came to make that reference to the United Nations, it could come speedily and without the intolerable delay which now confronts us.

In view of the decision of which we are now told, I cannot understand the events of last summer. The Morrison plan, as it is called—I think not because the right hon. Gentleman the Lord President of the Council invented it, but because he read it—was produced at the very beginning of August. It was made abundantly clear by both parties, Jews and Arabs, that it was not acceptable to them, and the rejection was based not upon this or that detail which might have been susceptible to modification, but on a fundamental divergence of view which

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has come up on every proposal that has been made—who is to control immigration, not for this year, not for next year, but in perpetuity, because the man who controls immigration decides whether there is to be a Jewish or an Arab majority, and whoever decides whether there is to be a Jewish or an Arab majority decides whether there is to be a Jewish or an Arab State. In those circumstances, it would have been easy to have—as one had to have for the sake of courtesy—the discussions with Jews and Arabs, although they were bound to result in failure, at the beginning of August and some time in October, when the meeting of the Assembly of the United Nations took place. It would have been easy to establish at that time this fundamental disagreement between the two parties, and it would have been easy to bring it before the United Nations in October last for the decision which has now to be postponed until next September. Indeed, it is very difficult, if this has always been the plan of the Government, to understand one particular passage in the speech which the President of the Board of Trade made in that Debate, because the suggestion, which is now the policy of the Government, that the matter might be referred to the United Nations was made during the Debate by several hon. Members, and this was the answer of the President of the Board of Trade:

" One or two hon. Members yesterday made the suggestion that the whole matter ought now to be referred to U.N.O. for fresh decisions and suggestions. It will of course be necessary for the terms of the trusteeship agreement which is to supersede the Mandate to be settled by U.N.O. . . . indeed, many hon. Members have already stressed the need for a speedy decision, and have noted quite rightly "—

this was last August—

" the deterioration in atmosphere that has gone on while we have been awaiting the present agreement. In the existing circumstances we believe a quick decision to be absolutely essential."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st August, 1946; Vol. 426, c. 1241.]


It was because of the need for a quick decision last August that the idea that it might have been referred to U.N.O. last October was rejected by the President of the Board of Trade. How can we reconcile that with the present proposal that it should go to the United Nations next September? I shall await from the right hon. Gentleman an explanation, and failing that, the Government will have to bear a responsibility for a delay which, on their own claim, could have been avoided, and a delay which has already caused much difficulty. To turn now, not to the delay which has taken place, but to the delay that lies in front of us, is there no way of avoiding that seven months' delay between now and the meeting of the ordinary Assembly of the United Nations in September next? I regard that delay as being fraught with all possible dangers, as something that ought to be avoided at all costs, and I beg the Government, if it is in any way possible, to curtail that delay. The suggestion was made to the right hon. Gentleman that one might get over this difficulty by referring the matter to the Security Council under Article 34. He replied that it was not within the terms of Article 34, and he did not think it threatened the peace of the world, but perhaps I might quote to him something which he said on 30th November, 1945:

" Considerations not only of equity and of humanity, but also of international amity and world peace, are thus involved in any search for solution."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 13th November, 1945; Vol. 415, c. 1928.]

In his speech today, the right hon. Gentleman referred to Palestine as a sore spot which, if not settled, would lead to wider disturbances; and it is difficult to see how, in view of those statements of the right hon. Gentleman, it would not be possible to bring this question within the ambit of the Security Council. It may well be that the right hon. Gentleman does not think the Security Council the right body to settle the matter, but one of the merits of bringing it before the Security Council in the first place is that the Security Council, under Article 20, could call a special meeting on the Assembly to consider the question, and it might be possible then still to submit this question to the Assembly of the United Nations, but to submit it much earlier than September, which is the date of the ordinary meeting. I feel that, whatever the difficulties, every attempt should be made to bridge a gap which may well prove to be disastrous to the possibility of any final settlement, and will certainly impose an immense strain on our own people during that period.

The second thing that we regret about the form in which this appeal is being made to the United Nations, is the fact that His Majesty's Government propose

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to lay the question before the Assembly with no indication of the policy which they themselves prefer. All kinds of suggestions, with some of which the right hon. Gentleman has dealt today, are to be put before the United Nations, for them to make their choice, but we, apparently, are to express no choice ourselves. It is clear, of course, that, after all these months, His Majesty's Government must have some view of their own upon this question. They must, despite difficulties and dangers, have made up their own minds which plan they think will have the best chance of proving to be a final and lasting settlement in Palestine. If they have such a view, how can they avoid, in the long run, putting it forward? They cannot go to the Assembly of U.N.O., hear all those various plans, and sit there in complete silence, without joining in the discussion at all. Of course not. It would be a ridiculous attitude to adopt. If they are going to join in the discussion and add their view, they surely must know, before they begin, where they want to lead the discussion and what object their arguments are intended to reach. They must, therefore, whatever be the position now, disclose to the Assembly, as soon as the discussions start, and then to us, what policy His Majesty's Government prefer upon this question. If that is so, if, next September, they have to make a choice and a recommendation, would it not be very much better to make it now?

It seems to me that there are two good reasons for doing it. The first is that if His Majesty's Government have a view —they cannot go to the meeting of the Assembly without it—this House and the country are entitled to know what it is and whether it is a policy which they will support. When the policy is disclosed at the Assembly it may well be too late for this House or the country to express approval or disapproval of the course then taken. The second reason why it might be wise to make the declaration now rather than in September is this: we are to go through a very dangerous period in the next six months. Let us not close our eyes to that fact. Jew and Arab will start from now, and will spend the intervening months in lobbying members of the Assembly in support of their two viewpoints. All the arts and wiles of propaganda and persuasion will be brought, in these six months, from both sides upon the nations who will form the Assembly. During that time, those nations will be left without any guidance as to what is the middle course which we, as Mandatory, would recommend. It does seem that, in the absence of that guidance, and of any recommendation, there is a very great danger that quite a number of nations will arrive at the Assembly next September with their minds already made up, influenced by the propaganda and publicity which they have received.

Mr. Scollan (Renfrew, Western): Is there not a chance that if Arabs and Jews do not know what the policy of the Government is, they might reconsider the whole position in the intervening period before the meeting of the Assembly?

Mr. Stanley: Why should anybody, Jew or Arab, reconsider their position during the intervening period. Their obvious line, before they go to the Assembly, is first to get as many friends as they can for their point of view, and then to present to the United Nations their own point of view complete, and 100 per cent. That is why I should prefer that, during those six months, the whole field should not be held by those two rival policies, both of them extreme, and that there should be in the field a third policy, that of His Majesty's Government. It is for that reason that we think there will be far more chance of success if His Majesty's Government, when they go to U.N.O. in September, were not to go there merely to empty upon the table of U.N.O. a wastepaper basket full of all the discarded plans of past years, but should go there to state clearly what their own views are and to ask the Assembly to support and approve them.

Our final criticism of the way in which the appeal has been made is that it contains no indication of what is to be our line after the Assembly has discussed this plan. I know that it means that any decision we make and any views we adopt today, must be on certain assumptions. This is the sort of matter in which any Government must look forward. It is quite true that, by their decision to refer this matter to U.N.O., a certain amount of time has been bought, although I think it has been bought pretty dearly. For some months, right hon. Gentlemen opposite will be able to

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return the answer to any question on their policy, that they cannot be expected to anticipate the discussions in the United Nations. It is true that for their supporters this is a postponement of the inevitable conflict between the pledges which many of them gave at the Election, and action which is likely to be taken by the Government which they support. For those reasons, a postponement of this kind is generally popular. It is also usually disastrous, for the only result of the postponement is merely to let things drift on so that, a few months later, we can take up again the question that we have been afraid to tackle today.

The least the Government can do is to prepare now for the possibilities of the Assembly when it meets. It may happen that, when the Assembly meets in September, some new plan will be proposed and that the whole of the fifty-odd nations will gather together and will agree to it, and that it will then be approved by Jew and by Arab. It would be a miracle if that happened. For years, people on all sides, with ability and talent, have been searching for a possible variation of any scheme that might be used as a solution of this problem. It is unlikely that, in a few months some wholly new proposal will be found. Every proposal that has yet been made has caused divisions in Palestine, and divisions in parties here, and even, it is sometimes rumoured, divisions in Cabinets. Probably what will happen when the United Nations meets next September is that there will be no such unanimity; that, in fact there will be the same divisions among the nations there as can be found among peoples and parties; and that, whatever final decision is taken, if any decision is taken, it will be arrived at by a majority, with a minority supporting the other viewpoint.

If such a situation arises, as it is almost sure to arise, it is important that we should be quite clear what is the position of this country and to what we have committed ourselves. Therefore, I would like to ask the right hon. Gentleman when he replies to answer two questions. The first is this. Are we pledged by our reference to U.N.O. to accept the majority decision, whatever it may be, and, what is important, of whomsoever the minority may consist? I appreciate that if there were an overwhelming majority, including all the great States, and that unanimity were only broken by a few small nations whose interest in the problem might, perhaps, be very remote, we would be quite entitled to treat that as a unanimous decision and to act upon it. But there might be a very different situation. We might have a situation in which there was a majority for a certain proposal, but in the minority there might be included at least one of the major Powers. We have to face this fact, that if there were a divergence at the Assembly, with some taking one side and some taking the other, even if we had a majority in favour of a particular course, if the minority included powerful States it would be very difficult to get the communities concerned to accept the decision, as we want them to accept it, as a final settlement. I want to know, therefore, whether, if there is merely a majority decision, we are committed to accept it and enforce it on the people of Palestine. Secondly, I want to ask if we are to carry out the recommendations of the majority even if they indicate a course with which we ourselves disagree. I quite appreciate that if we are to be loyal to the United Nations we must accept and acquiesce in the decision which they make, but there is a great difference between that and asking our troops and using our resources to enforce a decision of which we ourselves may not be in favour and which we cannot defend.

Those are the two questions. I would like to know whether our reference to U.N.O. in any way commits us to carry out a decision of the United Nations, however it is arrived at, with which we ourselves are not in agreement. Surely, it would be better to say now what we shall have to say in the end, namely, that failing agreement between the United Nations upon some policy which we ourselves can support, we will surrender the Mandate of Palestine and leave it to the United Nations themselves to appoint a successor and frame a policy. The principle of fixing a date and saying that if by that date something does not happen, we should clear out, is not a principle to which His Majesty's Government have any objection. They are doing it in India in much more difficult circumstances, in much more complicated conditions of greater danger and in circumstances where there is no United Nations organisation as a residuary legatee to whom we can hand back the responsibility which we feel no longer able to carry.

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I believe it might have a considerable effect upon the deliberations of the United Nations if we were to make this announcement now. If they were to know that their deliberations might be followed by certain consequences and that every nation who spoke and voted might have to take some part of the consequences of their speeches and their votes, it might have a very considerable effect upon their willingness to reach some sensible, practical and tolerable conclusion. Therefore, I see quite an advantage in making such a declaration now. I do not see any disadvantages. If, after the meeting of the United Nations, there has been no agreement, if the countries are found to be divided into parties supporting the Arab case and parties supporting the Jewish case, and if there is to be no concrete conclusion from that meeting, I do not think this country could ever hope to impose upon the people of Palestine any solution, whatever it may be. If we cannot hope to impose a solution and, as the right hon. Gentleman himself has said, if we cannot find a basis upon which the Mandate, which was never meant to be eternal, can be brought to an end, it is much better that we should say so at once and restore our Mandate to the United Nations, instead of continuing to jeopardise the lives of our men and pour out the all too exiguous treasures of the State in a task which, by then, will have been demonstrated to be incapable of successful conclusion.

We cannot change what has happened in the past. No one, of course, accuses the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues in the last 18 months of wasting time in the sense that we believe they have been idle or trying to put things off. Of course, that time has been lost—no one looking back over the past 18 months can deny it—but it is not the past which now matters so much as the future, and the future can be planned. All of us, in all quarters of the House, agree in the present circumstances to the appeal to the United Nations. It is only after that, that divergencies appear. We believe that that appeal should be made as soon as practicable and that, if necessary, it should go to the Security Council and, through the Security Council, to a special meeting of the Assembly in order to save time. We believe that we should go there recommending a policy ourselves, giving to the United Nations what they are surely entitled to—the views of the people who, for 30 odd years, have been actually administering the country which the United Nations had to consider. We believe that we should say; here and now, that if that policy is not approved and if we are not promised not only approval but actual support for that policy, we shall surrender our Mandate to the United Nations and leave to them future decisions—no doubt, with our assistance as an ordinary member of the United Nations Organisation.

That, at least, is a policy which would be definite and strong. At best, it might be the last chance of getting the sort of agreement at the Assembly which might enable some settlement to be imposed and accepted in Palestine. At worst, it would, at any rate, give us a definite rest from the burdens which we are now bearing and which are now becoming intolerable. The alternative proposal of His Majesty's Government is to go to the Assembly of the United Nations next September without recommending any course of action, and with no definition of what our position is to be after the Assembly have taken their decision. I regard that not as a policy, but merely a postponement. It means that next winter we shall all be sitting here discussing, once again, just the problems we are discussing now, which were discussed last August; and having to face, once again, just the decisions which we are refusing to face today. It is for that reason that I appeal to the right hon. Gentleman, before it is too late, to make, not a change in the whole thing, not an abandonment of an appeal to which we have agreed, but changes in the main, which, I believe, might offer success where now little promise prevails.

I want to say a few words upon the actual situation in Palestine, and what is likely to happen during the next few months. All of us must echo the hopes of the right hon. Gentleman that Arabs and Jews alike, in view of the discussions at the United Nations in the autumn, will, meanwhile, exercise restraint and moderation; that they will not proceed to violent extremes, if not for the sake of morality. at any rate in order not to prejudice their own case when it comes up for decision. But alas, however wise and moderate the leaders may be—and all of us hope that they will be—there are the extremists still to reckon with; and while we are still saddled with the responsibility we shall

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[Mr. Stanley.]
have to carry it out, and law and order must be maintained in the interim as rigorously as we have tried to maintain it in the past.

I have two points which I should like to put to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The first is with regard to immigration, and the rate of immigration of Jews during the period between now and next September. As the fine weather draws on, there comes, of course, the time most favourable for illegal immigration. There have been quite a number of instances, even during the storms and difficulties of the winter months. We have to expect an increase as conditions become more favourable. As I see it, in that illegal immigration during this period lies the greatest danger to peace in Palestine between now and the meeting of the Assembly. I wonder if it would not be possible, during this period, to make some special approach to the Arabs? Any increase during these few months, on which they may be asked to agree, could amount to only a few thousand; it could not possibly influence either the decision of the United Nations in September or, still less, the final result, which depends so much on numerical proportions in Palestine.

Twice already the Arabs have been approached with regard to an alteration in Jewish immigration. Although the right hon. Gentleman is quite correct when he says that they have not formally agreed, they have on both occasions acquiesced, and I think it is to their credit that they have done so, and have recognised the greater need and given attention to it. I wonder if it is not possible that they might be approached again, and that again they might acquiesce? And is it not possible that their acquiescence would be much more likely if it were possible to base any proposal for an increase during these few months on women and children alone? I do not know what the proportions have been during the past year; but I am told that an exceptionally large proportion of the legal immigrants have, in fact, been able-bodied young men. It is quite clear that a large proportion of able-bodied young men is the form of immigration which raises most fears in the hearts of the Arabs. Would it not be possible to approach them with a proposal that, over and above the 1,500 a month, between now and September a certain limited increase, drawn from those classes of people which will not cause anxiety, could be made with their consent? It might do much to smooth down possible difficulties in the intervening period.

The second question I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman is with regard to our own people. Since we last debated this question in the House only a few weeks ago, a great change has been made in the conditions under which British people live and work in Palestine. They are today living under what are nothing but siege conditions. The women and children have all been evacuated; and I think it is true to say that all officials have certainly left their homes, and are congregating in reserved and safe areas. It is a terrible life for people to be expected to lead for any long period, entailing great sacrifices and great hardships. As the House will remember, many protests were made in Palestine when that decision was taken a few weeks ago. I, myself, gave no support to those protests, because, as I understood the situation then, I thought the action the Government were taking was right. The Arab Conference was obviously breaking down, and we had been promised a statement of policy by His Majesty's Government. Everyone has always realised that immediately after a statement of policy, whatever the final result, there must be inevitably an increasing tension, and the possibility of grave disturbance.

When I read that order, in view of the forthcoming decisions, I thought the Government were taking a wise precaution in clearing the decks, and in removing the women and children. But, of course, we find now that that is not the case at all. There is no decision; the decision is postponed for at least a year; and the crisis, because of which I thought these people had been removed, now cannot occur till the end of next winter, or the beginning of next spring. In those circumstances, is it necessary or wise to maintain, during the whole of this period, the very stringent conditions which have now been imposed, and which the Government will justify by some impending crisis? Would it not be possible, for the months that are bound to elapse before an official decision is taken, to have some relaxation? Because the danger is, that if people are kept under this tension, suffering these hardships in these unnatural conditions for too long,

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when the moment of crisis comes they may already be stale, and they may not be at their best to meet it. Those are the two points I desire to put, and I should be grateful to the right hon. Gentleman if he could deal with them.

No one in this House is under any illusion today. We realise that we are discussing a matter of very grave moment for the people of this country, and indeed for the world. It is only one of the great problems that this House has to discuss in the next few weeks. There is the discussion of our own economic situation, on which depends our standard of life, and indeed our survival; the discussion on India, with all that that means in peace or chaos for four hundred million people; the discussion on Germany, with all that it will mean for the future of European civilisation, and the peace of this country. But with all those problems, grave as they are, this problem is worthy to take its place. On its solution depends the whole future of the Middle East.

There was a time, until peace began, when the Middle East was regarded as one of the key points of the British Empire. On its solution depends the attitude of Jews and Arabs to this country all over the world, with grave consequences, because they may easily affect the whole tenor of international relations. On its solution depends the safety of 100,000 British troops and British officials. On its solution depends whether the weight of the burden which has been carried, and which has to be carried, by the staggering people of this country will be lightened.

We welcome the fact that this problem has been submitted to U.N.O., but we regret the time and the manner of the appeal. If the appeal is to be presented as is now proposed, we believe it can only lead to delay, and that that delay can only be disastrous. If it is made, as we suggest, with speed and decision, we believe that it still may succeed. Now, the Foreign Secretary is not a man who is deficient in either of those two qualities, and it is, therefore, to him that we appeal —the last appeal, probably, we shall have a chance of making—to make those changes which may give a chance of success. I repeat that this, I think, may well be our last opportunity. *Post hoç occasio calva.*

5.53 p.m.

Mrs. Ayrton Gould (Hendon, North): We have listened with great interest to both the Foreign Secretary and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley). With much of what the latter has said many, I think, on this side agree; but, at the same time, I must point out that he rather over simplified the position when he said that it is perfectly easy to discover fundamental divergencies between Jew and Arab in a short time. I should like to remind the Opposition that there never would have been the difficulties which have arisen if it had not been for the White Paper policy which was instituted in 1939. That policy started a perfectly impossible situation.

The Foreign Secretary pointed out that, in his view, the Mandate would have worked quite well up to the time of the Hitler regime. Well, it could never have worked well if the completely iniquitious White Paper policy had been imposed. The difficulty that the Government have had since they came into power in connection with Palestine was quite simply stated—though I do not think he intended it to be—by the Foreign Secretary, when he said, at one point, that we could not carry out the White Paper policy, and, at another point, that we could not tear it up. Well, if we could not do either of those things we were obviously left in a fearful muddle, and that is the position we are in now: we have a muddle over a desperately serious affair. What, in their difficulties, the Government decided to do was to carry on a modified White Paper policy, and, of course, that was not acceptable to the Jews.

I believe that, if it could be left to the Jews and Arabs inside Palestine, a unitary State could be carried on, and that they could very well solve their difficulties in the future, as they have done in the past. But the moment we get these political difficulties arising from the Arab League and the Zionist Agency outside, we have an impossible position because both try to lay down bases for Palestine, which Palestine must accept. The Arab basis, quite simply, is that they are prepared to put up with the small minority of Jews that are there, but will not have any more immigration. In the last analysis, the Jewish basis is that they want immigration until they get a majority.

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[Mrs. Ayrton Gould.]

I want to suggest that the British proposals that have been made have been altogether too simple. On immigration, it was suggested 4,000 a month should be allowed for two years, and that, at the end of the two years, when 96,000 immigrants had legally been allowed in, an Advisory Council, which would sit under the High Commissioner, composed of both Arabs and Jews, would decide on further immigration. It sounds very well; it sounds a good bit of democratic work; but one has to remember that the Arab population compared with the Jewish population is two to one, and that, therefore, the democratic advisory council set up would inevitably give a majority to the Arabs, which would enable them alone to decide—that is what it would amount to—whether there should be any Jewish immigration into Palestine at all, and, if so, how much. The recommendation says that this council should decide even what immigration is to be allowed into the Jewish State. Knowing the Arab attitude, of course, the result would be that no immigration, after the 96,000, would be allowed at all.

There has been no mention of the Discriminatory Land Law, which would, in fact, play a very large part in the outlook of the Jews. In Western Palestine, only 5 per cent. of the Jewish population are allowed to purchase, or to settle on, the land. It is then suggested that, under the trusteeship, the local authorities should decide whether there should be an increase or a reduction, even whether the actual laws themselves should continue to be operative. As I said before, the majority of the authorities in the majority of States would be Arab. It would mean, again, that the majority ruling would inevitably prevent any expansion on the land for the Jews. Therefore, what really looks like a democratic suggestion, in fact, is not a democratic suggestion at all. It could only be democratic if there were approximately the same number of Arabs and Jews who were going to vote on these duly elected bodies to make these decisions. I can only say that it is no wonder that it was not accepted.

I agree that it has seemed to take a very long time to find out that it was not acceptable. Some of us have said from the beginning, right back in October, 1945, that it was not possible, along these lines, to come to any arrangement which would be acceptable to both sides. That leaves us in the position that, either we have to impose something, or we have to agree to allow a situation to go on like the present one.

There is, I suppose, no one in the House who is prepared to accept the present intolerable situation in Palestine. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol has said that we are not prepared to allow British troops to go on having their lives endangered, and we all agree about that; neither do we wish to see British people undergoing this artificial and extremely hard life, nor are we prepared to hold a mandated territory where there is continuous terrorism, or indeed, where there is any terrorism on the present scale in Palestine. I want to ask the Government what is to happen between now and the time when the whole question comes before the United Nations. It is all very well to say we hope that both the Jewish and Arab leaders will be able to persuade their followers to be moderate and behave, but it is impossible for them to do that. In view of the situation in Palestine, it is impossible for them to keep the terrorists under control, unless something is handed to them meantime, and they are offered unconditionally some definite hopes for the future. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol suggested that we should increase immigration, but, unlike him, I do not suggest it should be confined to women and children. It is absolutely necessary to have building operatives and other workers to provide accommodation for those who are to enter the country. It is necessary to have buildings for the women and children immigrants, many of whom are in a very bad physical and mental state because of what they have been through. I suggest that we allow immigration to continue at least to the extent of 4,000 per month, not only up to the time when the problem is handed over to the United Nations but during the time when it is being considered by the United Nations, because judging from what happened at the Assembly last year, and at all the conferences it will not be a week or a fortnight, but months before a decision will have been reached.

Does anyone suggest that the Jewish Agency or the moderate Jews can hold

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back the terrorists, when there is a miserable allocation of 1,500 immigrants per month? We know that illegal immigrants will be pouring in, and that they will consist of men, women and children who are the miserable remnants left in Europe. We must remember all the time what is behind all of this. It is no good talking about the humanitarian angle, as we did during the war, when we expressed horror over what the Nazis were doing, unless we face what is happening, and envisage what these remnants have gone through, remembering that Palestine is the only place in the world which wants them and welcomes them. I believe that the present state of affairs could be settled if we got out of Palestine. I do not believe the Government would dream of accepting this solution, but if the Haganah were allowed arms and Palestine was left to settle its own differences, I believe that before very long we should have a united country. What is the alternative? We shall have bloodshed in any case, and the alternative is that our boys will be involved in it. When history comes to be written, it will be decided that Palestine would have got a solution to her problems much more quickly if Great Britain had cleared out and let the people settle them herself. We are rightly asking that the Haganah, the moderate Zionists and others should root out the terrorists, bring them to justice, and hand them over, but it is too much to ask these people unarmed to root out the fanatical armed terrorists. I think it would be much better if we went to them and told them that during the interval we would allow them to be armed, if they would act as a localised police force—after all, we armed them during the war when we needed them. We should ask them to get down to rooting out the terrorists, and if that were done and Jewish immigration was raised to 4,000 a month, we could have peace in Palestine until the whole matter had been taken to the United Nations and a decision had been reached.

The British Government who have carried the burden of the Mandate for all these years, ought very definitely to make recommendations which will be acceptable to us, and if they are not agreed upon, we should simply hand over the Mandate to the United Nations. It is well known that residuary legatees do not do very well—and I do not think in these circumstances the United Nations will do very well—but what I am anxious about is that Britain should not be left as a residuary legatee, being expected to carry out a policy to which we may object very strongly, and have to risk the lives of our troops to carry it out. We ought to make it perfectly clear what we want and what we intend to do, and we should do everything possible to secure peace on both sides until the recommendations of the United Nations are made known.

6.10 p.m.

Mr. Clement Davies (Montgomery): Every reasonable man, in every country, must be longing to see a final settlement of this age-long problem. Every reasonable man must desire that that settlement should come by negotiation and agreement, and not by force or by war. I would like to pay my tribute to the Foreign Secretary, not only for the quite remarkable speech he made this afternoon, but for the manner in which he has undertaken and carried out his duties in his great office. At no period in history, was any Foreign Secretary ever called upon to face such problems as the present Foreign Secretary. No one has devoted himself more conscientiously to his duties. He has brought to them wide experience, great tact, and, above all, great human sympathy.

I would like to deal, here and now, with a point the right hon. Gentleman made, which, I believe, arose out of an interruption of mine. Let it be clearly understood that when he goes to Moscow, and discusses these great matters with other great States, this country, whatever Government may be in power, will always honour its word, and regard treaties as binding. This country will endeavour, so far as is possible, to carry out pledges which have already been given. But let it also be clearly understood that the decisions of this House are not even binding on itself, still less on its successors, and still less on successors who have gone to the country on a different programme from the one which the House followed at the time it made those decisions.

Having paid my tribute to the right hon. Gentleman, and said that, may I say that I can understand still less the criticism of the Foreign Secretary which came from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley)?

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[Mr. Davies.]
It was niggardly and carping, which is not unusual, coming from him. The right hon. Gentleman's criticism was that the Government's proposal was being presented at this time, that the offer might have been made last August. I may be doing the right hon. Gentleman an injustice, but I have tried to read, in the meantime, his own speech of last August, and I could not find in it any reference to handing this problem over to U.N.O.

Mr. Stanley: The right hon. and learned Gentleman is quite right. That was not my policy. I thought the Government would come to their own decision, and that when they were ready would impose it. We are now told that that has never been the policy, and that in default of agreement the Government will go to U.N.O.

Mr. Davies: I understood that the right hon. Gentleman accused the Government, and especially the Foreign Secretary, of wasting time. The only suggestion on those lines, last August, came from a supporter of Government for the President of the Board of Trade spoke in that Debate. After the right hon. and learned Gentleman had spoken there was a speech by the Leader of the Opposition, with which I am sure the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol did not agree. He and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) have never agreed on a real policy for Palestine. Speaking personally, I have never had any doubt whatever about the meaning of the Balfour Declaration. I have always felt, and said, that a home was not destroyed when lodgers came in. There is a whole world of difference between the right of a lodger in a house, and a right to people to recognise that place as their home.

Mr. Kenneth Lindsay: That is a piece of argument which is quite unworthy of the right hon. and learned Gentleman. The question is: What is the constitutional definition of a lot of people living together?

Mr. Davies: What was the pledge that was drawn up and signed by Mr. Balfour as Foreign Secretary, and agreed to by the Cabinet? It was brought before the League of Nations when His Majesty's Government undertook the Mandate. There has never been much doubt in the minds of those who were largely responsible for that Declaration, or those who remained in that Government. Neither the then Prime Minister, the late Earl Lloyd-George, or the present Leader of the Opposition, have ever doubted that what they had in mind that was in the course of time a home should be created for Jews, a true home where they could control their own affairs.

Mr. Gallacher (Fife, West): It was not just a home but a National Home.

Mr. Davies: Undoubtedly it was understood that in course of time such a state of affairs would come about that the Jews would be in control of their own affairs in Palestine. I cannot help feeling that a great part of this controversy would not have arisen today but for the fact that in the main those in charge of affairs in Palestine from 1922-39 never took that view. Although they were advised by those who had more to do with it than anyone, namely, the present Leader of the Opposition and Mr. Amery, they took the other line entirely. I should say that their desire was to whittle down the Balfour Declaration as much as it could be whittled down. It ill becomes anybody to say now that there have not been changes of view, both in the Government and in this House.

Look at the vacillation, right from 1922 down to today. I remember, in 1937, the Government coming forward with a wonderful scheme for partition. But in 1938, they said that partition would never do. In 1939, a White Paper was produced. That White Paper was described by the Lord President of the Council—I think rightly—as an evil thing. It was described by the Leader of the Opposition, in a most eloquent speech, as a breach of the Mandate. I would like to point out to the Foreign Secretary that in almost the last part of the speech delivered by the Lord President of the Council he made it clear that whatever the decision of the House then—and it was obvious what it would be—it would not be binding on the party opposite, in spite of the advice of Mr. Amery and the Leader of the Opposition. May I also remind him of the pledges that were given, not after the Election, but before the Election, with regard to this matter. Be that as it may, I am perfectly sure of this—that the Foreign Secretary and those who have assisted him, the ex-Secretary of State for he

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Colonies, and the present Secretary of State for the Colonies, have done their very best to deal with this situation as wisely as it was possible to do under the circumstances. I feel also that it was right that they should try to see, even now, whether there was not a way out of it, without having to resort even to the United Nations Organisation. We had undertaken the Mandate, and it was our duty, as trustees, to see how best that could be arranged to the advantage of all the beneficiaries under it.

I agree with the hon. Lady the Member for North Hendon (Mrs. Ayrton Gould) that there was little trouble before the White Paper of 1939—little trouble from the Jews prior to 1939; and, what was more, trouble from the Arabs had more or less died down in 1937 and 1938. One has only to read the pledges then made by Members of the Tory Government. Nothing, I think, has been so terribly sad and agonising as the attitude of the Jews since then, and recently, with regard to this country, its Government and its people. No nation in the world has been as generous to the Jewish people as this nation; it has not only opened its gates and protected them, but made every office in the land open to them. That, I agree, has not only been to their advantage but to the advantage of this country. It ill becomes anyone, anywhere, to malign this country; still more so to destroy the young British men who are actually in Palestine to try to ensure justice and fairness.

I have never regarded this as a purely Jewish question. The Arabs are not the cause of it, it is the treatment of the Jews by other nations throughout 2,000 years that is the cause of it. It is not merely an Arab question, and it is certainly not merely a British question. This has become a world question, and I would, therefore, ask that all the nations of the world should make their contribution towards its solution, once and for all, and among the peoples of the world are the Jewish people and the Arab people. They should see if there is not some way by which the Jewish people can reach their ambition, which is linked up with their faith, because a good deal of the ritual connected with that faith is meaningless outside Palestine. They have always built their synagogues facing towards Jerusalem and it has been linked up with their faith that once a covenant was made between the Almighty and themselves, that that land should be theirs. In every country to which they have gone they have formed their own little communities. If they could be brought back, many of the Arabs would assist, and then I should regard it as the duty of the United Nations of the world to do anything which the Arabs would require in return in order to help them. It is along those lines that I hope this matter will be approached, and approached successfully, so that, at any rate, we can say that in this generation, although we have fought two most terrible wars, we have tried to solve problems which have worried people for generations.

Finally, may I ask one question? The right hon. Member for West Bristol rather assumed that the question which will be put to U.N.O. is one of advice. I am not sure. I gather from the Foreign Secretary's speech, and the statement which he made to the House the other day, that the Government had come to the conclusion that the Mandate has failed, but until some other solution has been brought forward, they would, of course, carry out their duties as trustees. I want to know what is the matter that is to be put before U.N.O.? Is it, "We have not been able to arrive at a solution with regard to this. Will you advise us; and then we will follow that advice and carry out, more or less, your directions, and do our duty there once more as a Mandatory Power, acting now for the United Nations Organisation as we did for the defunct League of Nations"? Or do the Government intend to go to the United Nations Organisation and say, "We can no longer carry out this Mandate. It is finished. We will do our best to protect the Mandate in the meantime, but take it back and decide what is best for the future for these people, so that there may be a new Mandatory power given to the United Nations Organisation." Which of the two is it to be?

In the meantime, I am reminded that Members of this Government, having fought against and denounced that White Paper, and having gone to the country not only denouncing it, but saying that they would reverse it, are still carrying out, more or less, the policy which they told the country they would not carry out. Will they, from now until this new decision has been arrived at by the United Nations Organisation, go back to what

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[Mr. Davies.]

they conceive, what I conceive, and what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) conceived was the true meaning of the Mandate, and the true meaning of the Balfour Declaration? I most sincerely hope and pray that, finally, a peaceful solution may be found for this problem, so that never again will it worry any man in any country.

6.29 p.m.

Mr. Pickthorn (Cambridge University): I can find almost nothing—[HON. MEMBERS: "Speak up."] I will try to speak up but I am suffering from a sore throat and must ask the House to be kind to me. I can find almost nothing to agree with in the speech to which we have just listened. I cannot believe that it is very useful now for the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) to tell us what Mr. Balfour thought when Mr. Balfour composed his letter, more particularly as Mr. Balfour did not compose the letter. The history of it is pretty well known, particularly how it got composed and issued and why and when it was published. I think that the best comment which can be made upon it briefly—and I desire to be brief for the convenience of the House and for the convenience of myself—is to read a quotation, from a speech by Dr. Weizmann. I think I have got the date right, April, 1918, though I may be a year wrong. He said:

> "The fears of the Arabs that they are to be ousted from their present position are due either to a fundamental misconception of Zionist aims or to the malicious activities of our enemies."

I do not really see how in the light of that statement taken from Dr. Weizmann, who was certainly at that time even if he be not thought so now, the greatest possible authority upon these things, it can be said that the Balfour promise gave the Zionists the right to expect that British arms should be used to impose on a long settled society unwanted immigrants until they should become the majority under it, because that is the gloss put upon the national home by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery, and by the hon. Lady the Member for North Hendon (Mrs. Ayrton Gould) who spoke before him and whose arguments he adopted. I do not believe that the House should really allow itself to be stopped by that gloss, which I think is demonstrably unfair. Further, supposing it to be fair, I think this House would make a mistake to pay any attention to it, because if there is one thing plain it is that no man can ever have had, politically or morally the right to promise what Mr. Balfour is by that interpretation alleged to have promised. If there is one thing clearer even than this it is that if such a promise could have been made legitimately in 1918 it could not be legitimately kept now. There is nothing in such a promise or the keeping now of such a promise that can be defended by any principles of politics or morality, democracy, Christian principles, or I make bold to say, to my Jewish friends and Jewish colleagues, of the Jewish faith.

I want to say a very few things and to say them as shortly as I can. If I am longer than I mean it will be because it has been very difficult to listen to the Foreign Secretary's speech today and to be sure that one has exactly got hold of the right bits of it. I should like to begin by asking the Colonial Secretary whether he can quite easily—because I realise that it is not fair to face him with it—tell us now, or anyway at the end of the Debate, again exactly what are the interim immigration proposals. I do not blame the Foreign Secretary but I am bound to say that he did not leave me quite clear in mind as to what the position was, and I feel sure that the House ought to have its mind made quite clear about that.

Then I should like if I may without impertinence to compliment him in one respect. That is always a little difficult. I myself do not think much of compliments in this House, and especially compliments from one side to another, which are often not very useful. Above all I dislike the compliment on sincerity. I feel that when we address each other as hon. Gentlemen what we assume by that is that each of those of us who speak tries to the best of his intellectual power to say what he means. This is an occasion, however, when I hope that without fulsomeness or impertinence I may say that as political opponents we were moved by the sincerity of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I mean that not in the ordinary drawing room sense of being sincere, in the sense that he was not really telling us what he himself knew to be

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lies but in the far more important sense that he had performed the difficult and painful operation of thinking as hard about the subject as he could before he dared to inflict upon his countrymen what his opinions were. That is what I take sincerity to mean in our relations to each other here, and I hope he will not think it fulsome or impertinent of me if I say that he showed a shining example of it this afternoon.

Having paid him that compliment, I should like if I may to utter a small reproach. It is a very small one and I do not do it from any personal point of view. Today he clearly distinguished between two main parts of the difficulty with which we are concerned, which has not been done so clearly before by anyone speaking from that Box of whatever party. He continued as almost all have done—and I shall probably slip into the expression myself although I regard it as a bad habit—to speak of the Palestine Problem. It is the cutting up of life into Problems which tends to the assumption that if only we could get to the back of the teacher's book we would find a solution on the back page. This Palestine affair is a thing not of that sort. Although the Foreign Secretary used that, as I think, dangerous language, he did distinguish between the problem of what ought to be done with Palestine and the problem of what ought to be done with displaced Jews. I think that to make that distinction clear and clean is the beginning of wisdom in all this question. The small reproach I do address to him is that he did nothing to make clear that there have been here a few, a comparatively few, members who have made that distinction over and over again. I do not say that because I believe that I have been an important one of them, but Members who have been here during the war and in the last two Parliaments know the names of Members who made this distinction and could write their names on the back of a postcard.

I think that if this Debate has been carried on, continued as reasonably as it has been, and has been something quite different from the sort of way the subject was debated 12 years ago, that change in the climate of opinion has been made by people who may sometimes have seemed to the Foreign Secretary to be pertinacious questioners and tiresome debaters, and I do not think that it would have done any harm to acknowledge the service that has been performed by them, because if we wish to have Parliamentary Government continuing in the world, it is by noting advantages of that sort which accrue from Parliamentary Government that we shall do it. There is one other preliminary thing I should like to say before I pass on to the main matter and that is that it seemed to me that the Foreign Secretary dropped what I think were his two main heresies of a year ago. Of course hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite who have grown grey or great, or both grey and great in some cases, in working machinery whose honourable business was to try to raise the material conditions of the less fortunate parts of the population are rather specially tempted to think that economics is what matters in politics, that politics are scarcely more than the shadow of economics and that if they get economics right then politics will come right of themselves. I believe that to be the worst and the most actively harmful of the heresies of the last 50 years.

The right hon. Gentleman seemed to me a year ago to have that heresy, but today, whether consciously or unconsciously, he seemed to throw it away. He also seemed to throw another heresy away into what I hope will be an unregretted limbo—that is, the notion that international organisation should be built up by going over the heads of national states, straight to the people themselves. He threw away that notion very completely today and I congratulate him upon it.

The questions I wish to put to His Majesty's Government are, I am afraid it will be thought, of a rather verbal nature, but all our discussions and the discussions which may take place at the United Nations must be conducted with words as counters. I think we were almost, although I agree not entirely, promised some time ago by the Prime Minister that we should have a Palestine Debate before any decision had been taken, but now a decision of sorts has been taken, a decision not to decide, a decision to refer elsewhere, and I think the least we have a right to ask is that in that reference elsewhere we should know what the technical terms are going to mean and how the brief is going to be produced,

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[Mr. Pickthorn.]

and I am inviting the Colonial Secretary to make these matters clear to us this evening.

I speak in the presence of professional gentlemen who will correct me if I am wrong, but I imagine that any really competent Solicitor can so put a question to counsel, especially if the counsel be chosen as not very competent or practised, as to be pretty certain beforehand what counsel's opinion will be, and it is of the utmost importance that we should know in what shape and form this question is to be put to the United Nations. We have been told that there is not going to be any recommendation. There is going to be a mere statement of history. Can we be reassured that all the history is going to be drawn to the attention of the United Nations? I have no fear here that we might suggest something which would be tiresome to the British Government that might otherwise have passed unforseen. We may be quite sure that there will be people and indeed, it will be the duty of the United Nations to see that there should be people, who will drag up everything which seems to show that the British Government at any stage has been disingenuous or inadequate.

I wish to be quite sure that the British Government itself will do that work for them, that we can be perfectly sure that it is going to be perfectly clearly put to the United Nations if the matter is to be put at all, what is a mandate—a new word; how it got drawn up; what was an A Mandate, how an A Mandate was something which from the first admitted the existence of a society dwelling within the territory concerned with a right to nationhood provisionally admitted. It was admitted from the first that these were people provisionally to be recognised as deserving of political independence. What was the method by which and the date at which the Mandate become (*a*) politically and (*b*) legally a governing factor in the situation? It is far more complicated than people generally think, and than I myself think unless I have looked up the books and the papers the day before, and than the right hon. Gentleman below the Gangway thought. My recollection is that the Mandate did not acquire any legal or quasi legal force until I think it was the end of 1923. So there was a long period before that when whatever we were doing we were not doing it under the Mandate, nor did the Mandate come from the League of Nations as many people seem to think. We ought to be quite sure that all these things and all the relevant facts and documents are quite clearly set forth in the dossier which we put before the United Nations.

Secondly I should like to ask when we put this matter before them, are we going to define quite clearly what is Palestine for our purposes? Does it mean the borders and boundaries as they exist now or are there other possibilities which will be taken into consideration? Then, since it is The Palestine Problem which is being referred, it is extremely important that we should know what is from this point of view The Palestine Problem. Is it going to be sharply defined from the problem of dealing with the Jews in Europe? Those hon. Gentlemen with whom I have been more particularly associated on this question have always insisted all along that it is no use putting the difficulties and the blame upon Hitler.

Upon him primarily much of the blame is, but also upon all the rest of us who did not somehow find ways of taking in the persons whom Hitler persecuted or threw out. There is some blame. We have always said that, and I think it very important that now it should be made quite clear which of these things it is that we are putting before the United Nations, whether it is all one or whether it is two separable questions. I thought the most moving passage in the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State's speech this afternoon was when he, if I may say so with an absurd sort of arrogance, agreed with me on this point in advance, that whatever else we do we ought to be prepared to play our full share on the humanitarian side of the thing. We should make that quite clear, first that the burden ought to be taken off the Arabs. It should not be the Arabs upon whom the burden is left that they have to look after this terrible, cruel by-product of the vices of European civilisation, for which we all of us to some extent or another are responsible.

Then I want to ask one more small and one more large question about these definitions that are going I hope to be put to the United Nations. About the Jewish Agency for instance. The Jewish Agency originally was set up for a highly limited

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purpose, but it was from the first by the British Government allowed to develop into something far wider than its terms of reference properly warranted. There is no doubt of that.

Mr. Janner: Will the hon. Member permit me one question? Would he be good enough to say what the Mandate says about the Jewish Agency because if he reads it out he will find that the Jewish Agency had and have an extremely important position under the Mandate.

Mr. Pickthorn: I have not the reference in my pocket but on the last occasion on which I made a speech of this sort the hon. Gentleman interrupted me with exactly the same question and on that occasion I did read out the Mandate and it did carry out my argument to a sufficient extent. Perhaps I may leave hon. Members to look it up themselves. The argument then and now is whether the Jewish Agency is to be continued in its functions and decisions during this interim period and if so is it tolerable that that should be done without at least some similar council for consulting and co-operating with the Arabs. Now I come to my last question on this matter and indeed the last thing I have to say. What for this purpose is the United Nations organisation? I know we ought to know. The Foreign Secretary told us this afternoon that Sir Alexander Cadogan does know and I am quite sure that he does and for all I know by some means, direct or indirect, Sir Alexander Cadogan has told the Colonial Secretary, and I think the Colonial Secretary ought to tell us when he comes to reply. We none of us do know these documents and constitutions half as well as we ought and I take as much blame as anyone for that, but we are trying to learn too many things and to read too many papers.

What does it mean in practice for these purposes? Does it mean, to use a few letters, us, the U.S., and the U.S.S.R., or is there more in it than that? Is it in fact going to be a horse swapping deal, *a Kahhandel,* as the Germans say between the two or three both great Powers who have the proper power of the veto or what more than that does it mean? because on that, I think, does depend the next question which we ought to go into: that is, are we assuming that whatever decision is handed down we shall operate? If so, are we ourselves to be judges in the matter? Are we in on this matter, or do we, as fellows of a college do, if I may use an illustration from my own humble experience, when their own affairs are being discussed, go out politely into the outer combination room and read "Punch", or are we there all the time? That is always assuming that the Minister of Fuel allows "Punch" to be printed next September. I think it highly important and we want to know what the machinery is going to be, in simple terms which those of us who have read the covenant once and do not remember much about it now, will understand. We ought to know to whom it is we are appealing, whether we ourselves are to be there as advocates or judges, or both, or neither or as witnesses, or with some two of these functions, or what. It seems to me that this question ought to be properly explained to us by the Colonial Secretary this evening when he comes to wind up.

6.50 p.m.

Mr. Benn Levy (Eton and Slough): The hon. Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Pickthorn) reminded the House that this is a topic which has been wont in the past to rouse high feelings. I shall attempt myself to tackle it in a temperate and reasonable way because if my own emotions are engaged, I honestly believe they are not so through any Jewish prejudice but are engaged, as those of most hon. Members of this House would be, on behalf of any people or group of people who are in distress. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary himself underlined that point. In a rhetorical passage which I shall not attempt to emulate, he showed considerable sympathy, but I am bound to say that those Jewish people in distress can derive little comfort from his speech because there was little else he had to offer. His speech was, I admit, the best exposition of the Arab case that I have heard, but it had to me an air, if I may say so, not merely of unreality but of special pleading.

Let me take for example his treatment of the problem of partition. He argued against it on the grounds that any proposed scheme of partition would involve the leaving of an Arab minority in the Jewish sector in such a position that that minority would be permanent or would have to get out. But surely precisely the same argument would be valid against his own plan for a unitary Palestine in which the Jews were a permanent minority or

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[Mr. Levy.]

had to get out? Apparently in that case it was not thought a valid argument, because in another part of his speech, after expatiating on the various abilities of the Jews as statesmen, businessmen and the rest of it, he practically exhorted them to exercise their gifts for nationhood as a permanent minority inside an Arab state. That does not seem to me to be a very practicable or serious proposition——

Mr. Lipson: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that that is exactly what the Jews in this country and every other country are doing?

Mr. Levy: If the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Mr. Lipson) supposes for a moment that the position of Jews—he ought to know better—is the same in this country as it is or would be under Arab Government in Palestine, he really is not qualified to make an intervention. It is a libel on the British people.

Mr. M. Philips Price (Forest of Dean): Is the hon. Member aware that 120,000 Jews have lived in Bagdad since the days of Nebuchadnezzar?

Mr. Levy: There are 120,000 Jews who have lived in Bagdad and have been happy, and I do not know how many have lived in America. There have been 600,000 in Germany. I am talking about Palestine and not Great Britain or Bagdad.

To revert to my argument, there is another point which the Foreign Secretary made. I am trying to illustrate what seems to me to be the essential unreality of his argument. When last year he made Transjordan into an independent State, that action was criticised in some quarters as premature on the grounds that it would make possible future partition difficult. Today he comes down to the House and says, "Partition is difficult, if not impossible, because last year I made Transjordan an independent State, and there is, therefore, no longer room for a second viable Arab State if there is to be a viable Jewish State." The essential argument in favour of partition was never even mentioned. That essential argument is this, that it is surely at this day and age abundantly clear to everybody that it is impossible to submit Arabs to Jewish domination in a unitary Palestine and it is impossible to submit Jews to Arab domination in a unitary Palestine. The second course is even more impossible. I think both are impossible but the second is more impossible because, whatever the hon. Gentleman for Cheltenham may think, there is a wide discrepancy between the grades of social development of the Jews and the Arabs. To put the socially more advanced under the government of the socially less advanced is an absolutely untenable proposition.

I have never been a Zionist, though I am bound to confess that the Foreign Secretary has gone some way towards converting me; but his success is only partial. My conversion is still only half-hearted because my reasons are largely negative. I have felt in the past no mystic conviction of a national Jewish destiny. I have been averse also from the multiplication and intensification of nationalisms in a world which is striving, however ineffectually, towards internationalism; and moreover, there was to my mind objection to the avowed intention of Zionists to swamp Palestine by immigration in order to create a Jewish state in Palestine when the time for independence should arrive. But that objection has now been removed. There is no possibility any longer of the Jews being able to swamp Palestine—[An HON. MEMBER: "Why?"]—because six million of them have been slaughtered in Europe. There are not sufficient numbers waiting to go to Palestine—[An HON. MEMBER: "Oh."] Perhaps the hon. Member will allow me to quote from Sir Frederick Leggett, one of the members of the Anglo-American Committee, who is himself an anti-Zionist. He says:

> "As the average annual rate of natural increase of the Arabs is nearly twice that of the Jews and as mortality among the Arabs is declining, partly by reason of the better conditions which have followed the activities of Jews, it is fairly clear that no measurable amount of Jewish immigration will produce a Jewish majority."

I do not believe there is any serious possibility of that, so that objection has been removed so far as I am concerned.

But a more important reason and a new factor is this. I believe indeed that although every side of the House is committed to the establishment of a National Home in Palestine, it is quite impossible now to establish a National Home which is not also a National State, and for this reason. The Foreign Secretary admitted that he had some difficulty in understanding precisely what was meant by

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"a Jewish National Home." I sympathise. It is a nebulous phrase. But whatever it may mean, one thing is certain and that is that one cannot call a man's home his home if he is prevented from entering it at the point of a gun. Therefore, it seems to me that unless we have free immigration we cannot have a National Home.

It is merely specious to maintain that there are 600,000 Jews there now and that, therefore, the promise of a National Home has been fulfilled because there they are—at home. For, after all, that argument could have been equally well applied in 1922 when there were only 85,000 Jews there. So if the Home means anything, it must mean free immigration; yet it is clearly incontestable that the Arabs will not consent to further immigration into Palestine.

I feel, therefore, that the crux of the problem is immigration and I am convinced that if, when this Government took office, it had torn up the White Paper and the 100,000 had been admitted, the extreme Zionist argument would have lost very much of its force; and, moreover, paradoxically enough, Arab resistance would not have increased but would have diminished, for the simple reason that you fight so long as there is a chance of getting what you want, but you do not always fight against a *fait accompli*.

Very briefly, that is at least one aspect of the Jewish case. What I want to suggest to the House is that at no point does it conflict with British interests but, on the contrary, British interests are identical. There are three British interests of which I want to remind the House. One is of prime importance, namely, the reputation of British good faith. I know there has been a mass of contradictory promises in the past—that is deplorable, but it is an undeniable fact; and it is impossible, therefore, for any Government to come in now and fulfil all the pledges of its predecessors; but it can at least fulfil its own pledges——

Mr. Stokes (Ipswich): The Government as a Government have not made any.

Mr. Levy: Is the hon. Member advancing the theory that a party is only bound by pledges made when it is on the Government bench, and not when it is in Opposition? I should have thought he would have been the last person to suggest such a thing.

Mr. Stokes: My hon. Friend surely does not suggest, especially in the field of foreign affairs, that what is said in Opposition must be carried out at all costs by the party when it comes into government?

Mr. Levy: I should have said so; and what is absolutely indisputable is that this party is pledged not up to the hilt but up to the elbow, to repeal the White Paper when it came into office. The Foreign Secretary said this afternoon that there was a great difficulty about that, and he advanced what to me was a novel and extremely subtle doctrine in defence, that you cannot really do it without consulting the other party. That might have some substance if the original arrangement had been a matter of negotiation between parties, but when it is a unilateral one, why in the world cannot it be unilaterally repealed? After all, if unilateral commitments cannot subsequently be repealed by different governments, then an extremely bizarre theory is imported into government, and one which would have to apply also to internal affairs. Yet I did not notice that the Foreign Secretary was reluctant to repeal the Trades Disputes Act until he had consulted the employers; yet it is a completely parallel case.

Dr. Morgan (Rochdale): Specious.

Mr. Levy: I do not think I am being specious.

Dr. Morgan: You called it bizarre.

Mr. Levy: There are two other things I want to speak about. One is the question of safeguarding and preserving British lives; the other is the safeguarding of British economic and strategic interests. One word about the first. One thing which is quite clear is that this delay of 18 months, which has weakened the hands of the moderates, which has played into the hands of the terrorists, has cost us British lives. We cannot wash our hands of that responsibility. It is a deplorable thing but it is true and, unfortunately, as the right hon. Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley) has pointed out, the delay is not over. We are at the outset of another large delay. I hope

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[Mr. Levy.]

sincerely that means will be found by the Foreign Secretary to abbreviate the period of waiting before the matter can be submitted to U.N.O., but even when it has been submitted, there will still be a long period when we shall be left holding the baby.

As to the other point regarding our vital interests or key points, as the right hon. Member for West Bristol called them, it has for a long time been the orthodox Foreign Office view that we have vital economic and strategic interests in the Middle East which can only be protected by appeasing the Arabs. The Labour Party, rightly or wrongly, has disagreed with that view, but if the Foreign Secretary, since he has been accessible to the blandishments of the Foreign Office, has abandoned the Labour Party view and accepted the Foreign Office view, what is to happen if, when U.N.O. comes to a decision, it should decide that Great Britain must evacuate what the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office believe to be an essential strategic and economic position? Are we to invoke the veto? Are we to hedge? Are we to use all the machinery of delay open to us? If so, to submit the thing at all to the United Nations is a farce, and is merely a device for delay. I cannot believe that, but there is no alternative to that if the Foreign Secretary is persuaded that the *status quo* in Palestine is essential. If he is not so persuaded, then he must obviously have some alternative plan. But if we have some alternative plan, why cannot it be put into operation now before we continue to incur the odium of the present situation and the dishonour of broken pledges?

For these reasons, I believe the course that we are embarked upon is injurious to the interests of Great Britain, and I urge the Foreign Secretary to call a halt before it is too late.

7.9 p.m.

General Sir George Jeffreys (Petersfield): I do not propose to attempt to deal with the general situation as regards the government of Palestine. It is common ground that Jews and Arabs have been unable or are unwilling to agree, and will not accept any compromise proposals. It may be that the Government are well advised in referring this matter to the United Nations Organisation but, as we have heard from the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Levy) and from the Foreign Secretary himself, that must take time. It cannot come before the United Nations before next September but, whatever the eventual judgment of the United Nations may be, we must continue for some time at least to carry out our Mandate. I want to urge that, so long as we hold the Mandate, we should carry it out properly and, in particular, that we should enforce law and order in Palestine and shall suppress and rigorously punish terrorism.

It is with this question of the suppression of terrorism, and with the part that must be played in that suppression by British troops, that I wish especially to deal tonight.

The Foreign Secretary referred last week to the great strain which he said was put on the civil government of Palestine. No one will doubt that that strain is very great, but I suggest that it is nothing like the strain which is thrown on the British troops who have been living under the constant menace of kidnapping, murder, and outrage in its worst forms, and who have to treat the population as being supposedly friendly until some outrage is committed, or at least threatens. Those troops have never been called upon, nor permitted, to take any sustained offensive against terrorism. In that connection, I think the observations last summer by the Lord President of the Council regarding the order of the General Officer Commanding in Palestine were very unfair to the General Officer Commanding.

The troops in Palestine are in a very similar position to that of police in a criminal area. If those police are on friendly social terms of intercourse with the friends and families, possibly, of the criminals, their movements, and their intentions, will almost certainly be known by the criminals in due course, and those criminals will be able to take precautions accordingly. I think the position of our troops in Palestine is very analogous to that of police under those circumstances. If they go about, and are allowed to have social intercourse with the Jewish population, to go to public places of amusement and refreshment amongst them, they are not only risking kidnapping and outrage, but every unguarded word and indication of movement or intentions is sure to be overheard by someone. Even if it is not

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overheard by terrorists, it is certain to be passed on to them by their friends. I am sure that the instructions of the General Officer Commanding as to the avoidance by troops of social intercourse with Jews were fully justified for these reasons, apart from the strain on the troops involved in the present methods, a strain which is so great that I believe it would be too great for any troops except British troops, because of their morale and discipline, I say that these methods have been ineffective. When an outrage has been committed, according to reports which reach England, measures are at once taken locally and temporarily. They are strong measures, certainly, of searches, restrictions, curfews, arrests, and all the rest. But, after a short time, these measures are relaxed and finally taken off altogether, until the next outrage occurs. I would urge that what is necessary is a continuous and sustained offensive against terrorism, with no let-up whatever, no relaxation of pressure, and regardless of the inconvenience and restrictions which may in consequence fall on the Jewish population.

Mr. H. Hynd (Hackney, Central): Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman allow me? Is he quoting from Hitler's instructions to his troops for the occupation of Palestine?

Earl Winterton (Horsham): The hon. Member for Hackney, Central (Mr. H. Hynd) ought to be ashamed of himself. That was a most insolent interruption.

Mr. H. Hynd: I did stand up to make my interruption. That is more than the noble Lord did.

Sir G. Jeffreys: They should be treated in the way the civil population might be treated in a hostile country, until the hostile forces have been defeated. For instance there might be restrictions for intelligence purposes. After all, the Jewish Agency have refused co-operation against the terrorists, and can scarcely claim any consideration on that account. I believe everyone in this House will agree that the terrorists must be completely knocked out and exterminated. To my mind, the defended areas behind barbed wire should not be regarded as refuges, but as bases from which offensive operations can be conducted against the terrorists. Those operations should be continuous and sustained. There should be no relaxation, but they should be carried out with the use of every appropriate weapon which is available. There should be no question of waiting for the terrorists to shoot first. With the object of knocking out terrorism, I urge that complete discretion be allowed to the military authorities to deal with the situation. I do not know whether that is given now, but the general impression is that the military authorities are hampered at times by instructions from the Colonial Office, and are not allowed the completely free hand which they ought to have to deal with such a situation. There should be one order, and one only, to the G.O.C., to completely knock out terrorism with any and every means available. The terrorists should be brought to justice if possible, and, if brought to justice, they should be dealt with by the utmost rigour of the law.

The British troops who have this most unpleasant and invidious duty of attempting to restore law and order in Palestine and to suppress odious outrages there, should be given every form of encouragement and support. Their hands should not be tied in any way. They have displayed admirable restraint, and can be depended upon to display equal restraint in any offensive measures they take. Those measures should be taken, they should be continuous, there should be no relaxation until the moment terrorism is completely knocked out. So, and only so, shall we be carrying out the terms of our Mandate to govern Palestine properly, and to enforce law and order so long as we are there.

7.18 p.m.

Mr. Turner-Samuels (Gloucester): We are considering today a question of a very grave character, the treatment of which by this House, and in the future, might have very grievous results. I profoundly agree with the view that was expressed by the right hon. Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley) when he laid emphasis on the future in its relation to the present Debate. It is very easy in a matter of this kind to evoke emotion and to cover it with a lot of complications. Heaven knows there are plenty of complications on this subject which bear upon the past, and the sooner the past buries itself the better. We must concentrate on the future even if it is somewhat uncomfortable as we all know it very often is, to face facts.

It seems to me that the two material matters which concern this country, Palestine, and indeed, the world are. first the

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[Mr. Turner-Samuels.]

question of the Mandate, and secondly the question of the White Paper. The Foreign Secretary, in his speech, which I do not for a moment doubt was made with the greatest sincerity, and was intended to be helpful, was, in my humble submission, on the two critical points which I have mentioned, entirely unsatisfactory. He gave no guidance to the House on the crucial question of the White Paper as regards the period between now and September, when the matter is to go to U.N.O. Indeed, when I challenged him during his speech, to try to reconcile what he was saying—that this House was committed to the White Paper—with the entirely opposite version we had from the Prime Minister as recently as 1st July of last year, he observed that he was coming to that matter, but he never did.

I noticed one remarkable thing that he said about the Mandate. He said that it had become unworkable. All I can say is that it must have been through a long and painful course that he arrived at that conclusion after 23 years. Even if it were true that the Mandate was unworkable, it does not lie in the power of this or any other Government to abrogate the Mandate. If that is to be done, if the Mandate is to be changed, if there is to be a new document or a new policy, then the only power, the only source from which that can be done is the United Nations, and because of that it is to that body that it is now intended to refer this particular Mandate. The Foreign Secretary said at the same time, that the Mandate " was intended to lead to something." I find it difficult to see how it is to lead to something, if, according to the Foreign Secretary, it is in fact to lead to nothing, because that was the effect of what he told us this afternoon. The effect was not to implement the Mandate, not to try to carry out any of its terms, either in the language in which it is now framed, or in a modified form. His view was that it was unworkable.

There is one other point I would like to mention before I come to the point of the legal status of the Mandate, and a few words about the White Paper. The Foreign Secretary said what I thought was rather an extraordinary thing. I do not honestly believe that he intended to convey what his words, in my submission, did convey, namely, that the Jews were contending that they should be entitled to become members of the United Nations organisation on the single ground that they were Jews. Speaking as a member of that faith, if any Jew or any body of Jews were to suggest to me that they should have an entitlement for inclusion in the United Nations organisation, merely because they were Jews, I should just laugh at them. There is no possible foundation for any such claim. As the Foreign Secretary truly said, that would at once open the doors of the United Nations to all sorts of absurd and unsustainable applications for membership. But the Jews have never made any such far-fetched proposal. What they have said, as regards representation on the United Nations, has been that if they built up their National Home in Palestine, as the Mandate, in the most explicit terms, prescribes that they are to do, then they would be eligible in respect of that home on political grounds for a seat upon the United Nations organisation, in exactly the same way, it should be noted, as the Arabs are entitled to representation on the United Nations organisation, not because they are Arabs but because they have been given national independence in the particular States they now occupy. That is precisely the basis upon which the Jews put forward their claim, not on the basis of an absurd suggestion that because of some religious reason they ought to be members of the United Nations organisation.

Earl Winterton: I am sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman does not wish to indulge in an historical inaccuracy, which quite inadvertently he indulged in, and which might give offence to certain countries. The Arab States have not been given their independence. They have enjoyed independence for hundreds of years.

Mr. Turner-Samuels: May I remind the noble Lord that this country and America, with their treasure and their blood, fought to liberate large areas in the Near East. Therefore, is it not right to say that we, in this country, as well as the Americans, have some claim to say what ought to be done in the Near East in regard to those States? Indeed, that is precisely what has happened, because we were given Mandates of these places and these Mandated territories have now been converted into independent States. That is the position.

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Earl Winterton: I thank the hon. and learned Member most sincerely for having reminded me that I fought in the Desert in the 1914-18 war, with Lawrence. I was aware of the fact he mentioned, but I was dealing with the statement which he quite inadvertently made, that the Arab States have been given independence. Some of them were independent long before the 1914-18 war.

Mr. Turner-Samuels: Perhaps I did not quite catch the noble Lord's point because it was quite irrelevant. I was trying to underline the fact that as far as the position of the Jews in Palestine is concerned it is exactly the same as the position of the Arabs in the Arab States which had been under Mandate and had since been converted into independent States.

The senior Burgess for Cambridge University (Mr. Pickthorn) had an extraordinary idea about the origin of the Mandate. So far as I can gather from what he said, it appears to him to have come out of the blue and no one can trace its descent. Actually, the position is that the Mandate came into being as a result of an agreement of all the Allied Powers after the first World War. As a result of that, the Council of the League of Nations handed this particular Mandate to this country. The Mandate contained in its first recital, a clear statement as to why it was being handed to this country at all, and what its express object was. It said that the Government of His Britannic Majesty had made a declaration on 2nd November, 1917, and that that declaration was adopted by the other Powers,

> " in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people."

Subject to preserving certain rights to which I will refer to in a moment. That was the premise upon which this Mandate was established. That was the object of this Mandate. Every Article which follows is intended to carry out that object, subject to the modifications that other civil and religious rights are not to be prejudiced. I challenge anyone to contradict that statement. The reason why the phrase, " Jewish National Home " was used is not hard to understand. Advantage has been taken of the word " home " in order to raise some legal refinement about the fact that the word " State " is not used, but the word " Home." In my submission there is no distinction of substance between the phrase, " Jewish National Home " and " Jewish National State."

I will tell hon. Members why the word " Home " was, in my view, used instead of the word " State." It was perfectly clear that there was a large body of Jews outside Palestine who were anxious about what was taking place in Palestine as regards a Jewish State. They were people who were closely attached to their own particular countries. They had been born there, they were resident there, their families and businesses and hopes and their traditions were there. They were as much a part of the country as those who had been native to it for hundreds of years. They were troubled about the setting up in Palestine of what was to be described as a " Jewish State." As they were Jews themselves, they did not want the idea to be accepted that a Jew must necessarily be identified with Palestine because it was a Jewish State. That was I am sure one of the main reasons which operated to cause the phrase " Jewish National Home " to be used rather than the phrase " Jewish National State."

The other cause was obviously diplomatic. There was a good deal of sense in that. There were people who were already seated in Palestine. There were people there who had civil and religious rights. Naturally, everyone concerned was anxious that these people ought not to feel that they were to be dispossessed or prejudiced in the arrangement that was being made. If the word " State " had been used that might easily have aroused these doubts, whereas by using the word " Home ", a modified term, it was no doubt desired to avoid that. We must remember in this case that as a substitute for " State " we have the word " National." It is impossible for anyone reading the Articles of the Mandate and wishing to put an honest interpretation upon them, to come to any conclusion but that it was intended that a National Home should be set up in Palestine for the Jews, and, as it says in Article 2 that should lead gradually to " the development of self-governing institutions " there. There appears to be no doubt about that whatsoever. The whole context of the Mandate justifies that conclusion.

I would like to say a word about the Jewish Agency. A suggestion has been made that we can merely wave our hands

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[Mr. Turner-Samuels.]

and get rid of the Jewish Agency. The Agency is an integral part of the Mandate. Before we can get rid of the Jewish Agency, we must get rid of the Mandate. In Article 4 are stated precisely the functions of the Jewish Agency. Certainly it is not one of the prescribed functions that they should deal with matters of terrorism or anything of that kind. In fact, the Jewish Agency has neither the power nor the means to do that. The function of the Agency was:

"for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine."

That was their principal purpose. As immigration, under Article 6, was one of the main purposes of the Mandate, it was not likely, and it is not likely, that the Jewish Agency would do anything which would stop that immigration, for that would be a contravention of the Mandate itself. The Agency has never contravened a single one of its duties under the Mandate. I defy anyone to prove a single contravention by the Agency of any duty, obligation or function which it was given or has exercised under this Mandate.

Major Legge-Bourke (Isle of Ely): What about the White Paper?

Mr. Turner-Samuels: The White Paper is another matter; the White Paper is illegal. So far as the question of immigration is concerned, I would like to mention Article 6 of the Mandate which is very important. It is the Article which controls the question of immigration and it says:

"The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections"——

Brigadier Mackeson (Hythe): On a point of Order. Many of us are well acquainted with this question. Could we not get on with the modern problem?

Mr. Turner-Samuels: Hon. Members may be well acquainted with it, but the speeches already made have not indicated that. Those speeches and the errors they evince are on record and I think that I am, at least, entitled to correct them. Article 6 says:

"The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes."

Mr. Manningham-Buller (Daventry): Would the hon. and learned Gentleman read the earlier words:

"while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population . . ."

Mr. Turner-Samuels: I have just read those words. I do not know why I should be required to read them twice. I wish to say a few words about the White Paper of 1939. I will be brief, because I know others want to take part in the Debate. We are bound as regards the White Paper of 1939 to take into account what has been the policy of this party and the right hon. Gentlemen who now sit on the Front Bench. It is an absolute heresy, in my humble submission, for anyone to say that because they have become Members of the Government they can throw off, or discard, all the statements and pledges that they have ever made. If that were to pass as being the political principle of this country, we should have come to a sorry state of affairs. While the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary was speaking, I interrupted him. He said that this House was bound by the White Paper. That proposition cannot be sustained. It is a piece of pure advocacy. As I said when I interrupted the right hon. Gentleman earlier, the Prime Minister himself has repudiated any such position. I quoted his view as expressed in this House on 1st July, 1946, reported in HANSARD of that date in col. 1907. I am sorry that time does not allow me to go more fully into the White Paper, and I conclude by saying that the document is from beginning to end, illegal and ought now to be repudiated by the Government which opposed it originally in this House and had prior to this Parliament, consistently denounced it.

7.40 p.m.

Mr. Stokes (Ipswich): I will deal with some of the points mentioned by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels) in the course of my speech, but in regard to his suggestion about the Foreign Secretary changing party policy, I would say that I was not at the recent party meeting, but, from Press reports, I gather that, on the whole, the party supported him.

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Mr. Turner-Samuels: I was referring to the Labour Party.

Mr. Stokes: The hon. Member ought to have been long enough in the House to realise that the Parliamentary Labour Party does not have the job of interpreting the Foreign Secretary's policy in the House of Commons, and I would add that, when the Parliamentary Labour Party supports the Foreign Secretary, that is good enough for me. I was particularly delighted with the Foreign Secretary's speech, because I think that, for the first time, I heard him state a moderately fair case for the Arabs, though he did not go far enough for me. I thought he stated the Jewish case absolutely fairly, but I am assured by my Zionist friends, that he did not go far enough for them. We know that a good many promises have been made, but what must never be forgotten is that the Arabs were first promised the return of Palestine. Both my hon. and learned Friend who spoke before me and the Foreign Secretary expressed views as to the meaning of the Balfour Declaration. I think that a great deal of misapprehension exists there because people do not realise that the Balfour Declaration was only a sentence embodied in a long letter from Mr. Balfour to Lord Rothschild.

Mr. Janner *rose*——

Mr. Stokes: I am not going to give way. I want to make it quite clear that the Arabs never accepted the Balfour Declaration, and were never consulted about it. They never accepted the Mandate because they considered it to be completely contrary to Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Foreign Secretary went on to say that he did not find it easy to decide what a National Home for the Jews meant. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Gloucester explained that it really meant a national State, and said that the wrong word had been used. I am going to quote from the important White Paper which was issued on 3rd June, 1922—a British White Paper—which said:

"Unauthorised statements have been made to the effect that the purpose which is in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become 'Jewish as England is English.' His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab Delegation, the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine."

That was issued by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill), who said the other day that he stood completely by that declaration. I do not think there is any doubt whatever about what was intended.

My contention, and I speak with some limited experience of Arab affairs, is that, numerically, at any rate, the intentions of the Balfour Declaration have been carried out. When the last war ended, there were some 60,000 Jews in Palestine, forming about 7 per cent. of the population. There are now 600,000 Jews in Palestine, forming 30 per cent. of the population, and we cannot expect the Arabs to consent to more and more European Jews going into Palestine, when they were not responsible for the persecution of the Jews in Europe, and so long as Britain and America—and the Jews in England number 1 per cent. and the Jews in America 4 per cent. of the population—are not prepared to open their doors to let them in. I am quite sure from what I have been told by our Arab friends that, if we were prepared to raise our Jewish population up to 33 per cent., there would be no difficulty with the Arabs in Palestine.

I was very glad to hear the Foreign Secretary say that he was not going to give up his efforts to solve this problem. I was sorry when he said the other day that the matter had to go to U.N.O. I would much prefer, and I understand that my Arab friends would much prefer, that this matter should be settled between the British Government and the parties concerned, and I hope that the appeal which has been thrown out today will not fall on deaf ears.

To turn to another subject, that of the stamping out of violence, these acts of violence were condemned on both sides of the House with great unanimity. The point to which I would call attention is that our methods of stamping out violence in the case of Arabs are very different to the methods until recently used against the Jews. I think it was in 1937 that the Arab Higher Committee was declared an illegal organisation, and four members

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[Mr. Stokes.]

of the Arab Higher Committee and other Arab politicians were arrested and deported. Following on that, we had the attempted assassination of the High Commissioner, followed by the assassination of Lord Moyne, and what happened next? The Jews merely told us that they would be good boys, and we could get no further. Recent revelations have made it plain that there was some responsibility on the part of the Jewish Agency for being concerned in matters leading up to the blowing-up of the King David Hotel, and it is astonishing to me, in view of what has been said about the Mandate, that the Jewish Agency has not been declared illegal and the leading people in it removed from that country.

There is one other thing I would like to say. If the Foreign Secretary fails, and does not bring about a reconciliation of some kind, there can be no question of partition, because the Arabs will not have it at all. There can only be a unitary State, and I hope that if, in the end, the matter is going to U.N.O., the Foreign Secretary will make it clear that some time limit should be set. It seems to me that we should follow the excellent policy which has been announced in regard to India. I think that, in the case of India, the time is wrong, but that is by the way. We ought to have a time limit; otherwise, U.N.O. will mess about and not come to a decision, and our men will have to bear the heat and burden of the day.

There is one other small point. I hope the attention of U.N.O., as well as of this House, may be called to the extraordinary concessions granted in Palestine in 1921 and in 1927 both in regard to water and hydro-electric power and mineral resources. In the Colonial Office White Paper, it was stated that the salts in the waters of the Dead Sea, at the valuation at that time, were worth £240,000 million. The figure is at least double that value today. It is an astonishing thing that, when these concessions were granted, an hon. Member of this House—Sir W. Joynson-Hicks—said:

> "I have had some experience of contracts in this city, but the Rutenberg contract contains the most astonishing concessions I have ever seen or read in my life."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th July, 1922; Vol. 156, c. 304.]

I think that will bear investigation. I am sure that, behind the scenes, these matters have a great bearing on this situation.

I think it was a great mistake to mix up the question of the persecution of the Jews in Europe with the Palestine problem. But people always seem to do that. We all know that Mr. Balfour had no thought of Hitler in mind when the Declaration was made. There was no thought of thousands of Jews wanting to leave Europe. [An HON. MEMBER: "What are the figures?"] I cannot give the figures, but no doubt, when my hon. Friend speaks, he will say what was in Mr. Balfour's mind. I am quite certain that he did not contemplate the huge influx of Jews from the West to the East; he certainly did not contemplate that the Arabs were to be asked to take into their midst a huge European colony. It really is a matter of Arabs and Europeans—not Jews—against whom their military effort was sought in the 1914-18 war. I think that ought to be clear in people's minds when they discuss this subject.

I agree with the Foreign Secretary, and I believe that anybody who has travelled in that part will also agree that Arabs and Jews, if left alone, will get together. I believe that, even with this European influx, it is still possible, with a bit of good will on both sides, for them to do that. But, with no decision and the matter being allowed to drift on the thing becomes more and more difficult. As to our own party policy, I never agree with party policy; I am also violently against our foreign policy, as declared in that White Paper. In the Labour Party paper called "The International Post-War Settlement," under the heading "Colonies," we declare that the important thing is to develop the country and to give the indigenous population fair play and to support the Government. In the next column we say that we must doublecross the population in Palestine. That is fantastic. I do not believe that the party which passed that White Paper, had the slightest conception of what they were doing.

Finally, I will say that there is a common point between the Jews and the Arabs. They both dislike us; they dislike all our schemes, and they dislike one another. But they all realise that they must get together. That is a very good common ground from which to start. At least, one knows where one is. I believe that the Foreign Secretary's suggestion is right.

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If they would only follow the policy which he has outlined and try to get on together for three, five or ten years, as he said, under a properly constituted Government, in which everybody is represented, I think we should achieve the solution of our difficulties, and that this unhappy chapter will be closed for all time.

7.54 p.m.

Sir Ralph Glyn (Abingdon): I do not propose to detain the House for long, but I would like to say something in support of what the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) said just now. I am one of the few Members who were in this House when the Balfour Declaration and the White Paper were discussed. I think it is only right that, in such circumstances, one might say what one's recollections are of the intentions of that time, because, since then, many things have happened, and many things have overlaid the views then held.

We must first of all remember that the United States was to have had the Mandate, and that important point should not be forgotten. It was accepted by the United States, and, when President Wilson turned down the League of Nations, it passed to us to hold this troublesome baby. We accepted the Mandate, not because we wished to have it, but in order to do something for the benefit of the Middle East. The White Paper of 1922 was issued in an endeavour to correct what Mr. Balfour had said in that unhappy declaration about the National Home. There was an idea that the Jewish National Home should be not far from Jerusalem, and that there should be a university to which the Jews should go. It was at one time proposed that there should be a passport or a nationality office so that Jews could go there and obtain Jewish nationality. Having done that, they could then go wherever they wished, and could travel with a Jewish passport. But the British Jews, whose views I have always respected, and who made a great contribution to our efforts, were strenuously opposed to such a plan.

Mr. Janner: The hon. Gentleman is making a statement which is absolutely incorrect. There were a few British Jews who signed a letter, but they were in a very minute minority, and certainly did not represent the opinions of British Jewry at all.

Sir R. Glyn: No doubt the hon. Member will have a chance of stating his views later. All I can say is that at that time Zionism, as we know it today, was unknown, and our preoccupation at that time was to try and help settle those difficult problems in Palestine in such a way as was in accordance with British practice and tradition.

I believe that an immense amount of harm has been done both in the United States and elsewhere by mixing up strategical considerations with the Mandate. There have been a great many people in America who thought that we were manipulating the Mandate for strategical purposes. If a Mandate is used at all, it must be used largely in the interests of the people concerned in the territory for which a country is responsible. There ought to be no other consideration. The hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Levy) said, I think, that one of the reasons why we should continue with the Mandate was strategical. That, surely, should be the last reason. It shows that we are not carrying out the purpose of the Mandate quite disinterestedly, which was the original intention.

It was never felt that this country should be saddled with this Mandate for a long period. It was always considered that it should be for a fairly short time, but, unfortunately, we have got more and more into the morass. We must keep absolutely distinct the problem of Palestine from that of the Jewish displaced persons. There are certain figures which have been issued quite recently, and some hon. Members had an opportunity of seeing the distress in Europe and the number of Jews who are now in camps in Germany, Austria and Italy and are being looked after by U.N.R.R.A. Indeed, a great many of them are not in the camps, but are mixed with the people of these countries. There is no greater distress or misery in any part of the world than that suffered by these unfortunate people, and this country should give a lead in this matter. It is our duty to do it.

As reported by U.N.R.R.A. the actual number of Jews up to October last was 152,600. That is apart from the other displaced persons who, I think, number nearly a million. It is quite obvious that we are not going to help those people by thrusting them, willy-nilly, into Palestine. For one thing, many of them do not want

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[Sir R. Glyn.]

to go there, but they do want to get out of all the associations and the miseries of the Hitler persecution. It is a great blemish on the postwar conduct of foreign affairs that we have not been able to find a proper solution to that problem. But we should be in a far worse mess if this House—and, after all, this House is responsible for the Mandate—did not make it perfectly clear at this moment how far we are to be tied to this affair, even if we do go to the United Nations organisation. What I am afraid of—and I ask the House to consider this—is that too much time will be taken in arriving at a settlement. I believe it is right that we should go to the United Nations organisation, but that it is essential that we should fix a time limit for arriving at a decision.

We have done it for India, and I believe that policy will succeed, and we ought to do it for Palestine. If the meeting of the United Nations is in September, surely it would be reasonable to say that on 1st January, 1948, we quite definitely go out, because it would be intolerable that British troops, the Palestine police and our administration in Palestine should be forced to carry out a policy which we not only do not approve, but are not really capable of carrying out. It should be remembered that, though we may have numbers of men in uniform, unless the financial position of the country is such that they can be maintained at a necessary war potential, we have no business to accept the responsibility. We stand now upon the edge of a completely new situation. We have published to the world what our financial and economic position is. We have given the details and the numbers. I cannot conceive that anybody in his right senses could possibly doubt that Palestine and the Middle East are today a danger spot. Unless handled with the utmost care it will be the beginning of such trouble between East and West, and we shall find ourselves involved in such a situation, that it will be quite intolerable to the people of this country to have to bear the responsibility for law and order while not in fact being able to ensure it.

Having heard the statement of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, therefore, I believe today we stand as we did in 1922. Then we accepted the situation which somebody else had produced. Now today we acknowledge a situation with which we are no longer able to cope within the terms of the Mandate. We should go to the United Nations, as successor to the League of Nations, and say that for all these years we have struggled and done our best; circumstances are such that we honestly believe we cannot carry on any further, and we therefore fix a date when we come out, refusing to be tied to a position which is no longer tolerable.

Mr. Scollan: Will the hon. Member please explain how we can submit the matter to the United Nations for a decision while, at the same time, making a declaration that in no circumstances would we continue in Palestine?

Sir R. Glyn: The hon. Member may feel that we should give up all our sovereign rights in this country, but our first duty as a member of the United Nations is, surely, to point out that we are not any longer in a position to undertake the risks entailed by a continuation of the Mandate. The greatest mistake we could make today would be to do something in connection with Palestine which would be misunderstood, as the Balfour Declaration was. The whole history of the Middle East and of Britain's administration there is one series of misunderstandings and misconceptions, and, surely, we have had sufficient warnings of the difficulties which follow from not facing the facts and telling the truth. After all, what is it that is at stake? It is not a question of party politics, it is a question of right and wrong. Either we are able to do this job or we are not, and I am convinced that the time has come when we can say quite honourably that we have done our level best, but we are anxious that the world should take up this burden. We have failed to produce a policy—that is a fact—which brings peace to both sides. Nobody can say we have not tried; let somebody else try, and bring fresh minds to bear upon it.

My last word is in regard to the Arab League. The Arabs, and indeed all peoples, at our request, made a contribution to fighting the terrorism of Hitler. The Arab League represents a great assembly of religious people, believing in Mohammedanism, and forming an enormous block of power stretching right across that part of the world. We have had contacts with Moslems in every part of the world, we respect their faith and

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understand it. The Arab League are looking to those nations which understand them to give them a lead. It is not a question of domination, it is a question of help. There are many Arab states which are struggling forward. Let us not put ourselves in a position which perhaps does not permit us to give free and unfettered advice and help to those people, who have always looked to us in the past for honourable and fair dealing. I believe that we have a great opportunity; if we take it now we may save the world from another conflict, but if we do not take it, I think a conflict is more than possible.

8.6 p.m.

Brigadier Peto (Barnstaple): We have in the last three-quarters of an hour heard three totally different and extremely good speeches. The first, perhaps a little long, was by the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels), who took the Jewish point of view. The second was by the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes), who took a totally different view, that of the Arab, and the third was by my hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon (Sir R. Glyn), and with it I, personally, wholeheartedly agree. In the past I think both parties have made mistakes. The hon. and learned Member for Gloucester prefaced his remarks by saying that he was not going into the past, and from then on never mentioned the future in the rest of his speech. I, however, am going to mention the past, and at the beginning I feel it right to say that I do know a little about Palestine. I have been there and served there, and I was there right at the beginning, from 1921 until 1924. I have seen, and can bear witness to what the Foreign Secretary said, that it is perfectly possible for Jew and Arab to work together. They have not identical interests, and that is perhaps why it is quite easy for them to work togther. They are jealous of each other only when it comes to a question of which shall be the dominating people in the country. It is then that the quarrel begins.

As the Foreign Secretary said, the Jew is a town-dweller; 78 per cent. of them live in the urban districts, in Tel Aviv and so forth. The Arab, on the other hand, does not live in the towns, he cultivates the soil. It is quite possible for those two communities to live in harmony together. For my part I have always been in favour of partition, not as a permanency but as an initial stage with a view to getting them to live together without quarrelling for a certain period, meeting each other and possibly working for each other in a way which will lead ultimately to unity. There is no doubt in my mind that it is possible to start by partition and finish with unity in that country.

I have heard with some interest the views expressed by various hon. Members on the meaning of the term "National Home." I thought it was quite enlightening to hear the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester give his view that it meant a pre-eminently Jewish State. I have no doubt that is the view of many other hon. Members on the Labour side. It is not my view. While it is quite impossible to say what was in Lord Balfour's mind, my view is that the National Home was not intended to be an exclusive State for Jews only. I thought the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester gave the impression that it was to be an exclusive home for Jews.

Mr. S. Silverman: Is not the hon. and gallant Gentleman getting a little confused? A National Home is, surely, a home in which a nation lives, in which it is there as of right, and in which it is not dominated by anybody else. There are cases where one can have that, as in Wales and Scotland, without a State.

Brigadier Peto: The hon. Member answered that point himself, I think, when he interjected, a little while ago, that it was to be a Jewish home with free immigration into it, limited only by the economic capacity for absorption. That is obviously what it must be, and what it was intended to be—a limited number of Jews would be allowed to immigrate into the country, but the number would be limited by the economic capacity of the country, and it would not be to the exclusion of the Arabs who are there already. I find it very hard to understand how the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with their knowledge, could possibly have stated, in December, 1944, and May, 1945, at Labour conferences, things which are totally and absolutely different from the interpretation of the term "National Home" to which I have referred. According to those statements, it was to be to the exclusion of the Arabs. If I

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remember rightly, the Prime Minister's remark was to the effect that the Arabs must be encouraged to leave the country as soon as possible and that the Jews must be allowed to immigrate into Palestine absolutely freely, without any let or hindrance, and that no obstacle was to be placed in their way. I have the quotation here.

Mr. Hoy (Leith): Perhaps it would be better if the hon. and gallant Member would read the quotation, because I do not think it was exactly as he has said.

Brigadier Peto: The Prime Minister said:

> "There is, surely, neither object nor meaning in a Jewish National Home unless we are prepared to let Jews, if they wish, enter into this tiny land in such numbers as to become a majority, the Arabs being encouraged to move out as the Jews move in. Let them be compensated handsomely for their land and let them settle elsewhere . . ."

and so on.

Mr. S. Silverman: What is the date of the quotation?

Brigadier Peto: December, 1944, at the annual conference of the Labour Party. I could also quote what the Chancellor of the Exchequer said the following year, which was even stronger. I cannot understand how two men of great integrity and wisdom could possibly make such statements and lead the Labour Party, at a conference of that sort, completely up the garden path. Now those statements have come back on them. They are in a position of great responsibility. Their words can be quoted. Their party is entirely at sixes and sevens; some people in it think one thing, and some another; some people hold that the Jewish problem should be solved by allowing Jews to go into Palestine freely, and others hold totally opposite views, as, for example, the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes). We know that the great Labour Party has often been confused before as to their policy, and without wishing to rub it in, I mention their lack of policy with regard to Russia, India and Palestine, and I would add with regard to domestic affairs. They were full of promises before they had responsibility, and now that they have responsibility, they are not putting their promises into effect.

Mr. Scollan: Is that the reason the hon. and gallant Gentleman's party has no policy?

Brigadier Peto: The Foreign Secretary said that Palestine was, and is likely to be, a sore spot. The position in Palestine is extremely like that in Ireland after the 1914-18 war. I also happen to have served in that country at the time of the Sinn Fein troubles. The problem in Palestine now, with the terrorists, is almost identical with the problem that had to be solved from 1918-20 in Ireland. I think there is only one way of solving that problem, and that is to handle it very strictly and very firmly, or to get out. There used to be a saying at the time of the Irish troubles which is equally applicable today, although I hope that in mentioning it I shall not deter recruiting. It was

> "Join the Army and see the world"—

and in those days, they used to say:

> "Join the R.I.C. and see the next."

If one said now

> "Join the Palestine Police and see the next."

there would be a certain amount of similarity in it. Our men in Palestine have a very unpleasant task to do. Whatever is done, whether the Foreign Secretary goes to U.N.O. with a policy or without a policy, whether U.N.O. in the end comes to no decision or comes to a decision which we feel we have to implement, I ask one thing only, and it is this, that policy or no policy, we shall be guided by the rule that whatever is decided as a result, it shall not make the position of our troops in that country more difficult than it now is.

8.17 p.m.

Mr. Crossman (Coventry, East): Every time I have listened to a discussion in the House on Palestine, and particularly in listening to certain passages of the Foreign Secretary's speech, I have become increasingly aware that the chief problem is the distance, psychological and physical, between this country and Palestine. When I listen to our quiet discussion, and when I remember that, while we are talking cheerfully about keeping the door open and asking what, in two thousand years is a year in solving the problem, and that, on the other hand, in Jerusalem today British officials are cooped into ghettos and no British official

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can go about among the people he is trying to serve; when I remember that, in the last two days, I have received from two men, one an Englishman and one a New Zealander, who have spent their lives in serving Jews and Arabs, desperate appeals to be released from the prison into which they have been put by the British authorities; when I remember the feelings of Jews and Arabs, exasperated by 18 months' constant delay—and it is really ten years of delay from 1937—then I feel we ought to get some actuality and some real relationship between the urgency of the problem and what we are doing about it.

I welcome this Debate if for no other reason than that it will have impressed upon the Foreign Secretary the sense of hon. Members on all sides of the House, whether they are pro-Jew or pro-Arab or, as I prefer, mainly pro-British, our deep concern and our lack of policy today—lack of short-term policy, lack of long-term policy—and the dangers to this country which such a lack of policy will bring. There was one particular thing in the Foreign Secretary's speech which concerned and worried me. It is very easy to generalise from one's own experience. One has spent one's life in negotiations between reasonable British people, where one just gets them into two rooms, and then, after all, it is a question of the employers offering 8d. and the men demanding 10d., and then splitting at 9d., and it is very easy to believe that the Jews and the Arabs in their passionate national opposition, can be somehow jostled together by personal influence, and made to sign on the dotted line some compromise. Not one person who has visited Palestine in the last few years has come back disagreeing with the view that no agreed solution is possible, and that if we try to get people to conferences there will be endless postponement and delay. That was the view of the Peel Commission in 1937 and the view of Mr. Malcolm MacDonald in 1939; it is the point upon which the White Paper agrees and it was also the view of the Anglo-American Committee, of which I was a member, last year. Every person agrees that it is an absolute waste of time to go on bringing these people together into conference. I agree with the spokesman for the Opposition today that a whole year has been completely wasted, and that this matter should have gone to U.N.O. last year if it was going at all. I hope that after this Debate there will be no more talk about leaving the door open.

Arab and Jew have both of them an impregnable moral case. They have something that they really believe in, and they cannot be wangled out of it by some trick solution which everybody sees through. They know the problem from A to Z, and they look at every proposal with their eyes on the two questions of land and immigration. They judge every proposal according to the way in which those two questions are dealt with. There is no way of bringing them together before we impose something on both Jews and Arabs.

Mr. Alpass (Thornbury): Would the hon. Member impose a settlement by force?

Mr. Crossman: Perhaps my hon. Friend will allow me to develop the argument. There are only two ways of ending the situation, unless we continue the Mandate and continue spending £40 million a year on keeping a large army and being unpopular with both sides. One way is the 1937 way of partition. The other is the way of the White Paper of 1939. Now, 52 nations in U.N.O. are to find more devices for wanting to keep up the Mandate. One is the Arab way, and the other is the Jewish way. One way is that which enables the Jews to survive and have a reasonable chance of surviving, with a stake in parts of Palestine, where they can either come to terms with the Arabs or fight it out. The other way is to be at the mercy of an Arab majority.

Those two policies, partition and the White Paper, do not differ very much at the moment. The Jewish population in Palestine would, if the White Paper were imposed and our troops were withdrawn, create a *de facto* republic. British troops would go out and Jewish troops would take over what they could hold, and then there would be negotiations between the two sides. Whether we impose our wishes, or impose the White Paper, the future of Palestine will, in fact, be decided between the Jews on the one side and the Arabs on the other. What we have to decide is between an illegal or irregular way of dividing the country; walking out and leaving the parties to fight it out, or an internationally agreed partition of the country which will reduce

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[Mr. Crossman.]

the bloodshed to some extent. There is not a very great variety of solutions.

Now I would say a word or two about the reference to U.N.O. I am alarmed at the very easy way in which some people believe that reference to U.N.O. will settle the matter. I remember the days when a reference to the Anglo-American Committee was going to solve the problem. The problem is not to be solved in that way. As time goes on we find Arabs and Jew terrorists grow stronger, so that when we have to impose a solution the cost will be greater in British, Jewish and Arab blood the longer we wait. In regard to the reference to U.N.O. let us see realistically what is going to happen. There is a Russian *bloc* and an American *bloc*. The aim of the Russian *bloc* will be to have the British troops removed out of Palestine. The Russians want us out. What about the Americans? The Americans want us in. We have to understand that position. There has been a certain amount said about the Americans and upon the subject of elections in New York. Self-righteousness is rather dangerous. Apparently if there had been a million Jews in London we might have seen a slightly different attitude on the Front Benches on both sides of this House. There were Election pledges about the Jewish question. That British pressure group is big enough to get an election pledge at the conference, but not big enough to formulate the policy of a Government.

It is unwise to bicker at Americans about the size of the Jewish community in that country. We ought to look soberly at American interests. There are two factors which determine America's attitude, the Jewish democratic vote and Standard Oil. Jewish lobbying is vocal; oil lobbying is silent but highly influential. The oil lobby is quite powerful enough, in view of the close connection with the American Chiefs of Staff, to prevent the Americans assuming any responsibility in the Middle East, to jeopardise the relationship with the Arab world by which the oil supply would suffer. I do not blame the Americans for that. The Jewish group at home and Standard Oil abroad, make it their obvious interest to sit on the fence and to avoid ever making themselves get into the Middle East where they would have to fight pro-Jew or pro-Arab. Every American politician will do all he can to sit on the fence in the Middle East, so as to ensure that the British are there and that the Russians are not.

If this problem goes to U.N.O. the Americans will prevent the Russians having their way and will try to press the thing back on us. There will be some fantastic new constitution proposed, with a quite unworkable Mandate. We shall be politely pushed back into running the country to defend British and American interests in the Middle East. We shall, therefore, be no whit further on than if we had done it all ourselves. All U.N.O. brings is another Mandate which we shall not have written ourselves, but which others will have written for us. We may be much worse off than we are at present. Therefore, those Members of this House who have pressed for a time limit for the withdrawal of British personnel and troops are completely justified.

Secondly, we have not only to press for the time limit, but we have to make it clear to U.N.O. that, in our view, the Mandate is unworkable. On that point we agree with the Peel Commission and with the White Paper, and this House even agrees with the hon. and learned Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller) and myself, who were on the Commission which came to that simple conclusion—a conclusion which has only dawned on the Front Bench. The Mandate is unworkable. We are not prepared to work it. A new compromise cannot work, and we are not prepared to fail again. I believe it is essential that we should go to U.N.O. saying not only that we have this record but that this record has led us to this conclusion: It is impossible for an alien to go on ruling Jew and Arab. The problem has to be settled either by the White Paper or by partition which may both mean the same thing. But it has to be settled in one way or the other, enabling foreign rule to get out of Palestine. That would be to the interest, not only of the British but of the Arabs and the Jews.

I wish to say one harsh thing in conclusion. There are times, even in industrial disputes, when a strike or a lock-out is necessary, when a trial of strength has to come, when the task of the conciliator is to say, "The boys have got to have their heads and try it out." I believe that situation has arrived in Palestine, when it is preferable for Jew and Arab, who have

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passionate convictions, to " have it out " as equals and free men, even though it involves some bloodshed, than to continue fighting us. That is the case for partition. It is the case for the White Paper, and it is a case for ending the Mandate.

Mr. Kenneth Lindsay: It is a case for abdication.

Mr. Crossman: When two mature peoples are being ruled by a third people through a police State, I do not call it abdication. I call it liberation of the peoples concerned. It is not abdication to say that the Jews are now strong enough to defend themselves and the Arabs think they can defend themselves, that they should, therefore, have their freedom, and that we should not be tied up to some arrangement which the Americans want to impose on us for keeping us in Palestine with another " phoney " constitution and another compromise which will keep us balancing between the two. We all know that we are now ruling Palestine—we did not know it until last week—under the White Paper. The Foreign Secretary says we are bound to do it because it is a pledge to the Arab world. I would point out that if it is a pledge to the Arab world, it was also declared illegal by the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations—[An HON. MEMBER: " No."]—by a majority of one. It was declared illegal by the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations by four to three. It was declared illegal by Labour Ministers in the House of Commons, and I think I would be supported by the hon. and learned Member for Daventry opposite if I said that there was not a member of the Anglo-American Committee who could find a way of making the White Paper compatible with the Mandate.

We ought to be quite clear on what we are about. We are now saying that we do not want to impose a solution in Palestine. I would point out that we are imposing a solution in Palestine. With enormous force, we are imposing the White Paper. If, through that, we came to war, as at any moment we may, and this country were to find itself fighting to impose the White Paper which was declared illegal by the international authority under which we hold the Mandate, I must frankly say that I would be doubtful whether it would be a just or an unjust war.

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Mr. Pickthorn: Did the hon. Member say that we hold the Mandate under the Mandates Commission? If so, I think he should correct himself.

Mr. Crossmann: I said we hold it under the League of Nations.

Mr. Pickthorn: We do not.

Mr. Crossman: I will correct myself and say, " confirmed by the League of Nations." The point I was coming to was this: we have to face the reason why we are imposing the White Paper today. It is the same as in 1939. In 1939 we had to impose the White Paper because the Arab world might have joined the Axis in the years of the war. We all know that was the reason, and it may be it was a perfectly good strategic necessity, though an unpleasant one. We all know that today we are still imposing the White Paper, because we are afraid that otherwise the Arab world might go over to Soviet Russia.

I think it is time we were honest about this, and knew what we are doing from strategic reasons is taking precedence over morality and legality. If it does, at least we should know it in this House of Commons, and should know the motives behind our policy. It is intolerable to continue in this way, in which expediency is constantly having to take precedence over morality and legality. We know, of course, that there is a large terrorist movement; and if we increase Jewish immigration who in the Arab world will not say, " You are giving way to Jewish nuisance value "? The Arabs are bound to say that. Just as if the Arab view prevails the Jews will say, " You are giving way to Arab nuisance value." We have now reached the situation in Palestine in which both sides believe, and passionately believe, that the British give way to nuisance value. It is not a question of this Government, but a question of the last 10 years. The attitude is: The British give way to nuisance value, therefore the revolver is the " Esperanto." I say it is that which now utterly corrupts life in Palestine for Briton, Jew and Arab. If we have reached that point, and if the hon. Member for the English Universities (Mr. K. Lindsay) calls it abdication, I say that is nonsense.

Let us close down this lamentable story. Let us, for once, make up our minds, and go to the United Nations with the follow-

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[Mr. Crossman.]

ing three plain statements. First: The Mandate is unworkable, and we cannot possibly agree to any United Nations' recommendation for reconstituting the Mandate with any compromise solution at all. Secondly: We are in favour of an orderly partition of Palestine instead of a disorderly partition, which is what would occur if Palestine were made an Arab State and the Jews merely took what they wanted by means of the Haganah fighting for it; let us say we would rather do it under international guarantee. Thirdly: Whatever happens we will have our troops and adminstrators out by a certain date, because that will speed up the solution.

8.38 p.m.

Mr. Lipson (Cheltenham): It seemed to me that the whole burden of the argument of the hon. Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman) has been to lead up to his suggestion of partition. If I may say so, he has been extremely dogmatic.

Mr. Crossman: Brief.

Mr. Lipson: He is quite sure that no agreed solution is possible. But that was not the view put forward by the Foreign Secretary this afternoon. The Foreign Secretary told us that even at this late hour he has not given up hope that an agreed solution may be found. In the course of his speech he showed us how on two occasions he had almost brought the two parties together with the possibility of an agreed solution, when the untimely intervention of America made the position entirely impossible.

Mr. Crossman: Might I correct the hon. Member on one point? I was not, I think, quite dogmatic. All I said was that no one who has been to Palestine in the last three years has come back with the view that agreement is possible. That view is limited to people who sit in London.

Mr. Lipson: At any rate, personally I prefer the more optimistic view taken by the Foreign Secretary. The alternative offered by the hon. Member for East Coventry is that we should come out, and leave it to the Jews and Arabs to fight it out between themselves. That is an alternative which, to my mind, is quite unworthy of the responsibilities which we have had in that country for so many years; and the result of which, I think, would be too terrible to contemplate.

In all the Debates on Palestine in which I have been privileged to take part, I have tried to take as objective a view as possible of this problem.

Mr. Crossman: We all have.

Mr. Lipson: I have tried to be fair to the Government; I have tried to be fair to the Jews; I have tried to be fair to the Arabs; and have endeavoured to apply to this problem the principle which, in my view, ought to be applied to all political problems—the principle of justice. I have refused to forget that principle, or to turn a blind eye towards it, because, as a Jew, the problem of Palestine has a special significance to me. Starting from that premise, I want to say that I think that many of the charges which are brought against the Government in the handling of this problem are not fair. It has been said that there has been unreasonable delay. But to bring about a solution of the Palestine problem does not lie with this country alone. The other parties concerned, the Jews and the Arabs, have also their contribution to make, and I think it is clear that they have not been at all helpful. Both of them have maintained an extreme point of view.

Mr. Gallacher: Who are " they "?

Mr. Lipson: The Jews and the Arabs.

Mr. Gallacher: Then why does not the hon. Member say " We and the Arabs "?

Mr. Lipson: Perhaps the hon. Member will allow me to make my speech in my own way. Both of them have adopted an extreme point of view, and have not made the task of His Majesty's Government easier. Then, too, I think it is only fair to the Government to appreciate the fact that this is by no means the only problem with which they have had to deal since they came into office. After all, the war has created problems much greater and far more numerous than many people imagined it would, even when the war ended. Peace has not yet been made with Germany and Austria; the United Nations organisation had to be set up; economic problems of tremendous magnitude have had to be dealt with; the world has been, and still is, in danger of famine; in our own country we have had our domestic problems. In these circumstances it is most unreasonable of the extreme Jewish

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nationalists to complain that the Government have not given priority to their own particular problem.

Personally, I want to thank the Foreign Secretary for the speech which he made today. In my opinion, that speech is the best speech that has been made on the Palestine problem by anybody, and I think it has served a most useful purpose, because it has, at least, given all the facts, and it has made all the difficulties with which the Foreign Secretary has had to deal crystal clear; and to that extent, I think, it has considerably cleared the air. I was very much impressed by the obvious sympathy with which the Foreign Secretary has approached this problem, and the courage he has shown, in spite of all the difficulties, in trying to find a solution.

Therefore, I think that the supporters of the Zionist cause ought to show a little more understanding of his difficulties—perhaps they will after that speech—and realise it is not possible for him to meet all their demands, unless he is to sacrifice many of the political principles for which he and his party, and, indeed, all parties in this country have stood for so many years. It is, I think, obvious, that as a result of the terrorist activities in Palestine, the Zionist cause and the cause for a Jewish State have much less support than before. These people, by their actions, have done infinite harm to the cause of Jewry generally, and also to the cause of Jewish nationalism in Palestine. People are naturally asking now what kind of Jewish State is likely, when the terrorists show the particular attitude of mind indicated by their actions. As a result of the breakdown in the negotiations, it was inevitable that the Government should decide to refer this problem to U.N.O. The Foreign Secretary has said that the Mandate as it exists at present is unworkable, and it is only proper, therefore, that it should be handed over to U.N.O., which has been created to deal with problems of this kind. Personally, I hope the view expressed by the Foreign Secretary that there is still a chance that solution by agreement may be found between the Arabs and the Jews and the British Government before the matter goes to U.N.O. may be justified, because if agreement can be arrived at, it is far better than anything which is forced upon the country from outside. We can all hope and pray that that confidence is justified.

I should like to strengthen the appeal which has been made to the Foreign Secretary, that in the interval between now and, if need be, when the matter goes before U.N.O. in September, there should be an increase in the number of immigrants allowed into the country. I suggest the Government might agree, until the matter has been considered by U.N.O., to the figure being raised to 4,000 per month, which was the figure envisaged in the latest Government proposals for the settlement of the Palestine problem. I appeal to the Arabs to give sympathetic consideration to this request. I think I have shown that I have some understanding and appreciation of their point of view on this matter, and I trust that an appeal, coming from me, might have some influence with them. It is clear that an increase of this kind could not possibly do the Arab cause any harm whatsoever. On the other hand, it would relieve a tremendous amount of suffering, and help to create a better atmosphere in Palestine itself until a happier solution of the problem could be found. If the Colonial Secretary could assure the House that the Government are prepared to consider increasing the number of immigrants to 4,000 a month, I believe that such an assurance would meet with general acceptance, particularly when coupled with the plea which the Foreign Secretary made today, that all nations in the world should be prepared to open their gates and take their share of the displaced persons who are so sadly in need of a home.

I am glad that the Government have turned down the proposal for partition, because although partition might buy an easy peace for a time, like Munich, it would tend to keep Arab and Jew apart, with all the possibilities of conflict that might arise in consequence. As, in my view, the only ultimate solution of the Palestine problem is to be found in a Unitary State, in which Jews and Arabs would live and co-operate together for the common good of all, I believe that it would be a fatal mistake to start dividing the country. Palestine is smaller than Wales, and partition is a solution which the Government have rejected for India, where the case is so much stronger. If we were to accept partition for Palestine it would be difficult, from a logical, fair, and just point of view, to refuse Pakistan to India. There are differences of opinion

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[Mr. Lipson.]

as to how the Palestine problem is to be solved, but we are all agreed in desiring the earliest possible solution. I hope the Foreign Secretary will continue, as he told us he intends to do, in his efforts, so that, at long last, peace may be brought to Palestine, and that in peace and prosperity Palestine can once again make her proper contribution to human good and human happiness.

8.54 p.m.

Mr. Lever (Manchester, Exchange): I hope I shall not offend my hon. Friends, and give comfort to the Philistines, by extending to the Foreign Secretary's plan a conditional welcome, a welcome which I might describe as being with open arms, but crossed fingers. I believe in a united Palestine, and that partition, logically, would involve what my hon. Friend the Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman) says it would involve, namely, Jews and Arabs deciding to fight out their differences. I believe in a united Palestine because I believe that Jews and Arabs have to get together in Palestine, work together, and settle their differences, and I feel that partition as between Jews and Arabs would be the preliminary bout to a major fight. It would give no pleasure to me as a Jew to see the Jews of Palestine use their brilliant organising skill and great mental superiority and knowledge in Palestine to give them a victory in arms against their more primitive opponents. I think that nothing more dreadful could be contemplated, in the interests of the Jewish people anywhere, than a blood bath of that kind should be preceded by a partition policy. I believe in an independent Palestine, because I believe, as the Foreign Secretary has said—I hope sincerely—that the relationship between Jew and Arab in Palestine has been bedevilled from outside.

The Foreign Secretary seems to have in mind exclusively the hysteria of Madison Square Garden meetings and the efforts of some extreme Zionists. But there are other intermeddlers whom we ought to have in mind outside Palestine the moguls who rule the Arab States who represent every backward and reactionary tendency in the Middle East—and the oil moguls too, whose influence makes itself felt at every conference and on every decision about Palestine. I am bound to tell the House that I can think of another interfering party, who had no right to be there, and that is the British Government and the British Army. I am bound to say that it is not in the interests of British people that they should remain there any longer as one of the intermeddling parties of whom the Foreign Secretary has spoken. I give him hearty support in his desire for a united, free and genuinely independent Palestine, and a democratic Palestine which will govern its own destinies in every way. I do not think that that means that we can walk out tomorrow, but I think we ought to have a time limit. No one is going to believe the story that if we go out Jews and Arabs will massacre each other. If Britain goes out under a ruling of the United Nations Organisation and proper arrangements are made for a short interim period, the Jews and Arabs of Palestine will learn to live together, as everyone acknowledges they are able to do, if not subject to outside interference. They already work together in their trade unions, in big business, and in many other ways.

Mr. S. Silverman: How are we to get it?

Mr. Lever: The way to get it is to go to the United Nations organisation for the temporary cover under which we release our troops and set up the framework of a democratic self-governing Palestine. [*Interruption.*] With the Jews in a minority, at the moment, certainly. That is a matter for the people of Palestine to decide in a democratic way. I am bound to tell the House that I do not believe that any such solution will work without the temporary umbrella provided by the United Nations, it will not work if we do not at once admit a substantial number of Jews into Palestine. That is very different from demanding a Jewish State in Palestine, or a Jewish majority in Palestine. I am told by the Foreign Secretary, and I believe it, because I ventured to suggest the same thing myself some time ago, that, if we do not insist on the idea of a Jewish State and join with the Arabs in demanding self-government in Palestine, we can get agreement with the Arabs to let at least 100,000 Jews into Palestine. I want to see at least 100,000 Jews admitted into Palestine in the immediate future. I think the effect in soothing the

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whole situation would be immense and would give the denial to the pessimistic expectations of permanently bad relations between Jew and Arab. We are told by all sorts of people that these two races can never live together. Of course, they will not, if people with political and financial motives are continually bedevilling their relations. Let us see what are the genuine minimum needs of both sides and we might get rather a different and less gloomy picture of the possibilities from that which has been painted by my hon. Friend the Member for East Coventry.

One of the pressing problems of the moment is the question of the displaced persons, and this problem of displaced persons, if we try to for some academic reason, cannot be separated from Palestine. That problem is inseparably linked up with Palestine. We have to see these helpless people do not rot any longer in the displaced persons camps of Europe, and that we no longer pay mere lip service to humanitarian efforts which ought to have been made on their behalf. I am not afraid to say that there is a difference between displaced Jews and other displaced persons, because the Jews require rather different treatment and consideration. I must tell the House quite candidly that my view is that it is dishonesty and hypocrsy to pretend that the world should take them as an alternative to Palestine when at the present time the whole world shows no sign of wanting to take them. The only people in the world who have offered to take the displaced Jews are the Jews of Palestine who are prepared to die for the right to take them. I do not think that that can be ignored although the Jews are a minority in that country.

I want to put one or two questions and make a short statement. I should like the Colonial Secretary when he comes to reply to tell me in plain terms what steps the Government propose to take in regard to Palestine if the United Nations disagree on that subject. Secondly, I should like him to tell me what the Government proposes to do if the United Nations agree on Palestine. What steps are they to take in the interview. I should like an assurance from him now, particularly after all the statements that have been made on this matter in the House, that there are going to be no deals of an unsavoury kind, but that the British Government will take steps to get out of Palestine and leave Jew and Arab the job or running and ruling their own country. Those who are genuinely concerned about the British troops in Palestine want to see those troops brought home to England, where they are badly needed for the tasks confronting us today.

One final word. Some people in this country seem to have difficulty in understanding the position of the Jews in England and their special interest in the Jews in Europe and the Jews in Palestine. Some Members on both sides of the House in the course of Palestine Debates have made remarks of which on reflection they cannot be proud. I remember when my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) was valiantly fighting the battle of these unfortunate people the hon. and gallant Member for North Blackpool (Brigadier Low) made some remark suggesting a dubious loyalty existed on the part of the British Jews when he made his plea for these people. There is no mystery or secret about it. The British Jews are concerned about the suffering Jews in Europe and in Palestine, and in being so they do not abate one whit their loyalty to this country, but they desire to waken the conscience of the people of the world to the terrible plight of these unfortunate people. I ask the House to see that the Foreign Secretary sincerely fulfils the pledge he has given to get out of that country as soon as possible. I ask the House to insist that there is no double dealing now, because the history of the last 20 years is riddled with double dealing and false promises, which have helped to bring about this intolerable and ruinous state of affairs in Palestine, resulting in injustices to the Jews, fears on the part of the Arabs, and in no confident hope for the peace and prosperity of Palestine in the coming years.

9.6 p.m.

Mr. Manningham-Buller (Daventry): The hon. Gentleman the Member for the Exchange Division of Manchester (Mr. Lever) in the course of his extremely fluid speech took to task the hon. Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman) sitting in front of him. I was sorry that that should occur because that showed on the part of the hon. Member for the Exchange Division of Manchester a singular ignorance of the conditions in Palestine which

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[Mr. Manningham-Buller.]

would be likely to ensue if British troops forthwith left that country. The other point he made was the interest that the British Jews had in Jewish displaced persons. I was sorry that he confined his interest to British Jews. I think that on both sides of the House we are concerned with the interests of the displaced persons whether they be Jews or non-Jews who are now in camps in Europe.

Mr. Lever *rose*——

Mr. Manningham-Buller: I will not give way because I have not the time. I think that everyone will agree that we have listened to a good Debate today on this problem which has been so often debated in the House of Commons. The Foreign Secretary started his momentous and courageous speech by saying that there was no denying the fact that the Mandate was contradictory. That is no new discovery. It has already been pointed out by the hon. Member for East Coventry and it was mentioned in the Peel Report and confirmed in other documents. That in itself is a reasoned and cogent argument for the decision to refer this problem to the United Nations organisation. The right hon. Gentleman then went on to reduce the Palestine problem to three simple questions—simple in the sense that they can be simply asked but by no means easily answered.

The first was, should the claims of the Jews be admitted; secondly, should that of the Arabs; or, thirdly, should it be a United Palestinian State? As he said, we cannot solve these problems, but he invited this House "to face up to" them as he said His Majesty's Government have to "face up to them now." I do not know whether really there is very much point in this House facing those problems now if the Government are going to put them before the United Nations without any recommendation of any kind whatsoever. I agree that in the absence of agreement between Jews and Arabs those are questions which fall to be answered if there is to be a final solution of a difficult and persistent problem. My view of these answers is contained in the Report which I signed and which the hon. Member for East Coventry, among others, also signed. We said there that there should be no Jewish State. I think we were right in that, and having heard arguments since we signed it I personally adhere to that position. After all, the official Zionist demand for a Jewish State has a fairly recent origin, starting, I think, in 1942 with the Biltmore Declaration. I believe that is the first declaration——

Mr. Janner *rose*——

Mr. Manningham-Buller: I am limited in time.

Mr. Janner: That is not correct.

Mr. Manningham-Buller: I think I am entirely correct in saying that the Biltmore Declaration was the first official declaration of the Zionist demand for a Jewish State——

Mr. Paget (Northampton): Surely, there was one before?

Mr. Manningham-Buller: Not official Zionist policy. The hon. Member can correct me later if he desires, but I cannot give way because time is short and the Colonial Secretary wants sufficient time in which to reply. I do not believe that the claim for a Jewish State in Palestine is in the true long-term interest of the Jews in Palestine, and that is why I hope that even at this late date the Jewish organisations may reconsider their official policy. If they study the trend of population, there is no prospect of maintaining a permanent Jewish majority, or of obtaining one without some expulsion of the Arab inhabitants already there. I also agree that there should be no Arab State. I should not assent to the Arabs, with their present intensity of feelings, having any domination over the Jews now in the country. The hon. and gallant Member for Barnstaple (Brigadier Peto), who spoke with knowledge of the country, gave testimony to the fact that politics are removed when Jews and Arabs work together. We on the Commission did not exclude the possibility of both Arabs and Jews working in unison. If we had excluded that, we should have published a very different Report. There has been testimony from both sides of the House to the effect that the door is not yet completely closed to the possibility of Jewish and Arab co-operation in a united Palestine. In my belief, that—a united Palestine, if it can be achieved—is the policy which is likely to lead to greater prosperity in that country than any other.

There has been some discussion this evening on the thorny question of what

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is meant by the " National Home." The hon. and learned Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels) gave us a lengthy disquisition on that subject. The right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) said that the meaning was quite clear to him—that it meant a home and not lodgings, but he did not go further than that, and while he would say, no doubt, that Wales was his national home, he did not go on to indicate whether in his view that meant that Wales should be a national State.

It is agreed on both sides of the House that the Mandate is not only ambiguous but that it contains obligations which it is impossible to reconcile. From that it follows that there must be revision, and in recommendation No. 4 of our Report we anticipated that this matter would go to the United Nations—and that it would go without the delay that has occurred. If there was agreement between the Jews and Arabs as to what should be the contents of a trusteeship agreement, the revision would be so much easier, but even if there is no agreement, still, the revision is equally necessary.

But what is the cause of the delay which has occurred? We were asked to perform our duties in the short period of 100 days, and since then we have been told that there have been these efforts to secure agreement between Jews and Arabs. I listened with great interest to what the right hon. Gentleman had to say as to the history of those efforts and the reasons for the breakdown and change of attitude. I admire him for his optimism but I should have thought that anyone with any knowledge of this problem would have realised that at this present time agreement between Jews and Arabs was really completely impossible.

Indeed, it was completely impossible, as the Peel Report showed, before 1939, and long before the White Paper of that date—and in that respect the hon. Lady the Member for North Hendon (Mrs. Ayrton Gould) was entirely inaccurate. It would be a miracle in my view if that agreement was achieved; it could not be achieved unless the mutual fears of the Arabs and the Jews were resolved. I think we could all agree upon that. Now what are the Arab's fears? The Arab's fears, in the first place, are of Jewish domination; secondly, of dispossession and deprivation of his means of livelihood; thirdly, he fears a flood of immigration which will lead to that domination and to his dispossession. Those are the chief fears, in my belief, in the Arab mind. On the Jewish side, what are their fears? I am talking now not of the political Jews not residing in Palestine who have such an influence on the policy of the Jewish Agency but, so far as I can judge, of the Jews in Palestine. I believe their fear is this, and it can be stated quite simply: the fear that they will be dominated by the Arabs unless, with the aid of immigration, they can keep up their numbers.

We cannot resolve those fears, we cannot dispel them. It can only be done by a change of attitude on the part of the Jews, and also a change of attitude on the part of the Arabs. I regret that since 1942 Jewish domination has been in the forefront of Jewish policy. That was confirmed today by the Foreign Secretary when he said that the Jews thought it wrong that he should consult at all with the Arabs on the question of immigration. As I say, I regard this policy of the Jews, from the point of view of Jewish interests, to be really disastrous on long-term because, whether there is a Jewish state or not in Palestine, the livelihood and well being of those Jews who reside in Palestine must depend on their getting on well with the Arab inhabitants of that country and the surrounding people in the nations alongside. I cannot think that there can be any final settlement by agreement of this problem unless the Zionist attitude changes completely. Like the right hon. Gentleman, I would much prefer an agreed solution because that would have a much greater chance of finality, but I regret the right hon. Gentleman's statement the other day that the only proposals which would be put before the United Nations would be those contained in the White Paper, those which have been rejected either by Jews or by Arabs or by both. What does that mean? It means that if the United Nations accept any of the suggestions put forward in that White Paper, they either have to be imposed by force on the entire population of Palestine or on a majority or minority of the inhabitants who are opposed to that solution, and I cannot regard that as desirable.

Furthermore, these proposals are put forward by the right hon. Gentleman with a view to trying to secure agreement between the Arabs and Jews The proposals

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[Mr. Manningham-Buller.]

put forward to try to negotiate a settlement may not be quite the same as the proposals you put forward if you are trying to determine what is the right course to pursue in the interests of the inhabitants of Palestine. I hope that after this Debate there will be further consideration by His Majesty's Government as to whether or not they should put suggestions before the United Nations when the matter is referred to them.

I do not propose to spend much time on the proposals contained in the White Paper, but I take the view—opposed as I am to partition, having signed that Report—that any policy is better than no policy and, at the present time we have none, but in the final suggestions put forward by His Majesty's Government we give notice that we will quit Palestine in five years. That White Paper concludes with these remarkable words:

> "The proposals contained in the present Memorandum are designed to give the two peoples an opportunity of demonstrating their ability to work together for the good of Palestine as a whole and so providing a stable foundation for an independent State."

That is a great and pious aspiration. But, these people in the past have had many opportunities of working together. They have not taken them, and I feel confident, but reluctant, in expressing the opinion that if that sort of proposal is put forward in the present state of mind in Palestine, it will mean that both sides will prepare for the day when we withdraw and they will then settle their differences by the sword.

Mr. K. Lindsay: I gather that the hon. and learned Member's views were not in complete accord with those of the right hon. Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley). I know it is not usual for the Opposition to put forward policy, but when a matter is so serious as this, I think we should know the policy of the Opposition, as well as that of the Government.

Mr. Manningham-Buller: I signed this Report expressing my view. I am speaking for myself and not committing anyone, nor the party behind me, to adhere to the view stated in the Report.

Mr. S. Silverman: The hon. and learned Gentleman agrees that the Report he signed was expressly not intended to be a long-term agreement, but was a set of transitional proposals? Will he say now what he thinks is a permanent solution?

Mr. Manningham-Buller: I am asked by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) whether our Report was merely a set of transitional proposals? I do not agree with that, and I think that if the hon. Member studies it carefully he will see that it contains both short-term and long-term proposals. I am also asked to suggest the course to be followed now. The question we have to discuss tonight is not so much the policy which one of us might think right, but the course which His Majesty's Government should now pursue—[HON. MEMBERS: "That is the same thing."]—It is not the same thing. The course we are told His Majesty's Government should pursue now, is to throw this matter on to the table of the United Nations, with no recommendation at all. I have said before, and say again, that whether the policy put forward by His Majesty's Government is one with which I personally agree or not, I am prepared to go so far as to say that any policy put forward by them is better than no policy.

Mr. Lever: What policy would the hon. and learned Gentleman like to put forward?

Mr. Manningham-Buller: I wish to carry on with what I was saying before I was interrupted on these matters. I think the House will agree that to throw this matter at the United Nations without any advice, without any recommendations, in the hope that some nation, free from any responsibility, will put forward a solution which is universally acceptable, is a most impracticable hope. We, having governed Palestine, and not too badly at that since the Mandate, are really in the best position to say in what respects the Mandate should be revised, and what the trusteeship agreement, which will replace the Mandate, should contain. If there is no hope, as I think there is no hope, of getting a solution from the United Nations which is really universally acceptable, one can only regard this as another factor leading to delay. During that delay, apparently, the present situation must continue, and, for an indeterminate period, we shall continue to bear alone an intolerable burden, a burden we have borne for the last 18 months largely owing to the fact that His Majesty's Government have had no policy. We shall have to

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bear that burden, apparently, until next September, and we shall have to go on bearing it, apparently, until the United Nations has come to a conclusion, which may be for a much longer time.

I wish to say one word about immigration, because immigration is one of the first things, as the hon. Member for East Coventry said, to which the Arabs and Jews look in considering whether or not a policy is right, the second being land. I cannot help wondering whether, to assist in the solution of the problem in Europe, to which we drew attention in the forefront of our Report, it really would not assist immigration into Palestine if, in future, the selection was made by Great Britain or those to whom immigration certificates were to be given, and if priority was not given in future, and it has not been, I understand, in the last few years, to the aged and infirm who are now in these displaced persons centres, to the very young and to some skilled workmen, whose services are required in Palestine to provide accommodation for them.

As I understand it, the Jewish Agency now has the power of selection. That selection has, in the past, been criticised, I think rightly criticised by the orthodox Jews, Agudath Israel, for not including sufficient orthodox Jews. I criticise it on the ground that in determining to whom certificates for legal immigration should be granted, they have not selected those categories from inside the camps in Europe. I also ask the right hon. Gentleman to say whether the policy with regard to illegal immigrants has now changed. In 1945 an illegal immigrant who was detained, put in a camp, gained priority in securing immigration, under the quota, into Palestine. After he was caught, he went to the head of the queue to gain admission. I hope that that practice has ceased, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will be able to say it has, because of the danger of a wave of illegal immigration which will accentuate the tense situation this summer. I can think of few things so likely to encourage people to attempt this operation than the knowledge that if they are caught they will at least get priority in admission to Palestine.

I wish we had heard today, from the Foreign Secretary, a statement of the terms upon which we were prepared to carry on in Palestine. I wish we had heard from him that he was prepared to go to the United Nations and say, " This, in our view, is what the Mandate should contain. If the Mandate contains this, if it contains these obligations, then if the United Nations, the United States of America and every other country are prepared to support us, we will do our best to carry it through." I hope that we shall get some assurance that by going to the United Nations we are not getting ourselves into the position of undertaking an obligation to fulfil anything which the United Nations, in their wisdom, may determine to be right for the future of Palestine.

9.29 p.m.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Creech Jones): I want to assure the House that all the suggestions which have been made during this Debate will be most carefully studied by the Government. The Debate has shown, once again, how difficult is this problem of the two communities in Palestine, and how divided are the parties in this House in regard to a solution of the difficulties. It is not a problem out of which any party dare attempt to make political capital. I think the approach of the present Government has been that it is a great human problem, calling for the most careful handling, because of the deep human feelings which have been expressed and evidenced over a long period.

Therefore, we would accept the view that any contributions which can be made from any quarter of the House towards finding a method by which Arab and Jew communities can live together in Palestine, will have our most sympathetic examination. It is hardly reasonable to pronounce that His Majesty's Government have not had a policy in connection with this matter. I shall seek to show, if I can, what that policy has been over the past 18 months. It is not necessarily a failure on the part of the Government if, so far, they have been unable to bring the two communities together, for the finding of a constructive solution to a problem which has baffled us over so many years.

Mr. Pickthorn: The Minister spoke about not making political capital. Now he talks about a problem " which has baffled us "—by which I take him to

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[Mr. Pickthorn.]
mean his party—" over so many years." Surely, they were not baffled until after the General Election?

Mr. Creech Jones: I just do not understand the interruption. The problem is one which has baffled the British Government, as the Mandatory Power, almost ever since Great Britain has held the Mandate. There have been difficulties, and disturbances of all kinds. Numerous policies have been announced in the hope of resolving the difficulties between the two communities in Palestine. It is an easy gibe to say that the Government have wasted 12 months on this business, that we should have realised 12 months ago that this problem of trying to administer Palestine under the Mandate was insoluable, and that then we should have gone to the United Nations with the problem. Again, I want to show, it was the responsibility and the duty of the Government to attempt to find the means whereby the two communities could live in harmony together. It was an obligation upon the Government to exhaust all possibilities to achieve this end. When the Labour Government came into office, both Britain and the United States were entangled in promises which had been made to the Arabs. It was clear that, if this problem were to be solved, then a new approach would have to be found to what had already been an intractable problem for previous Governments. It was clear that any possible scheme, if it was to work, would have to be enforced and therefore, it was obviously desirable that an effort should be made to try to procure some agreement by negotiation. There had been the White Paper policy, which presumably was still being applied, and which, brought criticism from the United States. It was the responsibility of the new Government to decide whether, if the approaches which had previously been tried had proved ineffective, a new way should be discovered. Accordingly, representations were made to the United States for the purpose of seeing what degree of co-operation could be obtained from them in finding a way through these difficulties.

It has been said that a great deal of time was lost in obtaining the co-operation of the United States, but I submit that the difficulties were not with the Government, but on the other side of the Atlantic. There was no time lost in obtaining the Report of the Anglo-American Mission, and, immediately, the Mission reported, steps were made for the Report to be studied by the experts. A unanimous series of recommendations—unanimously agreed by the Anglo-American experts—was in our hands on 26th July. Within four or five days, an announcement was made in this House of what the British Government would seek to do in respect of the recommendations of the experts.

Mr. Stanley: When the right hon. Gentleman talks about Anglo-American experts, he is differentiating, is he not, between them and the Anglo-American Mission?

Mr. Creech Jones: I thought it was within the knowledge of the House that, immediately following the report of the Anglo-American Mission, the recommendations were submitted to two bodies of experts drawn from both the United States and the United Kingdom.

Mr. Crossman: Is it not a fact that, on the American side, not one of the experts had visited Palestine, whereas, at least, the Anglo-American Mission had been there?

Mr. Creech Jones: Certainly, but let us get the facts. These were, in the main, persons who were very familiar with these problems, many of them had had very long experience in regard to Palestinian affairs, and they certainly made a series of recommendations as to how the Report which had been received from the Mission——

Mr. Manningham-Buller: The right hon. Gentleman has not answered the question. He has repeatedly called these unknown gentlemen experts. Can he say how many of them have ever been to Palestine?

Mr. Creech Jones: In any case, the point is quite irrelevant. Some of these men were experts in regard to the Palestinian Administration and the problems of the Middle East. The problem which had to be tackled was the implementation of the report of the Mission, and I submit that, when it became obvious that the United States Government were not prepared to implement the Report of the Anglo-American Committee, the British Government themselves took the initiative and

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made their announcement on 31st July. This offered a basis for discussion to both the Arabs and the Jews. At that time, there was a reasonable hope of discussion on the basis of the recommendations contained in the Morrison Report. But let me add this important fact——

Mr. Pickthorn: On a point of Order. May we know, Mr. Speaker, what is meant by the " Morrison Report "?

Mr. Creech Jones: The Morrison Plan, obviously.

Hon. Members: Hear, hear.

Mr. Pickthorn: Hon. Members cannot " Hear, hear " for 20 minutes; the hon. Gentleman will have to say something.

Mr. Creech Jones: I also want to make another point clear. In January, 1946, the British Government made an announcement at the Assembly of the United Nations. They declared that the Palestine Mandate was receiving the close attention of the American and British Governments, and that, as early as possible, an announcement would be made to the Assembly in regard to these discussions. On the winding up of the League of Nations a few months later, Britain again declared, with the other Powers holding Mandates under the League of Nations, that she would observe the obligations of the Mandate until a new arrangement was made with the United Nations. That meant that if we were to present the problem of Palestine to the United Nations, we could only do it in one of two ways. Palestine could either achieve its independence, which was not a practical proposition, because of the opposition of both Jews and Arabs inside Palestine, or alternatively, the trust arrangements could be continued. But if an agreement were to be registered with the United Nations, and Palestine brought under the Trusteeship Council, then it became necessary that an understanding should be reached as between Jews and Arabs, and with the neighbouring Arab States who would also expect to give their agreement. Therefore, whether we liked it or not, if independence was not a possible immediate course for Palestine, sooner or later a trusteeship agreement would have to be negotiated. It was consequently an obligation on the British Government to attempt to find out what the terms of that agreement could be.

It has been suggested that we might have attempted to impose a solution, either of partition or of some plan along the lines which had previously been announced in the House of Commons in July of last year. It was not possible to impose a partition plan in Palestine, even if there had been the unanimous backing of the whole of Jewry, or even assuming that some practical scheme could have been found which would have satisfied the Jews. [HON. MEMBERS: " The Arabs."] No, the Jews. Any attempt to impose a partition solution in Palestine would have been out of harmony with the Mandate itself; it would not have been consistent with the terms of the Mandate. Moreover, it would have exposed us to a great deal of suspicion and distrust, and certainly the other nations in the United Nations would have declared that we were seeking to serve some ulterior purpose.

Mr. Stanley: Is it not a fact that the old League of Nations held that partition was within the terms of the Mandate, and at that time recommended the British Government to find a solution on those lines?

Mr. Creech Jones: That is not the interpretation which has been placed upon it by our own legal advisers. [*Interruption.*] I wish we could at least have an exhibition of good manners on the other side. This argument is of some importance because the Government have been criticised for not having imposed a solution in Palestine; I am trying to show that, as far as partition was concerned, it was not within the power of the Government to impose such a solution. It could only have been enforced by military operations which would have been repugnant to the British people. It would have been a threat to peace and would have brought us before the Security Council, with very doubtful results. In addition, I think, it would have brought us an enormous amount of resentment from the Arabs, and a continuing hostility. That was the position in regard to partition.

It was equally difficult for us to consider the imposition of any alternative scheme which implied the preservation of a united Palestine. The success of such an arrangement depended again on the collaboration of the Arab and Jewish communities, but both Arabs and Jews were

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[Mr. Jones.]
in opposition to a scheme of that kind and neither would accept it. Therefore, our responsibility as a Government, if we could not impose a scheme, and if it was essential to get some kind of basis for a trusteeship agreement, was to discover whether in some way we could obtain the co-operation of both Arabs and Jews. The Morrison Plan had been rejected. When, latterly, His Majesty's Government got the Arabs in conference and the Jews in informal discussions, we attempted very hard to find some plan which might be a basis for securing their co-operation. I want to make clear that what was offered, and what has been known as the Bevin plan, was merely a basis for discussion with the two sides. I do not accept the description of the proposals that was given by my hon. Friend the Member for North Hendon (Mrs. Ayrton Gould). What we attempted to do was to build up in Palestine, for the two communities, self-government, and we tried to give in various areas, to Jews and to Arabs, very real powers, and then to build up, if we could, some central political institutions whereby reasonable parity might be obtained in order to meet Jewish and Arab objections that one might conceivably dominate the other in the national political life of Palestine. Further, in the proposals that were made, we suggested areas which would give reasonable opportunities for economic expansion and land development; indeed, the land which could be freely acquired by the Jews was, I think, three times larger than they are permitted to expand in at the present time. Not only that, we attempted to find a satisfactory formula to cover immigration, because the Jews themselves were dissatisfied lest they found that economic absorptive capacity as a formula would not give them the volume of immigration which they regarded as necessary.

Sir Patrick Hannon (Birmingham, Moseley) *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: I cannot allow any interruptions. There are only seven minutes to go; the Government have been attacked, and they must be allowed to meet those attacks.

Mr. Creech Jones: Those proposals were in the spirit of the Charter. They were within the framework of the United Nations, and responsibilities were given to the respective authorities under the United Nations in the event of difficulties arising.

I come to the next criticism which has been made in regard to Government policy. Why are we making no recommendation to the United Nations? I do not accept the view that our line is to deny British leadership in the United Nations I do not accept the view that to offer this problem for the consideration of the United Nations is derogatory to the prestige of Britain. We shall offer to the United Nations our experience in the working of the Mandate; we shall submit all the schemes which have emerged in the discussions when a settlement has been sought. We shall not be a silent member when these deliberations are going on. The whole history of the Mandate will be objectively presented. There will be no special pleading for a particular solution. But I would like to put this, that on the practical side, when this problem is submitted, we as a nation, in regard to our administration of the Mandate have had to tolerate a great deal of villification, and we have been bitterly attacked, and our administration has come under the most severe scrutiny of various nations.

We have been very unfairly attacked in regard to our administration. Therefore, we feel that it is right and proper that we should let the world now judge what is the best to be done for Palestine. There is a great deal of suspicion and distrust in regard to Britain. If that is so, and if we are told that we are continuously seeking our own self-interest in connection with the affairs of Palestine, let there be a solution which we do not attempt to prejudice, a solution which is likely to give satisfaction to the rest of the world.

Further, all our plans which we have submitted for a solution, have so far been rejected. If we put all our plan within the possession of the Unite Nations it is far better that the Unit Nations, knowing of our experience ar knowing why those plans were submitt and the defects associated with the wor ing of the Mandate, should be able form their own judgment. If it should ha pen that another nation has a brig idea for solving this problem, let th idea be put into the pool. Do not l it be thought that Britain is trying t prejudice consideration of other scheme

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If other nations have ideas and proposals for schemes, let those schemes be fairly considered and let us not seek to deflect from their fair consideration by advocacy of particular schemes of our own.

Mr. C. Davies: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer this question? In what way is this question to be put before the United Nations? Are we the mandatory Power asking for advice, or do we surrender the Mandate and ask the United Nations what they will do about it?

Mr. Creech Jones: That is the point to which I was just coming. We are not going to the United Nations to surrender the Mandate. We are going to the United Nations setting out the problem and asking for their advice as to how the Mandate can be administered. If the Mandate cannot be administered in its present form we are asking how it can be amended. It would be folly for us at this point to prejudice that discussion by ourselves imposing any duress on the United Nations, or trying to set a time limit within which the decision must be taken. If we go to the United Nations we shall do all in our power to get as early a discussion as is possible. We are already exploring the question of how a speedier discussion of this problem can be achieved. It has been represented to us that we should go to the Security Council. I suggest that for the purpose of dealing with a problem such as this the Security Council is an imperfect instrument. Indeed, the machinery of the Security Council is such that it may not make a recommendation to the Assembly. [An HON. MEMBER: "It can call a special meeting."] True, it can call a special meeting. The Security Council may, under the Charter, keep this problem entirely within its own purview. There are other difficulties, and, likewise, there are difficulties about reference to the Trusteeship Council.

It being Ten o'Clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

* * * * * * *

[For Continuation of Proceedings, see Official Report for Wednesday, 26th February, 1947.]

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EXTRACT FROM
HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES

25 FEB 1947

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PALESTINE
(GOVERNMENT POLICY)

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[*Mr. William Whiteley.*]

3.44 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ernest Bevin): The course of events has led His Majesty's Government to decide that the problem of Palestine must be referred to the United Nations, as outlined in the announcement which I made to the House last week. The problem of Palestine is a very vexed and complex one. There is no denying the fact that the Mandate contained contradictory promises. In the first place it promised the Jews a National Home, and, in the second place it declared that the rights and position of the Arabs must be protected. Therefore, it provided for what was virtually an invasion of the country by thousands of immigrants, and at the same time said that this was not to disturb the people in possession. The question therefore arose whether this could be accomplished without a conflict, and events in the last 25 years have proved that it could not.

The Jews set about colonising and there is no doubt that in the sphere they have developed, they have carried out some very great experiments. Many of the Arabs, as I shall explain later, are involved in those developments, such as citrus growing which is vital to the economy of Palestine. As far as Jewish development is concerned, everybody in this country, who has been associated with the affair, certainly up to 1931, assumed that it was a National Home for the Jews about which we were talking. I want to remind the House, however that that is not the issue now. All that is over. The issue which the United Nations must consider and decide is, first, shall the claims of the Jews that Palestine is to be a Jewish State be admitted; second, shall the claim of the Arabs that it is to be an Arab State, with safeguards for the Jews under the decision for a National Home be admitted; or, third, shall it be a Palestinian State, in which the interests of both communities are as carefully balanced and protected as possible? I have put it in that form, because in all negotiations I have had to conduct, and whatever proposals we have adopted today, I come back every time to these three provisions. I cannot escape them and I do not think anyone who has been Colonial Secretary, or who has handled this problem hitherto, however much the question has been argued, has in fact, escaped them.

That, therefore, raises the issue which has got to be decided and we, as Mandatory Power, cannot solve that problem until the United Nations have recommended which of these three alternatives is to form the basis of the future organisation of Palestine. We as Mandatory Power have no power to make that decision. Nothing that I can find in any of the documents, either at the League of Nations, or in the discussions between the great Powers at Versailles and after, indicate that we have that power. The Mandate certainly does not give it, and the Anglo-American Committee, faced with the problem that we have been faced with, came to the view not to recommend a Jewish State, and everybody who has touched the Palestine question is forced back to that every time. I really want the House to face up to this problem which His Majesty's Government have to face up to now. In our recent negotiations the Colonial Secretary and I, over and over again, came up against this fundamental problem. All the proposals we have made for the gradual evolution of Palestine towards independence have been judged by the Arabs and the Jews according to the effect they might have on the final decision of the kind of State Palestine is to be when it becomes independent, and independent it must become. The Mandatory Power cannot go on for ever.

Let me trace the history of this business since we came into office. We gave early consideration to the problem, and discussed the matter very fully. I do not escape the fact—I do not desire to escape it—that when I was a member of the Coalition Government with right hon. Gentlemen opposite I took my corner in trying to see what solution we could find for Palestine. I have a perfectly open mind about it. All I want is a settlement, and I want a settlement because this is one of those sore spots in the Middle East that may, if not settled, lead to much wider trouble—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Various schemes have been evolved in the past, including partition, but all which have come before me, whether in the Coalition Government or

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in this Government, would have to be put into operation by force. That is to say, everybody came to the conclusion that we should not get agreement, but that we would have to come to a decision and then apply force to put it into operation.

His Majesty's Government, after reviewing the situation, came to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, that after all the force we had seen throughout the world in the last 25 years, force applied to this problem would not produce a final solution, that it might create wider difficulties in the Middle East, and might, indeed, start us on a road leading in another quarter of a century to another war. That we have had to face, having regard to the importance to the world economy of the raw materials and the whole position of the Middle East. We, therefore, proceeded, not too hopefully, but with the conviction that it was our duty, to make the effort to try to get a negotiated settlement. To begin with, and I want to make this very clear, we agreed that we could not enforce the White Paper of 1939 as a basis for our policy. It has been suggested that all that was needed was to tear up the White Paper. This raises a very serious question in international affairs, one that cannot be approached lightly. Statements have often been made in this House and outside that when Labour was in Opposition, they stated that they would not be bound by that decision of the Government of the day. But there are many precedents. It has always been accepted, in international affairs at least, that the party coming into office after making such a declaration, does not just tear up existing undertakings, but seeks to change them by proper negotiation and by substituting another policy. I have to emphasise this because this House of Commons did vote for the White Paper. It is true that the Mandates Commission did not endorse it——

Mr. Clement Davies (Montgomery): Not this House—a predecessor.

Mr. Bevin: I always regard this House as continuing from eternity to eternity, and I meant it in that sense. I think I am right—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I did not mean the actual Members of this House. What I meant was that the House in 1939 did, in fact, vote—and the Arabs took that as a decision of the British Parliament—[*Interruption.*] I must say that I should be reluctant to remain Foreign Secretary for five minutes, if I thought that I went to an international conference with a vote of a majority of this House and gave undertakings, and that those undertakings were to be torn up without proper negotiations at the end——

Mr. Sydney Silverman (Nelson and Colne): Would my right hon. Friend say that the White Paper of 1939 represents any kind of agreement or undertaking with any other Power with whom we were in international relations? Was it not merely a declaration of policy by the Mandatory Power.

Mr. Bevin: It was regarded by the Arab States at that conference as an undertaking by the British Parliament and one which would be carried out. May I suggest—[*Interruption.*] Please do not interrupt. We are dealing with one of the most serious problems. I suggest to my hon. Friend that if the vote had been the reverse way, and an undertaking of an inverse character had been given to the Jews, the hon. Member would have been on his feet and said that this was a vote from the House, and that we could not tear it up. Really, I must stand for this as a point of principle, because all my negotiations of any kind with Foreign Powers depend on the integrity of a vote of this House of Commons——

Mr. Turner-Samuels (Gloucester): If that is right, how can the Foreign Secretary reconcile that with the statement of the Prime Minister on 1st July last year in which he said:

> "The Government have never stood by the White Paper policy. . . It is quite wrong to say that we are carrying on the White Paper policy."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st July, 1946; Vol. 424, c. 1907.]

Mr. Bevin: That is quite right, and if the hon. and learned Member will wait a moment, I will show him why. The point I am making is this—and really I must ask the House, whether it is my party or any party, to support me in this because it is fundamental—I am going away next week to Moscow, and when I go to Moscow I shall be asked to give undertakings. When I arrive at conclusions, I shall have to say that it is subject to the ratification of the House of Commons, and when that ratification of the House takes place—whatever the vote is—and that undertaking is given, I assume that

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whatever party succeeds us, whatever its political colour may be, will honour that undertaking until it negotiates a change. I must ask my hon. Friends to accept that; otherwise they ought never to send me to an international conference at all for any purpose. Really I have to state this, because it is fundamental to the carrying on of the business of the country. This is not a question of continuity of policy, but a question of keeping one's word, and, indeed, if there is one thing I have grown up in, not merely as a politician but as a trade union leader, it is that I have kept my word, whatever the opposition may have been.

Therefore, I told the Arabs quite straight that my party declared that they could not be bound by this, and that a change must be negotiated, and I have proceeded on that policy with my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary ever since. I think that is a perfectly legitimate action to take. Thereupon, the present question arose; what should the approach be? The position had become accentuated by the European situation and I thought, with the then Colonial Secretary, that the first step which should be taken—and I agree with the right hon. Gentleman who corrected me the other night about the date—was to decide about immigration. The question was, should immigration come to an end at 31st December, 1945? I communicated with the Arabs and told them that I thought it should not. My right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary in his Department, took it up with the Arabs in Palestine—I dealt with the Arab States—and we agreed that it should continue at 1,500 a month. I will not say, and it would be wrong of me to say, that there was an agreement by the Arabs to do that, but there was at least acquiescence, and on that acquiescence in a friendly way, we proceeded to issue certificates at 1,500 a month.

Since we took that decision in December of 1945, 21,000 Jewish immigrants have entered Palestine over and above the 75,000 for whom the White Paper provides, and immigration now is proceeding at the rate of 18,000 a year. There seems to be an impression everywhere that this is an abnormally low rate of entry, but the fact is that it has only been exceeded five times in the whole history of the Mandate—in 1925, and in the first four years of the Nazi rule in Germany. In other words, 18,000 a year is above the average for the whole Mandatory period and I must say that I felt, having moved up to that as the first step in the opening of negotiations, it was not a bad rate of entry. But I think we might have been able to do more for the Jews, and have increased this rate at that time, if the bitterness of feeling which surrounds this problem of immigration had not been increased by American pressure for the immediate admission of 100,000. I do not desire to create any ill feeling with the United States; in fact, I have done all I can to promote the best possible relations with them, as with other countries, but I should have been happier if they had had regard to the fact that we were the Mandatory Power, and that we were carrying the responsibility—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—and if they had only waited to ask us what we were doing. Then we could have informed them. But, instead of that, a person named Earl Harrison went out to their zone in Germany collecting certain information, and a report was issued. I must say it really destroyed the basis of good feeling that we—the Colonial Secretary and I—were endeavouring to produce in the Arab States, and it set the whole thing back.

However we realised that we had to take American interest in this problem into account. Accordingly, having regard to what they had said, we invited them to join us in forming the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Now I must point out that I have been very severely criticised by people in the United States for not accepting the Committee's Report. I was reminded of this when I was over there recently almost every day. But none of the Report was accepted by the United States except one point, namely, the admission of 100,000 immigrants. I was perfectly willing to stand up to the problem of the Report as a whole, which included 10 points. I have never gone back on that, but even if I had, as events have turned out, it would not have settled the Palestine problem, as I shall show before I sit down. We could not undertake this, except as a part of the general settlement, and we had to continue our efforts to work out policy.

Our first attempt resulted in the plan for provisional autonomy. I must remind the House that the Anglo-American Committee reported against a Jewish State. Therefore, taking the Report as a basis,

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we put forward this provisional autonomy plan as a basis for negotiation. We did not lay it down but, if I may say so, if other countries with different races and different religions, can work on the cantonal principle, I really cannot see why it cannot work in Palestine as elsewhere. We then tried to convene a conference of both Arabs and Jews. We tried very hard to get the Jews into conference. I interviewed their representatives in Paris, in London, and I tried to persuade them, to the best of my ability to come in and face the issue with us.

I profoundly regret they did not. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I know—and I do not want to set one section of Jews against another—that those who have been trained in England and grown up under English customs and practice, wanted to come in, but the Jewish Agency, very largely dominated by New York, would not really come in, and it was with gentlemen from there that I had to deal so much. They would not join the conference unless, as a prerequisite, we would more or less commit ourselves to a Jewish State in advance, either partition or as a whole. How could I? I had to consult Arabs, I had to discuss the whole problem, and how could any representative of His Majesty's Government give an advance declaration one way or the other? However, we did agree to put any plan which the Jewish Agency cared to submit on the agenda, and to examine it on its merits whatever it involved.

The proposal I put to them was, "Here is the British plan. There is the Arab plan"—it by then had been drawn up—"You have your plan. Let us take these three plans, and see if, out of them, we can produce a solution." I knew from experience that I could not get them in the same room. That, too, I think is regrettable when you have a problem of this character to solve. And in this case it was the Arabs who were the greatest difficulty. I want to make a balanced statement on this, quite fairly. They argued that experience of the past was not helpful, but the Jews were willing if I would accept the Jewish State, in some form, in advance. I could not do that, so they did not come into the conference. Neither could I get them into one room.

I did reach a stage, however, in meeting the Jews separately, in which I advanced the idea of an interim arrangement, leading ultimately to self-government. I indicated that I did not mind whether it was five years, or 10 years, or three years, or whatever it was. I said to them, "If you will work together for three, five, or 10 years, it might well be that you will not want to separate. Let us try to make up the difference." At that stage things looked more hopeful. There was a feeling—I do not think I overestimated it—when they left me in the Foreign Office that day, that I had the right approach at last. But what happened? I went back to the Paris Peace Conference, and next day—I believe it was the Day of Atonement, or a special day of the Jewish religion—my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister telephoned me at midnight, and told me that the President of the United States was going to issue another statement on the 100,000. I think the country and the world ought to know about this.

I went next morning to the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, and told him how far I had got the day before. I believed we were on the road, if only they would leave us alone. I begged that the statement be not issued, but I was told that if it was not issued by Mr. Truman, a competitive statement would be issued by Mr. Dewey. In international affairs I cannot settle things if my problem is made the subject of local elections. I hope I am not saying anything to cause bad feeling with the United States, but I feel so intensely about this. A vexed problem like this, with a thousand years of religious differences, has to be handled with the greatest detail and care. No one knows that more than I do. I have seen these tense religious struggles in parts of this country, in Ireland, and elsewhere. I know what it involves. It can lead to civil war before you know where you are. However, the statement was issued. I was dealing with Jewish representatives at the time, and I had to call it off because the whole thing was spoilt.

One thing is clear. I had to open the conference with the Arabs alone, and they put the point to me that they wanted finality. They wanted to determine what the future of Palestine was to be. The Jews also want finality, provided it takes the form of a Jewish State. But they would be prepared to see British rule continued as a protecting Power, provided it was clearly aiming at a Jewish Sovereign

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State. The conference was suspended at that time. The United Nations was meeting in New York. I thought that by going to New York, I could talk to a lot of people, and try to help the thing along by meeting people, and so on. While there I discussed the matter with the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, and at the end, he made a public statement saying that the basis upon which Great Britain was proposing to hold the conference, in his view merited the attendance of the Jews as well as the Arabs. Even that, from America, produced no results.

Then came the second session of the conference with the Arabs. In view of the difficulty, we agreed to have informal talks with the Jewish Agency. We did not press them to come into conference. I have been too long a negotiator to stand on form. I thought it was better, if they could not see their way clear to come into the conference, that I should meet them informally, and see whether, with my colleagues, I could get over this difficulty. When we met, the Arabs adhered to their plan for a unitary independent State in Palestine. They have reiterated at every meeting that they have never accepted the Palestine Mandate, nor recognised the legality of the Balfour Declaration. Nevertheless, they told us they were willing to recognise the results of this policy so far as the present residents in Palestine were concerned. These included about 600,000 Jews, now nearer 700,000 I am told, already living in Palestine with 1,200,000 Arabs.

I say this in all seriousness. If it were only a question of relieving Europe of 100,000 Jews, I believe a settlement could be found. I believe a settlement can now be found if it is purely the humanitarian problem I have to solve. Unfortunately, that is not the position. From the Zionist point of view the 100,000 is only a beginning, and the Jewish Agency talk in terms of millions. I think the Arabs could be persuaded to agree to 100,000 new immigrants, in an orderly way, on humanitarian grounds, having regard to the European situation if—and I emphasise this—immigration after that, was to be determined by the elected representatives of the people of Palestine.

The claim made by the Arabs is a very difficult one to answer. We here in Great Britain as a House of Commons determine whether people shall be admitted into this country or not. No one else is doing that. Why should an external agency, largely financed from America, determine how many people should come into Palestine, and interfere with the economy of the Arabs, who have been there for 2,000 years? This is what I have to face. There may be an answer to it, if it is on the merits of how long the respective parties have owned the country. But, the Arabs say they are not going to be pushed out, by an external agency, from a country which they regard as their own—I am using their words—and in which they have been living for just about as long as England has been a Christian country. That is what the House has to face, and it is a difficult thing to answer. I do not know what would happen if a lot of Welshmen tried to drive the Englishmen out. There would have to be a buffer state. The difficulty would be no doubt intense. Under the Arab plan the Jewish National Home—and they now accept the National Home—although they did not accept the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate, they will accept the National Home——

Mr. Kenneth Lindsay (Combined English Universities): Does that also mean partition?

Mr. Bevin: No. I will deal with partition in a moment. But they accept the Home within a unitary State. That gives an Arab majority. I have argued with both Jews and Arabs. What is it we have got to solve? Are the Jews a State or are they a religion. I have got to face the question of Catholics, Mahommedans and everybody else, and really, this is a difficult thing to decide. I cannot believe that if there is a unitary State in Palestine every Arab will vote for an Arab candidate—he may in the first instance—or that every Jew will vote for a Jewish candidate. About the only constituency in this country which returned a Communist candidate was Mile End and they have a perfect right to do so. No one is elected to this House either as a Jew or a Christian. One is elected as a man, as a representative. Therefore, one will have Communists, one will have Socialists, and it depends on the intelligence of the people whether there will be Conservatives. It may be that there will be some liberalism, even in Palestine. There is no doubt that people will form views

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which will crystallise. Therefore, the Arabs argue, "Leave it to the intelligence of the people who live in the State."

Mr. S. Silverman: Will my right hon. Friend explain to the House exactly what he understands by the word "National" in the phrase "Jewish National Home"?

Mr. Bevin: I am sorry that I cannot give an accurate definition, and Balfour is dead. I do not say that unkindly, but whether anyone can explain what people meant at the time, I do not know. When I used it, there was an understanding on the part of the Arabs that in Palestine, in view of certain historical associations, those Jews who had migrated there should have their liberty and freedom—no pogroms, no persecution—and be equal citizens of the State. That makes it a national home—[*Interruption.*] My national home is in England, with the same conditions.

Mr. Turner-Samuels: My right hon. Friend says that the Arabs are prepared to accept the National Home. If he does not know what that is, and cannot give a definition of it, what is the good of telling the House that the Arabs are prepared to accept it?

Mr. Bevin: Because they agreed in their plan—hon. Members have it before them—that "You can have your own language, your own university, your own religion, everything"—[*Interruption.*] My hon. Friend says, "Very kind of them," but if other countries that persecuted Jews had only given them that, there would never have been a problem.

Mr. Lipson (Cheltenham): It is the people who matter.

Mr. Bevin: It is human rights which are the basis of the United Nations, and in the proposals, which I thought were perhaps too limited—I did not accept them—they were fundamental principles which I thought gave effect to what I understood to be the basis of the claim originally made by Nathan Rothschild and other people—I have read all the papers—in the original discussions.

I want to put the other side. The Jews say that if that is done they will be tolerated as a minority. I cannot alter the balance of people in a State—that is impossible—any more than one can alter it between Nehru and Jinnah today in India. The numbers are there, and one cannot alter it in any country. Then we tried our hand at another plan. Members will have seen it in the White Paper. The plan had certain features common to the Anglo-American Report and the Provincial Autonomy Plan. From the Arab point of view, those proposals had the advantage that they placed in Arab hands the maintenance of existing safeguards against the dispossession of Arab cultivators, and at the end of two years they would have given the Arabs a voice in determining the rate of immigration. We proposed to set up a Governor's Council, and in two years—and this was not based on anything but humanitarian principles—96,000 people would have been allowed from Europe, without any question of economic absorptive capacity. That was the proposal. Afterwards, the High Commissioner was to consult a council of both Jews and Arabs, and after consulting them he was to decide, on the basis of economic absorptive capacity, incorporating the words of the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill), which he included in the 1922 White Paper.

Mr. Janner (Leicester, West): Will my right hon. Friend permit me to ask one question, a rather important one. What is the proposal with regard to the fulfilment of the provisions in the Mandate about the Jewish Agency, which is recognised as an international body?

Mr. Bevin: I will come to that, but my hon. Friend is delaying my statement, and I hope that I shall be allowed to proceed. We proposed that if the High Commissioner's decision was not accepted by either party, the Secretary-General of the United Nations would appoint an arbitration tribunal, and we, as the Mandatory Power, would abide by the result. Was that not reasonable? What was the answer? It was that that proposal was rejected because we proposed that the Arabs should be consulted at all. Really, His Majesty's Government could not accept a position in which one was going to admit people into a country, and representatives of the people living in it must not be consulted. That was really too tall an order, and I could not, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, accept that. I am saying this because I am leading up to the point where I shall

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say, at the end, that there is a chance of a settlement yet, without going to the United Nations, if people will come off their arbitrary positions. I am still open to try.

Then the other difficulty was that the present Government have no roots in the people at all. It is an alien Government imposed on the top by a mandatory government. I do not know what previous people who held the office of Colonial Secretary had in their minds, but I am perfectly sure in the discussion of this problem during the five years when I was in the Coalition Government it was never intended that we should be a Mandatory Power for ever. It was intended to lead to something and that the regulation of our relationship with Palestine should, in the end, be on a treaty basis and not a mandatory basis. That is as I understood it, and I believe that there is agreement on that. Therefore, I thought it would be a good thing. Suggestions have been put to me over and over again by hon. Members of this House and by Members of another place, " Why not try to establish a British Dominion to try to solve the problem?" But really it is too late for that.

The Trusteeship Council has been established and there is no other road but the establishment of a trusteeship leading to independence from a mandatory position, unless we get agreement between the parties, and there was no chance of agreement. Therefore, we proposed a trusteeship for five years—for two years with 96,000 immigrants, and arbitration after that on the question of the economic absorptive capacity—and that we should begin at once by creating municipal areas in certain parts of Palestine which would have Jewish majorities, and others which would have Arab majorities. In order to achieve that, we designed our plans to give the Jews the benefit of Tel Aviv. It is not realised that 78 per cent. of the Jews live in Tel Aviv and the balance are on the land. It is sometimes assumed that they are all on the land. That is not true. They are an urban population.

Mr. Oliver Stanley (Bristol, West): The right hon. Gentleman said that 78 per cent. live in Tel Aviv. I do not think he meant that. I think he meant that they live in urban districts.

Mr. Bevin: I beg pardon. They live in urban areas. Taking the Tel Aviv population with that of other urban areas, we have this majority of 78 per cent. It is quite clear that the police for the maintenance of order have no roots in the place. We suggested devising a police system like our own which would be partly central and partly municipal in the respective areas. It would be recruited in a way similar to that adopted in Birmingham, or any other local government area in this country. This was suggested so as to begin building up a government with roots in the people, ready to hand over. After four years, we suggested a constituent assembly which should endeavour to work out a Constitution. If they could not succeed—this is not British territory; we hold it under trust—we would return to the United Nations and ask for their help and advice. We felt that if we could begin self-government, begin getting people to work together, it would help to solve the problem. I am convinced that if the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine—I emphasise in Palestine—are given a chance to work together, they will work together and solve this problem, but if it is to be settled in accordance with the Jewish Agency's dictates, it will never be settled. I am speaking, I hope, impartially.

Mr. Janner: With the greatest respect——

Hon. Members: Order.

Mr. Bevin: I have given way many times. In the Citrus Board, in the trade boards and the various boards of commerce, they do work together. If they can work together in trade and commerce in that way, personally I am convinced that if given the chance and removed from political difficulty, then the Jews and Arabs will develop a State of which they can well be proud. That is my view, and I am entitled to my view after all these negotiations. We have been compelled to maintain a Government with which the people, as I say, have not been sufficiently associated. We, therefore, tried a new method. It was rejected.

In the other States of the Middle East where we also had a Mandate, it has led to self-government—in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and all the rest. I want to suggest that the cultural development of the Arabs and Jews in Palestine is of as high a standard

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as the cultural development and aptitude for government to be found in any other Arab State. That being so, we rather pinned our faith on developing independence in that way. If this policy was expressed in connection with any other place in the world, I believe this House, the United Nations, and everybody else, would say that our policy was right in that we were aiming for independence, getting rid of the Mandate and developing self-government and self-determination with proper protection for the rights of any minorities. That has been our policy and I think if this was not Palestine, it would have been successful.

I was asked a question about defining the National Home. This has been a great puzzle to me. When the Balfour Declaration and the subsequent Mandate were made, nobody indicated, as far as I can discover, when the National Home would be established. I cannot find it anywhere. Was it millions of Jews; was it a majority; was it a Jewish State, or what was it? The only expression that I can find is this vague expression of a " Jewish National Home." I know the reason for this Declaration. I konw why it was made, but I do not believe it would help the discussion now. It was thought by most people prior to 1939, that the steps that had been taken up to date, did really fulfil the Balfour Declaration. Between the Labour Party and the party then in office a great dispute was carried on in this House. But, frankly, the more one reads the documents, the more difficult it is to find any guide as to when a Jewish National Home has been completed or established. It was for that reason that we thought if we developed these municipal areas, if we transferred the land regulations, the laws and the police, and all this kind of thing, to majorities in that area, we should have established in fact the National Home. We should have established the National Home within a unitary State, with a free chance to the Jews for their own development, which would have allowed them in the joint Parliament of Arabs and Jews, to have had their say in the affairs of the world.

That leads me to another point, which is also a very difficult one. It is said that, if we have a unitary State, the Jews, as Jews, will not be in the United Nations. Really, this is raising a very big question. Are we in the United Nations as a religion, are we in the United Nations as a people geographically situated, or how are we in it? If the United Nations is to arrive at a position in which it will have five or six great religions as dominant factors, then that will be a very disturbing situation, and, as far as I am concerned, at any rate——

Mr. Turner-Samuels *rose*——

Mr. Bevin: I have given way very often already, and the hon. and learned Gentleman will have his turn. I must raise this issue, because really it is fundamental. I have to deal with the points put to me by the Jewish Agency, and the Jewish Agency says that, " as nationals, but not as Jews, we shall be in the United Nations." I never knew, and I never thought, that we had promised or done anything to establish a situation of that character, but, if that is the case, let us do it with our eyes open. This is one of the difficulties which I see, and I say this because I want both the Jews and the Arabs to reconsider their position. We are united in the United Nations today as States, and, within every State of the United Nations, there are any number of religions. It may be different, but that is the situation that is put to me, and I hope it will be debated and brought out, because it does raise a very serious position, especially for a Commonwealth like this, which represents every possible phase of people in the world. We cannot divide ourselves like that.

Therefore, I have asked, over and over again, if it will not be possible to have a Palestinian State, and with the ability that is there—the business ability, and it is exceptional and has done remarkably well, the statesmanship and the aptitude for government—cannot we find a place through a Palestinian State to deal with these problems in the United Nations from a State point of view? That is the question which I should like debated in the course of this Debate, because it is the issue upon which the whole crux of this settlement really depends. I hope it will not be dealt with in any spirit of prejudice, because we have to face these issues, and because, when we go to the United Nations next September, these are the issues which I suggest are going to come before us. Take the position of Russia. I do not know how many races there are in that great territory, covering one-seventh of the globe, but it is colossal,

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[Mr. Bevin.]

and I have never heard that this particular theory has been advanced there. Therefore, I ask for consideration of this problem.

May I now turn to the question of partition? A good many people have said that the way out of the difficulty is to have partition. I am sure that, if we have agreed to partition, we would have had a tremendous row as to where the frontier should be. We have drawn frontiers in the Provincial Automony Plan; I have seen the Jewish idea of partition in an American paper, but we really cannot make two viable States of Palestine, however we may try. We can make one viable State, and, so far as I can see, or as far as any student of the map could see, the only thing we could do would be to transfer the rest to one of the Arab States, but I ask what trouble is that going to cause in the whole of the Arab world? That will set going a conflict which will be worse than the conflict we have tried to settle. It has been suggested that we could do it by knitting in Transjordan, and it is argued that we carried out partition when we created Transjordan. That may be, but, if we try now, with Palestine as we know it today, to make it into two viable States, I say that we cannot do it. If we try to take away the taxable capacity of the best areas of Palestine for productive purposes, and that taxation goes entirely to the Jewish portion, you cannot expect the others to accept it. You cannot expect to make the one State dependent upon somebody else. The best partition scheme, and the most favourable one that I have seen up to now, has the effect that it would leave, at the present moment, 450,000 Jews and 360,000 Arabs in that Jewish State. I put that to the Arabs quite frankly, and what was their answer? The Arabs say: "If it is wrong for the Jews to be in a minority of $33\frac{1}{3}$ or 40 per cent. in the whole country, what justification is there for putting 360,000 Arabs under the Jews? What is your answer to that?" I have no answer to that.

Therefore, you transfer one large issue in solving your problem by partition, and there are only two possible consequences. Either the Arabs in the partitioned State must always be an Arab minority, or else they must be driven out—the one thing or the other—and, on that basis, I am afraid that I should be led, and the Government would be led, to a worse position. I have been asked "Why go to the United Nations?" Any remedy that has been put up to the Government in the form of creating a Jewish State, will lead to one result—the Arab States will take you to the United Nations. Supposing we partitioned the country now, and the question then went to the United Nations. Syria, or some other country, would take us to the United Nations, where we should have our conduct discussed on the basis of our legal action in carving up a State that was not ours, and I venture to suggest, after my experiences in New York last year, that Britain would be placed in a very funny position. It is indefensible. We can discuss all these things, I know, quite easily, but, really, we cannot do that.

Therefore, the Government tried to get the best they could within the Mandate, and, in the end, we came to the conclusion that this Mandate is really unworkable. I think we could establish a case that we have carried out what the Mandate originally intended, provided that the problem had not been accentuated by the Hitler regime. If we take the ratio of migration and development unaccentuated by the Hitler regime, I think that the original basis of the Mandate, as visualised in 1922, has, in fact, been carried out. What we have not been able to do, is to meet with this Mandate the accentuated position created by the Hitler regime and the persecution in Germany. That is my view. I believe that continuous British Governments have done their best all the way through.

The Palestine Administration has had one of the most difficult tasks of any administration in the world. Sometimes, when reading the reports and documents, I wonder how they managed to carry through. They have had no support from the people, and they have been criticised by both sides. I believe that they have honestly tried to do their best, and that if there has been a failure in dealing with the problem of these displaced persons due to Jewish persecution, it has not been the Palestine Mandate, as administered on the original basis, which has been the cause of failure; it has been the failure of the moral consciousness of international organisations to grapple with this problem as a whole which has left the problem as it is at the present time.

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Take the position now. There are a million displaced persons on the Continent. I have said to Governments, week after week, what is a million people out of 4,000 million in the world? I have made the offer—and I make it from this Box today—that, to get over this problem, we will take a proportion, together with all the other countries of the world, of that million, and add them to our population in order to get rid of this miserable state of affairs. The thing ought to be taken up and grappled with. I pleaded with the United States to take in thousands—I do not mean Jews; I do not single out Jews, and I do not think they ought to be singled out. But all States ought to do it. It is really absurd to think that, with all the organisation built up for this business, one million people could not be thus absorbed. That ought to be done, but, everywhere I go, and everywhere I turn, nobody wants them. It is a tragedy. They are doing something in South America, and in some other parts of the world, but it is relatively very little.

I will not mention the name of one great statesman in the British Commonwealth who came and gave me a half hour's lecture on the Zionist problem. When he had finished, I said to him, "How many will you take? I will get a ship and send them to you tomorrow." Not one. That is really sympathy without relief. We really ought to get rid of this problem, and if I could get back to the contribution on purely humanitarian grounds of 100,000—that is, 60,000 more than we are now taking in over two years—into Palestine, and if this political fight for a Jewish State could be put on one side, and we could develop self-government by the people resident in Palestine, without any other political issue, I would be willing to try again. I honestly believe that it could be accomplished. But, if the attack is made that this is merely the advance proportion coming out of Europe, in order that more millions can be poured in, so as to get a complete Jewish State, which we have never undertaken to create, I am afraid—and I say this with great sincerity—that will provoke a conflict in the Middle East which I do not desire to see. There is enough conflict in the world already. I am convinced that if, as I have said today, we can bring the matter back to this contribution to the relief of European suffering, which was where His Majesty's Government originally started to deal with it, then there is a chance of solution.

Finally, there is the question of time. I have been asked whether we can do something before September. It is very difficult, and I cannot give an answer. I am studying the matter to see whether there is any process by which we can get it considered earlier, under the Charter. But I must ask for more time on that. I am in consultation with Sir Alexander Cadogan, who knows the Charter inside out, to see whether anything can be done. Even now, rather than that it should go to the United Nations, I would prefer that Great Britain, with all her traditions, should be allowed to deal with the problem on a humanitarian basis. Let us remove the political conflict and get back to relieving Europe of these 100,000 people as we are asked to do, and let us be allowed to deal with any further immigrants on the basis I have suggested. If there is a dispute, let there be arbitration, and, in the quickest possible time we can create an independent State in Palestine where Jew and Arab, who have such traditions and have contributed so much to the religious and cultural thought of the world, can work together and end these century-old conflicts.

4.58 p.m.

Mr. Oliver Stanley (Bristol, West): It had been the intention of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition to open this Debate from our side of the House. I am sure that the whole House will sympathise with the family bereavement which is the cause of his absence today, and I am also sure that the House will regret that one who has played such a prominent part in connection with the problem which we are now discussing, should be absent on such a vital occasion.

I am not always in agreement with the views of the right hon. Gentleman on Palestine, and perhaps many in this House have differed from it, but all of us have been impressed with the sincerity of his feelings and the generosity of the emotions which have led to it.

In the last 18 months, His Majesty's Government have had every reason to be grateful to hon. Members on this side of the House for their behaviour in regard to the Palestine question. During the whole of that time, we have refrained from Debate which might excite controversy on the policy to be adopted. We have, **it**

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[Mr. Stanley.]

is true, on several occasions discussed law and order, but the only Debate which has taken place upon policy was at the request of His Majesty's Government. I think the right hon. Gentleman will agree that, during that Debate, we tried to be constructive rather than destructive. We on this side have been actuated by a sincere desire that this Government, or any other Government, should be enabled to find a solution. That a successful solution would redound to the credit of the present Government is a little thing compared to the benefits that a successful solution would confer upon the nation. Looking back, I am not sure that we have been altogether wise. It may be that if we had pressed on more frequent occasions for a Debate we should not be in the situation in which we find ourselves now, which, shorn of all verbiage, is that after 18 months nothing has happened in Palestine, and now for the best part of another year nothing can happen.

I cannot disguise the fact that I and many of my hon. Friends did under those circumstances feel considerable disquiet at the statement made by the right hon. Gentleman last week. It was only a few days since we had had a Debate in this House upon the maintenance of law and order in Palestine. During that Debate all speakers on both sides of the House, whatever views they might have taken upon the immediate problem of the maintenance of law and order, expressed their opinion that it was inextricably bound up with the announcement of some policy by His Majesty's Government, and that the Administration could not indefinitely maintain law and order unless such a policy was produced. I remember that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in winding up that Debate, repudiated in a tone almost of ferocity—which is not usually one of the attributes of his Parliamentary speeches—the idea which seemed to be held by some that the Government have no policy on Palestine. In those circumstances the statement of last week, which no one after all can claim to be a policy, which is only a postponement of the issue and a plan to get others as well as ourselves to join in finding a policy, came as a great disappointment.

Today we have had from the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary a remarkable speech. With some of it I agree, with some I disagree. I am grateful for some of the things he said, and I am sorry for some of the things he omitted to say. Certainly in that speech he set out clearly and sombrely the difficulties which lie today, but which also have lain for several years, in the way of finding a solution for the Palestine problem. In that speech he certainly displayed a willingness to appreciate the Arab point of view and a fairness in stating the Arab case which has not always been shown in speeches made on this problem by members of his Party or by his colleagues. I cannot help thinking that it was a pity the right hon. Gentleman did not make that speech at the Blackpool Conference in June, 1945. How different it was in tone from the speech which was actually made then by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer. He saw no difficulties, he saw no two points of view. He did not think it was necessary to wait for the decision of the United Nations. He was quite clear—unlimited immigration and a Jewish State. That was to be the policy of the Labour Party.

Mr. S. Silverman: Unlimited except by economic conditions.

Mr. Stanley: Yes, unlimited except by economic conditions—that was to be the policy of the Labour Party, and he pledged his Party light heartedly to a solution the difficulties of which have today been put before us and before his Party so potently by the right hon. Gentleman. I did not sympathise with the solution then proposed, but I confess that today I have some sympathy with the Jews. If that had been said two years ago, if that had been the policy of the Labour Party over the last few years, if they had been told then as they are being told now that their aspirations for a Jewish State were unobtainable, who knows but that there might not have been some change in their policy, that they might not today be putting forward that policy with a vigour some of which they would draw from the belief that it was hon. Gentlemen opposite who for years had been supporting them in their demands?

Mr. S. Silverman: And that the White Paper of 1939 was binding on the Labour Government.

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Mr. Stanley: I will leave the hon. Gentleman to pursue that point. Although I agree with much of the right hon. Gentleman's definition of the difficulties that face anyone looking for a solution in Palestine, we must remember that a mere statement of difficulty in the end gets us nowhere, and that, however difficult it is, sometime, somehow, somebody must make a decision, somebody must choose between those difficulties, somebody must choose between the dangers, and among alternative courses all of which may be dangerous somebody must find the courage to choose the least bad.

I do not propose today to follow the right hon. Gentleman in his analysis of all the various solutions that have been put forward. If I did I should have something to say about the solution which I have always confessed would be the one I should prefer, but which he dismissed rather summarily and not entirely objectively. We have to face quite a different situation today from that to which the right hon. Gentleman's speech was devoted. We have to face the fact that the Government are not themselves announcing a policy, which we either criticise or approve, or against which we can put up some alternative solution. The Government are defending or explaining a decision that they will, under certain circumstances and at a certain time, go to the United Nations and obtain from them the advice, and if possible the support, which they need, and it is to that decision rather than to a perhaps airy discussion of the various alternatives which have been put forward for Palestine that I want to devote my attention this afternoon.

I want to make it plain from the beginning that as far as we on this side are concerned we have no complaint to make at all about a reference of this problem at this stage to the United Nations. We agree that in any case it would have been necessary, *ex post facto*, to submit any solution we proposed to the Trusteeship Council, and we agree that in the special circumstances of the day it may well be that rather than that it is better to get prior approval and support from the Assembly. While we do not criticise the decision to go to the United Nations, we criticise both the timing of that appeal and the method of the appeal. We find it very difficult to understand the delay that has already taken place. The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary advanced the principle, for which there is much to be said, that in default of agreement between the two parties, it is necessary to go to the United Nations for a decision, but the right hon. Gentleman must have known—and so must his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies—many months ago that there was really no prospect of agreement between Jews and Arabs, if by "agreement" one means a prospect of those two parties coming together and setting their names to a policy which is then to be carried out.

Certainly, in the years I was connected with the problem I never heard any expert connected either with the Foreign Office or with the Colonial Office suggest that there was any possibility of that occurring, and I should be very surprised if, in the intervening months, they had changed their minds. I was always told—and I believe this still to be the case—that in no circumstances would either side dare to make in advance the concessions that would be necessary to secure agreement, and therefore, what one had to aim at was not to attempt the imposition of an agreement beforehand, but to attempt oneself to find a solution which it might be possible that both sides would acquiesce in afterwards. If it was the decision of the Government that, in default of agreement, the whole matter should be referred to the United Nations, I suggest that it was the duty of the Government so to arrange their programme of announcements and discussions that, when the moment came to make that reference to the United Nations, it could come speedily and without the intolerable delay which now confronts us.

In view of the decision of which we are now told, I cannot understand the events of last summer. The Morrison plan, as it is called—I think not because the right hon. Gentleman the Lord President of the Council invented it, but because he read it—was produced at the very beginning of August. It was made abundantly clear by both parties, Jews and Arabs, that it was not acceptable to them, and the rejection was based not upon this or that detail which might have been susceptible to modification, but on a fundamental divergence of view which

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has come up on every proposal that has been made—who is to control immigration, not for this year, not for next year, but in perpetuity, because the man who controls immigration decides whether there is to be a Jewish or an Arab majority, and whoever decides whether there is to be a Jewish or an Arab majority decides whether there is to be a Jewish or an Arab State. In those circumstances, it would have been easy to have—as one had to have for the sake of courtesy—the discussions with Jews and Arabs, although they were bound to result in failure, at the beginning of August and some time in October, when the meeting of the Assembly of the United Nations took place. It would have been easy to establish at that time this fundamental disagreement between the two parties, and it would have been easy to bring it before the United Nations in October last for the decision which has now to be postponed until next September. Indeed, it is very difficult, if this has always been the plan of the Government, to understand one particular passage in the speech which the President of the Board of Trade made in that Debate, because the suggestion, which is now the policy of the Government, that the matter might be referred to the United Nations was made during the Debate by several hon. Members, and this was the answer of the President of the Board of Trade:

"One or two hon. Members yesterday made the suggestion that the whole matter ought now to be referred to U.N.O. for fresh decisions and suggestions. It will of course be necessary for the terms of the trusteeship agreement which is to supersede the Mandate to be settled by U.N.O. . . . indeed, many hon. Members have already stressed the need for a speedy decision, and have noted quite rightly"—

this was last August—

"the deterioration in atmosphere that has gone on while we have been awaiting the present agreement. In the existing circumstances we believe a quick decision to be absolutely essential."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st August, 1946; Vol. 426, c. 1241.]

It was because of the need for a quick decision last August that the idea that it might have been referred to U.N.O. last October was rejected by the President of the Board of Trade. How can we reconcile that with the present proposal that it should go to the United Nations next September? I shall await from the right hon. Gentleman an explanation, and failing that, the Government will have to bear a responsibility for a delay which, on their own claim, could have been avoided, and a delay which has already caused much difficulty. To turn now, not to the delay which has taken place, but to the delay that lies in front of us, is there no way of avoiding that seven months' delay between now and the meeting of the ordinary Assembly of the United Nations in September next? I regard that delay as being fraught with all possible dangers, as something that ought to be avoided at all costs, and I beg the Government, if it is in any way possible, to curtail that delay. The suggestion was made to the right hon. Gentleman that one might get over this difficulty by referring the matter to the Security Council under Article 34. He replied that it was not within the terms of Article 34, and he did not think it threatened the peace of the world, but perhaps I might quote to him something which he said on 30th November, 1945:

"Considerations not only of equity and of humanity, but also of international amity and world peace, are thus involved in any search for solution."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 13th November, 1945; Vol. 415, c. 1928.]

In his speech today, the right hon. Gentleman referred to Palestine as a sore spot which, if not settled, would lead to wider disturbances; and it is difficult to see how, in view of those statements of the right hon. Gentleman, it would not be possible to bring this question within the ambit of the Security Council. It may well be that the right hon. Gentleman does not think the Security Council the right body to settle the matter, but one of the merits of bringing it before the Security Council in the first place is that the Security Council, under Article 20, could call a special meeting on the Assembly to consider the question, and it might be possible then still to submit this question to the Assembly of the United Nations, but to submit it much earlier than September, which is the date of the ordinary meeting. I feel that, whatever the difficulties, every attempt should be made to bridge a gap which may well prove to be disastrous to the possibility of any final settlement, and will certainly impose an immense strain on our own people during that period.

The second thing that we regret about the form in which this appeal is being made to the United Nations, is the fact that His Majesty's Government propose

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to lay the question before the Assembly with no indication of the policy which they themselves prefer. All kinds of suggestions, with some of which the right hon. Gentleman has dealt today, are to be put before the United Nations, for them to make their choice, but we, apparently, are to express no choice ourselves. It is clear, of course, that, after all these months, His Majesty's Government must have some view of their own upon this question. They must, despite difficulties and dangers, have made up their own minds which plan they think will have the best chance of proving to be a final and lasting settlement in Palestine. If they have such a view, how can they avoid, in the long run, putting it forward? They cannot go to the Assembly of U.N.O., hear all those various plans, and sit there in complete silence, without joining in the discussion at all. Of course not. It would be a ridiculous attitude to adopt. If they are going to join in the discussion and add their view, they surely must know, before they begin, where they want to lead the discussion and what object their arguments are intended to reach. They must, therefore, whatever be the position now, disclose to the Assembly, as soon as the discussions start, and then to us, what policy His Majesty's Government prefer upon this question. If that is so, if, next September, they have to make a choice and a recommendation, would it not be very much better to make it now?

It seems to me that there are two good reasons for doing it. The first is that if His Majesty's Government have a view —they cannot go to the meeting of the Assembly without it—this House and the country are entitled to know what it is and whether it is a policy which they will support. When the policy is disclosed at the Assembly it may well be too late for this House or the country to express approval or disapproval of the course then taken. The second reason why it might be wise to make the declaration now rather than in September is this: we are to go through a very dangerous period in the next six months. Let us not close our eyes to that fact. Jew and Arab will start from now, and will spend the intervening months in lobbying members of the Assembly in support of their two viewpoints. All the arts and wiles of propaganda and persuasion will be brought, in these six months, from both sides upon the nations who will form the Assembly. During that time, those nations will be left without any guidance as to what is the middle course which we, as Mandatory, would recommend. It does seem that, in the absence of that guidance, and of any recommendation, there is a very great danger that quite a number of nations will arrive at the Assembly next September with their minds already made up, influenced by the propaganda and publicity which they have received.

Mr. Scollan (Renfrew, Western): Is there not a chance that if Arabs and Jews do not know what the policy of the Government is, they might reconsider the whole position in the intervening period before the meeting of the Assembly?

Mr. Stanley: Why should anybody, Jew or Arab, reconsider their position during the intervening period. Their obvious line, before they go to the Assembly, is first to get as many friends as they can for their point of view, and then to present to the United Nations their own point of view complete, and 100 per cent. That is why I should prefer that, during those six months, the whole field should not be held by those two rival policies, both of them extreme, and that there should be in the field a third policy, that of His Majesty's Government. It is for that reason that we think there will be far more chance of success if His Majesty's Government, when they go to U.N.O. in September, were not to go there merely to empty upon the table of U.N.O. a wastepaper basket full of all the discarded plans of past years, but should go there to state clearly what their own views are and to ask the Assembly to support and approve them.

Our final criticism of the way in which the appeal has been made is that it contains no indication of what is to be our line after the Assembly has discussed this plan. I know that it means that any decision we make and any views we adopt today, must be on certain assumptions. This is the sort of matter in which any Government must look forward. It is quite true that, by their decision to refer this matter to U.N.O., a certain amount of time has been bought, although I think it has been bought pretty dearly. For some months, right hon. Gentlemen opposite will be able to

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return the answer to any question on their policy, that they cannot be expected to anticipate the discussions in the United Nations. It is true that for their supporters this is a postponement of the inevitable conflict between the pledges which many of them gave at the Election, and action which is likely to be taken by the Government which they support. For those reasons, a postponement of this kind is generally popular. It is also usually disastrous, for the only result of the postponement is merely to let things drift on so that, a few months later, we can take up again the question that we have been afraid to tackle today.

The least the Government can do is to prepare now for the possibilities of the Assembly when it meets. It may happen that, when the Assembly meets in September, some new plan will be proposed and that the whole of the fifty-odd nations will gather together and will agree to it, and that it will then be approved by Jew and by Arab. It would be a miracle if that happened. For years, people on all sides, with ability and talent, have been searching for a possible variation of any scheme that might be used as a solution of this problem. It is unlikely that, in a few months some wholly new proposal will be found. Every proposal that has yet been made has caused divisions in Palestine, and divisions in parties here, and even, it is sometimes rumoured, divisions in Cabinets. Probably what will happen when the United Nations meets next September is that there will be no such unanimity; that, in fact there will be the same divisions among the nations there as can be found among peoples and parties; and that, whatever final decision is taken, if any decision is taken, it will be arrived at by a majority, with a minority supporting the other viewpoint.

If such a situation arises, as it is almost sure to arise, it is important that we should be quite clear what is the position of this country and to what we have committed ourselves. Therefore, I would like to ask the right hon. Gentleman when he replies to answer two questions. The first is this. Are we pledged by our reference to U.N.O. to accept the majority decision, whatever it may be, and, what is important, of whomsoever the minority may consist? I appreciate that if there were an overwhelming majority, including all the great States, and that unanimity were only broken by a few small nations whose interest in the problem might, perhaps, be very remote, we would be quite entitled to treat that as a unanimous decision and to act upon it. But there might be a very different situation. We might have a situation in which there was a majority for a certain proposal, but in the minority there might be included at least one of the major Powers. We have to face this fact, that if there were a divergence at the Assembly, with some taking one side and some taking the other, even if we had a majority in favour of a particular course, if the minority included powerful States it would be very difficult to get the communities concerned to accept the decision, as we want them to accept it, as a final settlement. I want to know, therefore, whether, if there is merely a majority decision, we are committed to accept it and enforce it on the people of Palestine. Secondly, I want to ask if we are to carry out the recommendations of the majority even if they indicate a course with which we ourselves disagree. I quite appreciate that if we are to be loyal to the United Nations we must accept and acquiesce in the decision which they make, but there is a great difference between that and asking our troops and using our resources to enforce a decision of which we ourselves may not be in favour and which we cannot defend.

Those are the two questions. I would like to know whether our reference to U.N.O. in any way commits us to carry out a decision of the United Nations, however it is arrived at, with which we ourselves are not in agreement. Surely, it would be better to say now what we shall have to say in the end, namely, that failing agreement between the United Nations upon some policy which we ourselves can support, we will surrender the Mandate of Palestine and leave it to the United Nations themselves to appoint a successor and frame a policy. The principle of fixing a date and saying that if by that date something does not happen, we should clear out, is not a principle to which His Majesty's Government have any objection. They are doing it in India in much more difficult circumstances, in much more complicated conditions of greater danger and in circumstances where there is no United Nations organisation as a residuary legatee to whom we can hand back the responsibility which we feel no longer able to carry.

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I believe it might have a considerable effect upon the deliberations of the United Nations if we were to make this announcement now. If they were to know that their deliberations might be followed by certain consequences and that every nation who spoke and voted might have to take some part of the consequences of their speeches and their votes, it might have a very considerable effect upon their willingness to reach some sensible, practical and tolerable conclusion. Therefore, I see quite an advantage in making such a declaration now. I do not see any disadvantages. If, after the meeting of the United Nations, there has been no agreement, if the countries are found to be divided into parties supporting the Arab case and parties supporting the Jewish case, and if there is to be no concrete conclusion from that meeting, I do not think this country could ever hope to impose upon the people of Palestine any solution, whatever it may be. If we cannot hope to impose a solution and, as the right hon. Gentleman himself has said, if we cannot find a basis upon which the Mandate, which was never meant to be eternal, can be brought to an end, it is much better that we should say so at once and restore our Mandate to the United Nations, instead of continuing to jeopardise the lives of our men and pour out the all too exiguous treasures of the State in a task which, by then, will have been demonstrated to be incapable of successful conclusion.

We cannot change what has happened in the past. No one, of course, accuses the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues in the last 18 months of wasting time in the sense that we believe they have been idle or trying to put things off. Of course, that time has been lost—no one looking back over the past 18 months can deny it—but it is not the past which now matters so much as the future, and the future can be planned. All of us, in all quarters of the House, agree in the present circumstances to the appeal to the United Nations. It is only after that, that divergencies appear. We believe that that appeal should be made as soon as practicable and that, if necessary, it should go to the Security Council and, through the Security Council, to a special meeting of the Assembly in order to save time. We believe that we should go there recommending a policy ourselves, giving to the United Nations what they are surely entitled to—the views of the people who, for 30 odd years, have been actually administering the country which the United Nations had to consider. We believe that we should say, here and now, that if that policy is not approved and if we are not promised not only approval but actual support for that policy, we shall surrender our Mandate to the United Nations and leave to them future decisions—no doubt, with our assistance as an ordinary member of the United Nations Organisation.

That, at least, is a policy which would be definite and strong. At best, it might be the last chance of getting the sort of agreement at the Assembly which might enable some settlement to be imposed and accepted in Palestine. At worst, it would, at any rate, give us a definite rest from the burdens which we are now bearing and which are now becoming intolerable. The alternative proposal of His Majesty's Government is to go to the Assembly of the United Nations next September without recommending any course of action, and with no definition of what our position is to be after the Assembly have taken their decision. I regard that not as a policy, but merely a postponement. It means that next winter we shall all be sitting here discussing, once again, just the problems we are discussing now, which were discussed last August; and having to face, once again, just the decisions which we are refusing to face today. It is for that reason that I appeal to the right hon. Gentleman, before it is too late, to make, not a change in the whole thing, not an abandonment of an appeal to which we have agreed, but changes in the main, which, I believe, might offer success where now little promise prevails.

I want to say a few words upon the actual situation in Palestine, and what is likely to happen during the next few months. All of us must echo the hopes of the right hon. Gentleman that Arabs and Jews alike, in view of the discussions at the United Nations in the autumn, will, meanwhile, exercise restraint and moderation; that they will not proceed to violent extremes, if not for the sake of morality, at any rate in order not to prejudice their own case when it comes up for decision. But alas, however wise and moderate the leaders may be—and all of us hope that they will be—there are the extremists still to reckon with; and while we are still saddled with the responsibility we shall

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[Mr. Stanley.]

have to carry it out, and law and order must be maintained in the interim as rigorously as we have tried to maintain it in the past.

I have two points which I should like to put to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The first is with regard to immigration, and the rate of immigration of Jews during the period between now and next September. As the fine weather draws on, there comes, of course, the time most favourable for illegal immigration. There have been quite a number of instances, even during the storms and difficulties of the winter months. We have to expect an increase as conditions become more favourable. As I see it, in that illegal immigration during this period lies the greatest danger to peace in Palestine between now and the meeting of the Assembly. I wonder if it would not be possible, during this period, to make some special approach to the Arabs? Any increase during these few months, on which they may be asked to agree, could amount to only a few thousand; it could not possibly influence either the decision of the United Nations in September or, still less, the final result, which depends so much on numerical proportions in Palestine.

Twice already the Arabs have been approached with regard to an alteration in Jewish immigration. Although the right hon. Gentleman is quite correct when he says that they have not formally agreed, they have on both occasions acquiesced, and I think it is to their credit that they have done so, and have recognised the greater need and given attention to it. I wonder if it is not possible that they might be approached again, and that again they might acquiesce? And is it not possible that their acquiescence would be much more likely if it were possible to base any proposal for an increase during these few months on women and children alone? I do not know what the proportions have been during the past year; but I am told that an exceptionally large proportion of the legal immigrants have, in fact, been able-bodied young men. It is quite clear that a large proportion of able-bodied young men is the form of immigration which raises most fears in the hearts of the Arabs. Would it not be possible to approach them with a proposal that, over and above the 1,500 a month, between now and September a certain limited increase, drawn from those classes of people which will not cause anxiety, could be made with their consent? It might do much to smooth down possible difficulties in the intervening period.

The second question I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman is with regard to our own people. Since we last debated this question in the House only a few weeks ago, a great change has been made in the conditions under which British people live and work in Palestine. They are today living under what are nothing but siege conditions. The women and children have all been evacuated; and I think it is true to say that all officials have certainly left their homes, and are congregating in reserved and safe areas. It is a terrible life for people to be expected to lead for any long period, entailing great sacrifices and great hardships. As the House will remember, many protests were made in Palestine when that decision was taken a few weeks ago. I, myself, gave no support to those protests, because, as I understood the situation then, I thought the action the Government were taking was right. The Arab Conference was obviously breaking down, and we had been promised a statement of policy by His Majesty's Government. Everyone has always realised that immediately after a statement of policy, whatever the final result, there must be inevitably an increasing tension, and the possibility of grave disturbance.

When I read that order, in view of the forthcoming decisions, I thought the Government were taking a wise precaution in clearing the decks, and in removing the women and children. But, of course, we find now that that is not the case at all. There is no decision; the decision is postponed for at least a year; and the crisis, because of which I thought these people had been removed, now cannot occur till the end of next winter, or the beginning of next spring. In those circumstances, is it necessary or wise to maintain, during the whole of this period, the very stringent conditions which have now been imposed, and which the Government will justify by some impending crisis? Would it not be possible, for the months that are bound to elapse before an official decision is taken, to have some relaxation? Because the danger is, that if people are kept under this tension, suffering these hardships in these unnatural conditions for too long,

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when the moment of crisis comes they may already be stale, and they may not be at their best to meet it. Those are the two points I desire to put, and I should be grateful to the right hon. Gentleman if he could deal with them.

No one in this House is under any illusion today. We realise that we are discussing a matter of very grave moment for the people of this country, and indeed for the world. It is only one of the great problems that this House has to discuss in the next few weeks. There is the discussion of our own economic situation, on which depends our standard of life, and indeed our survival; the discussion on India, with all that that means in peace or chaos for four hundred million people; the discussion on Germany, with all that it will mean for the future of European civilisation, and the peace of this country. But with all those problems, grave as they are, this problem is worthy to take its place. On its solution depends the whole future of the Middle East.

There was a time, until peace began, when the Middle East was regarded as one of the key points of the British Empire. On its solution depends the attitude of Jews and Arabs to this country all over the world, with grave consequences, because they may easily affect the whole tenor of international relations. On its solution depends the safety of 100,000 British troops and British officials. On its solution depends whether the weight of the burden which has been carried, and which has to be carried, by the staggering people of this country will be lightened.

We welcome the fact that this problem has been submitted to U.N.O., but we regret the time and the manner of the appeal. If the appeal is to be presented as is now proposed, we believe it can only lead to delay, and that that delay can only be disastrous. If it is made, as we suggest, with speed and decision, we believe that it still may succeed. Now, the Foreign Secretary is not a man who is deficient in either of those two qualities, and it is, therefore, to him that we appeal —the last appeal, probably, we shall have a chance of making—to make those changes which may give a chance of success. I repeat that this, I think, may well be our last opportunity. *Post hoç occasio calva.*

5.53 p.m.

Mrs. Ayrton Gould (Hendon, North): We have listened with great interest to both the Foreign Secretary and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley). With much of what the latter has said many, I think, on this side agree; but, at the same time, I must point out that he rather over simplified the position when he said that it is perfectly easy to discover fundamental divergencies between Jew and Arab in a short time. I should like to remind the Opposition that there never would have been the difficulties which have arisen if it had not been for the White Paper policy which was instituted in 1939. That policy started a perfectly impossible situation.

The Foreign Secretary pointed out that, in his view, the Mandate would have worked quite well up to the time of the Hitler regime. Well, it could never have worked well if the completely iniquitious White Paper policy had been imposed. The difficulty that the Government have had since they came into power in connection with Palestine was quite simply stated—though I do not think he intended it to be—by the Foreign Secretary, when he said, at one point, that we could not carry out the White Paper policy, and, at another point, that we could not tear it up. Well, if we could not do either of those things we were obviously left in a fearful muddle, and that is the position we are in now: we have a muddle over a desperately serious affair. What, in their difficulties, the Government decided to do was to carry on a modified White Paper policy, and, of course, that was not acceptable to the Jews.

I believe that, if it could be left to the Jews and Arabs inside Palestine, a unitary State could be carried on, and that they could very well solve their difficulties in the future, as they have done in the past. But the moment we get these political difficulties arising from the Arab League and the Zionist Agency outside, we have an impossible position because both try to lay down bases for Palestine, which Palestine must accept. The Arab basis, quite simply, is that they are prepared to put up with the small minority of Jews that are there, but will not have any more immigration. In the last analysis, the Jewish basis is that they want immigration until they get a majority.

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[Mrs. Ayrton Gould.]

I want to suggest that the British proposals that have been made have been altogether too simple. On immigration, it was suggested 4,000 a month should be allowed for two years, and that, at the end of the two years, when 96,000 immigrants had legally been allowed in, an Advisory Council, which would sit under the High Commissioner, composed of both Arabs and Jews, would decide on further immigration. It sounds very well; it sounds a good bit of democratic work; but one has to remember that the Arab population compared with the Jewish population is two to one, and that, therefore, the democratic advisory council set up would inevitably give a majority to the Arabs, which would enable them alone to decide—that is what it would amount to—whether there should be any Jewish immigration into Palestine at all, and, if so, how much. The recommendation says that this council should decide even what immigration is to be allowed into the Jewish State. Knowing the Arab attitude, of course, the result would be that no immigration, after the 96,000, would be allowed at all.

There has been no mention of the Discriminatory Land Law, which would, in fact, play a very large part in the outlook of the Jews. In Western Palestine, only 5 per cent. of the Jewish population are allowed to purchase, or to settle on, the land. It is then suggested that, under the trusteeship, the local authorities should decide whether there should be an increase or a reduction, even whether the actual laws themselves should continue to be operative. As I said before, the majority of the authorities in the majority of States would be Arab. It would mean, again, that the majority ruling would inevitably prevent any expansion on the land for the Jews. Therefore, what really looks like a democratic suggestion, in fact, is not a democratic suggestion at all. It could only be democratic if there were approximately the same number of Arabs and Jews who were going to vote on these duly elected bodies to make these decisions. I can only say that it is no wonder that it was not accepted.

I agree that it has seemed to take a very long time to find out that it was not acceptable. Some of us have said from the beginning, right back in October, 1945, that it was not possible, along these lines, to come to any arrangement which would be acceptable to both sides. That leaves us in the position that, either we have to impose something, or we have to agree to allow a situation to go on like the present one.

There is, I suppose, no one in the House who is prepared to accept the present intolerable situation in Palestine. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol has said that we are not prepared to allow British troops to go on having their lives endangered, and we all agree about that; neither do we wish to see British people undergoing this artificial and extremely hard life, nor are we prepared to hold a mandated territory where there is continuous terrorism, or indeed, where there is any terrorism on the present scale in Palestine. I want to ask the Government what is to happen between now and the time when the whole question comes before the United Nations. It is all very well to say we hope that both the Jewish and Arab leaders will be able to persuade their followers to be moderate and behave, but it is impossible for them to do that. In view of the situation in Palestine, it is impossible for them to keep the terrorists under control, unless something is handed to them meantime, and they are offered unconditionally some definite hopes for the future. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol suggested that we should increase immigration, but, unlike him, I do not suggest it should be confined to women and children. It is absolutely necessary to have building operatives and other workers to provide accommodation for those who are to enter the country. It is necessary to have buildings for the women and children immigrants, many of whom are in a very bad physical and mental state because of what they have been through. I suggest that we allow immigration to continue at least to the extent of 4,000 per month, not only up to the time when the problem is handed over to the United Nations but during the time when it is being considered by the United Nations, because judging from what happened at the Assembly last year, and at all the conferences it will not be a week or a fortnight, but months before a decision will have been reached.

Does anyone suggest that the Jewish Agency or the moderate Jews can hold

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back the terrorists, when there is a miserable allocation of 1,500 immigrants per month? We know that illegal immigrants will be pouring in, and that they will consist of men, women and children who are the miserable remnants left in Europe. We must remember all the time what is behind all of this. It is no good talking about the humanitarian angle, as we did during the war, when we expressed horror over what the Nazis were doing, unless we face what is happening, and envisage what these remnants have gone through, remembering that Palestine is the only place in the world which wants them and welcomes them. I believe that the present state of affairs could be settled if we got out of Palestine. I do not believe the Government would dream of accepting this solution, but if the Haganah were allowed arms and Palestine was left to settle its own differences, I believe that before very long we should have a united country. What is the alternative? We shall have bloodshed in any case, and the alternative is that our boys will be involved in it. When history comes to be written, it will be decided that Palestine would have got a solution to her problems much more quickly if Great Britain had cleared out and let the people settle them herself. We are rightly asking that the Haganah, the moderate Zionists and others should root out the terrorists, bring them to justice, and hand them over, but it is too much to ask these people unarmed to root out the fanatical armed terrorists. I think it would be much better if we went to them and told them that during the interval we would allow them to be armed, if they would act as a localised police force—after all, we armed them during the war when we needed them. We should ask them to get down to rooting out the terrorists, and if that were done and Jewish immigration was raised to 4,000 a month, we could have peace in Palestine until the whole matter had been taken to the United Nations and a decision had been reached.

The British Government who have carried the burden of the Mandate for all these years, ought very definitely to make recommendations which will be acceptable to us, and if they are not agreed upon, we should simply hand over the Mandate to the United Nations. It is well known that residuary legatees do not do very well—and I do not think in these circumstances the United Nations will do very well—but what I am anxious about is that Britain should not be left as a residuary legatee, being expected to carry out a policy to which we may object very strongly, and have to risk the lives of our troops to carry it out. We ought to make it perfectly clear what we want and what we intend to do, and we should do everything possible to secure peace on both sides until the recommendations of the United Nations are made known.

6.10 p.m.

Mr. Clement Davies (Montgomery): Every reasonable man, in every country, must be longing to see a final settlement of this age-long problem. Every reasonable man must desire that that settlement should come by negotiation and agreement, and not by force or by war. I would like to pay my tribute to the Foreign Secretary, not only for the quite remarkable speech he made this afternoon, but for the manner in which he has undertaken and carried out his duties in his great office. At no period in history, was any Foreign Secretary ever called upon to face such problems as the present Foreign Secretary. No one has devoted himself more conscientiously to his duties. He has brought to them wide experience, great tact, and, above all, great human sympathy.

I would like to deal, here and now, with a point the right hon. Gentleman made, which, I believe, arose out of an interruption of mine. Let it be clearly understood that when he goes to Moscow, and discusses these great matters with other great States, this country, whatever Government may be in power, will always honour its word, and regard treaties as binding. This country will endeavour, so far as is possible, to carry out pledges which have already been given. But let it also be clearly understood that the decisions of this House are not even binding on itself, still less on its successors, and still less on successors who have gone to the country on a different programme from the one which the House followed at the time it made those decisions.

Having paid my tribute to the right hon. Gentleman, and said that, may I say that I can understand still less the criticism of the Foreign Secretary which came from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley)?

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[Mr. Davies.]

It was niggardly and carping, which is not unusual, coming from him. The right hon. Gentleman's criticism was that the Government's proposal was being presented at this time, that the offer might have been made last August. I may be doing the right hon. Gentleman an injustice, but I have tried to read, in the meantime, his own speech of last August, and I could not find in it any reference to handing this problem over to U.N.O.

Mr. Stanley: The right hon. and learned Gentleman is quite right. That was not my policy. I thought the Government would come to their own decision, and that when they were ready would impose it. We are now told that that has never been the policy, and that in default of agreement the Government will go to U.N.O.

Mr. Davies: I understood that the right hon. Gentleman accused the Government, and especially the Foreign Secretary, of wasting time. The only suggestion on those lines, last August, came from a supporter of Government for the President of the Board of Trade spoke in that Debate. After the right hon. and learned Gentleman had spoken there was a speech by the Leader of the Opposition, with which I am sure the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bristol did not agree. He and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) have never agreed on a real policy for Palestine. Speaking personally, I have never had any doubt whatever about the meaning of the Balfour Declaration. I have always felt, and said, that a home was not destroyed when lodgers came in. There is a whole world of difference between the right of a lodger in a house, and a right to people to recognise that place as their home.

Mr. Kenneth Lindsay: That is a piece of argument which is quite unworthy of the right hon. and learned Gentleman. The question is: What is the constitutional definition of a lot of people living together?

Mr. Davies: What was the pledge that was drawn up and signed by Mr. Balfour as Foreign Secretary, and agreed to by the Cabinet? It was brought before the League of Nations when His Majesty's Government undertook the Mandate. There has never been much doubt in the minds of those who were largely responsible for that Declaration, or those who remained in that Government. Neither the then Prime Minister, the late Earl Lloyd-George, or the present Leader of the Opposition, have ever doubted that what they had in mind that was in the course of time a home should be created for Jews, a true home where they could control their own affairs.

Mr. Gallacher (Fife, West): It was not just a home but a National Home.

Mr. Davies: Undoubtedly it was understood that in course of time such a state of affairs would come about that the Jews would be in control of their own affairs in Palestine. I cannot help feeling that a great part of this controversy would not have arisen today but for the fact that in the main those in charge of affairs in Palestine from 1922-39 never took that view. Although they were advised by those who had more to do with it than anyone, namely, the present Leader of the Opposition and Mr. Amery, they took the other line entirely. I should say that their desire was to whittle down the Balfour Declaration as much as it could be whittled down. It ill becomes anybody to say now that there have not been changes of view, both in the Government and in this House.

Look at the vacillation, right from 1922 down to today. I remember, in 1937, the Government coming forward with a wonderful scheme for partition. But in 1938, they said that partition would never do. In 1939, a White Paper was produced. That White Paper was described by the Lord President of the Council—I think rightly—as an evil thing. It was described by the Leader of the Opposition, in a most eloquent speech, as a breach of the Mandate. I would like to point out to the Foreign Secretary that in almost the last part of the speech delivered by the Lord President of the Council he made it clear that whatever the decision of the House then—and it was obvious what it would be—it would not be binding on the party opposite, in spite of the advice of Mr. Amery and the Leader of the Opposition. May I also remind him of the pledges that were given, not after the Election, but before the Election, with regard to this matter. Be that as it may, I am perfectly sure of this—that the Foreign Secretary and those who have assisted him, the ex-Secretary of State for he

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Colonies, and the present Secretary of State for the Colonies, have done their very best to deal with this situation as wisely as it was possible to do under the circumstances. I feel also that it was right that they should try to see, even now, whether there was not a way out of it, without having to resort even to the United Nations Organisation. We had undertaken the Mandate, and it was our duty, as trustees, to see how best that could be arranged to the advantage of all the beneficiaries under it.

I agree with the hon. Lady the Member for North Hendon (Mrs. Ayrton Gould) that there was little trouble before the White Paper of 1939—little trouble from the Jews prior to 1939; and, what was more, trouble from the Arabs had more or less died down in 1937 and 1938. One has only to read the pledges then made by Members of the Tory Government. Nothing, I think, has been so terribly sad and agonising as the attitude of the Jews since then, and recently, with regard to this country, its Government and its people. No nation in the world has been as generous to the Jewish people as this nation; it has not only opened its gates and protected them, but made every office in the land open to them. That, I agree, has not only been to their advantage but to the advantage of this country. It ill becomes anyone, anywhere, to malign this country; still more so to destroy the young British men who are actually in Palestine to try to ensure justice and fairness.

I have never regarded this as a purely Jewish question. The Arabs are not the cause of it, it is the treatment of the Jews by other nations throughout 2,000 years that is the cause of it. It is not merely an Arab question, and it is certainly not merely a British question. This has become a world question, and I would, therefore, ask that all the nations of the world should make their contribution towards its solution, once and for all, and among the peoples of the world are the Jewish people and the Arab people. They should see if there is not some way by which the Jewish people can reach their ambition, which is linked up with their faith, because a good deal of the ritual connected with that faith is meaningless outside Palestine. They have always built their synagogues facing towards Jerusalem and it has been linked up with their faith that once a covenant was made between the Almighty and themselves, that that land should be theirs. In every country to which they have gone they have formed their own little communities. If they could be brought back, many of the Arabs would assist, and then I should regard it as the duty of the United Nations of the world to do anything which the Arabs would require in return in order to help them. It is along those lines that I hope this matter will be approached, and approached successfully, so that, at any rate, we can say that in this generation, although we have fought two most terrible wars, we have tried to solve problems which have worried people for generations.

Finally, may I ask one question? The right hon. Member for West Bristol rather assumed that the question which will be put to U.N.O. is one of advice. I am not sure. I gather from the Foreign Secretary's speech, and the statement which he made to the House the other day, that the Government had come to the conclusion that the Mandate has failed, but until some other solution has been brought forward, they would, of course, carry out their duties as trustees. I want to know what is the matter that is to be put before U.N.O.? Is it, "We have not been able to arrive at a solution with regard to this. Will you advise us; and then we will follow that advice and carry out, more or less, your directions, and do our duty there once more as a Mandatory Power, acting now for the United Nations Organisation as we did for the defunct League of Nations"? Or do the Government intend to go to the United Nations Organisation and say, "We can no longer carry out this Mandate. It is finished. We will do our best to protect the Mandate in the meantime, but take it back and decide what is best for the future for these people, so that there may be a new Mandatory power given to the United Nations Organisation." Which of the two is it to be?

In the meantime, I am reminded that Members of this Government, having fought against and denounced that White Paper, and having gone to the country not only denouncing it, but saying that they would reverse it, are still carrying out, more or less, the policy which they told the country they would not carry out. Will they, from now until this new decision has been arrived at by the United Nations Organisation, go back to what

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[Mr. Davies.]

they conceive, what I conceive, and what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) conceived was the true meaning of the Mandate, and the true meaning of the Balfour Declaration? I most sincerely hope and pray that, finally, a peaceful solution may be found for this problem, so that never again will it worry any man in any country.

6.29 p.m.

Mr. Pickthorn (Cambridge University): I can find almost nothing—[HON. MEMBERS: "Speak up."] I will try to speak up but I am suffering from a sore throat and must ask the House to be kind to me. I can find almost nothing to agree with in the speech to which we have just listened. I cannot believe that it is very useful now for the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) to tell us what Mr. Balfour thought when Mr. Balfour composed his letter, more particularly as Mr. Balfour did not compose the letter. The history of it is pretty well known, particularly how it got composed and issued and why and when it was published. I think that the best comment which can be made upon it briefly—and I desire to be brief for the convenience of the House and for the convenience of myself—is to read a quotation, from a speech by Dr. Weizmann. I think I have got the date right, April, 1918, though I may be a year wrong. He said:

> "The fears of the Arabs that they are to be ousted from their present position are due either to a fundamental misconception of Zionist aims or to the malicious activities of our enemies."

I do not really see how in the light of that statement taken from Dr. Weizmann, who was certainly at that time even if he be not thought so now, the greatest possible authority upon these things, it can be said that the Balfour promise gave the Zionists the right to expect that British arms should be used to impose on a long settled society unwanted immigrants until they should become the majority under it, because that is the gloss put upon the national home by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery, and by the hon. Lady the Member for North Hendon (Mrs. Ayrton Gould) who spoke before him and whose arguments he adopted. I do not believe that the House should really allow itself to be stopped by that gloss, which I think is demonstrably unfair. Further, supposing it to be fair, I think this House would make a mistake to pay any attention to it, because if there is one thing plain it is that no man can ever have had, politically or morally the right to promise what Mr. Balfour is by that interpretation alleged to have promised. If there is one thing clearer even than this it is that if such a promise could have been made legitimately in 1918 it could not be legitimately kept now. There is nothing in such a promise or the keeping now of such a promise that can be defended by any principles of politics or morality, democracy, Christian principles, or I make bold to say, to my Jewish friends and Jewish colleagues, of the Jewish faith.

I want to say a very few things and to say them as shortly as I can. If I am longer than I mean it will be because it has been very difficult to listen to the Foreign Secretary's speech today and to be sure that one has exactly got hold of the right bits of it. I should like to begin by asking the Colonial Secretary whether he can quite easily—because I realise that it is not fair to face him with it—tell us now, or anyway at the end of the Debate, again exactly what are the interim immigration proposals. I do not blame the Foreign Secretary but I am bound to say that he did not leave me quite clear in mind as to what the position was, and I feel sure that the House ought to have its mind made quite clear about that.

Then I should like if I may without impertinence to compliment him in one respect. That is always a little difficult. I myself do not think much of compliments in this House, and especially compliments from one side to another, which are often not very useful. Above all I dislike the compliment on sincerity. I feel that when we address each other as hon. Gentlemen what we assume by that is that each of those of us who speak tries to the best of his intellectual power to say what he means. This is an occasion, however, when I hope that without fulsomeness or impertinence I may say that as political opponents we were moved by the sincerity of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I mean that not in the ordinary drawing room sense of being sincere, in the sense that he was not really telling us what he himself knew to be

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lies but in the far more important sense that he had performed the difficult and painful operation of thinking as hard about the subject as he could before he dared to inflict upon his countrymen what his opinions were. That is what I take sincerity to mean in our relations to each other here, and I hope he will not think it fulsome or impertinent of me if I say that he showed a shining example of it this afternoon.

Having paid him that compliment, I should like if I may to utter a small reproach. It is a very small one and I do not do it from any personal point of view. Today he clearly distinguished between two main parts of the difficulty with which we are concerned, which has not been done so clearly before by anyone speaking from that Box of whatever party. He continued as almost all have done—and I shall probably slip into the expression myself although I regard it as a bad habit—to speak of the Palestine Problem. It is the cutting up of life into Problems which tends to the assumption that if only we could get to the back of the teacher's book we would find a solution on the back page. This Palestine affair is a thing not of that sort. Although the Foreign Secretary used that, as I think, dangerous language, he did distinguish between the problem of what ought to be done with Palestine and the problem of what ought to be done with displaced Jews. I think that to make that distinction clear and clean is the beginning of wisdom in all this question. The small reproach I do address to him is that he did nothing to make clear that there have been here a few, a comparatively few, members who have made that distinction over and over again. I do not say that because I believe that I have been an important one of them, but Members who have been here during the war and in the last two Parliaments know the names of Members who made this distinction and could write their names on the back of a postcard.

I think that if this Debate has been carried on, continued as reasonably as it has been, and has been something quite different from the sort of way the subject was debated 12 years ago, that change in the climate of opinion has been made by people who may sometimes have seemed to the Foreign Secretary to be pertinacious questioners and tiresome debaters, and I do not think that it would have done any harm to acknowledge the service that has been performed by them, because if we wish to have Parliamentary Government continuing in the world, it is by noting advantages of that sort which accrue from Parliamentary Government that we shall do it. There is one other preliminary thing I should like to say before I pass on to the main matter and that is that it seemed to me that the Foreign Secretary dropped what I think were his two main heresies of a year ago. Of course hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite who have grown grey or great, or both grey and great in some cases, in working machinery whose honourable business was to try to raise the material conditions of the less fortunate parts of the population are rather specially tempted to think that economics is what matters in politics, that politics are scarcely more than the shadow of economics and that if they get economics right then politics will come right of themselves. I believe that to be the worst and the most actively harmful of the heresies of the last 50 years.

The right hon. Gentleman seemed to me a year ago to have that heresy, but today, whether consciously or unconsciously, he seemed to throw it away. He also seemed to throw another heresy away into what I hope will be an unregretted limbo—that is, the notion that international organisation should be built up by going over the heads of national states, straight to the people themselves. He threw away that notion very completely today and I congratulate him upon it.

The questions I wish to put to His Majesty's Government are, I am afraid it will be thought, of a rather verbal nature, but all our discussions and the discussions which may take place at the United Nations must be conducted with words as counters. I think we were almost, although I agree not entirely, promised some time ago by the Prime Minister that we should have a Palestine Debate before any decision had been taken, but now a decision of sorts has been taken, a decision not to decide, a decision to refer elsewhere, and I think the least we have a right to ask is that in that reference elsewhere we should know what the technical terms are going to mean and how the brief is going to be produced,

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[Mr. Pickthorn.]

and I am inviting the Colonial Secretary to make these matters clear to us this evening.

I speak in the presence of professional gentlemen who will correct me if I am wrong, but I imagine that any really competent Solicitor can so put a question to counsel, especially if the counsel be chosen as not very competent or practised, as to be pretty certain beforehand what counsel's opinion will be, and it is of the utmost importance that we should know in what shape and form this question is to be put to the United Nations. We have been told that there is not going to be any recommendation. There is going to be a mere statement of history. Can we be reassured that all the history is going to be drawn to the attention of the United Nations? I have no fear here that we might suggest something which would be tiresome to the British Government that might otherwise have passed unforseen. We may be quite sure that there will be people and indeed, it will be the duty of the United Nations to see that there should be people, who will drag up everything which seems to show that the British Government at any stage has been disingenuous or inadequate.

I wish to be quite sure that the British Government itself will do that work for them, that we can be perfectly sure that it is going to be perfectly clearly put to the United Nations if the matter is to be put at all, what is a mandate—a new word; how it got drawn up; what was an A Mandate, how an A Mandate was something which from the first admitted the existence of a society dwelling within the territory concerned with a right to nationhood provisionally admitted. It was admitted from the first that these were people provisionally to be recognised as deserving of political independence. What was the method by which and the date at which the Mandate become (*a*) politically and (*b*) legally a governing factor in the situation? It is far more complicated than people generally think, and than I myself think unless I have looked up the books and the papers the day before, and than the right hon. Gentleman below the Gangway thought. My recollection is that the Mandate did not acquire any legal or quasi legal force until I think it was the end of 1923. So there was a long period before that when whatever we were doing we were not doing it under the Mandate, nor did the Mandate come from the League of Nations as many people seem to think. We ought to be quite sure that all these things and all the relevant facts and documents are quite clearly set forth in the dossier which we put before the United Nations.

Secondly I should like to ask when we put this matter before them, are we going to define quite clearly what is Palestine for our purposes? Does it mean the borders and boundaries as they exist now or are there other possibilities which will be taken into consideration? Then, since it is The Palestine Problem which is being referred, it is extremely important that we should know what is from this point of view The Palestine Problem. Is it going to be sharply defined from the problem of dealing with the Jews in Europe? Those hon. Gentlemen with whom I have been more particularly associated on this question have always insisted all along that it is no use putting the difficulties and the blame upon Hitler.

Upon him primarily much of the blame is, but also upon all the rest of us who did not somehow find ways of taking in the persons whom Hitler persecuted or threw out. There is some blame. We have always said that, and I think it very important that now it should be made quite clear which of these things it is that we are putting before the United Nations, whether it is all one or whether it is two separable questions. I thought the most moving passage in the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State's speech this afternoon was when he, if I may say so with an absurd sort of arrogance, agreed with me on this point in advance, that whatever else we do we ought to be prepared to play our full share on the humanitarian side of the thing. We should make that quite clear, first that the burden ought to be taken off the Arabs. It should not be the Arabs upon whom the burden is left that they have to look after this terrible, cruel by-product of the vices of European civilisation, for which we all of us to some extent or another are responsible.

Then I want to ask one more small and one more large question about these definitions that are going I hope to be put to the United Nations. About the Jewish Agency for instance. The Jewish Agency originally was set up for a highly limited

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purpose, but it was from the first by the British Government allowed to develop into something far wider than its terms of reference properly warranted. There is no doubt of that.

Mr. Janner: Will the hon. Member permit me one question? Would he be good enough to say what the Mandate says about the Jewish Agency because if he reads it out he will find that the Jewish Agency had and have an extremely important position under the Mandate.

Mr. Pickthorn: I have not the reference in my pocket but on the last occasion on which I made a speech of this sort the hon. Gentleman interrupted me with exactly the same question and on that occasion I did read out the Mandate and it did carry out my argument to a sufficient extent. Perhaps I may leave hon. Members to look it up themselves. The argument then and now is whether the Jewish Agency is to be continued in its functions and decisions during this interim period and if so is it tolerable that that should be done without at least some similar council for consulting and co-operating with the Arabs. Now I come to my last question on this matter and indeed the last thing I have to say. What for this purpose is the United Nations organisation? I know we ought to know. The Foreign Secretary told us this afternoon that Sir Alexander Cadogan does know and I am quite sure that he does and for all I know by some means, direct or indirect, Sir Alexander Cadogan has told the Colonial Secretary, and I think the Colonial Secretary ought to tell us when he comes to reply. We none of us do know these documents and constitutions half as well as we ought and I take as much blame as anyone for that, but we are trying to learn too many things and to read too many papers.

What does it mean in practice for these purposes? Does it mean, to use a few letters, us, the U.S., and the U.S.S.R., or is there more in it than that? Is it in fact going to be a horse swapping deal, *a Kahhandel,* as the Germans say between the two or three both great Powers who have the proper power of the veto or what more than that does it mean? because on that, I think, does depend the next question which we ought to go into: that is, are we assuming that whatever decision is handed down we shall operate? If so, are we ourselves to be judges in the matter? Are we in on this matter, or do we, as fellows of a college do, if I may use an illustration from my own humble experience, when their own affairs are being discussed, go out politely into the outer combination room and read "Punch", or are we there all the time? That is always assuming that the Minister of Fuel allows "Punch" to be printed next September. I think it highly important and we want to know what the machinery is going to be, in simple terms which those of us who have read the covenant once and do not remember much about it now, will understand. We ought to know to whom it is we are appealing, whether we ourselves are to be there as advocates or judges, or both, or neither or as witnesses, or with some two of these functions, or what. It seems to me that this question ought to be properly explained to us by the Colonial Secretary this evening when he comes to wind up.

6.50 p.m.

Mr. Benn Levy (Eton and Slough): The hon. Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Pickthorn) reminded the House that this is a topic which has been wont in the past to rouse high feelings. I shall attempt myself to tackle it in a temperate and reasonable way because if my own emotions are engaged, I honestly believe they are not so through any Jewish prejudice but are engaged, as those of most hon. Members of this House would be, on behalf of any people or group of people who are in distress. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary himself underlined that point. In a rhetorical passage which I shall not attempt to emulate, he showed considerable sympathy, but I am bound to say that those Jewish people in distress can derive little comfort from his speech because there was little else he had to offer. His speech was, I admit, the best exposition of the Arab case that I have heard, but it had to me an air, if I may say so, not merely of unreality but of special pleading.

Let me take for example his treatment of the problem of partition. He argued against it on the grounds that any proposed scheme of partition would involve the leaving of an Arab minority in the Jewish sector in such a position that that minority would be permanent or would have to get out. But surely precisely the same argument would be valid against his own plan for a unitary Palestine in which the Jews were a permanent minority or

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[Mr. Levy.]
had to get out? Apparently in that case it was not thought a valid argument, because in another part of his speech, after expatiating on the various abilities of the Jews as statesmen, businessmen and the rest of it, he practically exhorted them to exercise their gifts for nationhood as a permanent minority inside an Arab state. That does not seem to me to be a very practicable or serious proposition——

Mr. Lipson: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that that is exactly what the Jews in this country and every other country are doing?

Mr. Levy: If the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Mr. Lipson) supposes for a moment that the position of Jews—he ought to know better—is the same in this country as it is or would be under Arab Government in Palestine, he really is not qualified to make an intervention. It is a libel on the British people.

Mr. M. Philips Price (Forest of Dean): Is the hon. Member aware that 120,000 Jews have lived in Bagdad since the days of Nebuchadnezzar?

Mr. Levy: There are 120,000 Jews who have lived in Bagdad and have been happy, and I do not know how many have lived in America. There have been 600,000 in Germany. I am talking about Palestine and not Great Britain or Bagdad.

To revert to my argument, there is another point which the Foreign Secretary made. I am trying to illustrate what seems to me to be the essential unreality of his argument. When last year he made Transjordan into an independent State, that action was criticised in some quarters as premature on the grounds that it would make possible future partition difficult. Today he comes down to the House and says, "Partition is difficult, if not impossible, because last year I made Transjordan an independent State, and there is, therefore, no longer room for a second viable Arab State if there is to be a viable Jewish State." The essential argument in favour of partition was never even mentioned. That essential argument is this, that it is surely at this day and age abundantly clear to everybody that it is impossible to submit Arabs to Jewish domination in a unitary Palestine and it is impossible to submit Jews to Arab domination in a unitary Palestine. The second course is even more impossible. I think both are impossible, but the second is more impossible because, whatever the hon. Gentleman for Cheltenham may think, there is a wide discrepancy between the grades of social development of the Jews and the Arabs. To put the socially more advanced under the government of the socially less advanced is an absolutely untenable proposition.

I have never been a Zionist, though I am bound to confess that the Foreign Secretary has gone some way towards converting me; but his success is only partial. My conversion is still only half-hearted because my reasons are largely negative. I have felt in the past no mystic conviction of a national Jewish destiny. I have been averse also from the multiplication and intensification of nationalisms in a world which is striving, however ineffectually, towards internationalism; and moreover, there was to my mind objection to the avowed intention of Zionists to swamp Palestine by immigration in order to create a Jewish state in Palestine when the time for independence should arrive. But that objection has now been removed. There is no possibility any longer of the Jews being able to swamp Palestine—[An HON. MEMBER: "Why?"]—because six million of them have been slaughtered in Europe. There are not sufficient numbers waiting to go to Palestine—[An HON. MEMBER: "Oh."] Perhaps the hon. Member will allow me to quote from Sir Frederick Leggett, one of the members of the Anglo-American Committee, who is himself an anti-Zionist. He says:

> "As the average annual rate of natural increase of the Arabs is nearly twice that of the Jews and as mortality among the Arabs is declining, partly by reason of the better conditions which have followed the activities of Jews, it is fairly clear that no measurable amount of Jewish immigration will produce a Jewish majority."

I do not believe there is any serious possibility of that, so that objection has been removed so far as I am concerned.

But a more important reason and a new factor is this. I believe indeed that although every side of the House is committed to the establishment of a National Home in Palestine, it is quite impossible now to establish a National Home which is not also a National State, and for this reason. The Foreign Secretary admitted that he had some difficulty in understanding precisely what was meant by

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"a Jewish National Home." I sympathise. It is a nebulous phrase. But whatever it may mean, one thing is certain and that is that one cannot call a man's home his home if he is prevented from entering it at the point of a gun. Therefore, it seems to me that unless we have free immigration we cannot have a National Home.

It is merely specious to maintain that there are 600,000 Jews there now and that, therefore, the promise of a National Home has been fulfilled because there they are—at home. For, after all, that argument could have been equally well applied in 1922 when there were only 85,000 Jews there. So if the Home means anything, it must mean free immigration; yet it is clearly incontestable that the Arabs will not consent to further immigration into Palestine.

I feel, therefore, that the crux of the problem is immigration and I am convinced that if, when this Government took office, it had torn up the White Paper and the 100,000 had been admitted, the extreme Zionist argument would have lost very much of its force; and, moreover, paradoxically enough, Arab resistance would not have increased but would have diminished, for the simple reason that you fight so long as there is a chance of getting what you want, but you do not always fight against a *fait accompli*.

Very briefly, that is at least one aspect of the Jewish case. What I want to suggest to the House is that at no point does it conflict with British interests but, on the contrary, British interests are identical. There are three British interests of which I want to remind the House. One is of prime importance, namely, the reputation of British good faith. I know there has been a mass of contradictory promises in the past—that is deplorable, but it is an undeniable fact; and it is impossible, therefore, for any Government to come in now and fulfil all the pledges of its predecessors; but it can at least fulfil its own pledges——

Mr. Stokes (Ipswich): The Government as a Government have not made any.

Mr. Levy: Is the hon. Member advancing the theory that a party is only bound by pledges made when it is on the Government bench, and not when it is in Opposition? I should have thought he would have been the last person to suggest such a thing.

Mr. Stokes: My hon. Friend surely does not suggest, especially in the field of foreign affairs, that what is said in Opposition must be carried out at all costs by the party when it comes into government?

Mr. Levy: I should have said so; and what is absolutely indisputable is that this party is pledged not up to the hilt but up to the elbow, to repeal the White Paper when it came into office. The Foreign Secretary said this afternoon that there was a great difficulty about that, and he advanced what to me was a novel and extremely subtle doctrine in defence, that you cannot really do it without consulting the other party. That might have some substance if the original arrangement had been a matter of negotiation between parties, but when it is a unilateral one, why in the world cannot it be unilaterally repealed? After all, if unilateral commitments cannot subsequently be repealed by different governments, then an extremely bizarre theory is imported into government, and one which would have to apply also to internal affairs. Yet I did not notice that the Foreign Secretary was reluctant to repeal the Trades Disputes Act until he had consulted the employers; yet it is a completely parallel case.

Dr. Morgan (Rochdale): Specious.

Mr. Levy: I do not think I am being specious.

Dr. Morgan: You called it bizarre.

Mr. Levy: There are two other things I want to speak about. One is the question of safeguarding and preserving British lives; the other is the safeguarding of British economic and strategic interests. One word about the first. One thing which is quite clear is that this delay of 18 months, which has weakened the hands of the moderates, which has played into the hands of the terrorists, has cost us British lives. We cannot wash our hands of that responsibility. It is a deplorable thing but it is true and, unfortunately, as the right hon. Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley) has pointed out, the delay is not over. We are at the outset of another large delay. I hope

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[Mr. Levy.]

sincerely that means will be found by the Foreign Secretary to abbreviate the period of waiting before the matter can be submitted to U.N.O., but even when it has been submitted, there will still be a long period when we shall be left holding the baby.

As to the other point regarding our vital interests or key points, as the right hon. Member for West Bristol called them, it has for a long time been the orthodox Foreign Office view that we have vital economic and strategic interests in the Middle East which can only be protected by appeasing the Arabs. The Labour Party, rightly or wrongly, has disagreed with that view, but if the Foreign Secretary, since he has been accessible to the blandishments of the Foreign Office, has abandoned the Labour Party view and accepted the Foreign Office view, what is to happen if, when U.N.O. comes to a decision, it should decide that Great Britain must evacuate what the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office believe to be an essential strategic and economic position? Are we to invoke the veto? Are we to hedge? Are we to use all the machinery of delay open to us? If so, to submit the thing at all to the United Nations is a farce, and is merely a device for delay. I cannot believe that, but there is no alternative to that if the Foreign Secretary is persuaded that the *status quo* in Palestine is essential. If he is not so persuaded, then he must obviously have some alternative plan. But if we have some alternative plan, why cannot it be put into operation now before we continue to incur the odium of the present situation and the dishonour of broken pledges?

For these reasons, I believe the course that we are embarked upon is injurious to the interests of Great Britain, and I urge the Foreign Secretary to call a halt before it is too late.

7.9 p.m.

General Sir George Jeffreys (Petersfield): I do not propose to attempt to deal with the general situation as regards the government of Palestine. It is common ground that Jews and Arabs have been unable or are unwilling to agree, and will not accept any compromise proposals. It may be that the Government are well advised in referring this matter to the United Nations Organisation but, as we have heard from the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Levy) and from the Foreign Secretary himself, that must take time. It cannot come before the United Nations before next September but, whatever the eventual judgment of the United Nations may be, we must continue for some time at least to carry out our Mandate. I want to urge that, so long as we hold the Mandate, we should carry it out properly and, in particular, that we should enforce law and order in Palestine and shall suppress and rigorously punish terrorism.

It is with this question of the suppression of terrorism, and with the part that must be played in that suppression by British troops, that I wish especially to deal tonight.

The Foreign Secretary referred last week to the great strain which he said was put on the civil government of Palestine. No one will doubt that that strain is very great, but I suggest that it is nothing like the strain which is thrown on the British troops who have been living under the constant menace of kidnapping, murder, and outrage in its worst forms, and who have to treat the population as being supposedly friendly until some outrage is committed, or at least threatens. Those troops have never been called upon, nor permitted, to take any sustained offensive against terrorism. In that connection, I think the observations last summer by the Lord President of the Council regarding the order of the General Officer Commanding in Palestine were very unfair to the General Officer Commanding.

The troops in Palestine are in a very similar position to that of police in a criminal area. If those police are on friendly social terms of intercourse with the friends and families, possibly, of the criminals, their movements, and their intentions, will almost certainly be known by the criminals in due course, and those criminals will be able to take precautions accordingly. I think the position of our troops in Palestine is very analogous to that of police under those circumstances. If they go about, and are allowed to have social intercourse with the Jewish population, to go to public places of amusement and refreshment amongst them, they are not only risking kidnapping and outrage, but every unguarded word and indication of movement or intentions is sure to be overheard by someone. Even if it is not

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overheard by terrorists, it is certain to be passed on to them by their friends. I am sure that the instructions of the General Officer Commanding as to the avoidance by troops of social intercourse with Jews were fully justified for these reasons, apart from the strain on the troops involved in the present methods, a strain which is so great that I believe it would be too great for any troops except British troops, because of their morale and discipline, I say that these methods have been ineffective. When an outrage has been committed, according to reports which reach England, measures are at once taken locally and temporarily. They are strong measures, certainly, of searches, restrictions, curfews, arrests, and all the rest. But, after a short time, these measures are relaxed and finally taken off altogether, until the next outrage occurs. I would urge that what is necessary is a continuous and sustained offensive against terrorism, with no let-up whatever, no relaxation of pressure, and regardless of the inconvenience and restrictions which may in consequence fall on the Jewish population.

Mr. H. Hynd (Hackney, Central): Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman allow me? Is he quoting from Hitler's instructions to his troops for the occupation of Palestine?

Earl Winterton (Horsham): The hon. Member for Hackney, Central (Mr. H. Hynd) ought to be ashamed of himself. That was a most insolent interruption.

Mr. H. Hynd: I did stand up to make my interruption. That is more than the noble Lord did.

Sir G. Jeffreys: They should be treated in the way the civil population might be treated in a hostile country, until the hostile forces have been defeated. For instance there might be restrictions for intelligence purposes. After all, the Jewish Agency have refused co-operation against the terrorists, and can scarcely claim any consideration on that account. I believe everyone in this House will agree that the terrorists must be completely knocked out and exterminated. To my mind, the defended areas behind barbed wire should not be regarded as refuges, but as bases from which offensive operations can be conducted against the terrorists. Those operations should be continuous and sustained. There should be no relaxation, but they should be carried out with the use of every appropriate weapon which is available. There should be no question of waiting for the terrorists to shoot first. With the object of knocking out terrorism, I urge that complete discretion be allowed to the military authorities to deal with the situation. I do not know whether that is given now, but the general impression is that the military authorities are hampered at times by instructions from the Colonial Office, and are not allowed the completely free hand which they ought to have to deal with such a situation. There should be one order, and one only, to the G.O.C., to completely knock out terrorism with any and every means available. The terrorists should be brought to justice if possible, and, if brought to justice, they should be dealt with by the utmost rigour of the law.

The British troops who have this most unpleasant and invidious duty of attempting to restore law and order in Palestine and to suppress odious outrages there, should be given every form of encouragement and support. Their hands should not be tied in any way. They have displayed admirable restraint, and can be depended upon to display equal restraint in any offensive measures they take. Those measures should be taken, they should be continuous, there should be no relaxation until the moment terrorism is completely knocked out. So, and only so, shall we be carrying out the terms of our Mandate to govern Palestine properly, and to enforce law and order so long as we are there.

7.18 p.m.

Mr. Turner-Samuels (Gloucester): We are considering today a question of a very grave character, the treatment of which by this House, and in the future, might have very grievous results. I profoundly agree with the view that was expressed by the right hon. Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley) when he laid emphasis on the future in its relation to the present Debate. It is very easy in a matter of this kind to evoke emotion and to cover it with a lot of complications. Heaven knows there are plenty of complications on this subject which bear upon the past, and the sooner the past buries itself the better. We must concentrate on the future even if it is somewhat uncomfortable as we all know it very often is, to face facts.

It seems to me that the two material matters which concern this country, Palestine, and indeed, the world are, first the

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[Mr. Turner-Samuels.]

question of the Mandate, and secondly the question of the White Paper. The Foreign Secretary, in his speech, which I do not for a moment doubt was made with the greatest sincerity, and was intended to be helpful, was, in my humble submission, on the two critical points which I have mentioned, entirely unsatisfactory. He gave no guidance to the House on the crucial question of the White Paper as regards the period between now and September, when the matter is to go to U.N.O. Indeed, when I challenged him during his speech, to try to reconcile what he was saying—that this House was committed to the White Paper—with the entirely opposite version we had from the Prime Minister as recently as 1st July of last year, he observed that he was coming to that matter, but he never did.

I noticed one remarkable thing that he said about the Mandate. He said that it had become unworkable. All I can say is that it must have been through a long and painful course that he arrived at that conclusion after 23 years. Even if it were true that the Mandate was unworkable, it does not lie in the power of this or any other Government to abrogate the Mandate. If that is to be done, if the Mandate is to be changed, if there is to be a new document or a new policy, then the only power, the only source from which that can be done is the United Nations, and because of that it is to that body that it is now intended to refer this particular Mandate. The Foreign Secretary said at the same time, that the Mandate " was intended to lead to something." I find it difficult to see how it is to lead to something, if, according to the Foreign Secretary, it is in fact to lead to nothing, because that was the effect of what he told us this afternoon. The effect was not to implement the Mandate, not to try to carry out any of its terms, either in the language in which it is now framed, or in a modified form. His view was that it was unworkable.

There is one other point I would like to mention before I come to the point of the legal status of the Mandate, and a few words about the White Paper. The Foreign Secretary said what I thought was rather an extraordinary thing. I do not honestly believe that he intended to convey what his words, in my submission, did convey, namely, that the Jews were contending that they should be entitled to become members of the United Nations organisation on the single ground that they were Jews. Speaking as a member of that faith, if any Jew or any body of Jews were to suggest to me that they should have an entitlement for inclusion in the United Nations organisation, merely because they were Jews, I should just laugh at them. There is no possible foundation for any such claim. As the Foreign Secretary truly said, that would at once open the doors of the United Nations to all sorts of absurd and unsustainable applications for membership. But the Jews have never made any such far-fetched proposal. What they have said, as regards representation on the United Nations, has been that if they built up their National Home in Palestine, as the Mandate, in the most explicit terms, prescribes that they are to do, then they would be eligible in respect of that home on political grounds for a seat upon the United Nations organisation, in exactly the same way, it should be noted, as the Arabs are entitled to representation on the United Nations organisation, not because they are Arabs but because they have been given national independence in the particular States they now occupy. That is precisely the basis upon which the Jews put forward their claim, not on the basis of an absurd suggestion that because of some religious reason they ought to be members of the United Nations organisation.

Earl Winterton: I am sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman does not wish to indulge in an historical inaccuracy, which quite inadvertently he indulged in, and which might give offence to certain countries. The Arab States have not been given their independence. They have enjoyed independence for hundreds of years.

Mr. Turner-Samuels: May I remind the noble Lord that this country and America, with their treasure and their blood, fought to liberate large areas in the Near East. Therefore, is it not right to say that we, in this country, as well as the Americans, have some claim to say what ought to be done in the Near East in regard to those States? Indeed, that is precisely what has happened, because we were given Mandates of these places and these Mandated territories have now been converted into independent States. That is the position.

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Earl Winterton: I thank the hon. and learned Member most sincerely for having reminded me that I fought in the Desert in the 1914-18 war, with Lawrence. I was aware of the fact he mentioned, but I was dealing with the statement which he quite inadvertently made, that the Arab States have been given independence. Some of them were independent long before the 1914-18 war.

Mr. Turner-Samuels: Perhaps I did not quite catch the noble Lord's point because it was quite irrelevant. I was trying to underline the fact that as far as the position of the Jews in Palestine is concerned it is exactly the same as the position of the Arabs in the Arab States which had been under Mandate and had since been converted into independent States.

The senior Burgess for Cambridge University (Mr. Pickthorn) had an extraordinary idea about the origin of the Mandate. So far as I can gather from what he said, it appears to him to have come out of the blue and no one can trace its descent. Actually, the position is that the Mandate came into being as a result of an agreement of all the Allied Powers after the first World War. As a result of that, the Council of the League of Nations handed this particular Mandate to this country. The Mandate contained in its first recital, a clear statement as to why it was being handed to this country at all, and what its express object was. It said that the Government of His Britannic Majesty had made a declaration on 2nd November, 1917, and that that declaration was adopted by the other Powers,

"in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people."

Subject to preserving certain rights to which I will refer to in a moment. That was the premise upon which this Mandate was established. That was the object of this Mandate. Every Article which follows is intended to carry out that object, subject to the modifications that other civil and religious rights are not to be prejudiced. I challenge anyone to contradict that statement. The reason why the phrase, "Jewish National Home" was used is not hard to understand. Advantage has been taken of the word "home" in order to raise some legal refinement about the fact that the word "State" is not used, but the word "Home." In my submission there is no distinction of substance between the phrase, "Jewish National Home" and "Jewish National State."

I will tell hon. Members why the word "Home" was, in my view, used instead of the word "State." It was perfectly clear that there was a large body of Jews outside Palestine who were anxious about what was taking place in Palestine as regards a Jewish State. They were people who were closely attached to their own particular countries. They had been born there, they were resident there, their families and businesses and hopes and their traditions were there. They were as much a part of the country as those who had been native to it for hundreds of years. They were troubled about the setting up in Palestine of what was to be described as a "Jewish State." As they were Jews themselves, they did not want the idea to be accepted that a Jew must necessarily be identified with Palestine because it was a Jewish State. That was I am sure one of the main reasons which operated to cause the phrase "Jewish National Home" to be used rather than the phrase "Jewish National State."

The other cause was obviously diplomatic. There was a good deal of sense in that. There were people who were already seated in Palestine. There were people there who had civil and religious rights. Naturally, everyone concerned was anxious that these people ought not to feel that they were to be dispossessed or prejudiced in the arrangement that was being made. If the word "State" had been used that might easily have aroused these doubts, whereas by using the word "Home", a modified term, it was no doubt desired to avoid that. We must remember in this case that as a substitute for "State" we have the word "National." It is impossible for anyone reading the Articles of the Mandate and wishing to put an honest interpretation upon them, to come to any conclusion but that it was intended that a National Home should be set up in Palestine for the Jews, and, as it says in Article 2 that should lead gradually to "the development of self-governing institutions" there. There appears to be no doubt about that whatsoever. The whole context of the Mandate justifies that conclusion.

I would like to say a word about the Jewish Agency. A suggestion has been made that we can merely wave our hands

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[Mr. Turner-Samuels.]
and get rid of the Jewish Agency. The Agency is an integral part of the Mandate. Before we can get rid of the Jewish Agency, we must get rid of the Mandate. In Article 4 are stated precisely the functions of the Jewish Agency. Certainly it is not one of the prescribed functions that they should deal with matters of terrorism or anything of that kind. In fact, the Jewish Agency has neither the power nor the means to do that. The function of the Agency was:

"for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine."

That was their principal purpose. As immigration, under Article 6, was one of the main purposes of the Mandate, it was not likely, and it is not likely, that the Jewish Agency would do anything which would stop that immigration, for that would be a contravention of the Mandate itself. The Agency has never contravened a single one of its duties under the Mandate. I defy anyone to prove a single contravention by the Agency of any duty, obligation or function which it was given or has exercised under this Mandate.

Major Legge-Bourke (Isle of Ely): What about the White Paper?

Mr. Turner-Samuels: The White Paper is another matter; the White Paper is illegal. So far as the question of immigration is concerned, I would like to mention Article 6 of the Mandate which is very important. It is the Article which controls the question of immigration and it says:

"The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections"——

Brigadier Mackeson (Hythe): On a point of Order. Many of us are well acquainted with this question. Could we not get on with the modern problem?

Mr. Turner-Samuels: Hon. Members may be well acquainted with it, but the speeches already made have not indicated that. Those speeches and the errors they evince are on record and I think that I am, at least, entitled to correct them. Article 6 says:

"The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes."

Mr. Manningham-Buller (Daventry): Would the hon. and learned Gentleman read the earlier words:

"while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population . . ."

Mr. Turner-Samuels: I have just read those words. I do not know why I should be required to read them twice. I wish to say a few words about the White Paper of 1939. I will be brief, because I know others want to take part in the Debate. We are bound as regards the White Paper of 1939 to take into account what has been the policy of this party and the right hon. Gentlemen who now sit on the Front Bench. It is an absolute heresy, in my humble submission, for anyone to say that because they have become Members of the Government they can throw off, or discard, all the statements and pledges that they have ever made. If that were to pass as being the political principle of this country, we should have come to a sorry state of affairs. While the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary was speaking, I interrupted him. He said that this House was bound by the White Paper. That proposition cannot be sustained. It is a piece of pure advocacy. As I said when I interrupted the right hon. Gentleman earlier, the Prime Minister himself has repudiated any such position. I quoted his view as expressed in this House on 1st July, 1946, reported in HANSARD of that date in col. 1907. I am sorry that time does not allow me to go more fully into the White Paper, and I conclude by saying that the document is from beginning to end, illegal and ought now to be repudiated by the Government which opposed it originally in this House and had prior to this Parliament, consistently denounced it.

7.40 p.m.

Mr. Stokes (Ipswich): I will deal with some of the points mentioned by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels) in the course of my speech, but in regard to his suggestion about the Foreign Secretary changing party policy, I would say that I was not at the recent party meeting, but, from Press reports, I gather that, on the whole, the party supported him.

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Mr. Turner-Samuels: I was referring to the Labour Party.

Mr. Stokes: The hon. Member ought to have been long enough in the House to realise that the Parliamentary Labour Party does not have the job of interpreting the Foreign Secretary's policy in the House of Commons, and I would add that, when the Parliamentary Labour Party supports the Foreign Secretary, that is good enough for me. I was particularly delighted with the Foreign Secretary's speech, because I think that, for the first time, I heard him state a moderately fair case for the Arabs, though he did not go far enough for me. I thought he stated the Jewish case absolutely fairly, but I am assured by my Zionist friends, that he did not go far enough for them. We know that a good many promises have been made, but what must never be forgotten is that the Arabs were first promised the return of Palestine. Both my hon. and learned Friend who spoke before me and the Foreign Secretary expressed views as to the meaning of the Balfour Declaration. I think that a great deal of misapprehension exists there because people do not realise that the Balfour Declaration was only a sentence embodied in a long letter from Mr. Balfour to Lord Rothschild.

Mr. Janner *rose*——

Mr. Stokes: I am not going to give way. I want to make it quite clear that the Arabs never accepted the Balfour Declaration, and were never consulted about it. They never accepted the Mandate because they considered it to be completely contrary to Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Foreign Secretary went on to say that he did not find it easy to decide what a National Home for the Jews meant. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Gloucester explained that it really meant a national State, and said that the wrong word had been used. I am going to quote from the important White Paper which was issued on 3rd June, 1922—a British White Paper—which said:

"Unauthorised statements have been made to the effect that the purpose which is in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become 'Jewish as England is English.' His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab Delegation, the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine."

That was issued by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill), who said the other day that he stood completely by that declaration. I do not think there is any doubt whatever about what was intended.

My contention, and I speak with some limited experience of Arab affairs, is that, numerically, at any rate, the intentions of the Balfour Declaration have been carried out. When the last war ended, there were some 60,000 Jews in Palestine, forming about 7 per cent. of the population. There are now 600,000 Jews in Palestine, forming 30 per cent. of the population, and we cannot expect the Arabs to consent to more and more European Jews going into Palestine, when they were not responsible for the persecution of the Jews in Europe, and so long as Britain and America—and the Jews in England number 1 per cent. and the Jews in America 4 per cent. of the population—are not prepared to open their doors to let them in. I am quite sure from what I have been told by our Arab friends that, if we were prepared to raise our Jewish population up to 33 per cent., there would be no difficulty with the Arabs in Palestine.

I was very glad to hear the Foreign Secretary say that he was not going to give up his efforts to solve this problem. I was sorry when he said the other day that the matter had to go to U.N.O. I would much prefer, and I understand that my Arab friends would much prefer, that this matter should be settled between the British Government and the parties concerned, and I hope that the appeal which has been thrown out today will not fall on deaf ears.

To turn to another subject, that of the stamping out of violence, these acts of violence were condemned on both sides of the House with great unanimity. The point to which I would call attention is that our methods of stamping out violence in the case of Arabs are very different to the methods until recently used against the Jews. I think it was in 1937 that the Arab Higher Committee was declared an illegal organisation, and four members

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[Mr. Stokes.]
of the Arab Higher Committee and other Arab politicians were arrested and deported. Following on that, we had the attempted assassination of the High Commissioner, followed by the assassination of Lord Moyne, and what happened next? The Jews merely told us that they would be good boys, and we could get no further. Recent revelations have made it plain that there was some responsibility on the part of the Jewish Agency for being concerned in matters leading up to the blowing-up of the King David Hotel, and it is astonishing to me, in view of what has been said about the Mandate, that the Jewish Agency has not been declared illegal and the leading people in it removed from that country.

There is one other thing I would like to say. If the Foreign Secretary fails, and does not bring about a reconciliation of some kind, there can be no question of partition, because the Arabs will not have it at all. There can only be a unitary State, and I hope that if, in the end, the matter is going to U.N.O., the Foreign Secretary will make it clear that some time limit should be set. It seems to me that we should follow the excellent policy which has been announced in regard to India. I think that, in the case of India, the time is wrong, but that is by the way. We ought to have a time limit; otherwise, U.N.O. will mess about and not come to a decision, and our men will have to bear the heat and burden of the day.

There is one other small point. I hope the attention of U.N.O., as well as of this House, may be called to the extraordinary concessions granted in Palestine in 1921 and in 1927 both in regard to water and hydro-electric power and mineral resources. In the Colonial Office White Paper, it was stated that the salts in the waters of the Dead Sea, at the valuation at that time, were worth £240,000 million. The figure is at least double that value today. It is an astonishing thing that, when these concessions were granted, an hon. Member of this House—Sir W. Joynson-Hicks—said:

> "I have had some experience of contracts in this city, but the Rutenberg contract contains the most astonishing concessions I have ever seen or read in my life."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th July, 1922; Vol. 156, c. 304.]

I think that will bear investigation. I am sure that, behind the scenes, these matters have a great bearing on this situation.

I think it was a great mistake to mix up the question of the persecution of the Jews in Europe with the Palestine problem. But people always seem to do that. We all know that Mr. Balfour had no thought of Hitler in mind when the Declaration was made. There was no thought of thousands of Jews wanting to leave Europe. [An HON. MEMBER: "What are the figures? "] I cannot give the figures, but no doubt, when my hon. Friend speaks, he will say what was in Mr. Balfour's mind. I am quite certain that he did not contemplate the huge influx of Jews from the West to the East; he certainly did not contemplate that the Arabs were to be asked to take into their midst a huge European colony. It really is a matter of Arabs and Europeans—not Jews—against whom their military effort was sought in the 1914-18 war. I think that ought to be clear in people's minds when they discuss this subject.

I agree with the Foreign Secretary, and I believe that anybody who has travelled in that part will also agree that Arabs and Jews, if left alone, will get together. I believe that, even with this European influx, it is still possible, with a bit of good will on both sides, for them to do that. But, with no decision and the matter being allowed to drift on the thing becomes more and more difficult. As to our own party policy, I never agree with party policy; I am also violently against our foreign policy, as declared in that White Paper. In the Labour Party paper called "The International Post-War Settlement," under the heading "Colonies," we declare that the important thing is to develop the country and to give the indigenous population fair play and to support the Government. In the next column we say that we must doublecross the population in Palestine. That is fantastic. I do not believe that the party which passed that White Paper, had the slightest conception of what they were doing.

Finally, I will say that there is a common point between the Jews and the Arabs. They both dislike us; they dislike all our schemes, and they dislike one another. But they all realise that they must get together. That is a very good common ground from which to start. At least, one knows where one is. I believe that the Foreign Secretary's suggestion is right.

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If they would only follow the policy which he has outlined and try to get on together for three, five or ten years, as he said, under a properly constituted Government, in which everybody is represented, I think we should achieve the solution of our difficulties, and that this unhappy chapter will be closed for all time.

7.54 p.m.

Sir Ralph Glyn (Abingdon): I do not propose to detain the House for long, but I would like to say something in support of what the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) said just now. I am one of the few Members who were in this House when the Balfour Declaration and the White Paper were discussed. I think it is only right that, in such circumstances, one might say what one's recollections are of the intentions of that time, because, since then, many things have happened, and many things have overlaid the views then held.

We must first of all remember that the United States was to have had the Mandate, and that important point should not be forgotten. It was accepted by the United States, and, when President Wilson turned down the League of Nations, it passed to us to hold this troublesome baby. We accepted the Mandate, not because we wished to have it, but in order to do something for the benefit of the Middle East. The White Paper of 1922 was issued in an endeavour to correct what Mr. Balfour had said in that unhappy declaration about the National Home. There was an idea that the Jewish National Home should be not far from Jerusalem, and that there should be a university to which the Jews should go. It was at one time proposed that there should be a passport or a nationality office so that Jews could go there and obtain Jewish nationality. Having done that, they could then go wherever they wished, and could travel with a Jewish passport. But the British Jews, whose views I have always respected, and who made a great contribution to our efforts, were strenuously opposed to such a plan.

Mr. Janner: The hon. Gentleman is making a statement which is absolutely incorrect. There were a few British Jews who signed a letter, but they were in a very minute minority, and certainly did not represent the opinions of British Jewry at all.

Sir R. Glyn: No doubt the hon. Member will have a chance of stating his views later. All I can say is that at that time Zionism, as we know it today, was unknown, and our preoccupation at that time was to try and help settle those difficult problems in Palestine in such a way as was in accordance with British practice and tradition.

I believe that an immense amount of harm has been done both in the United States and elsewhere by mixing up strategical considerations with the Mandate. There have been a great many people in America who thought that we were manipulating the Mandate for strategical purposes. If a Mandate is used at all, it must be used largely in the interests of the people concerned in the territory for which a country is responsible. There ought to be no other consideration. The hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Levy) said, I think, that one of the reasons why we should continue with the Mandate was strategical. That, surely, should be the last reason. It shows that we are not carrying out the purpose of the Mandate quite disinterestedly, which was the original intention.

It was never felt that this country should be saddled with this Mandate for a long period. It was always considered that it should be for a fairly short time, but, unfortunately, we have got more and more into the morass. We must keep absolutely distinct the problem of Palestine from that of the Jewish displaced persons. There are certain figures which have been issued quite recently, and some hon. Members had an opportunity of seeing the distress in Europe and the number of Jews who are now in camps in Germany, Austria and Italy and are being looked after by U.N.R.R.A. Indeed, a great many of them are not in the camps, but are mixed with the people of these countries. There is no greater distress or misery in any part of the world than that suffered by these unfortunate people, and this country should give a lead in this matter. It is our duty to do it.

As reported by U.N.R.R.A. the actual number of Jews up to October last was 152,600. That is apart from the other displaced persons who, I think, number nearly a million. It is quite obvious that we are not going to help those people by thrusting them, willy-nilly, into Palestine. For one thing, many of them do not want

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[Sir R. Glyn.]

to go there, but they do want to get out of all the associations and the miseries of the Hitler persecution. It is a great blemish on the postwar conduct of foreign affairs that we have not been able to find a proper solution to that problem. But we should be in a far worse mess if this House—and, after all, this House is responsible for the Mandate—did not make it perfectly clear at this moment how far we are to be tied to this affair, even if we do go to the United Nations organisation. What I am afraid of—and I ask the House to consider this—is that too much time will be taken in arriving at a settlement. I believe it is right that we should go to the United Nations organisation, but that it is essential that we should fix a time limit for arriving at a decision.

We have done it for India, and I believe that policy will succeed, and we ought to do it for Palestine. If the meeting of the United Nations is in September, surely it would be reasonable to say that on 1st January, 1948, we quite definitely go out, because it would be intolerable that British troops, the Palestine police and our administration in Palestine should be forced to carry out a policy which we not only do not approve, but are not really capable of carrying out. It should be remembered that, though we may have numbers of men in uniform, unless the financial position of the country is such that they can be maintained at a necessary war potential, we have no business to accept the responsibility. We stand now upon the edge of a completely new situation. We have published to the world what our financial and economic position is. We have given the details and the numbers. I cannot conceive that anybody in his right senses could possibly doubt that Palestine and the Middle East are today a danger spot. Unless handled with the utmost care it will be the beginning of such trouble between East and West, and we shall find ourselves involved in such a situation, that it will be quite intolerable to the people of this country to have to bear the responsibility for law and order while not in fact being able to ensure it.

Having heard the statement of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, therefore, I believe today we stand as we did in 1922. Then we accepted the situation which somebody else had produced. Now today we acknowledge a situation with which we are no longer able to cope within the terms of the Mandate. We should go to the United Nations, as successor to the League of Nations, and say that for all these years we have struggled and done our best; circumstances are such that we honestly believe we cannot carry on any further, and we therefore fix a date when we come out, refusing to be tied to a position which is no longer tolerable.

Mr. Scollan: Will the hon. Member please explain how we can submit the matter to the United Nations for a decision while, at the same time, making a declaration that in no circumstances would we continue in Palestine?

Sir R. Glyn: The hon. Member may feel that we should give up all our sovereign rights in this country, but our first duty as a member of the United Nations is, surely, to point out that we are not any longer in a position to undertake the risks entailed by a continuation of the Mandate. The greatest mistake we could make today would be to do something in connection with Palestine which would be misunderstood, as the Balfour Declaration was. The whole history of the Middle East and of Britain's administration there is one series of misunderstandings and misconceptions, and, surely, we have had sufficient warnings of the difficulties which follow from not facing the facts and telling the truth. After all, what is it that is at stake? It is not a question of party politics, it is a question of right and wrong. Either we are able to do this job or we are not, and I am convinced that the time has come when we can say quite honourably that we have done our level best, but we are anxious that the world should take up this burden. We have failed to produce a policy—that is a fact—which brings peace to both sides. Nobody can say we have not tried; let somebody else try, and bring fresh minds to bear upon it.

My last word is in regard to the Arab League. The Arabs, and indeed all peoples, at our request, made a contribution to fighting the terrorism of Hitler. The Arab League represents a great assembly of religious people, believing in Mohammedanism, and forming an enormous block of power stretching right across that part of the world. We have had contacts with Moslems in every part of the world, we respect their faith and

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understand it. The Arab League are looking to those nations which understand them to give them a lead. It is not a question of domination, it is a question of help. There are many Arab states which are struggling forward. Let us not put ourselves in a position which perhaps does not permit us to give free and unfettered advice and help to those people, who have always looked to us in the past for honourable and fair dealing. I believe that we have a great opportunity; if we take it now we may save the world from another conflict, but if we do not take it, I think a conflict is more than possible.

8.6 p.m.

Brigadier Peto (Barnstaple): We have in the last three-quarters of an hour heard three totally different and extremely good speeches. The first, perhaps a little long, was by the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels), who took the Jewish point of view. The second was by the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes), who took a totally different view, that of the Arab, and the third was by my hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon (Sir R. Glyn), and with it I, personally, wholeheartedly agree. In the past I think both parties have made mistakes. The hon. and learned Member for Gloucester prefaced his remarks by saying that he was not going into the past, and from then on never mentioned the future in the rest of his speech. I, however, am going to mention the past, and at the beginning I feel it right to say that I do know a little about Palestine. I have been there and served there, and I was there right at the beginning, from 1921 until 1924. I have seen, and can bear witness to what the Foreign Secretary said, that it is perfectly possible for Jew and Arab to work together. They have not identical interests, and that is perhaps why it is quite easy for them to work togther. They are jealous of each other only when it comes to a question of which shall be the dominating people in the country. It is then that the quarrel begins.

As the Foreign Secretary said, the Jew is a town-dweller; 78 per cent. of them live in the urban districts, in Tel Aviv and so forth. The Arab, on the other hand, does not live in the towns, he cultivates the soil. It is quite possible for those two communities to live in harmony together. For my part I have always been in favour of partition, not as a permanency but as an initial stage with a view to getting them to live together without quarrelling for a certain period, meeting each other and possibly working for each other in a way which will lead ultimately to unity. There is no doubt in my mind that it is possible to start by partition and finish with unity in that country.

I have heard with some interest the views expressed by various hon. Members on the meaning of the term "National Home." I thought it was quite enlightening to hear the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester give his view that it meant a pre-eminently Jewish State. I have no doubt that is the view of many other hon. Members on the Labour side. It is not my view. While it is quite impossible to say what was in Lord Balfour's mind, my view is that the National Home was not intended to be an exclusive State for Jews only. I thought the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester gave the impression that it was to be an exclusive home for Jews.

Mr. S. Silverman: Is not the hon. and gallant Gentleman getting a little confused? A National Home is, surely, a home in which a nation lives, in which it is there as of right, and in which it is not dominated by anybody else. There are cases where one can have that, as in Wales and Scotland, without a State.

Brigadier Peto: The hon. Member answered that point himself, I think, when he interjected, a little while ago, that it was to be a Jewish home with free immigration into it, limited only by the economic capacity for absorption. That is obviously what it must be, and what it was intended to be—a limited number of Jews would be allowed to immigrate into the country, but the number would be limited by the economic capacity of the country, and it would not be to the exclusion of the Arabs who are there already. I find it very hard to understand how the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with their knowledge, could possibly have stated, in December, 1944, and May, 1945, at Labour conferences, things which are totally and absolutely different from the interpretation of the term "National Home" to which I have referred. According to those statements, it was to be to the exclusion of the Arabs. If I

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[Brigadier Peto.]
remember rightly, the Prime Minister's remark was to the effect that the Arabs must be encouraged to leave the country as soon as possible and that the Jews must be allowed to immigrate into Palestine absolutely freely, without any let or hindrance, and that no obstacle was to be placed in their way. I have the quotation here.

Mr. Hoy (Leith): Perhaps it would be better if the hon. and gallant Member would read the quotation, because I do not think it was exactly as he has said.

Brigadier Peto: The Prime Minister said:

> "There is, surely, neither object nor meaning in a Jewish National Home unless we are prepared to let Jews, if they wish, enter into this tiny land in such numbers as to become a majority, the Arabs being encouraged to move out as the Jews move in. Let them be compensated handsomely for their land and let them settle elsewhere . . ."

and so on.

Mr. S. Silverman: What is the date of the quotation?

Brigadier Peto: December, 1944, at the annual conference of the Labour Party. I could also quote what the Chancellor of the Exchequer said the following year, which was even stronger. I cannot understand how two men of great integrity and wisdom could possibly make such statements and lead the Labour Party, at a conference of that sort, completely up the garden path. Now those statements have come back on them. They are in a position of great responsibility. Their words can be quoted. Their party is entirely at sixes and sevens; some people in it think one thing, and some another; some people hold that the Jewish problem should be solved by allowing Jews to go into Palestine freely, and others hold totally opposite views, as, for example, the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes). We know that the great Labour Party has often been confused before as to their policy, and without wishing to rub it in, I mention their lack of policy with regard to Russia, India and Palestine, and I would add with regard to domestic affairs. They were full of promises before they had responsibility, and now that they have responsibility, they are not putting their promises into effect.

Mr. Scollan: Is that the reason the hon. and gallant Gentleman's party has no policy?

Brigadier Peto: The Foreign Secretary said that Palestine was, and is likely to be, a sore spot. The position in Palestine is extremely like that in Ireland after the 1914-18 war. I also happen to have served in that country at the time of the Sinn Fein troubles. The problem in Palestine now, with the terrorists, is almost identical with the problem that had to be solved from 1918-20 in Ireland. I think there is only one way of solving that problem, and that is to handle it very strictly and very firmly, or to get out. There used to be a saying at the time of the Irish troubles which is equally applicable today, although I hope that in mentioning it I shall not deter recruiting. It was

> "Join the Army and see the world"—

and in those days, they used to say:

> "Join the R.I.C. and see the next."

If one said now

> "Join the Palestine Police and see the next."

there would be a certain amount of similarity in it. Our men in Palestine have a very unpleasant task to do. Whatever is done, whether the Foreign Secretary goes to U.N.O. with a policy or without a policy, whether U.N.O. in the end comes to no decision or comes to a decision which we feel we have to implement, I ask one thing only, and it is this, that policy or no policy, we shall be guided by the rule that whatever is decided as a result, it shall not make the position of our troops in that country more difficult than it now is.

8.17 p.m.

Mr. Crossman (Coventry, East): Every time I have listened to a discussion in the House on Palestine, and particularly in listening to certain passages of the Foreign Secretary's speech, I have become increasingly aware that the chief problem is the distance, psychological and physical, between this country and Palestine. When I listen to our quiet discussion, and when I remember that, while we are talking cheerfully about keeping the door open and asking what, in two thousand years is a year in solving the problem, and that, on the other hand, in Jerusalem today British officials are cooped into ghettos and no British official

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can go about among the people he is trying to serve; when I remember that, in the last two days, I have received from two men, one an Englishman and one a New Zealander, who have spent their lives in serving Jews and Arabs, desperate appeals to be released from the prison into which they have been put by the British authorities; when I remember the feelings of Jews and Arabs, exasperated by 18 months' constant delay—and it is really ten years of delay from 1937—then I feel we ought to get some actuality and some real relationship between the urgency of the problem and what we are doing about it.

I welcome this Debate if for no other reason than that it will have impressed upon the Foreign Secretary the sense of hon. Members on all sides of the House, whether they are pro-Jew or pro-Arab or, as I prefer, mainly pro-British, our deep concern and our lack of policy today—lack of short-term policy, lack of long-term policy—and the dangers to this country which such a lack of policy will bring. There was one particular thing in the Foreign Secretary's speech which concerned and worried me. It is very easy to generalise from one's own experience. One has spent one's life in negotiations between reasonable British people, where one just gets them into two rooms, and then, after all, it is a question of the employers offering 8d. and the men demanding 10d., and then splitting at 9d., and it is very easy to believe that the Jews and the Arabs in their passionate national opposition, can be somehow jostled together by personal influence, and made to sign on the dotted line some compromise. Not one person who has visited Palestine in the last few years has come back disagreeing with the view that no agreed solution is possible, and that if we try to get people to conferences there will be endless postponement and delay. That was the view of the Peel Commission in 1937 and the view of Mr. Malcolm MacDonald in 1939; it is the point upon which the White Paper agrees and it was also the view of the Anglo-American Committee, of which I was a member, last year. Every person agrees that it is an absolute waste of time to go on bringing these people together into conference. I agree with the spokesman for the Opposition today that a whole year has been completely wasted, and that this matter should have gone to U.N.O. last year if it was going at all. I hope that after this Debate there will be no more talk about leaving the door open.

Arab and Jew have both of them an impregnable moral case. They have something that they really believe in, and they cannot be wangled out of it by some trick solution which everybody sees through. They know the problem from A to Z, and they look at every proposal with their eyes on the two questions of land and immigration. They judge every proposal according to the way in which those two questions are dealt with. There is no way of bringing them together before we impose something on both Jews and Arabs.

Mr. Alpass (Thornbury): Would the hon. Member impose a settlement by force?

Mr. Crossman: Perhaps my hon. Friend will allow me to develop the argument. There are only two ways of ending the situation, unless we continue the Mandate and continue spending £40 million a year on keeping a large army and being unpopular with both sides. One way is the 1937 way of partition. The other is the way of the White Paper of 1939. Now, 52 nations in U.N.O. are to find more devices for wanting to keep up the Mandate. One is the Arab way, and the other is the Jewish way. One way is that which enables the Jews to survive and have a reasonable chance of surviving, with a stake in parts of Palestine, where they can either come to terms with the Arabs or fight it out. The other way is to be at the mercy of an Arab majority.

Those two policies, partition and the White Paper, do not differ very much at the moment. The Jewish population in Palestine would, if the White Paper were imposed and our troops were withdrawn, create a *de facto* republic. British troops would go out and Jewish troops would take over what they could hold, and then there would be negotiations between the two sides. Whether we impose our wishes, or impose the White Paper, the future of Palestine will, in fact, be decided between the Jews on the one side and the Arabs on the other. What we have to decide is between an illegal or irregular way of dividing the country; walking out and leaving the parties to fight it out, or an internationally agreed partition of the country which will reduce

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[Mr. Crossman.]

the bloodshed to some extent. There is not a very great variety of solutions.

Now I would say a word or two about the reference to U.N.O. I am alarmed at the very easy way in which some people believe that reference to U.N.O. will settle the matter. I remember the days when a reference to the Anglo-American Committee was going to solve the problem. The problem is not to be solved in that way. As time goes on we find Arabs and Jew terrorists grow stronger, so that when we have to impose a solution the cost will be greater in British, Jewish and Arab blood the longer we wait. In regard to the reference to U.N.O. let us see realistically what is going to happen. There is a Russian *bloc* and an American *bloc*. The aim of the Russian *bloc* will be to have the British troops removed out of Palestine. The Russians want us out. What about the Americans? The Americans want us in. We have to understand that position. There has been a certain amount said about the Americans and upon the subject of elections in New York. Self-righteousness is rather dangerous. Apparently if there had been a million Jews in London we might have seen a slightly different attitude on the Front Benches on both sides of this House. There were Election pledges about the Jewish question. That British pressure group is big enough to get an election pledge at the conference, but not big enough to formulate the policy of a Government.

It is unwise to bicker at Americans about the size of the Jewish community in that country. We ought to look soberly at American interests. There are two factors which determine America's attitude, the Jewish democratic vote and Standard Oil. Jewish lobbying is vocal; oil lobbying is silent but highly influential. The oil lobby is quite powerful enough, in view of the close connection with the American Chiefs of Staff, to prevent the Americans assuming any responsibility in the Middle East, to jeopardise the relationship with the Arab world by which the oil supply would suffer. I do not blame the Americans for that. The Jewish group at home and Standard Oil abroad, make it their obvious interest to sit on the fence and to avoid ever making themselves get into the Middle East where they would have to fight pro-Jew or pro-Arab. Every American politician will do all he can to sit on the fence in the Middle East, so as to ensure that the British are there and that the Russians are not.

If this problem goes to U.N.O. the Americans will prevent the Russians having their way and will try to press the thing back on us. There will be some fantastic new constitution proposed, with a quite unworkable Mandate. We shall be politely pushed back into running the country to defend British and American interests in the Middle East. We shall, therefore, be no whit further on than if we had done it all ourselves. All U.N.O. brings is another Mandate which we shall not have written ourselves, but which others will have written for us. We may be much worse off than we are at present. Therefore, those Members of this House who have pressed for a time limit for the withdrawal of British personnel and troops are completely justified.

Secondly, we have not only to press for the time limit, but we have to make it clear to U.N.O. that, in our view, the Mandate is unworkable. On that point we agree with the Peel Commission and with the White Paper, and this House even agrees with the hon. and learned Member for Daventry (Mr. Manningham-Buller) and myself, who were on the Commission which came to that simple conclusion—a conclusion which has only dawned on the Front Bench. The Mandate is unworkable. We are not prepared to work it. A new compromise cannot work, and we are not prepared to fail again. I believe it is essential that we should go to U.N.O. saying not only that we have this record but that this record has led us to this conclusion: It is impossible for an alien to go on ruling Jew and Arab. The problem has to be settled either by the White Paper or by partition which may both mean the same thing. But it has to be settled in one way or the other, enabling foreign rule to get out of Palestine. That would be to the interest, not only of the British but of the Arabs and the Jews.

I wish to say one harsh thing in conclusion. There are times, even in industrial disputes, when a strike or a lock-out is necessary, when a trial of strength has to come, when the task of the conciliator is to say, "The boys have got to have their heads and try it out." I believe that situation has arrived in Palestine, when it is preferable for Jew and Arab, who have

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passionate convictions, to " have it out " as equals and free men, even though it involves some bloodshed, than to continue fighting us. That is the case for partition. It is the case for the White Paper, and it is a case for ending the Mandate.

Mr. Kenneth Lindsay: It is a case for abdication.

Mr. Crossman: When two mature peoples are being ruled by a third people through a police State, I do not call it abdication. I call it liberation of the peoples concerned. It is not abdication to say that the Jews are now strong enough to defend themselves and the Arabs think they can defend themselves, that they should, therefore, have their freedom, and that we should not be tied up to some arrangement which the Americans want to impose on us for keeping us in Palestine with another " phoney " constitution and another compromise which will keep us balancing between the two. We all know that we are now ruling Palestine—we did not know it until last week—under the White Paper. The Foreign Secretary says we are bound to do it because it is a pledge to the Arab world. I would point out that if it is a pledge to the Arab world, it was also declared illegal by the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations—[An HON. MEMBER: " No."]—by a majority of one. It was declared illegal by the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations by four to three. It was declared illegal by Labour Ministers in the House of Commons, and I think I would be supported by the hon. and learned Member for Daventry opposite if I said that there was not a member of the Anglo-American Committee who could find a way of making the White Paper compatible with the Mandate.

We ought to be quite clear on what we are about. We are now saying that we do not want to impose a solution in Palestine. I would point out that we are imposing a solution in Palestine. With enormous force, we are imposing the White Paper. If, through that, we came to war, as at any moment we may, and this country were to find itself fighting to impose the White Paper which was declared illegal by the international authority under which we hold the Mandate, I must frankly say that I would be doubtful whether it would be a just or an unjust war.

Mr. Pickthorn: Did the hon. Member say that we hold the Mandate under the Mandates Commission? If so, I think he should correct himself.

Mr. Crossmann: I said we hold it under the League of Nations.

Mr. Pickthorn: We do not.

Mr. Crossman: I will correct myself and say, " confirmed by the League of Nations." The point I was coming to was this: we have to face the reason why we are imposing the White Paper today. It is the same as in 1939. In 1939 we had to impose the White Paper because the Arab world might have joined the Axis in the years of the war. We all know that was the reason, and it may be it was a perfectly good strategic necessity, though an unpleasant one. We all know that today we are still imposing the White Paper, because we are afraid that otherwise the Arab world might go over to Soviet Russia.

I think it is time we were honest about this, and knew what we are doing from strategic reasons is taking precedence over morality and legality. If it does, at least we should know it in this House of Commons, and should know the motives behind our policy. It is intolerable to continue in this way, in which expediency is constantly having to take precedence over morality and legality. We know, of course, that there is a large terrorist movement; and if we increase Jewish immigration who in the Arab world will not say, " You are giving way to Jewish nuisance value "? The Arabs are bound to say that. Just as if the Arab view prevails the Jews will say, " You are giving way to Arab nuisance value." We have now reached the situation in Palestine in which both sides believe, and passionately believe, that the British give way to nuisance value. It is not a question of this Government, but a question of the last 10 years. The attitude is: The British give way to nuisance value, therefore the revolver is the " Esperanto." I say it is that which now utterly corrupts life in Palestine for Briton, Jew and Arab. If we have reached that point, and if the hon. Member for the English Universities (Mr. K. Lindsay) calls it abdication, I say that is nonsense.

Let us close down this lamentable story. Let us, for once, make up our minds, and go to the United Nations with the follow-

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[Mr. Crossman.]

ing three plain statements. First: The Mandate is unworkable, and we cannot possibly agree to any United Nations' recommendation for reconstituting the Mandate with any compromise solution at all. Secondly: We are in favour of an orderly partition of Palestine instead of a disorderly partition, which is what would occur if Palestine were made an Arab State and the Jews merely took what they wanted by means of the Haganah fighting for it; let us say we would rather do it under international guarantee. Thirdly: Whatever happens we will have our troops and adminstrators out by a certain date, because that will speed up the solution.

8.38 p.m.

Mr. Lipson (Cheltenham): It seemed to me that the whole burden of the argument of the hon. Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman) has been to lead up to his suggestion of partition. If I may say so, he has been extremely dogmatic.

Mr. Crossman: Brief.

Mr. Lipson: He is quite sure that no agreed solution is possible. But that was not the view put forward by the Foreign Secretary this afternoon. The Foreign Secretary told us that even at this late hour he has not given up hope that an agreed solution may be found. In the course of his speech he showed us how on two occasions he had almost brought the two parties together with the possibility of an agreed solution, when the untimely intervention of America made the position entirely impossible.

Mr. Crossman: Might I correct the hon. Member on one point? I was not, I think, quite dogmatic. All I said was that no one who has been to Palestine in the last three years has come back with the view that agreement is possible. That view is limited to people who sit in London.

Mr. Lipson: At any rate, personally I prefer the more optimistic view taken by the Foreign Secretary. The alternative offered by the hon. Member for East Coventry is that we should come out, and leave it to the Jews and Arabs to fight it out between themselves. That is an alternative which, to my mind, is quite unworthy of the responsibilities which we have had in that country for so many years; and the result of which, I think, would be too terrible to contemplate.

In all the Debates on Palestine in which I have been privileged to take part, I have tried to take as objective a view as possible of this problem.

Mr. Crossman: We all have.

Mr. Lipson: I have tried to be fair to the Government; I have tried to be fair to the Jews; I have tried to be fair to the Arabs; and have endeavoured to apply to this problem the principle which, in my view, ought to be applied to all political problems—the principle of justice. I have refused to forget that principle, or to turn a blind eye towards it, because, as a Jew, the problem of Palestine has a special significance to me. Starting from that premise, I want to say that I think that many of the charges which are brought against the Government in the handling of this problem are not fair. It has been said that there has been unreasonable delay. But to bring about a solution of the Palestine problem does not lie with this country alone. The other parties concerned, the Jews and the Arabs, have also their contribution to make, and I think it is clear that they have not been at all helpful. Both of them have maintained an extreme point of view.

Mr. Gallacher: Who are " they "?

Mr. Lipson: The Jews and the Arabs.

Mr. Gallacher: Then why does not the hon. Member say " We and the Arabs "?

Mr. Lipson: Perhaps the hon. Member will allow me to make my speech in my own way. Both of them have adopted an extreme point of view, and have not made the task of His Majesty's Government easier. Then, too, I think it is only fair to the Government to appreciate the fact that this is by no means the only problem with which they have had to deal since they came into office. After all, the war has created problems much greater and far more numerous than many people imagined it would, even when the war ended. Peace has not yet been made with Germany and Austria; the United Nations organisation had to be set up; economic problems of tremendous magnitude have had to be dealt with; the world has been, and still is, in danger of famine; in our own country we have had our domestic problems. In these circumstances it is most unreasonable of the extreme Jewish

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nationalists to complain that the Government have not given priority to their own particular problem.

Personally, I want to thank the Foreign Secretary for the speech which he made today. In my opinion, that speech is the best speech that has been made on the Palestine problem by anybody, and I think it has served a most useful purpose, because it has, at least, given all the facts, and it has made all the difficulties with which the Foreign Secretary has had to deal crystal clear; and to that extent, I think, it has considerably cleared the air. I was very much impressed by the obvious sympathy with which the Foreign Secretary has approached this problem, and the courage he has shown, in spite of all the difficulties, in trying to find a solution.

Therefore, I think that the supporters of the Zionist cause ought to show a little more understanding of his difficulties—perhaps they will after that speech—and realise it is not possible for him to meet all their demands, unless he is to sacrifice many of the political principles for which he and his party, and, indeed, all parties in this country have stood for so many years. It is, I think, obvious, that as a result of the terrorist activities in Palestine, the Zionist cause and the cause for a Jewish State have much less support than before. These people, by their actions, have done infinite harm to the cause of Jewry generally, and also to the cause of Jewish nationalism in Palestine. People are naturally asking now what kind of Jewish State is likely, when the terrorists show the particular attitude of mind indicated by their actions. As a result of the breakdown in the negotiations, it was inevitable that the Government should decide to refer this problem to U.N.O. The Foreign Secretary has said that the Mandate as it exists at present is unworkable, and it is only proper, therefore, that it should be handed over to U.N.O., which has been created to deal with problems of this kind. Personally, I hope the view expressed by the Foreign Secretary that there is still a chance that solution by agreement may be found between the Arabs and the Jews and the British Government before the matter goes to U.N.O. may be justified, because if agreement can be arrived at, it is far better than anything which is forced upon the country from outside. We can all hope and pray that that confidence is justified.

I should like to strengthen the appeal which has been made to the Foreign Secretary, that in the interval between now and, if need be, when the matter goes before U.N.O. in September, there should be an increase in the number of immigrants allowed into the country. I suggest the Government might agree, until the matter has been considered by U.N.O., to the figure being raised to 4,000 per month, which was the figure envisaged in the latest Government proposals for the settlement of the Palestine problem. I appeal to the Arabs to give sympathetic consideration to this request. I think I have shown that I have some understanding and appreciation of their point of view on this matter, and I trust that an appeal, coming from me, might have some influence with them. It is clear that an increase of this kind could not possibly do the Arab cause any harm whatsoever. On the other hand, it would relieve a tremendous amount of suffering, and help to create a better atmosphere in Palestine itself until a happier solution of the problem could be found. If the Colonial Secretary could assure the House that the Government are prepared to consider increasing the number of immigrants to 4,000 a month, I believe that such an assurance would meet with general acceptance, particularly when coupled with the plea which the Foreign Secretary made today, that all nations in the world should be prepared to open their gates and take their share of the displaced persons who are so sadly in need of a home.

I am glad that the Government have turned down the proposal for partition, because although partition might buy an easy peace for a time, like Munich, it would tend to keep Arab and Jew apart, with all the possibilities of conflict that might arise in consequence. As, in my view, the only ultimate solution of the Palestine problem is to be found in a Unitary State, in which Jews and Arabs would live and co-operate together for the common good of all, I believe that it would be a fatal mistake to start dividing the country. Palestine is smaller than Wales, and partition is a solution which the Government have rejected for India, where the case is so much stronger. If we were to accept partition for Palestine it would be difficult, from a logical, fair, and just point of view, to refuse Pakistan to India. There are differences of opinion

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[Mr. Lipson.]
as to how the Palestine problem is to be solved, but we are all agreed in desiring the earliest possible solution. I hope the Foreign Secretary will continue, as he told us he intends to do, in his efforts, so that, at long last, peace may be brought to Palestine, and that in peace and prosperity Palestine can once again make her proper contribution to human good and human happiness.

8.54 p.m.

Mr. Lever (Manchester, Exchange): I hope I shall not offend my hon. Friends, and give comfort to the Philistines, by extending to the Foreign Secretary's plan a conditional welcome, a welcome which I might describe as being with open arms, but crossed fingers. I believe in a united Palestine, and that partition, logically, would involve what my hon. Friend the Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman) says it would involve, namely, Jews and Arabs deciding to fight out their differences. I believe in a united Palestine because I believe that Jews and Arabs have to get together in Palestine, work together, and settle their differences, and I feel that partition as between Jews and Arabs would be the preliminary bout to a major fight. It would give no pleasure to me as a Jew to see the Jews of Palestine use their brilliant organising skill and great mental superiority and knowledge in Palestine to give them a victory in arms against their more primitive opponents. I think that nothing more dreadful could be contemplated, in the interests of the Jewish people anywhere, than a blood bath of that kind should be preceded by a partition policy. I believe in an independent Palestine, because I believe, as the Foreign Secretary has said—I hope sincerely—that the relationship between Jew and Arab in Palestine has been bedevilled from outside.

The Foreign Secretary seems to have in mind exclusively the hysteria of Madison Square Garden meetings and the efforts of some extreme Zionists. But there are other intermeddlers whom we ought to have in mind outside Palestine the moguls who rule the Arab States who represent every backward and reactionary tendency in the Middle East—and the oil moguls too, whose influence makes itself felt at every conference and on every decision about Palestine. I am bound to tell the House that I can think of another interfering party, who had no right to be there, and that is the British Government and the British Army. I am bound to say that it is not in the interests of British people that they should remain there any longer as one of the intermeddling parties of whom the Foreign Secretary has spoken. I give him hearty support in his desire for a united, free and genuinely independent Palestine, and a democratic Palestine which will govern its own destinies in every way. I do not think that that means that we can walk out tomorrow, but I think we ought to have a time limit. No one is going to believe the story that if we go out Jews and Arabs will massacre each other. If Britain goes out under a ruling of the United Nations Organisation and proper arrangements are made for a short interim period, the Jews and Arabs of Palestine will learn to live together, as everyone acknowledges they are able to do, if not subject to outside interference. They already work together in their trade unions, in big business, and in many other ways.

Mr. S. Silverman: How are we to get it?

Mr. Lever: The way to get it is to go to the United Nations organisation for the temporary cover under which we release our troops and set up the framework of a democratic self-governing Palestine. [*Interruption.*] With the Jews in a minority, at the moment, certainly. That is a matter for the people of Palestine to decide in a democratic way. I am bound to tell the House that I do not believe that any such solution will work without the temporary umbrella provided by the United Nations, it will not work if we do not at once admit a substantial number of Jews into Palestine. That is very different from demanding a Jewish State in Palestine, or a Jewish majority in Palestine. I am told by the Foreign Secretary, and I believe it, because I ventured to suggest the same thing myself some time ago, that, if we do not insist on the idea of a Jewish State and join with the Arabs in demanding self-government in Palestine, we can get agreement with the Arabs to let at least 100,000 Jews into Palestine. I want to see at least 100,000 Jews admitted into Palestine in the immediate future. I think the effect in soothing the

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whole situation would be immense and would give the denial to the pessimistic expectations of permanently bad relations between Jew and Arab. We are told by all sorts of people that these two races can never live together. Of course, they will not, if people with political and financial motives are continually bedevilling their relations. Let us see what are the genuine minimum needs of both sides and we might get rather a different and less gloomy picture of the possibilities from that which has been painted by my hon. Friend the Member for East Coventry.

One of the pressing problems of the moment is the question of the displaced persons, and this problem of displaced persons, if we try to for some academic reason, cannot be separated from Palestine. That problem is inseparably linked up with Palestine. We have to see these helpless people do not rot any longer in the displaced persons camps of Europe, and that we no longer pay mere lip service to humanitarian efforts which ought to have been made on their behalf. I am not afraid to say that there is a difference between displaced Jews and other displaced persons, because the Jews require rather different treatment and consideration. I must tell the House quite candidly that my view is that it is dishonesty and hypocrsy to pretend that the world should take them as an alternative to Palestine when at the present time the whole world shows no sign of wanting to take them. The only people in the world who have offered to take the displaced Jews are the Jews of Palestine who are prepared to die for the right to take them. I do not think that that can be ignored although the Jews are a minority in that country.

I want to put one or two questions and make a short statement. I should like the Colonial Secretary when he comes to reply to tell me in plain terms what steps the Government propose to take in regard to Palestine if the United Nations disagree on that subject. Secondly, I should like him to tell me what the Government proposes to do if the United Nations agree on Palestine. What steps are they to take in the interview. I should like an assurance from him now, particularly after all the statements that have been made on this matter in the House, that there are going to be no deals of an unsavoury kind, but that the British Government will take steps to get out of Palestine and leave Jew and Arab the job or running and ruling their own country. Those who are genuinely concerned about the British troops in Palestine want to see those troops brought home to England, where they are badly needed for the tasks confronting us today.

One final word. Some people in this country seem to have difficulty in understanding the position of the Jews in England and their special interest in the Jews in Europe and the Jews in Palestine. Some Members on both sides of the House in the course of Palestine Debates have made remarks of which on reflection they cannot be proud. I remember when my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) was valiantly fighting the battle of these unfortunate people the hon. and gallant Member for North Blackpool (Brigadier Low) made some remark suggesting a dubious loyalty existed on the part of the British Jews when he made his plea for these people. There is no mystery or secret about it. The British Jews are concerned about the suffering Jews in Europe and in Palestine, and in being so they do not abate one whit their loyalty to this country, but they desire to waken the conscience of the people of the world to the terrible plight of these unfortunate people. I ask the House to see that the Foreign Secretary sincerely fulfils the pledge he has given to get out of that country as soon as possible. I ask the House to insist that there is no double dealing now, because the history of the last 20 years is riddled with double dealing and false promises, which have helped to bring about this intolerable and ruinous state of affairs in Palestine, resulting in injustices to the Jews, fears on the part of the Arabs, and in no confident hope for the peace and prosperity of Palestine in the coming years.

9.6 p.m.

Mr. Manningham-Buller (Daventry): The hon. Gentleman the Member for the Exchange Division of Manchester (Mr. Lever) in the course of his extremely fluid speech took to task the hon. Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman) sitting in front of him. I was sorry that that should occur because that showed on the part of the hon. Member for the Exchange Division of Manchester a singular ignorance of the conditions in Palestine which

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[Mr. Manningham-Buller.]
would be likely to ensue if British troops forthwith left that country. The other point he made was the interest that the British Jews had in Jewish displaced persons. I was sorry that he confined his interest to British Jews. I think that on both sides of the House we are concerned with the interests of the displaced persons whether they be Jews or non-Jews who are now in camps in Europe.

Mr. Lever *rose*——

Mr. Manningham-Buller: I will not give way because I have not the time. I think that everyone will agree that we have listened to a good Debate today on this problem which has been so often debated in the House of Commons. The Foreign Secretary started his momentous and courageous speech by saying that there was no denying the fact that the Mandate was contradictory. That is no new discovery. It has already been pointed out by the hon. Member for East Coventry and it was mentioned in the Peel Report and confirmed in other documents. That in itself is a reasoned and cogent argument for the decision to refer this problem to the United Nations organisation. The right hon. Gentleman then went on to reduce the Palestine problem to three simple questions—simple in the sense that they can be simply asked but by no means easily answered.

The first was, should the claims of the Jews be admitted; secondly, should that of the Arabs; or, thirdly, should it be a United Palestinian State? As he said, we cannot solve these problems, but he invited this House " to face up to " them as he said His Majesty's Government have to " face up to them now." I do not know whether really there is very much point in this House facing those problems now if the Government are going to put them before the United Nations without any recommendation of any kind whatsoever. I agree that in the absence of agreement between Jews and Arabs those are questions which fall to be answered if there is to be a final solution of a difficult and persistent problem. My view of these answers is contained in the Report which I signed and which the hon. Member for East Coventry, among others, also signed. We said there that there should be no Jewish State. I think we were right in that, and having heard arguments since we signed it I personally adhere to that position. After all, the official Zionist demand for a Jewish State has a fairly recent origin, starting, I think, in 1942 with the Biltmore Declaration. I believe that is the first declaration——

Mr. Janner *rose*——

Mr. Manningham-Buller: I am limited in time.

Mr. Janner: That is not correct.

Mr. Manningham-Buller: I think I am entirely correct in saying that the Biltmore Declaration was the first official declaration of the Zionist demand for a Jewish State——

Mr. Paget (Northampton): Surely, there was one before?

Mr. Manningham-Buller: Not official Zionist policy. The hon. Member can correct me later if he desires, but I cannot give way because time is short and the Colonial Secretary wants sufficient time in which to reply. I do not believe that the claim for a Jewish State in Palestine is in the true long-term interest of the Jews in Palestine, and that is why I hope that even at this late date the Jewish organisations may reconsider their official policy. If they study the trend of population, there is no prospect of maintaining a permanent Jewish majority, or of obtaining one without some expulsion of the Arab inhabitants already there. I also agree that there should be no Arab State. I should not assent to the Arabs, with their present intensity of feelings, having any domination over the Jews now in the country. The hon. and gallant Member for Barnstaple (Brigadier Peto), who spoke with knowledge of the country, gave testimony to the fact that politics are removed when Jews and Arabs work together. We on the Commission did not exclude the possibility of both Arabs and Jews working in unison. If we had excluded that, we should have published a very different Report. There has been testimony from both sides of the House to the effect that the door is not yet completely closed to the possibility of Jewish and Arab co-operation in a united Palestine. In my belief, that—a united Palestine, if it can be achieved—is the policy which is likely to lead to greater prosperity in that country than any other.

There has been some discussion this evening on the thorny question of what

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is meant by the " National Home." The hon. and learned Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels) gave us a lengthy disquisition on that subject. The right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) said that the meaning was quite clear to him—that it meant a home and not lodgings, but he did not go further than that, and while he would say, no doubt, that Wales was his national home, he did not go on to indicate whether in his view that meant that Wales should be a national State.

It is agreed on both sides of the House that the Mandate is not only ambiguous but that it contains obligations which it is impossible to reconcile. From that it follows that there must be revision, and in recommendation No. 4 of our Report we anticipated that this matter would go to the United Nations—and that it would go without the delay that has occurred. If there was agreement between the Jews and Arabs as to what should be the contents of a trusteeship agreement, the revision would be so much easier, but even if there is no agreement, still, the revision is equally necessary.

But what is the cause of the delay which has occurred? We were asked to perform our duties in the short period of 100 days, and since then we have been told that there have been these efforts to secure agreement between Jews and Arabs. I listened with great interest to what the right hon. Gentleman had to say as to the history of those efforts and the reasons for the breakdown and change of attitude. I admire him for his optimism but I should have thought that anyone with any knowledge of this problem would have realised that at this present time agreement between Jews and Arabs was really completely impossible.

Indeed, it was completely impossible, as the Peel Report showed, before 1939, and long before the White Paper of that date—and in that respect the hon. Lady the Member for North Hendon (Mrs. Ayrton Gould) was entirely inaccurate. It would be a miracle in my view if that agreement was achieved; it could not be achieved unless the mutual fears of the Arabs and the Jews were resolved. I think we could all agree upon that. Now what are the Arab's fears? The Arab's fears, in the first place, are of Jewish domination; secondly, of dispossession and deprivation of his means of livelihood; thirdly, he fears a flood of immigration which will lead to that domination and to his dispossession. Those are the chief fears, in my belief, in the Arab mind. On the Jewish side, what are their fears? I am talking now not of the political Jews not residing in Palestine who have such an influence on the policy of the Jewish Agency but, so far as I can judge, of the Jews in Palestine. I believe their fear is this, and it can be stated quite simply: the fear that they will be dominated by the Arabs unless, with the aid of immigration, they can keep up their numbers.

We cannot resolve those fears, we cannot dispel them. It can only be done by a change of attitude on the part of the Jews, and also a change of attitude on the part of the Arabs. I regret that since 1942 Jewish domination has been in the forefront of Jewish policy. That was confirmed today by the Foreign Secretary when he said that the Jews thought it wrong that he should consult at all with the Arabs on the question of immigration. As I say, I regard this policy of the Jews, from the point of view of Jewish interests, to be really disastrous on long-term because, whether there is a Jewish state or not in Palestine, the livelihood and well being of those Jews who reside in Palestine must depend on their getting on well with the Arab inhabitants of that country and the surrounding people in the nations alongside. I cannot think that there can be any final settlement by agreement of this problem unless the Zionist attitude changes completely. Like the right hon. Gentleman, I would much prefer an agreed solution because that would have a much greater chance of finality, but I regret the right hon. Gentleman's statement the other day that the only proposals which would be put before the United Nations would be those contained in the White Paper, those which have been rejected either by Jews or by Arabs or by both. What does that mean? It means that if the United Nations accept any of the suggestions put forward in that White Paper, they either have to be imposed by force on the entire population of Palestine or on a majority or minority of the inhabitants who are opposed to that solution, and I cannot regard that as desirable.

Furthermore, these proposals are put forward by the right hon. Gentleman with a view to trying to secure agreement between the Arabs and Jews The proposals

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[Mr. Manningham-Buller.]

put forward to try to negotiate a settlement may not be quite the same as the proposals you put forward if you are trying to determine what is the right course to pursue in the interests of the inhabitants of Palestine. I hope that after this Debate there will be further consideration by His Majesty's Government as to whether or not they should put suggestions before the United Nations when the matter is referred to them.

I do not propose to spend much time on the proposals contained in the White Paper, but I take the view—opposed as I am to partition, having signed that Report—that any policy is better than no policy and, at the present time we have none, but in the final suggestions put forward by His Majesty's Government we give notice that we will quit Palestine in five years. That White Paper concludes with these remarkable words:

> "The proposals contained in the present Memorandum are designed to give the two peoples an opportunity of demonstrating their ability to work together for the good of Palestine as a whole and so providing a stable foundation for an independent State."

That is a great and pious aspiration. But, these people in the past have had many opportunities of working together. They have not taken them, and I feel confident, but reluctant, in expressing the opinion that if that sort of proposal is put forward in the present state of mind in Palestine, it will mean that both sides will prepare for the day when we withdraw and they will then settle their differences by the sword.

Mr. K. Lindsay: I gather that the hon. and learned Member's views were not in complete accord with those of the right hon. Member for West Bristol (Mr. Stanley). I know it is not usual for the Opposition to put forward policy, but when a matter is so serious as this, I think we should know the policy of the Opposition, as well as that of the Government.

Mr. Manningham-Buller: I signed this Report expressing my view. I am speaking for myself and not committing anyone, nor the party behind me, to adhere to the view stated in the Report.

Mr. S. Silverman: The hon. and learned Gentleman agrees that the Report he signed was expressly not intended to be a long-term agreement, but was a set of transitional proposals? Will he say now what he thinks is a permanent solution?

Mr. Manningham-Buller: I am asked by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) whether our Report was merely a set of transitional proposals? I do not agree with that, and I think that if the hon. Member studies it carefully he will see that it contains both short-term and long-term proposals. I am also asked to suggest the course to be followed now. The question we have to discuss tonight is not so much the policy which one of us might think right, but the course which His Majesty's Government should now pursue—[HON. MEMBERS: "That is the same thing."]—It is not the same thing. The course we are told His Majesty's Government should pursue now, is to throw this matter on to the table of the United Nations, with no recommendation at all. I have said before, and say again, that whether the policy put forward by His Majesty's Government is one with which I personally agree or not, I am prepared to go so far as to say that any policy put forward by them is better than no policy.

Mr. Lever: What policy would the hon. and learned Gentleman like to put forward?

Mr. Manningham-Buller: I wish to carry on with what I was saying before I was interrupted on these matters. I think the House will agree that to throw this matter at the United Nations without any advice, without any recommendations, in the hope that some nation, free from any responsibility, will put forward a solution which is universally acceptable, is a most impracticable hope. We, having governed Palestine, and not too badly at that since the Mandate, are really in the best position to say in what respects the Mandate should be revised, and what the trusteeship agreement, which will replace the Mandate, should contain. If there is no hope, as I think there is no hope, of getting a solution from the United Nations which is really universally acceptable, one can only regard this as another factor leading to delay. During that delay, apparently, the present situation must continue, and, for an indeterminate period, we shall continue to bear alone an intolerable burden, a burden we have borne for the last 18 months largely owing to the fact that His Majesty's Government have had no policy. We shall have to

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bear that burden, apparently, until next September, and we shall have to go on bearing it, apparently, until the United Nations has come to a conclusion, which may be for a much longer time.

I wish to say one word about immigration, because immigration is one of the first things, as the hon. Member for East Coventry said, to which the Arabs and Jews look in considering whether or not a policy is right, the second being land. I cannot help wondering whether, to assist in the solution of the problem in Europe, to which we drew attention in the forefront of our Report, it really would not assist immigration into Palestine if, in future, the selection was made by Great Britain or those to whom immigration certificates were to be given, and if priority was not given in future, and it has not been, I understand, in the last few years, to the aged and infirm who are now in these displaced persons centres, to the very young and to some skilled workmen, whose services are required in Palestine to provide accommodation for them.

As I understand it, the Jewish Agency now has the power of selection. That selection has, in the past, been criticised, I think rightly criticised by the orthodox Jews, Agudath Israel, for not including sufficient orthodox Jews. I criticise it on the ground that in determining to whom certificates for legal immigration should be granted, they have not selected those categories from inside the camps in Europe. I also ask the right hon. Gentleman to say whether the policy with regard to illegal immigrants has now changed. In 1945 an illegal immigrant who was detained, put in a camp, gained priority in securing immigration, under the quota, into Palestine. After he was caught, he went to the head of the queue to gain admission. I hope that that practice has ceased, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will be able to say it has, because of the danger of a wave of illegal immigration which will accentuate the tense situation this summer. I can think of few things so likely to encourage people to attempt this operation than the knowledge that if they are caught they will at least get priority in admission to Palestine.

I wish we had heard today, from the Foreign Secretary, a statement of the terms upon which we were prepared to carry on in Palestine. I wish we had heard from him that he was prepared to go to the United Nations and say, " This, in our view, is what the Mandate should contain. If the Mandate contains this, if it contains these obligations, then if the United Nations, the United States of America and every other country are prepared to support us, we will do our best to carry it through." I hope that we shall get some assurance that by going to the United Nations we are not getting ourselves into the position of undertaking an obligation to fulfil anything which the United Nations, in their wisdom, may determine to be right for the future of Palestine.

9.29 p.m.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Creech Jones): I want to assure the House that all the suggestions which have been made during this Debate will be most carefully studied by the Government. The Debate has shown, once again, how difficult is this problem of the two communities in Palestine, and how divided are the parties in this House in regard to a solution of the difficulties. It is not a problem out of which any party dare attempt to make political capital. I think the approach of the present Government has been that it is a great human problem, calling for the most careful handling, because of the deep human feelings which have been expressed and evidenced over a long period.

Therefore, we would accept the view that any contributions which can be made from any quarter of the House towards finding a method by which Arab and Jew communities can live together in Palestine, will have our most sympathetic examination. It is hardly reasonable to pronounce that His Majesty's Government have not had a policy in connection with this matter. I shall seek to show, if I can, what that policy has been over the past 18 months. It is not necessarily a failure on the part of the Government if, so far, they have been unable to bring the two communities together, for the finding of a constructive solution to a problem which has baffled us over so many years.

Mr. Pickthorn: The Minister spoke about not making political capital. Now he talks about a problem " which has baffled us "—by which I take him to

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[Mr. Pickthorn.]
mean his party—" over so many years." Surely, they were not baffled until after the General Election?

Mr. Creech Jones: I just do not understand the interruption. The problem is one which has baffled the British Government, as the Mandatory Power, almost ever since Great Britain has held the Mandate. There have been difficulties, and disturbances of all kinds. Numerous policies have been announced in the hope of resolving the difficulties between the two communities in Palestine. It is an easy gibe to say that the Government have wasted 12 months on this business, that we should have realised 12 months ago that this problem of trying to administer Palestine under the Mandate was insoluable, and that then we should have gone to the United Nations with the problem. Again, I want to show, it was the responsibility and the duty of the Government to attempt to find the means whereby the two communities could live in harmony together. It was an obligation upon the Government to exhaust all possibilities to achieve this end. When the Labour Government came into office, both Britain and the United States were entangled in promises which had been made to the Arabs. It was clear that, if this problem were to be solved, then a new approach would have to be found to what had already been an intractable problem for previous Governments. It was clear that any possible scheme, if it was to work, would have to be enforced and therefore, it was obviously desirable that an effort should be made to try to procure some agreement by negotiation. There had been the White Paper policy, which presumably was still being applied, and which, brought criticism from the United States. It was the responsibility of the new Government to decide whether, if the approaches which had previously been tried had proved ineffective, a new way should be discovered. Accordingly, representations were made to the United States for the purpose of seeing what degree of co-operation could be obtained from them in finding a way through these difficulties.

It has been said that a great deal of time was lost in obtaining the co-operation of the United States, but I submit that the difficulties were not with the Government, but on the other side of the Atlantic. There was no time lost in obtaining the Report of the Anglo-American Mission, and, immediately, the Mission reported, steps were made for the Report to be studied by the experts. A unanimous series of recommendations—unanimously agreed by the Anglo-American experts—was in our hands on 26th July. Within four or five days, an announcement was made in this House of what the British Government would seek to do in respect of the recommendations of the experts.

Mr. Stanley: When the right hon. Gentleman talks about Anglo-American experts, he is differentiating, is he not, between them and the Anglo-American Mission?

Mr. Creech Jones: I thought it was within the knowledge of the House that, immediately following the report of the Anglo-American Mission, the recommendations were submitted to two bodies of experts drawn from both the United States and the United Kingdom.

Mr. Crossman: Is it not a fact that, on the American side, not one of the experts had visited Palestine, whereas, at least, the Anglo-American Mission had been there?

Mr. Creech Jones: Certainly, but let us get the facts. These were, in the main, persons who were very familiar with these problems, many of them had had very long experience in regard to Palestinian affairs, and they certainly made a series of recommendations as to how the Report which had been received from the Mission——

Mr. Manningham-Buller: The right hon. Gentleman has not answered the question. He has repeatedly called these unknown gentlemen experts. Can he say how many of them have ever been to Palestine?

Mr. Creech Jones: In any case, the point is quite irrelevant. Some of these men were experts in regard to the Palestinian Administration and the problems of the Middle East. The problem which had to be tackled was the implementation of the report of the Mission, and I submit that, when it became obvious that the United States Government were not prepared to implement the Report of the Anglo-American Committee, the British Government themselves took the initiative and

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made their announcement on 31st July. This offered a basis for discussion to both the Arabs and the Jews. At that time, there was a reasonable hope of discussion on the basis of the recommendations contained in the Morrison Report. But let me add this important fact——

Mr. Pickthorn: On a point of Order. May we know, Mr. Speaker, what is meant by the " Morrison Report "?

Mr. Creech Jones: The Morrison Plan, obviously.

Hon. Members: Hear, hear.

Mr. Pickthorn: Hon. Members cannot " Hear, hear " for 20 minutes; the hon. Gentleman will have to say something.

Mr. Creech Jones: I also want to make another point clear. In January, 1946, the British Government made an announcement at the Assembly of the United Nations. They declared that the Palestine Mandate was receiving the close attention of the American and British Governments, and that, as early as possible, an announcement would be made to the Assembly in regard to these discussions. On the winding up of the League of Nations a few months later, Britain again declared, with the other Powers holding Mandates under the League of Nations, that she would observe the obligations of the Mandate until a new arrangement was made with the United Nations. That meant that if we were to present the problem of Palestine to the United Nations, we could only do it in one of two ways. Palestine could either achieve its independence, which was not a practical proposition, because of the opposition of both Jews and Arabs inside Palestine, or alternatively, the trust arrangements could be continued. But if an agreement were to be registered with the United Nations, and Palestine brought under the Trusteeship Council, then it became necessary that an understanding should be reached as between Jews and Arabs, and with the neighbouring Arab States who would also expect to give their agreement. Therefore, whether we liked it or not, if independence was not a possible immediate course for Palestine, sooner or later a trusteeship agreement would have to be negotiated. It was consequently an obligation on the British Government to attempt to find out what the terms of that agreement could be.

It has been suggested that we might have attempted to impose a solution, either of partition or of some plan along the lines which had previously been announced in the House of Commons in July of last year. It was not possible to impose a partition plan in Palestine, even if there had been the unanimous backing of the whole of Jewry, or even assuming that some practical scheme could have been found which would have satisfied the Jews. [HON. MEMBERS: " The Arabs."] No, the Jews. Any attempt to impose a partition solution in Palestine would have been out of harmony with the Mandate itself; it would not have been consistent with the terms of the Mandate. Moreover, it would have exposed us to a great deal of suspicion and distrust, and certainly the other nations in the United Nations would have declared that we were seeking to serve some ulterior purpose.

Mr. Stanley: Is it not a fact that the old League of Nations held that partition was within the terms of the Mandate, and at that time recommended the British Government to find a solution on those lines?

Mr. Creech Jones: That is not the interpretation which has been placed upon it by our own legal advisers. [*Interruption.*] I wish we could at least have an exhibition of good manners on the other side. This argument is of some importance because the Government have been criticised for not having imposed a solution in Palestine; I am trying to show that, as far as partition was concerned, it was not within the power of the Government to impose such a solution. It could only have been enforced by military operations which would have been repugnant to the British people. It would have been a threat to peace and would have brought us before the Security Council, with very doubtful results. In addition, I think, it would have brought us an enormous amount of resentment from the Arabs, and a continuing hostility. That was the position in regard to partition.

It was equally difficult for us to consider the imposition of any alternative scheme which implied the preservation of a united Palestine. The success of such an arrangement depended again on the collaboration of the Arab and Jewish communities, but both Arabs and Jews were

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[Mr. Jones.]
in opposition to a scheme of that kind and neither would accept it. Therefore, our responsibility as a Government, if we could not impose a scheme, and if it was essential to get some kind of basis for a trusteeship agreement, was to discover whether in some way we could obtain the co-operation of both Arabs and Jews. The Morrison Plan had been rejected. When, latterly, His Majesty's Government got the Arabs in conference and the Jews in informal discussions, we attempted very hard to find some plan which might be a basis for securing their co-operation. I want to make clear that what was offered, and what has been known as the Bevin plan, was merely a basis for discussion with the two sides. I do not accept the description of the proposals that was given by my hon. Friend the Member for North Hendon (Mrs. Ayrton Gould). What we attempted to do was to build up in Palestine, for the two communities, self-government, and we tried to give in various areas, to Jews and to Arabs, very real powers, and then to build up, if we could, some central political institutions whereby reasonable parity might be obtained in order to meet Jewish and Arab objections that one might conceivably dominate the other in the national political life of Palestine. Further, in the proposals that were made, we suggested areas which would give reasonable opportunities for economic expansion and land development; indeed, the land which could be freely acquired by the Jews was, I think, three times larger than they are permitted to expand in at the present time. Not only that, we attempted to find a satisfactory formula to cover immigration, because the Jews themselves were dissatisfied lest they found that economic absorptive capacity as a formula would not give them the volume of immigration which they regarded as necessary.

Sir Patrick Hannon (Birmingham, Moseley) *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: I cannot allow any interruptions. There are only seven minutes to go; the Government have been attacked, and they must be allowed to meet those attacks.

Mr. Creech Jones: Those proposals were in the spirit of the Charter. They were within the framework of the United Nations, and responsibilities were given to the respective authorities under the United Nations in the event of difficulties arising.

I come to the next criticism which has been made in regard to Government policy. Why are we making no recommendation to the United Nations? I do not accept the view that our line is to deny British leadership in the United Nations I do not accept the view that to offer this problem for the consideration of the United Nations is derogatory to the prestige of Britain. We shall offer to the United Nations our experience in the working of the Mandate; we shall submit all the schemes which have emerged in the discussions when a settlement has been sought. We shall not be a silent member when these deliberations are going on. The whole history of the Mandate will be objectively presented. There will be no special pleading for a particular solution. But I would like to put this, that on the practical side, when this problem is submitted, we as a nation, in regard to our administration of the Mandate have had to tolerate a great deal of villification, and we have been bitterly attacked, and our administration has come under the most severe scrutiny of various nations.

We have been very unfairly attacked in regard to our administration. Therefore, we feel that it is right and proper that we should let the world now judge what is the best to be done for Palestine. There is a great deal of suspicion and distrust in regard to Britain. If that is so, and if we are told that we are continuously seeking our own self-interest in connection with the affairs of Palestine, let there be a solution which we do not attempt to prejudice, a solution which is likely to give satisfaction to the rest of the world.

Further, all our plans which we have submitted for a solution, have so far been rejected. If we put all our plans within the possession of the United Nations it is far better that the United Nations, knowing of our experience and knowing why those plans were submitted and the defects associated with the working of the Mandate, should be able to form their own judgment. If it should happen that another nation has a bright idea for solving this problem, let that idea be put into the pool. Do not let it be thought that Britain is trying to prejudice consideration of other schemes.

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If other nations have ideas and proposals for schemes, let those schemes be fairly considered and let us not seek to deflect from their fair consideration by advocacy of particular schemes of our own.

Mr. C. Davies: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer this question? In what way is this question to be put before the United Nations? Are we the mandatory Power asking for advice, or do we surrender the Mandate and ask the United Nations what they will do about it?

Mr. Creech Jones: That is the point to which I was just coming. We are not going to the United Nations to surrender the Mandate. We are going to the United Nations setting out the problem and asking for their advice as to how the Mandate can be administered. If the Mandate cannot be administered in its present form we are asking how it can be amended. It would be folly for us at this point to prejudice that discussion by ourselves imposing any duress on the United Nations, or trying to set a time limit within which the decision must be taken. If we go to the United Nations we shall do all in our power to get as early a discussion as is possible. We are already exploring the question of how a speedier discussion of this problem can be achieved. It has been represented to us that we should go to the Security Council. I suggest that for the purpose of dealing with a problem such as this the Security Council is an imperfect instrument. Indeed, the machinery of the Security Council is such that it may not make a recommendation to the Assembly. [An HON. MEMBER: "It can call a special meeting."] True, it can call a special meeting. The Security Council may, under the Charter, keep this problem entirely within its own purview. There are other difficulties, and, likewise, there are difficulties about reference to the Trusteeship Council.

It being Ten o'Clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

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[For Continuation of Proceedings, see Official Report for Wednesday, 26th February, 1947.]

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IMMEDIATE.

The following is a summary of the speech I made in opening the debate on Palestine in the House of Commons on February 25th.

~~My immediately preceding telegram following is the summary.~~ I began by drawing attention to the conflicting provisions of the Mandate, on the one hand for the development of the Jewish National Home and on the other hand for the preservation of the rights and position of the Arabs. The time had now been reached when it was necessary to decide upon the final settlement in which the Mandatory régime was to terminate. Was Palestine to be a Jewish State? Or an Arab State with safeguards for the Jews? Or could it be a Palestinian State in which the interests of both communities would be carefully balanced?. I had reached the conclusion that we, as Mandatory Power, could not make any further progress until the United Nations had recommended which of these three alternatives was to form the basis for the future organisation of Palestine. All the proposals we had made for the gradual evolution of Palestine towards independence had been judged by the Arabs and the Jews according to the effect they might have on the final decision as to the kind of State Palestine was to be when it became independent. We believed that it should become independent. The Mandatory régime could not go on for ever.

2. I then traced the history of this problem since the present Government came into Office. We had started with the determination not to

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
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apply force in order to impose a solution. We therefore proceeded, not too hopefully but with the conviction that it was our duty, to try to obtain a negotiated settlement. To begin with, we agreed that we could not take the White Paper of 1939 as the basis of our policy. It did not follow, however, that we could tear up that document until we had carried out negotiations with the interested parties and substituted another policy for it. It was important in international affairs that His Majesty's Government should be able to feel that their work, once endorsed by Parliament, would be respected by future Parliaments. This was fundamental to the maintenance of international confidence. I had ~~therefore~~ told the Arabs that the Labour Party did not feel that they could be bound by the White Paper of 1939, and ~~And~~ that I therefore desired to arrive by negotiation at a new policy.

3. In December 1945, the Jewish immigration into Palestine provided for by the 1939 White Paper came to an end. At that time we were faced with the desperate situation of the displaced persons in Europe. We communicated with the Arab States and with the Arabs of Palestine, suggesting that Jewish immigration should continue at the existing rate of 1,500 a month. I could not say that the Arabs had agreed, but at least we obtained their acquiescence. Since that time, 21,000 Jewish immigrants had entered Palestine over and above the 75,000 for whom the White Paper provided. Immigration was now proceeding at

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the rate of 18 000 a year, a rate which was above the average for the whole period of the Mandate.

4. I then stated my belief that we might have been able to do more to relieve the Jewish distress in Europe if the bitterness of feeling which surrounded this problem of immigration had not been increased by American pressure for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. This pressure had wrecked the attempt which we were making to create a favourable atmosphere for the settlement of the problem. We realised, however, that we had to take American interest into account. We therefore invited the United States Government to join us in forming the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry. I had been severely criticized in the United States for not accepting the report of this Committee. But in fact none of the report was accepted by the United States except for one point, the admission of 100,000 immigrants. We could not undertake this except as part of a general settlement, and we therefore had to continue our efforts to work out a policy.

5. Starting from the conclusions reached by the Anglo-American Committee which, as I reminded the House, had reported against a Jewish State, we put forward the proposal for provincial autonomy. With this as a basis for negotiation we tried to convene a conference with both the Arabs and the Jews. We profoundly regretted that, despite all our efforts to persuade them, the Jews refused to

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enter the conference. They would not come in unless as a prerequisite we would more or less commit ourselves to a Jewish State in advance. This we could not do, but we did agree to put any plan which the Jewish Agency cared to submit on the Agenda and to examine it on its merits.

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6. I had nevertheless been able to meet the Jews separately, and to put before them certain proposals for an interim arrangement in Palestine. At that stage the atmosphere seemed hopeful, but on the following day I was told that President Truman was preparing to issue another statement in support of ~~Jewish claims~~ the admission of 100,000 immigrants. I called on Mr. Byrnes ~~in Paris at the time~~ - we were in Paris at the time - and told him how matters stood. I begged that the statement should not be issued, but I was told that it was necessary for reasons of domestic politics. It ~~had been~~ was issued, and it had made further progress impossible at that time.

7. The Conference had to be opened with the Arabs alone. It was clear that what the Arabs wanted was finality. They wanted the future of Palestine to be clearly determined. The Jews also would like a final decision in their favour, but they would be prepared to see British rule continue provided that it was clearly aimed at (eventually reaching) a Jewish state.

8. The Conference was adjourned because of the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. While I was there I ~~had~~ discussed the matter with ~~the American Secretary of State~~ Mr. Byrnes, who then made a public statement saying that the basis upon which we were conducting the Conference merited in his view the attendance of the Jews as well as of the Arabs. Nevertheless the Jews did not come. We were able however to have informal talks with representatives of the Jewish Agency during the second session of the Anglo-Arab/

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Arab Conference.

9. The Arabs had never accepted the mandate or recognised the legality of the Balfour Declaration. Nevertheless they told us that they were willing to recognise the results of this policy so far as the 600,000 Jews now resident in Palestine were concerned. It was my belief that a settlement could now be found if the question were simply one of relieving Europe of 100,000 Jews on purely humanitarian grounds. From the Zionist point of view however, the 100,000 were only a beginning, and the Jewish Agency talked in terms of millions. I thought the Arabs could be persuaded to agree to 100,000 new immigrants on humanitarian grounds, if immigration after that was to be determined by the elected representatives of the people in Palestine. It was difficult to answer the Arab contention that ~~and~~ an external agency, largely financed ~~by~~ from America, should not be permitted to determine how many people should enter Palestine, where the Arabs had been living for just about as long as England had been a Christian country.

10. In other words the Arabs would accept a Jewish national home within a unitary State. This would mean a State with an Arab majority. But I could not believe that in the long run the inhabitants of ~~the country in~~ Palestine would vote on racial lines. The Zionists objected that such a solution would leave them in a minority, but there were twice as many Arabs as Jews in Palestine and we could not alter that.

11. We next tried our hands at an alternative plan, having certain features in common with the both

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report of the Anglo-American Committee and with the provincial autonomy plan. So far as immigration was concerned, we proposed to admit 96,000 people on humanitarian grounds. Thereafter the High Commissioner would consult his Advisory Council, composed of both Arabs and Jews. If his decision were not accepted by either party the Secretary General of the United Nations would appoint an arbitration tribunal and we would abide by the result. The Zionists rejected this proposal because they thought the Arabs should not be consulted at all. I had not been able, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, to accept that view.

12. The existing administration of Palestine had no roots in the people. It was an alien government imposed from outside, and this system clearly could not continue for ever. Since the establishment of the trusteeship system under the United Nations, the only road leading from a mandatory position to independence, unless agreement could be reached between the parties, was by means of trusteeship. Our plan had therefore provided for trusteeship for five years. We proposed to develop self-government at once by creating municipal areas with either a Jewish or an Arab majority, ~~and to give wide powers to the administrations of these areas.~~ At the end of four years we would convene a Constituent Assembly. If agreement could not be reached on the terms of a Constitution, we would turn to the United Nations and ask them for their advice. I was convinced that if the two peoples/

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peoples of Palestine could be given a chance to work together, they would do so. The cultural development of the two peoples in Palestine was of as high a standard as that of those Arab states which had formerly been under mandate and were now independent.

13. I had been asked to define the Jewish national home. The more I read the documents, the more difficult it was to find any guidance as to when the Jewish national home ~~had~~ would have been established. Under our proposals there would in fact have been a national home with a chance of development, and with a voice, together with the Arab population, in the affairs of the world. It had been argued that if there was a unitary state in Palestine the Jews as Jews would not be in the United Nations. I thought it a very disturbing suggestion that representation in the United Nations should be on a religious basis.

14. Many people had said that the way out of ~~any~~ our difficulty in Palestine was partition. But if a decision in principle were taken in favour of partition there would still be dispute as to where the frontier would be. It was not possible to make two viable states in Palestine. Under the most reasonable partition scheme I had seen, there would be 450,000 Jews and 360,000 Arabs in the Jewish state. To a proposal of that kind the Arabs would say: If it is wrong for the Jews to be in a minority of 33% in the whole country, what justification could there be for placing a proportionately larger minority of Arabs

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under a Jewish State? The adoption by us of proposals for partition would result in reference to the United Nations by one or other of the Arab states. Our conduct would then be discussed on the basis of our legal action of carving up a State which was not ours.

15. Therefore we had reached the conclusion that the Mandate was unworkable. We had not been able, within the framework of the Mandate, to deal with the problem created by Nazi persecution of the Jews in Europe. The Palestine administration had had one of the most difficult tasks of any administration in the world. They had honestly tried to do their best and if there had been a failure in dealing with the problem of Jewish persons displaced through persecution it had not been their fault. It was the fault of the moral consciences of international organisations.

16. There were now a million displaced persons on the Continent of Europe. I had made the offer before, and now made it again, that we in the United Kingdom would take a proportion of that million together with all the other countries of the world. We really ought to get rid of this problem. As a humanitarian measure I was sure that 100,000 Jews could be taken into Palestine. But if they were to be regarded as the advance guard for a larger immigration from Europe, with the object of creating a Jewish State, then a conflict would be provoked in the Middle East. If we could regard this immigration as a contribution to the relief of European suffering there was a chance of solution.

17/

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17, I had been asked whether we could do something before the regular Annual Session of the General Assembly in September. I was examining this possibility, but could not say more for the moment.

[illegible] Please see from Dr. [illegible] 27/2

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OUT FILE

449

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En Clair

DEPARTMENTAL No. 2

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 456

27th February 1947. D. 9.00 p.m. 27th February 1947.

Repeated to Bagdad No. 179
Jedda No. 99
Beirut No. 133
Damascus No. 101
Amman No. 79
B.M.E.O. No. 208
Jerusalem
New York (Sir A. Cadogan) No. 640
Moscow No. 815

IMMEDIATE rrrrrr

The following is a summary of the speech I made in opening the debate on Palestine in the House of Commons on February 25th. I began by drawing attention to the conflicting provisions of the Mandate, on the one hand for the development of the Jewish National Home and on the other hand for the preservation of the rights and position of the Arabs. The time had now been reached when it was necessary to decide upon the final settlement in which the mandatory régime was to terminate. Was Palestine to be a Jewish State? Or an Arab State with safeguards for the Jews? Or could it be a Palestinian State in which the interests of both communities would be carefully balanced? I had reached the conclusion that we, as mandatory power, could not make any further progress until the United Nations had recommended which of these three alternatives was to form the basis for the future organisation of Palestine. All the proposals we had made for the gradual evolution of Palestine towards independence had been judged by the Arabs and the Jews according to the effect they might have on the final decision as to the kind of State Palestine was to be when it became independent. We believed that it should become independent. The mandatory régime could not go on for ever.

2. I then traced the history of this problem since the present Government came into Office. We had started with the determination not to apply force in order to impose a solution. We therefore proceeded, not too hopefully but with the conviction that it was our duty, to try to obtain a negotiated settlement. To begin with, we agreed that we could not take the White Paper of 1939 as the basis of our policy. It did not follow, however, that we could tear up that document until we

had

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had carried out negotiations with the interested parties and substituted another policy for it. It was important in international affairs that His Majesty's Government should be able to feel that their work, once endorsed by Parliament, would be respected by future Parliaments. This was fundamental to the maintenance of international confidence. I had told the Arabs that the Labour Party did not feel that they could be bound by the White Paper of 1939, and that I therefore desired to arrive by negotiation at a new policy.

3. In December 1945, the Jewish immigration into Palestine provided for by the 1939 White Paper came to an end. At that time we were faced with the desperate situation of the displaced persons in Europe. We communicated with the Arab States and with the Arabs of Palestine, suggesting that Jewish immigration should continue at the existing rate of 1,500 a month. I could not say that the Arabs had agreed, but at least we obtained their acquiescence. Since that time, 21,000 Jewish immigrants had entered Palestine over and above the 75,000 for whom the White Paper provided. Immigration was now proceeding at the rate of 18,000 a year, a rate which was above the average for the whole period of the Mandate.

4. I then stated my belief that we might have been able to do more to relieve the Jewish distress in Europe if the bitterness of feeling which surrounded this problem of immigration had not been increased by American pressure for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. This pressure had wrecked the attempt which we were making to create a favourable atmosphere for the settlement of the problem. We realised, however, that we had to take American interest into account. We therefore invited the United States Government to join us in forming the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry. I had been severely criticised in the United States for not accepting the report of this Committee. But in fact none of the report was accepted by the United States except for one point, the admission of 100,000 immigrants. We could not undertake this except as part of a general settlement, and we therefore had to continue our efforts to work out a policy.

5. Starting from the conclusions reached by the Anglo-American Committee which, as I reminded the House, had reported against a Jewish State, we put forward the proposal for provincial autonomy. With this as a basis for negotiation we tried to convene a conference with both the Arabs and the Jews. We profoundly regretted that, despite all our efforts to persuade them, the Jews refused to enter the conference. They would not come in unless as a pre-requisite we would more or less commit ourselves to a Jewish State in advance. This we could not do, but we did agree to put any plan which the Jewish Agency cared to submit on the Agenda and to examine it on its merits.

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6. I had nevertheless been able to meet the Jews separately, and to put before them certain proposals for an interim arrangement in Palestine. At that stage the atmosphere seemed hopeful, but on the following day I was told that President Truman was preparing to issue another statement in support of the admission of 100,000 immigrants. I called on Mr. Byrnes - we were in Paris at the time - and told him how matters stood. I begged that the statement should not be issued, but I was told that it was necessary for reasons of domestic politics. It was issued, and it had made further progress impossible at that time.

7. The Conference had to be opened with the Arabs alone. It was clear that what the Arabs wanted was finality. They wanted the future of Palestine to be clearly determined. The Jews also would like a final decision in their favour, but they would be prepared to see British rule continue provided that it was clearly aimed at eventually creating a Jewish state.

8. The Conference was adjourned because of the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. While I was there I discussed the matter with Mr. Byrnes who then made a public statement saying that the basis upon which we were conducting the Conference merited in his view the attendance of the Jews as well as of the Arabs. Nevertheless the Jews did not come. We were able however to have informal talks with representatives of the Jewish Agency during the second session of the Anglo-Arab Conference.

9. The Arabs had never accepted the mandate or recognised the legality of the Balfour Declaration. Nevertheless they told us that they were willing to recognise the results of this policy so far as the 600,000 Jews now resident in Palestine were concerned. It was my belief that a settlement could now be found if the question were simply one of relieving Europe of 100,000 Jews on purely humanitarian grounds. From the Zionist point of view however, the 100,000 were only a beginning, and the Jewish Agency talked in terms of millions. I thought the Arabs could be persuaded to agree to 100,000 new immigrants on humanitarian grounds, if immigration after that was to be determined by the elected representatives of the people in Palestine. It was difficult to answer the Arab contention that an external agency, largely financed from America, should not be permitted to determine how many people should enter Palestine, where the Arabs had been living for just about as long as England had been a Christian country.

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11. We next tried our hands at an alternative plan, having certain features in common both with the report of the Anglo-American Committee and with the provincial autonomy plan. So far as immigration was concerned, we proposed to admit 96,000 people on humanitarian grounds. Thereafter the High Commissioner would consult his Advisory Council, composed of both Arabs and Jews. If his decision were not accepted by either party the Secretary-General of the United Nations would appoint an arbitration tribunal and we would abide by the result. The Zionists rejected this proposal because they thought the Arabs should not be consulted at all. I had not been able, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, to accept that view.

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13. I had been asked to define the Jewish national home. The more I read the documents, the more difficult it was to find any guidance as to when the Jewish national home would have been established. Under our proposals there would in fact have been a national home with a chance of development, and with a voice, together with the Arab population, in the affairs of the world. It had been argued that if there was a unitary state in Palestine the Jews as Jews would not be in the United Nations. I thought it a very disturbing suggestion that representation

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14. Many people had said that the way out of our difficulty in Palestine was partition. But if a decision in principle were taken in favour of partition there would still be dispute as to where the frontier would be. It was not possible to make two viable states in Palestine. Under the most reasonable partition scheme I had seen, there would be 450,000 Jews and 360,000 Arabs in the Jewish state. To a proposal of that kind the Arabs would say: If it is wrong for the Jews to be in a minority of 33% in the whole country, what justification could there be for placing a proportionately larger minority of Arabs under a Jewish State? The adoption by us of proposals for partition would result in reference to the United Nations by one or other of the Arab States. Our conduct would then be discussed on the legal basis of our action of carving up a State which was not ours.

15. Therefore we had reached the conclusion that the Mandate was unworkable. We had not been able, within the framework of the Mandate, to deal with the problem created by Nazi persecution of the Jews in Europe. The Palestine administration had had one of the most difficult tasks of any administration in the world. They had honestly tried to do their best and if there had been a failure in dealing with the problem of Jewish persons displaced through persecution it had not been their fault. It was the fault of the moral conscience of international organisations.

16. There were now a million displaced persons on the Continent of Europe. I had made the offer before, and now made it again, that we in the United Kingdom would take a proportion of that million together with all the other countries of the world. We really ought to get rid of this problem. As a humanitarian measure I was sure that 100,000 Jews could be taken into Palestine. But if they were to be regarded as the advance guard for a larger immigration from Europe, with the object of creating a Jewish State, then a conflict would be provoked in the Middle East. If we could regard this immigration as a contribution to the relief of European suffering there was a chance of solution.

17. I had been asked whether we could do something before the regular Annual Session of the General Assembly in September. I was examining this possibility, but could not say more for the moment.

[Cairo only]

Please pass to British Middle East Office as my telegram No. 208.

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PALESTINE

E 1733. 454

E 1733 / 46 / 931

Developments in Palestine

F.O. Min
Mr Bowker

Draft tel to Wilson quoting extract from telegram from Jerusalem to C.O of 14 Feb.

Dated 15 Feb
Received 16 Feb

Last Paper.

~~E [redacted]~~
1728

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15 Feb

(Minutes.)
I think this should be white.

HB. 27/2

(Action completed.)
GEM 1/3

(Index.)
24/6/48

Next Paper.

1773

26513 F.O.P.

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Registry No. E

Top Secret.
~~XXXX~~
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Draft.

To:

Washington.

Telegram.

No. 1570

(Date) Febs

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~~*Code.*~~
Cypher.

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458

F. O.,

194 .

IMMEDIATE.

Top Secret.

Despatched February *M.*

The following is extract from telegram from the High Commissioner, ~~of~~ Jerusalem, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies dated February 14th. It may be useful to you for background on present developments in Palestine.

/BEGINS/

I have heard that American press are writing up the requisitioning of security areas in the way you mentioned. I can only say that I am satisfied that areas were chosen ~~justified~~ by the Army for genuine security reasons as being the only suitable ones in the circumstances. The absolute minimum accommodation is being taken, as much consideration as possible is being shown, and we are giving all the help we can in searching for alternative accommodation, even to the extent of providing some ourselves. In regard to the ~~execu~~accusations of panic, they presumably arise from the fact that we acted quickly. You will of course realise that this was due to a desire to get Gruner case out of the way as soon as possible. It was not then evident that legal action which is being taken could delay it as it ~~is~~ has. It is somewhat difficult to explain this to the press. I will do what I can to get all the real facts across but most of our American

press/

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press correspondents, and some British, fatten on misrepresentation and Jewish Agency provide them with constant provender.

You ask about my plans. On these also the delay over Gruner has had considerable effect. Had he been executed there appears little doubt that we would have had outbreaks of violence. In preparation for this letter to Jewish Agency was written to find out exactly where they stood. Meanwhile sentence was stayed. In view of tension in the country, I ~~therefo~~re sent for Mrs. Myerson and Kaplan and told them that it was not intended to replace civil administration by military at present, but I also warned them again that any further outbreaks of violence would have severe consequences. They assured me they were taking some steps against terrorism and if they were not successful, were even prepared to use force. They qualified this however by saying that deportation of illegal immigrants made their task infinitely more difficult. There have been signs however that steps are being taken thought it is not yet clear to what effect. In regard to the immediate future, I have therefore decided to take no further action, firstly to create as little disturbance in London as possible, but also as I want to allow time to see whether, in fact, Jewish Agency's plans are any use, and also to allow the General Officer commanding time to get his bearings. If however outbreaks occur, I will allow the Army to take such steps as

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seem proper to the case up to ~~pressing~~ placing an area under military law for which we have plans. Police and Army are continuing their policy of searches. I will not, of course, proceed with military control if it can possibly be avoided, except insofar as may be necessary to attach a particular area under the Army for a limited time. I am however having this question examined by a Committee as I feel there may be intermediate stages.

ENDS

15/2

[Copy sent to the Secretariat]

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(E)

(Top Secret)

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL No. 1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 1510. D. 4.05 p.m. 15th February, 1947.
15th February, 1947.

3 3 3

IMMEDIATE.

TOP SECRET.

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You ask about my plans. On these also the delay over Gruner has had considerable effect. Had he been executed there appears little doubt that we would have had outbreaks of violence. In preparation for this letter to Jewish Agency was written to find out exactly where they stood. Meanwhile sentence was stayed. In view of tension in the country, I sent for Mrs. Myerson and Kaplan and told them that it was not intended to replace civil administration by military at present, but I also warned them again that any further outbreaks of violence would have severe consequences. They assured me they were taking some steps against terrorism and if they were not successful, were even

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[Ends].

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat].

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1947

PALESTINE

E 1773

27 FEB

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Registry Number E 1773/46/31.

FROM Henry F. Samuels.

No.

Dated

Received in Registry 27 Feb 1947

Palestine and Judea.

Enclosed pamphlet entitled Palestine and Judea. Transmitting possible solution to the Palestine Problem.

Last Paper.

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PALESTINE and JUDEA

E 1773
27 FEB

HENRY C. SAMUELS

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First edition published December 1, 1946

– Further information on page 3 –

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PALESTINE and JUDEA

By Henry C. Samuels

INTRODUCTION

This booklet deals with a problem and situation which is the concern of progressive people everywhere, as indicated by its title. The aim of your humble writer is to present the problem as clearly as possible, and to point to a comprehensive and acceptable adjustment of the situation, for the good of all concerned. A brief article by the author entitled, "Why Religion," taken from a previous publication, is included at the close of this booklet. – H. C. S.

– PART ONE –

We know that there are exceptions to all rules, which must be given due consideration, else the rules will fail somewhere on the way, and they may even be lost sight of entirely.

Therefore, a good doctor will not treat a severe ailment until the patient is given a thorough examination, in order that the exceptions or limitations may be fully taken into consideration; the condition of the heart and the lungs, blood circulation, etc., and the treatment is then prescribed accordingly. Likewise when a flock of sheep is threatened by wolves, a good sheep herder will not only set out to eliminate the wolves in his vicinity, but will also give extra protection to the sheep in his charge.

At this time humanity is beset with a type of people to whom selfishness and its ugliness are their primary means of expression. This is obviousy realized best through hate and cruelty; therefore people who are most innocent of those evils are from their point of view the most guilty. In this way they have crucified nations, religious communities and beneficient institutions. Free Masons, Catholics, Protestants, Jewish people, and people of other kindred groups have suffered

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at their hands beyond description. But Jewish people who are close to them are still in great danger, and they are still being terribly persecuted.

Now, common sense shows beyond any doubt that the main problem for humanity in this situation is not with the persecuted but with the persecutors, and fortunately good work is being done in the direction of that problem by the United Nations Organization, the military occupation forces and other related effort. But all that fine and creditable effort makes for a long drawn out task, which is performed as it were in juxtaposition with destiny itself. In the meantime, as shown by the fine example of the good and practical sheep herder, something must be done immediately for those Jewish people who are still being persecuted; who have little or nothing left, and whose very lives are in danger if they should be left in the lands of their birth, though indeed they belong there, and they should enjoy their rightful citizenship there as any other folk.

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But further: Since we know the sort of people the persecutors are, and their main reason for persecution; also, since we can readily see that Jewish people in their vicinity are still being persecuted by them – actually not because they are Jewish, but because of that for which they stand, then can the world afford not to relieve the situation without any delay? Can the world afford not to create the possibility for them to come to themselves and to build upon the ideals for which they stand – for righteousness sake, and for the good of all concerned? Those who are the wolves in this case cannot be eliminated by the same methods employed by sheep herders. Happily, with few exceptions, in such cases our civilization calls not for elimination but for transformation, which is a slow though certain process, but all of which makes the immediate relief under consideration most imperative.

Of course there are exceptions to that, for Jewish people are human and they are as imperfect as others are. But they meet their obstacles in life as all people do, individually and collectively, for the divine law is inviolable, and it is the same for all. The scales of Justice are in the hands of God, our business is to help where help is needed. Also, we know that the Oneness of humanity is as much a fact as the Oneness of life, therefore all must suffer for any neglect in remedying the situation. But it can be done now, and there is no excuse for not doing a thing which can and must be done.

– PART TWO –

Now, of all the solutions that are offered for the immediate relief of Jewish people who are still subject to persecution, and to remedy the situation as a whole, the most practical appears to be the establishment or rather the reestablishment of a Judean state in Palestine; which is the dream of persecuted Jewish people throughout

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the ages. In this way it is pointed out, and rightly so, that those unfortunate people will not only enjoy a good measure of safety, but they will also be in a position to do the best for themselves, and for the world. But before that blessed venture can be made possible it must be freed from all its inconsistencies which unfortunately cling to it like barnacles on a ship. Without that important operation the effort must entail trouble and misfortune, which is indeed the case up to the present time. Let us then look into that proposal which is often termed "Resettement."

First of all it is totally inconsistent to promulgate the idea that a Jewish nation is to be reestablished, for the simple reason that a Jewish nation has never existed, nor can it exist. There has existed in Palestine up to some 2000 years ago, a Judean (not Jewish) nation, wherein the Jewish element of the Hebrew faith was the national religious expression. This for example, is similar to the position of the Lutheran church of the Protestant faith, which is the national religious expression in most Scandinavian countries. But there is no Lutheran nation in the world, nor are citizens in America, England, Germany or anywhere who are members of the Lutheran church subject in any way to Sweden, Norway, Denmark, etc., by virtue of their religious link.

The situation is also similar in the case of the Church of England, which is Episcopalian in America and in other lands: This is also a church of the Protestant faith, and it forms the national religious expression in England. But citizens in any land outside of England who are members of the Episcopalian Church are not English, of course, nor does their religious identity with the Church of England obligate them to England in any way.

The relation then of Jewish people anywhere in the world to Judea, past or future, where

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Judaism was or is likely to be the state religious expression is precisely the same. It is that people of the Hebrew faith anywhere in the world belong fully and decidedly to the respective lands of their birth or citizenship, the same as members of the Lutheran and Episcopalian churches in the examples shown.

— PART THREE —

The term "Jewish" refers to a religious community in the world regardless of nationality or race, while the term "Judea" refers to a state which historically has a rightful place in Palestine among the other states there. The term "Hebrew" refers to a paritcular faith in the world, the same as to the terms "Catholic" and "Protestant" which refer purely to those two faiths, and the Jewish community is one of several elements in the Hebrew faith, just as a denomination is in the Protestant faith.

Conventionally the terms "Jewish" and "Hebrew" are confused which is the cause of much misunderstanding. We also know that mankind suffers much from numerous conventional practices and confusions, but the fact is that while all Jewish people are Hebrews, not all Hebrews are necessarily Jewish. For example, all Methodists and Presbyterians are Protestants, but not all Protestants are Methodists or Presbyterians, etc., etc.

The several distinctions in the Hebrew faith were plainly evident in olden days, and they are still quite potent, though covered with conventional and erroneous usage and age. There were, for example, Israelites, Samaritans, Essenes and others, who still carry on, more or less. Now, the Essenes were Hebrews and they were citizens of Judea, but not Jewish though many refer to them as Jewish. They formed their own community or denomination, and they were in fact not too well taken by the Jewish element in

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Judea. Then as to the Israelites and Samaritans in our example, they were likewise Hebrews, of course, but they were certainly neither Jewish nor Judeans, for they had their own nations — Samaria being linked to the Kingdom of Israel, and their folk still carry on in Palestine as a definite Samaritan Hebrew (not Jewish) community.

The distinctions in the Hebrew faith are not as pronounced now, or apparently the several elements outside the Jewish element are not as large as they used to be. Also, the distinctions in the Hebrew faith are not nearly as numerous as they are in the Protestant faith, and therefore not as evident. Then, as pointed out, there is also a sort of a conventional Jewish blanket which apparently covers the different expressions or elements in the Hebrew faith.

But those distinctions or elements in the Hebrew faith are there just the same, and they fill definite and important needs. There is also plenty of life and vigor that is potent in those different elements to make trouble in any attempt to corral them or to estrange them from their own distinctive spheres of expression, the same as it would be if such an attempt were made with the different denominations in the Protestant faith, or the different expressions in the Catholic faith, as the Greek and Russian Orthodox churches, etc.

— PART FOUR —

It may be noted that the Zionist movement which happily is well taken in the world, enjoys nevertheless a comparatively small Hebraic membership. But that is quite natural for Zionism is essentially a Judaic and not a Hebraic endeavor, nor can it be any more than that; and so it attracts only the numbers it can naturally and rightfully embrace. It is, however, quite human to try to embrace more than it is natural

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and proper, and Zionists are no exception in that. The Romans and others have tried it. In our own day the Germans, or rather the Nazis, have tried it, and others may still be foolish enough to aim for it. In fact that experiment goes on right along in the case of strong liquor, beefsteaks, gefilte fish and green apple pie, but the results are invariably disastrous, at least most disagreeable.

If the Zionists therefore, who as pointed out cannot fill any more than their own limited place, would not be so inconsistent in their efforts to establish a Judean state in Palestine by aiming to embrace the entire Jewish community in the world, much less the entire Hebrew faith, or even to give such an impression, they would surely create a place of considerable safety for the many oppressed Jewish people in the world, who are doubtless eager to assume Judean or Palestenian citizenship.

The principle obstacle for "resettlement" which of course embodies the intent of a Judean (so-called "Jewish") state is due to the objections or rather the fears of the states and groups in and around Palestine. But it is not likely that those peoples, Arabs and others, would be afraid of a small Judean state in their midst, though naturally they would hesitate and doubtless offer certain stipulations. Doubtless one of the principal stipuations would and should be that the new Judean state must become a full-pledged member of the newly organized Arab Federation, or league, and abide by the decision of the majority.*

But the Arabs or Palestenians are as confused about the whole affair as so many others are, and they are simply afraid; afraid of that *fictitious*

* In consonance with the views expressed here, the writer respectfully suggests the name "Palestenian Federation of States" instead of "Arab Federation, or league."

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Dear Friend: 469

Please retain this copy of Palestine and Judea with the compliments of the author, and trust the effort advanced therein will merit your favorable consideration. H.C.S.

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nation of some 16 million Hebrews in the world (often referred to as 16 million Jews), but which is a pure "Ballyhoo" non-esixtent and humanly impossible unit which never has, never will, and nexer can exist.

Last but not least, it is evident that Palestine is heading to become an established federation of states (not really of nations) in which a number of the smaller groups there will enter and exercise state rights. Therefore, the supposed national aims for Judea, even without the mistaken connections with the Jewish community and the Hebrew faith in the world, are nevertheless totally out of order, distasteful to world statesmanship, and it must call out only resentment from Palestenians generally.

The efforts for new Judea must indicate conclusively that the aim for such new state is to be only an equal neighbor among neighbors, and with a hearty interest in the good and progress of each and all. Withal, in the light of proper clarification and alignment of the whole affair, Palestenians may and should be most eager to embrace new Judea for their own good and for the good of all concerned.

Indeed, this will also dissolve a perplexing situation regarding Judea of some 2500 years standing, the adjustment of which is inevitable and cannot be avoided. Therefore, the opportunity should be welcomed by all peoples.

– PART FIVE –

There are also conventional references to a Hebrew or Jewish race in the world, which is another one of those unfortunate "rumors." Also, Jewish people are often referred to as "Semites," and there are doubtless Semitic traces that linger in some of them or even in many of them, but we know now that the only remnant of the ancient Semites in the world are the Kabyles in Africa; even the Arabs are not really Semites.

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But the propaganda which brands Jewish people as Semites helps the dark forces in the world, for they are thereby called "anti-Semites" instead of anti-righteousness, which is what they are – enemies of righteousness. Surely, it was amply seen in recent years that those enemies do not persecute Jewish people (so-called Semites) only, but all whom they think stand in their way.

The fact is that there are people of the Hebrew faith in practically every race and nation in the world, which include also colored races and nations, and Hebrews intermarry right along. Also, there is no reference in the Bible to a Hebrew or Jewish race, only that they are a unique religious community, with a specific culture and mission in the world, which is divinely ordained for them through their faith of old. But every group has its blessed mission which comes from the same divine source, and is no less important, and all humanity is aiming for the same divine goal, and must work together for the good of each and all.

Underlying all, it is obviously possible to estabish a just and well ordered Judean state in Palestine now, and increase immigration of refugees into that land in due proportion. This imperative step can be taken with the help of God and common sense, understandingly, and in a way in which it can be welcomed by Palestenians and the world as a whole.

Your friends will appreciate an introduction to this inexpensive and timely booklet.

(See page 3)

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WHY RELIGION?

By Henry C. Samuels

Previously published by the author in his occasional papers, March 1, 1946.

The world would be much at a loss without the advances in the various phases of human endeavor, other than religion; such as science, philosophy, education, statesmanship and government, the advances in the arts and crafts, industry and business, etc. All those are indeed important to human progress, but religion is much more than important; it is imperative!

It is amply proven from the hoary past to most recent events that true happiness in life comes from a fulness of religion, however humble its expression. On the other hand the tragedies of life are due mainly to a lack of true religious expression—rather than a lack of any of the important phases of endeavor just referred to. It is likewise evident that there can be no true culture, no true growth of character, in the individual and consequently in the community, unless religion receives such basic consideration. It is then only that all other blessed aims can be pursued safely —as safely as possible, and by the same token as successfully as possible, consistent with moral and social advancement and effort as a whole.

All phases of human endeavor are subject to error and to misuse, which result in strife and tragedy, and religion is not exempt from that. But there is a difference, a vast difference, for the primary intent in religion is guidance to man, to help him especially in the balance of heart and mind, that life as a whole including all worthy

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effort, may be advanced as beneficently as possible.

Through philosophy we aim to discover "Why," and when it is wisely studied then it leads to an understanding of the divine plan. Through science we aim to discover "what" things are, and how to employ them usefully and safely. Through industry we are provided with the things needed. Commerce and business enterprise are our means of distribution. Statesmanship and government are expressions of human dignity and peace, whereby we order ourselves in the best light possible—the divine light. But of what value can all those be without religion which is designed to attune man to life itself, and that his two natural and divinely ordained companions (heart and mind) may not separate, but function harmoniously together, in blessed understanding and noble conduct?

Have we not seen (and to our great sorrow) the result of keen minds without love in the heart; love which inspires the mind to true reason? Likewise the heart with its unfolding love must have the discrimination of the mind. It is the realization and practice of this balance, however humble or great, that leads to all that is truly worthy and blessed in life, and for all of which religion is the primary champion.

It makes no difference to what religion or faith one belongs or how Deity is viewed or defined, or whether a Mediator is or is not invoked. Those are details, though beautiful and important indeed, but which are put in order as understanding progresses. But first of all the way of life must be made clear in the heart and mind, which is the way of the Lord—as best as each can do, and then understanding and the gifts thereof

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must surely follow. Therefore has King Solomon prayed for a heart that "listens" (usually translated "an understanding heart"), not only because of the divine and natural union of heart and mind, but also because it is safer that the heart rather than the mind should predominate in making decisions—in arriving at conclusions.

In Eastern scripture the mind is sometimes referred to as "the slayer of the real," and it will do that when it is permitted to become estranged from its great companion—the heart. But unitedly and in proper order they lead to understanding, to wisdom divine, even "the wisdom that mightily and sweetly ordereth all things."

Such and much more is the underlying purpose of religion, and its function in relation to all else, and anything that has no relationship with religion is worthless. Indeed, religion suffers much from human littleness, yet it is upheld by human greatness. But, as already pointed out, are not all other worthy efforts similarly affected? But if need be we can afford to live in a community where there is no scientific institution; where there is no Chamber of Commerce, or where there is no extensive industrial effort, etc., though all such effort is cetrainly important. But we cannot afford the risk of living in a community where there is no church or synagogue or some other temple of God!

The extent of attention given to religion by an individual or a family is a private matter, for different people are naturally attracted to different phases of endeavor, more or less. Religion cannot be everyone's life work; in fact, it can be the life work of only a comparatively few. But everyone is born into a specific religion, and that is a pricless link which should be maintained

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throughout life; it should be maintained by an appropriate amount of study, individual devotion and community interest—all with due appreciation for religion as a whole, and also for its various beneficient expressions, be they great or as yet humble.

Those who have no attraction for any particular religious expression (though such situation is rare) then the church or temple nearest to their doorstep is their community shrine, regardless of its faith or denomination. The community would not only be terribly poor and morally poverty stricken without that shrine, but it would also be an unsafe place to live in. But above all who can afford not to participate in religion and contribute to its advancement to some extent? Religion is the very basis of moral and social upliftment in the world, and it is also much, much more than that, to each and all!

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
— Further information on page 3 —

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ISAIAH 52:7

"How beautiful upon the mountains are the steps of the Messenger as He approacheth with tidings of good, and soundeth forth the note of peace; who proclaimeth that which is good, and calleth forth in the voice of salvation; who sayeth unto Zion "Thy God reigneth."

Note: This blessed utterance, like all fine prophecy and teaching in Christian scripture, embodies profound spiritual meaning to contemplate, and which is significant in the life of every individual, regardless of birth or faith. The translation above is from the Hebrew by the author of this booklet.—H. C. S.



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HENRY C. SAMUELS
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Hoyk.
Amb. Dept
Lond Am. Dept

The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin. M.P.
House of Commons,
London
England.

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1947

E

PALESTINE

E 1777
27 FEB
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Registry Number: E1777/46/31

FROM: P.P.

No.: M' Tanner

Dated:

Received in Registry: 24 Feb 1947
24 Feb 1947

Palestine (Dollars)

M' Tanner asked Chancellor of Exchequer how many dollars accrued to the dollar pool of the sterling bloc in the year 1946 in consequence of Jewish & Zionist activities in Palestine. M. W. Attlee replied, it is impossible to estimate.

Last Paper.

1443

References.

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

(*Minutes.*)

HB. 28/2

(Action completed.)
F&M 1/3

(Index.)
24/6/48

Next Paper.

1786

32003 F.O.P

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479 E 1777

Parliamentary Question

Lab * 20. Mr. Janner,—To ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, how many dollars accrued to the dollar pool of the sterling bloc in the year 1946 in consequence of Jewish and Zionist activities in Palestine. [*Monday 24th February.*]

Leicester W

1947

1407/8.

DOLLAR POOL (ZIONIST ACTIVITIES)

108. **Mr. Janner** asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how many dollars accrued to the dollar pool of the sterling *bloc* in the year 1946, in consequence of Jewish and Zionist activities in Palestine.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. William Whiteley): I have been asked to reply. It is impossible to estimate.

Mr. Janner: Is it not a fact that at least 55 million dollars have been brought into the pact in this way, of which 24 million were obtained from one industry alone?

Mr. Whiteley: When dollars are tendered to us, they usually go through a bank, and we do not usually attempt to discover their source.

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PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION. 480

DOLLAR POOL (ZIONIST ACTIVITIES)

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1947

E

PALESTINE

E 1780

27 FEB

Registry Number: E 1478/46/31

FROM: P. Q

No.: M' Wilkes

Dated:

Received in Registry: 25 Feb 1947
27 Feb 1947

Palestine Question, o U N O.

M' Wilkes. asked Sof S whether Govt will take action as authorised under Article 20 of U N Charter and request that Security Council shall apply to convene thro' Sec Gen a meeting of the Assembly at earliest convenient date and to make their recommendation for the future policing etc. M' Mayhew replied H M Govt intend to ask Sec Gen to make such recommendations re interim police.

Last Paper.

1774

References.

(Minutes.)

HB. 28/2

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

FC 16/3

(Index.)

24/6/48

Next Paper.

1781

32003 F.O.P

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E 1780

Parliamentary Question

* 50. Mr. Wilkes,—To ask the Prime Minister, whether the British Government will take action, as authorised under Article 20 of the United Nations Charter, and request that the Security Council shall agree to convene through the Secretary General a meeting of the Assembly at the earliest convenient date in order to consider the question of Palestine and to make their recommendation for the interim policing and administration of this country until the Assembly makes its decision known. [*Tuesday 25th February.*]

Lab.

Newcastle-upon-Tyne Central.

ANSWERED ON 1947
REPLY ATTACHED.

(272)

United Nations Meeting

109. **Mr. Wilkes** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the British Government will take action, as authorised under Article 20 of the United Nations Charter, and request that the Security Council shall agree to convene through the Secretary General a meeting of the Assembly at the earliest convenient date in order to consider the question of Palestine and to make their recommendation for the interim policing and administration of this country until the Assembly makes its decision known.

Mr. Mayhew: My right hon. Friend is still considering the method of our approach to the General Assembly. It is not his present intention to ask the United Nations to make any recommendation concerning interim policy in Palestine.

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Draft Reply to P.Q.
No: 50.

Mr. Wilkes
Feb 25th.

I am

we ~~are~~ still considering the method of our approach to the General Assembly. ~~We do not intend~~ It is not my present intention to ask the United Nations to make any recommendation concerning interim policy in Palestine.

R.V.W.
24/2

C.R.M.

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PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

Lab. Newcastle-upon-Tyne Central. Mr. Wilkes. To ask the Prime Minister whether the British Government will take action, as authorised under Article 20 of the United Nations Charter, and request that the Security Council shall agree to convene through the Secretary General a meeting of the Assembly at the earliest convenient date in order to consider the question of Palestine and to make their recommendation for the interim policing and administration of this country until the Assembly makes its decision known.

(Tuesday 25th February)

F.O. ARE ASKED TO TAKE.

Draft submitted. The Colonial Office approve of this line.

H Beeley 24/2

U.N. Dept. 24/2

I gather it is proposed to speak of "our present intention." That would be better.

F. Mason 24.2.

Draft amended.

H Beeley 24/2

R.S. Hurel 24/2

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Reference: FO 371/61768

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END

United Nations Meeting

109. **Mr. Wilkes** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the British Government will take action, as authorised under Article 20 of the United Nations Charter, and request that the Security Council shall agree to convene through the Secretary General a meeting of the Assembly at the earliest convenient date in order to consider the question of Palestine and to make their recommendation for the interim policing and administration of this country until the Assembly makes its decision known.

Mr. Mayhew: My right hon. Friend is still considering the method of our approach to the General Assembly. It is not his present intention to ask the United Nations to make any recommendation concerning interim policy in Palestine.

25 FEB 1947

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